CourtListener 10865902•Yu v. West Bend Mutual Ins. Co. CA4/3
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Filed 5/28/26 Yu v. West Bend Mutual Ins. Co. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
BANN-SHIANG LIZA YU,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G064542
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2009-
00255065)
WEST BEND MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
William D. Claster, Judge. Affirmed.
Lex Opus, Mohammed K. Ghods, Jeremy A. Rhyne and Lori L.
Speak for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Kirtland & Packard and Robert A. Muhlbach for Defendant and
Respondent.
Since 2009, plaintiff Bann-Shiang Liza Yu has pursued claims
against multiple insurance companies for, inter alia, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and for contribution following
settlements in a construction defect lawsuit filed over 20 years ago. Those
settlements included assignments to Yu of various parties’ rights to pursue
those insurers which did not participate in the construction defect action.
This appeal is from the judgment entered in favor of one of those
insurers, defendant West Bend Insurance Company, following a bench trial
on stipulated issues remaining in the case. The trial court issued a statement
of decision containing the court’s finding that neither Yu nor West Bend’s
insured, ATMI Design Build, provided West Bend notice of Yu’s construction
defect action against ATMI until well after Yu settled with ATMI. In light of
the notice and no-voluntary-payments provisions contained in the relevant
West Bend insurance policies and governing law, the court concluded Yu is
unable to recover against West Bend on any theory.
We affirm. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
findings on notice. Because those findings are dispositive as to West Bend’s
liability to Yu in this case, we do not address Yu’s challenges to other rulings
and findings by the court which limited the type and amount of recovery she
might have been entitled to had West Bend been provided notice.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDUAL HISTORY
I.
THE CONSTRUCTION PROJECT
In January 2002, Yu, a developer, entered into a contract with
ATMI to act as the general contractor for the construction of a hotel in
Anaheim (the project). (Yu v. West Bend Mutual insurance Company (Feb. 14,
2
2018, G053358) [nonpub. opn.] (Yu).) Construction on the project began in
September 2002.
In 2004, ATMI allegedly abandoned the project. Himes Peters
Jepsen Architects (HPJA), with which Yu had already contracted to act as
architects on the project, took over as the general contractor for the project.
(Yu, supra, G053358.)
II.
ATMI IS INSURED BY, INTER ALIA, WEST BEND
West Bend issued annual comprehensive general liability policies
to ATMI from June 30, 2000, through June 30, 2003 (West Bend policies).
(Yu, supra, G053358.) The West Bend policies contained provisions requiring
ATMI to notify West Bend as soon as practical if a claim is made or a lawsuit
is brought against it. The West Bend policies also contained a no-voluntary-
payment provision prohibiting ATMI, except at its own cost, from voluntarily
making a payment, or assuming an obligation, or incurring any expense
without West Bend’s consent.
ATMI was thereafter insured by American Zurich Insurance
Company (American Zurich) and Zurich American Company (Zurich
American). (Yu, supra, G053358.)1
III.
THE CONSTRUCTION DEFECT ACTION
In October 2004, after problems developed during construction,
Yu filed a construction defect action naming as defendants ATMI and
numerous entities and individuals, including subcontractors on the project
1 We sometimes refer to American Zurich and Zurich American
collectively as “Zurich.”
3
(collectively, the ATMI parties) and HPJA. (Yu, supra, G053358; Yu v.
Century Surety Company (Feb. 27, 2014, G048427) [nonpub. opn.].)
On July 5, 2006, attorney William Schuster, solely on behalf of
ATMI’s responsible managing employee, defendant Richard Marko, sent a
letter (the 2006 Schuster letter) addressed to American Zurich’s claims
department, Marsh, Inc., and the Columbian Agency, Inc.2 Columbian served
as an agent for “multiple insurers.”
The “[r]e” line of the 2006 Schuster letter stated as follows:
“Tender of Defense and Indemnity
“Insured: ATMI Design-Build; ATMI Precast
“Our Client: . . . Marko
“Policy: American Zurich . . .
“No. GL3486626
“American International Specialty Lines Umbrella,
No. BE3205850
“Lawsuit: Bann-Shiang Liza Yu v. ATMI Design Build, et al.
“Orange County Superior Court Case No. 04CC00683.”
In the 2006 Schuster letter, Schuster specifically sought to invoke
coverage under the specified American Zurich policy and an umbrella policy
issued by American International Specialty Lines. The letter stated in part:
“We understand that ATMI . . . is one of the named insureds under the above-
referenced insurance policies issued by American Zurich . . . . We understand
that the Commercial General Liability Policy . . . appl[ies] to the claims in
this case made against our client, . . . Marko.”
2 ATMI was separately represented by attorney Edward Picozzi
during this timeframe. In May 2006, the Klinedinst PC firm associated in as
counsel for ATMI.
4
The 2006 Schuster letter concluded by stating: “Marko is entitled
to both defense and indemnity under the subject GCL Policy. [¶] At this time,
we are requesting your immediate confirmation of the receipt of this tender of
defense and indemnity and an acknowledgement that the tender will be
accepted on . . . Marko’s behalf. There are several matters currently pending
which require immediate attention, including upcoming depositions of the
plaintiff and her representative and . . . Marko’s production of documents. [¶]
I will appreciate receiving confirmation of your receipt of this tender and the
related file materials. I will be happy to provide any and all materials that we
have or that are available to us to assist you with the opening of your file and
processing of this claim. [¶] Thank you for your prompt courtesy and
attention to this matter.” (Italics added.)
American Zurich thereafter provided ATMI a defense in the
construction defect action.
IV.
ATMI AND HPJA SETTLE YU’S CLAIMS AGAINST THEM AND ASSIGN TO HER
THEIR RIGHTS TO SUE “NON-DEFENDING INSURERS”
On March 25, 2008, Yu settled with the ATMI parties. Under the
terms of the settlement agreement, the ATMI parties agreed to pay Yu
$6 million and further agreed, along with Zurich, to assign to Yu any claims
any of them had or might have had against any other person arising out of
the construction defect action. The assignment provision in the agreement
concluded: “This assignment includes without limitation any rights to which
Zurich would otherwise become subrogated through the Zurich/ATMI
Policies.” Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, the ATMI settlement
payment date was May 20, 2008.
5
On December 11, 2008, Yu settled with HPJA by which Zurich
American, on behalf of HPJA, would pay Yu $260,000 in cash, HPJA
stipulated to a $10 million judgment against it, and HPJA assigned to Yu its
rights against its insurance companies.
V.
YU FILES THE INSTANT INSURANCE COVERAGE ACTION AGAINST, INTER ALIA,
WEST BEND AS ASSIGNEE OF ATMI’S RIGHTS
On March 25, 2009, Yu filed the instant insurance coverage
action against West Bend and 20 other alleged “non-participating insurers
who failed to defend, indemnify, contribute or otherwise participate in the
underlying [c]onstruction [a]ction.” Yu alleged she brought this action as the
assignee of certain rights and claims against West Bend and the other named
defendants that previously belonged to parties and their insurers pursuant to
her settlement with such parties in the underlying construction defect action.
On August 3, 2009, Yu’s counsel wrote a letter to West Bend
enclosing correspondence from counsel for another defendant in the instant
insurance coverage action, Illinois National Insurance Company. In the
letter, Yu’s counsel explained Illinois National was claiming that West Bend
“in fact, issued a primary commercial general liability policy to [certain ATMI
parties] for the period June 30, 2002–June 30, 2003.” The letter further
stated: “Previously, both ATMI (and Plaintiff, as subsequent assignee of
ATMI’s rights under all policies) and counsel for ATMI believed that Illinois
National issued the primary insurance for that period. Illinois National
claims that the enclosed Certificate of Liability Insurance has a
typographical error that lists Illinois National as the primary carrier.”
In August 2009, Yu filed the first amended complaint which is
the operative complaint in this matter. She asserted claims for declaratory
6
relief, breach of insurance contract, and bad faith breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as well as a claim for “equitable
subrogation/contribution indemnity” against West Bend and all other
defendants except defendant Sequoia Insurance Company. Yu prayed for
$20 million in compensatory damages and an award of punitive damages.
On August 31, 2009, Columbian notified West Bend of the instant
insurance coverage lawsuit.
A. Phase One of Bench Trial on Claims Alleged Against West Bend
As to Yu’s claims against West Bend in the instant action, the
trial court bifurcated the trial into two phases. In phase one of what the
parties agreed would be a court trial, the court was to initially determine the
answer to a single question: whether the facts alleged in the operative
complaint of the construction defect action “created a potential for coverage to
trigger [West Bend]’s duty to defend its insureds in that action.” In its
statement of decision, the court concluded West Bend was unable to prove the
underlying claims against ATMI did not fall within the coverage of the West
Bend policies. Consequently, the court further concluded, as the potential for
coverage existed, West Bend’s duty to defend the ATMI parties in the
construction defect action would have been triggered.
B. The Evidence Code Section 405 Hearings
After phase one of the trial, and in anticipation of phase two, the
trial court held hearings pursuant to Evidence Code section 405. At the first
hearing, the court concluded the only rights assigned by Zurich to Yu were
rights of subrogation, and not rights of contribution. Accordingly, the court
ruled, any claims by Yu seeking contribution from West Bend based on
Zurich’s participation in the Yu-ATMI settlement (Yu sought such
contribution in the amount of about $4 million) were barred.
7
The trial court concluded Yu could not recover from West Bend
$1.9 million of the amount she settled with ATMI because that amount
constituted uninsurable restitution. (See Bank of the West v. Superior Court
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1266 [“It is well established that one may not insure
against the risk of being ordered to return money or property that has been
wrongfully acquired. Such orders do not award ‘damages’ as that term is used
in insurance policies”].)
Yu filed a petition for a writ of mandate, prohibition, or other
appropriate relief as to the trial court’s ruling with respect to the portion of
the settlement agreement that constituted uninsurable restitution. A panel of
this court summarily denied Yu’s petition.
C. Phase Two of Bench Trial on Claims Against West Bend
Yu and West Bend thereafter stipulated to a court trial on the
remaining issues they agreed still needed to be decided in phase two. With
the exception of live testimony from a single witness, the phase two trial
involved the presentation of documentary evidence, including deposition
testimony, all of which were admitted into evidence.
Following trial, the trial court issued a proposed statement of
decision to which Yu filed objections. The court thereafter issued its final
statement of decision in which it stated Yu’s objections “have been
considered.” Noting the parties had stipulated “as to the issues to be decided”
in the phase two trial, the court addressed each of the issues in the final
statement of decision.
Dispositively, the trial court determined West Bend had not
received notice of the underlying construction defect action until well after
Yu, the ATMI parties, and HPJA had settled the matter. Consequently, the
8
court concluded there was no basis for Yu to recover against West Bend in
this matter.
Judgment was entered in favor of West Bend. Yu timely
appealed.
DISCUSSION
In her opening brief, Yu challenges the trial court’s dispositive
determination she could not recover from West Bend because West Bend had
not received notice of the construction defect action until well after Yu
entered the settlement agreement with the AMTI parties and HPJA.
Following a completed bench trial, we review questions of fact decided by the
trial court for substantial evidence and we independently review legal issues
de novo. (Orange County Water Dist. v. MAG Aerospace Industries, Inc. (2017)
12 Cal.App.5th 229, 239–240.) For the reasons we explain, we conclude the
court did not err in its determination.
I.
THE WEST BEND POLICIES CONTAINED A STANDARD NOTICE PROVISION
As is the case with most liability policies, the West Bend policies
required its insured to give West Bend prompt notice of any third-party claim
or lawsuit. (See Croskey et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation (The
Rutter Group 2025) ¶ 7:407, p. 176.) Specifically, in the section of the West
Bend policies entitled “Commercial General Liability Conditions,” the
insured’s duties, in the event of an occurrence, offense, claim or suit, included
the following: “If a claim is made or ‘suit’ is brought against any insured, you
must: [¶] (1) Immediately record the specifics of the claim or ‘suit’ and the
date received; and [¶] (2) Notify us as soon as practicable. [¶] You must see to
it that we receive written notice of the claim or ‘suit’ as soon as practicable.”
9
Yu does not in any way challenge the applicability or
enforceability of the standard notice provision in the West Bend policies in
this case. She also does not challenge the trial court’s finding “[t]here is no
evidence that West Bend was directly notified of the [construction defect
action] before August 2009 [when the operative pleading in the instant
insurance coverage case was filed] or that there was any effort by ATMI or
Yu to communicate with West Bend or follow up with Columbian before
2009.”
II.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THE 2006
SCHUSTER LETTER DID NOT PROVIDE WEST BEND NOTICE
Yu argues West Bend received notice the West Bend policies were
implicated in the construction defect action when the 2006 Schuster letter,
along with the enclosed copy of the fourth amended complaint filed in that
action, were sent to Columbian; the trial court found in its statement of
decision Columbian had acted as West Bend’s agent at “all relevant times.”
The trial court rejected Yu’s notice argument, stating in its
statement of decision “[a] close examination of that letter and other evidence”
convinced the court the letter did not constitute sufficient notice of West
Bend’s obligations under the West Bend policies. Substantial evidence
supports that finding.
The 2006 Schuster letter, which was admitted into evidence at
the phase two trial, stated it constituted “Tender of Defense and Indemnity”
for the ATMI parties solely with respect to two specifically identified
insurance policies—an America Zurich policy and an umbrella policy issued
by American International Specialty Lines. The text of the letter confirms its
limited scope: to place the recipients on notice that Marko was entitled to
10
both a defense and indemnity under the identified comprehensive general
liability policy.
Nothing in the 2006 Schuster letter implicates, much less
references, any other insurance company or policy. Schuster testified at his
deposition that, inter alia, he sent the letter to Columbian so it would tender
it to Zurich. The record establishes Columbian represented several insurance
companies, and at some point in the course of the construction defect action,
Columbian accepted tender on behalf of two unidentified insurance
companies. Nothing in the letter suggested the letter was sent to Columbian
because of its agency relationship with West Bend.
While a copy of the fourth amended complaint in the construction
defect action was enclosed with the 2006 Schuster letter, that pleading
showed Yu had asserted claims against a host of entities and individuals. The
contents of the letter framed the relevance of its enclosure as establishing
Marko’s status as an ATMI employee and named defendant in the
construction defect action.
The 2006 Schuster letter specifically asked for the “immediate
confirmation of the receipt of this tender of defense and indemnity and an
acknowledgement that the tender will be accepted on . . . Marko’s behalf.”
The record establishes the letter’s stated objective was accomplished as it is
undisputed American Zurich responded to the call of the letter and thereafter
provided a defense in the construction defect action accordingly. Under these
circumstances, there was no further action item, and none was asked for,
after American Zurich accepted tender.
In her opening brief, Yu argues the 2006 Schuster letter put West
Bend, via Columbian’s receipt of the letter, on constructive notice of its
contractual duty to defend the ATMI parties in the construction defect action.
11
Yu cites OneBeacon America Ins. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2009)
175 Cal.App.4th 183, 200, which states in part: “‘Tender can be either formal
or constructive. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Thus, although the duty to defend
ordinarily arises after receipt of an actual tender of defense, it may arise
upon receipt of ‘constructive notice’ of the contractual duty to defend.” (Italics
added.)
To the extent Yu argues, with respect to her bad faith claim, that
West Bend had constructive knowledge of the construction defect action, her
argument is without merit. It is well established an insurer must have had
actual notice of facts obligating it to defend in order to be liable for bad faith.
(See Croskey et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation, supra,
¶ 12:603, p. 98 [“For a bad faith action to lie, the insurer must have had
actual notice of facts obligating it to defend” and “[k]nowledge merely of facts
that should have led it to make further inquiry is not enough”], citing
California Shoppers, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1, 58.)
Therefore, West Bend’s lack of actual notice necessarily defeats any such
claim.
With respect to breach of contract liability against an insurer, an
insurer owes a defense if it “had notice of facts that would put a reasonable
person on inquiry and it failed to make such inquiry.” (Croskey, et al. Cal.
Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation, supra, ¶ 12:605, p. 98, italics added,
citing California Shoppers, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., supra,
175 Cal.App.3d at p. 37.)
“By their nature, issues related to the ‘reasonableness’ of a
party’s conduct often implicate disputed issues of fact.” (Hedayati v.
Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 833,
847.) In its statement of decision, the trial court found, under the particular
12
circumstances of this case, the 2006 Schuster letter did not put Columbian,
as West Bend’s agent, on inquiry of West Bend’s obligations in the
construction defect action. Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding.
As the court explained, the following evidence shows the reasonableness of
Columbian’s conduct of not conducting an inquiry: (1) Columbian is an
insurance agency that serves as agent for multiple insurers and even
accepted tender on behalf of two unidentified insurance companies in
connection with the construction defect action; (2) the 2006 Schuster letter
sent to Columbian was limited in effect to tendering the defense and
indemnity of the construction defect action vis-a-vis the ATMI parties with
respect to two specific insurance policies from two specific insurance
companies, neither of which was West Bend; and (3) the 2006 Schuster letter
successfully “led to the requested coverage from Zurich being provided.”
In addition, excerpts from Schuster’s deposition admitted at trial
included his testimony he sent that letter to Columbian so that its
representative Lee McWethy would tender the letter to Zurich. Although
Schuster further testified he hoped McWethy might tender the letter to
“anyone else that had insurance that was issued to ATMI,” such sentiment is
not suggested in the text of the letter which communicated a very specific and
limited tender. In any event, Schuster’s testimony shows Columbian was a
recipient of the letter because of its relationship to American Zurich and not
because of West Bend.
Furthermore, as noted in the statement of decision, although
West Bend’s policy stated the insured “‘must see to it that [West Bend]
receive written notice of the claim or “suit” as soon as practicable,’” we note
there is no evidence the ATMI parties or any other party in the construction
defect action saw to it West Bend received notice of that action akin to the
13
requests and information contained in the 2006 Schuster letter with respect
to American Zurich.3
In the 2006 Schuster letter, Marko’s counsel requested the
“immediate confirmation” of American Zurich’s “receipt of this tender of
defense and indemnity and an acknowledgment that the tender will be
accepted on . . . Marko’s behalf.” The letter further advised there were then
“several matters currently pending which require[d] immediate attention,
including upcoming depositions of the plaintiff and her representative and
Mr. Marko’s production of documents.” No such confirmation and advisement
was requested in the 2006 Schuster letter or otherwise with respect to any
other insurer, including West Bend.4
3 We reject Yu’s suggestion the trial court shifted the burden of
proof on the notice issue to Yu. Yu points to comments in the statement of
decision whereby the court noted the ATMI parties’ abject failure to ever
follow up with Columbian or West Bend regarding the West Bend policies in
the construction defect action. We construe the court’s comments in this
regard as part of the court’s consideration of the particular circumstances of
this case and not to show the court misapplied the governing burden of proof.
4 Yu also argues West Bend was placed on notice of potential
claims in the construction defect action no later than 2007 based on a 2007
communication between an ATMI attorney and a Columbian customer
service representative Jo-Ann Billo. That communication occurred in the
context of Billo assisting ATMI’s counsel by gathering documentation to
support a claim for coverage under a policy issued by another insurer.
Substantial evidence shows West Bend was neither given actual notice nor
placed on inquiry notice of claims against it by virtue of Billo’s
communication with ATMI’s counsel. To the contrary, the record shows
neither ATMI nor Yu were aware West Bend policies might be implicated in
the construction defect action at that time and neither made any effort to
provide West Bend notice of that fact, via Columbian or otherwise, until well
after the date Yu settled with the ATMI parties in 2008.
14
Yu does not address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
trial court’s finding on notice in her appellate briefs. We reject any suggestion
the mere transmittal of a pleading with an insured’s name listed as a
defendant to an insurance company or agent automatically provides sufficient
notice of an insurer’s obligations regardless of the attendant circumstances.
Yu has not furnished any legal authority supporting such a per se rule for
notice.
III.
WEST BEND WAS NOT REQUIRED TO SHOW PREJUDICE IN LIGHT OF ITS
POLICIES’ NO-VOLUNTARY-PAYMENT PROVISION
In her opening brief, Yu argues even if it had received late notice,
West Bend was required to show “it suffered prejudice by virtue of the
purportedly delayed notice” but it did not do so. (See Safeco Ins. Co. of
America v. Parks (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 992, 1003–1004 [“An insured’s
failure to comply with the notice or claims provisions in an insurance policy
will not excuse the insurer’s obligations under the policy unless the insurer
proves it was substantially prejudiced by the late notice”].) West Bend,
however, need not show prejudice here because it was not given notice of the
construction defect action before Yu and the ATMI parties settled and
payments were made by the ATMI parties without West Bend’s consent, in
violation of the West Bend policies’ no-voluntary-payment clause.
“‘California law enforces . . . no-voluntary-payments provisions in
the absence of economic necessity, insurer breach,[5] or other extraordinary
5 Here, the record shows the ATMI parties settled with Yu before
West Bend had the opportunity to breach its contract with the ATMI parties
by refusing to defend or indemnify them under the West Bend policies. That
West Bend challenges Yu’s right to recover against it in the instant insurance
coverage action does not render the no-voluntary-payment provisions of those
policies ineffective or unenforceable.
15
circumstances. [Citations.] They are designed to ensure that responsible
insurers that promptly accept a defense tendered by their insureds thereby
gain control over the defense and settlement of the claim. That means
insureds cannot unilaterally settle a claim before the establishment of the
claim against them and the insurer’s refusal to defend in a lawsuit to
establish liability . . . . [T]he decision to pay any remediation costs outside the
civil action context raises a “judgment call left solely to the insurer . . . .”
[Citation.] In short, the provision protects against coverage by fait accompli.’
[Citation.] [¶] ‘[U]nlike a notice provision or a cooperation clause, [a no-
voluntary-payment] provision can be enforced without a showing of prejudice:
“‘[T]he existence or absence of prejudice to [the insurer] is simply irrelevant
to [its] duty to indemnify costs incurred before notice. The policy plainly
provides that notice is a condition precedent to the insured’s right to be
indemnified; a fortiori the right to be indemnified cannot relate back to
payments made or obligations incurred before notice’”’” (Low v. Golden Eagle
Ins. Co. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1544–1545, first italics added; see
Gribaldo, Jacobs, Jones & Associates v. Agrippina Versicherunges A.G. (1970)
3 Cal.3d 434, 449 [purpose of no-voluntary-payment clause “‘is to prevent
collusion as well as to invest the insurer with the complete control and
direction of the defense or compromise of suits or claims’”].)
The West Bend policies’ no-voluntary-payments clause stated:
“No insured will, except at that insured’s own cost, voluntarily make a
payment, assume any obligation or incur any expense, other than for first
aid, without our consent.” As explained in the statement of decision: “Because
West Bend was not given notice of the [construction defect action] before any
settlement payments were made by ATMI, and because West Bend did not
consent to those payments, they clearly qualify as ‘voluntary payments’
16
pursuant to this provision. As a result they are not covered by the applicable
insurance policies.”
In sum, given the lack of notice discussed ante, the trial court did
not err by concluding West Bend is not liable to Yu for any failure to defend
or indemnify the ATMI parties pursuant to the West Bend policies. Because
the lack of notice finding is dispositive, we do not reach Yu’s arguments
challenging the other determinations made by the court in its statement of
decision and in its pretrial rulings, all of which affected the type and scope of
damages Yu might have been eligible to recover in the instant insurance
coverage action had such notice been provided.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent to recover costs on appeal.
MOTOIKE, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, J.
GOODING, J.
17
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