People v. Rodriguez CA1/4

CourtListener 10865209Calctapp27 mai 2026

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Filed 5/27/26 P. v. Rodriguez CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A172863

v. (Solano County
IVAN RODRIGUEZ, Super. Ct. No.
Defendant and Appellant. VCR239136)

Ivan Rodriguez appeals from a final judgment of conviction
and a sentence that included seven consecutive terms of 15 years
to life based on seven counts of aggravated sexual assault of a
child. Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to
establish that the two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a
child based on sexual penetration took place within the Solano
County Superior Court’s jurisdiction in Vallejo, California, rather
than in Mexico. As to the aggravated sexual assault of a child
counts based on oral copulation, sexual penetration and rape, he
argues there was insufficient evidence that the underlying acts
occurred on separate occasions, as required for the imposition of

1
consecutive sentences under Penal Code1 section 667.6,
subdivision (d). We agree that there is insufficient evidence to
establish that one of the charged counts of aggravated sexual
assault of a child based on sexual penetration took place in
Vallejo, but we reject the argument that consecutive sentences
were improper under section 667.6, subdivision (d). Accordingly,
we reverse the conviction on count 8 for insufficient evidence and
otherwise affirm.
BACKGROUND
Charges
On May 16, 2023, Ivan Rodriguez was charged with the
following 14 felony offenses: corporal injury on spouse on
December 31, 2021 (Pen. Code, § 273.5 (count 1)); committing a
lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 on December 31, 2021
(§ 288, subd. (a) (count 2)); evading an officer on December 31,
2021 (Vehicle Code, § 2800.4 (count 3)); three counts of
aggravated sexual assault of a child, by rape, between November
1, 2019, and December 31, 2021 (§ 269, subd. (a)(1) (counts 4, 5 &
6)); two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child, by sexual
penetration, between November 1, 2019, and December 31, 2021
(§ 269, subd. (a)(5) (counts 7 & 8)); two counts of aggravated
sexual assault of a child, by forcible oral copulation, between
November 1, 2019, and December 31, 2021 (§ 269, subd. (a)(4)
(counts 9 & 10)); child abuse or endangerment between
September 1, 2021, and December 31, 2021 (§ 273a, subd. (a)

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code

except as otherwise indicated.
2
(count 11)); inducing a minor to use marijuana between
September 1, 2021, and December 31, 2021 (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11361, subd. (a) (count 12)); and two counts of committing a
lewd act upon a child between November 1, 2019, and December
31, 2021 (§ 288, subd. (a) (counts 13 & 14)).
Defendant pleaded not guilty to all counts, and a jury trial
began on January 8, 2025.
Testimony
Elizabeth G. and defendant share a daughter, F.C., who
was born in 2008. They had a second daughter together
approximately six years later, and they all lived together in
Mexico until approximately 2015. During Elizabeth G.’s and
defendant’s relationship, defendant left Mexico for the United
States to look for work. After defendant moved to the United
States, he returned to Mexico several times to visit Elizabeth G.
and their children. Elizabeth G. and defendant separated in
2018, but Elizabeth G. and her daughters visited defendant twice
in the United States after the separation.
F.C. was 16 years old at the time of trial. She testified that
she was five years old when defendant first hit her, and that he
hit her more than 10 times, striking her with a belt or cable,
slapping her, and pulling her ears. F.C. also witnessed defendant
hit her mother. When asked if she felt scared for her mother,
F.C. answered that she did “[b]ecause [F.C.] knew he did not
know how to control himself and, perhaps, in one of the blows
[her mother] could not stand that or even die or something else.”

3
During their first visit to defendant in December 2019,
Elizabeth G. and her daughters traveled from Mexico and stayed
with defendant at his apartment in Vallejo, California, for about
one week. At this time, F.C. was 11 years old. On December 24,
2019, defendant touched F.C. sexually for the first time. F.C.’s
younger sister was sleeping in a bedroom in defendant’s
apartment while F.C., her mother, and defendant were lying on
blankets on the living room floor. Defendant was between F.C.
and her mother. While F.C’s mother slept, defendant started
touching F.C.’s “back buttocks” with his hands and began kissing
her lips and neck. Defendant ordered F.C. to remove her clothes.
Defendant told her to remove the top half of her pajamas, saying
to her, “nothing was going to happen; . . . this was something
normal between some fathers and daughters.” F.C. told
defendant that she did not like what was happening and “did not
want to do it.” Defendant replied that he did not care. Defendant
put his hands beneath F.C.’s remaining clothing to touch her bare
bottom and vagina with his hand. Defendant then removed the
rest of F.C.’s clothing and inserted his penis into her vagina,
moving his body “back and forth.” Defendant continued until
F.C.’s mother began moving around in her sleep.
Following this visit to Vallejo in December 2019, F.C., her
mother, and her sister returned to Mexico. At some point after
this trip, F.C. took several unknown pills in an attempt to end
her life. When asked why she wanted to do this, F.C. testified,
“Because every time I would see [defendant] or every time he

4
would visit us he would look for whatever reason to hit me, and
also because he was sexually abusing me.”
When F.C. was 12 years old, defendant moved back to
Mexico and lived with Elizabeth G. and his daughters. He
continued touching F.C. sexually during this period, typically
while the other family members were asleep. F.C. testified that
“[w]hat happened in December would happen again several
times.” Defendant threatened F.C. by telling her that “he
had . . . many friends that could harm [F.C. and her family],” and
he warned her not to complain, make any noise, or tell anyone
what he was doing to her.
After living together in Mexico for about a year, F.C., her
mother, her sister, and defendant moved to Vallejo, California
together. Defendant continued to touch F.C. sexually after the
family moved to the United States. On one occasion around
Thanksgiving in 2021, defendant grabbed F.C. by the hand and
pulled her into the bedroom while they were in their apartment
alone together. He told her to lay on the bed and pull her pants
and underwear down. Defendant then put on a condom and
inserted his penis into F.C.’s vagina. Defendant stopped after a
short period because he was interrupted by a phone call from
Elizabeth G.
On the night of December 23, 2021, defendant and F.C.
were alone together in the living room of defendant’s apartment,
with Elizabeth G. and F.C.’s sister in a closed bedroom nearby.
Defendant woke F.C. up very early in the morning on December
24th and, after F.C. initially protested, threatened to “do

5
something” to F.C.’s mother if F.C. refused him sexually.
Defendant again told F.C. to remove her clothes and underwear.
He began touching her vagina and bottom with his hands. He
removed his pants, put on a condom, and applied lubricant to his
penis. Defendant then inserted his penis into F.C.’s vagina.
Defendant eventually stopped penetrating F.C., told her to get
dressed, to stay quiet, and told her not to tell anyone what
happened.
Later that day on December 24, 2021, F.C., her sister, and
mother were at the apartment with defendant. Defendant pulled
F.C. into the bathroom with him, closed the door, and ordered
F.C. to pull down her pants. He removed his pants and began
touching F.C.’s vagina, buttocks, and legs with his hands and
penis. Defendant then put on a condom, inserted his penis into
her vagina, and moved his body “back and forth.” Defendant
eventually stopped, pulled his pants up, and told F.C. to get
dressed.
In addition to these accounts of abuse that occurred on
specific dates, F.C. testified about several other instances of
defendant’s abusive behavior towards her. F.C. testified that
defendant put his penis in her vagina “many” other times and
that it was hard for her to count how many. During the time that
F.C. was living with defendant in Vallejo, he also touched her
body with his mouth on several occasions. She testified that
“[e]ach time he would touch [her] sexually,” defendant would put
his mouth on her vagina. He would also put his mouth on her
neck, legs, chest, and bottom. The prosecutor asked F.C. if this

6
took place at defendant’s apartment in Vallejo, and she
responded in the affirmative, “Yes.”
F.C. also relayed that defendant would pass his fingers
over her vagina and then insert his fingers into her vagina. She
testified that defendant did that more than 10 times. The
prosecutor asked F.C. if this also occurred at defendant’s
apartment in Vallejo, and she answered, “Yes.”
Additionally, defendant would make F.C. put her mouth on
his penis while they lived together in Vallejo. F.C. remembered
previously telling an interviewer at a child advocacy center that
this happened “less than 10 times.” When asked where in the
apartment this took place, F.C. answered, “In the bathroom, the
living room, and sometimes the bedroom.” Further, during the
time the family was living in Vallejo, defendant also hit F.C. with
his hands or a leather belt. On several occasions, defendant left
marks on F.C.’s body from beating her.
The final incident of defendant’s sexual abuse of F.C.
occurred on December 31, 2021, at the apartment in Vallejo.
While F.C.’s mother and sister were sleeping, defendant woke
F.C. up and pulled her into the bathroom with him. Once he
closed the bathroom door, defendant shoved F.C. against the wall
and started to undress her. He was kissing F.C.’s chest, neck,
and face when her mother walked into the bathroom. Defendant
backed away from F.C. and pushed her to the side. Elizabeth G.
asked what was going on and why the door was closed.
Defendant replied that “he was just checking on [F.C.] because
something had happened to [her] nose.” Defendant exited the

7
bathroom and Elizabeth G. continued questioning him, asserting
that she saw “something else” and that “something was
happening to [F.C.].” Defendant yelled insults back at Elizabeth
G. and started to physically attack her, hitting her repeatedly.
F.C. intervened, pulling defendant aside in the kitchen and
assuring him that she would not say anything to her mother.
Then, Elizabeth G. went into the bedroom of the apartment and
F.C. followed her inside. Defendant exited the apartment with
his keys and jacket.
Shortly afterwards, defendant re-entered the apartment,
attempting to speak with Elizabeth G. again. Elizabeth G. tried
to remain calm, picked up her car keys, and left the apartment
with her two daughters. While they were at a park, hiding from
defendant, F.C. spoke to her mother in more detail about what
defendant had been doing to her. Elizabeth G. then called the
police and took her daughters to the Vallejo police station.
Elizabeth G. reported to Vallejo Police Officer Elias Diaz that
defendant had been physically abusing her and sexually abusing
their daughter, F.C. Officer Diaz alerted other officers that
defendant was wanted for domestic violence and sexual assault.
Later that evening, while patrolling in their marked police
vehicle, two other officers observed the vehicle known to be
associated with defendant. They activated their overhead
emergency lights and sounded the siren to initiate an
investigative stop of defendant’s vehicle. However, defendant did
not stop driving. The officers initiated a pursuit of defendant’s
vehicle, which ultimately ended with the officers performing an

8
“intervention technique” while defendant was moving at a slower
speed and detaining him at gunpoint.
Verdict
On January 24, 2025, the jury found defendant guilty on all
counts except count 12 (inducing a minor to use marijuana).
Sentencing
On March 17, 2025, the court sentenced defendant to seven
consecutive indeterminate terms of 15 years to life on counts 4
through 10, totaling an indeterminate term of 105 years to life.
The court also imposed a total determinate term of 13 years, to
run consecutively to the indeterminate term, on counts 1 through
3, 11, 13, and 14.2
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
Defendant first argues there was insufficient evidence that
the two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child by sexual
penetration (counts 7 & 8) occurred in Vallejo, California, as
opposed to Mexico. When considering a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we review the
entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment and
determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. (People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 514–
515.) A reviewing court “presumes in support of the judgment

2 Defendant does not challenge the convictions or sentences

for these counts, so we do not discuss them further.
9
the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from
the evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)
Defendant also asserts there was insufficient evidence that
the aggravated sexual assault of a child counts based on oral
copulation (counts 9 & 10), sexual penetration (counts 7 & 8), and
rape (counts 4, 5 & 6) occurred on separate occasions, as required
for the court to impose mandatory consecutive 15-year-to-life
sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (d). When a trial court
finds “that a defendant committed offenses on separate occasions,
[we] may reverse only if no reasonable trier of fact could have
decided the defendant had a reasonable opportunity for reflection
after completing an offense before resuming his assaultive
behavior.”3 (People v. Garza (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1092.)
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence That Counts 7 and 8
Took Place in Vallejo, California
Defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated
sexual assault of a child by sexual penetration, between
November 1, 2019, and December 31, 2021 (counts 7 & 8).
During trial, the prosecutor explained that counts 7 and 8 were
based on defendant’s acts of digitally penetrating F.C. Defendant
argues there is insufficient evidence that both counts occurred

3 Defendant also argues that the trial court failed to make

an express finding under section 667.6, subdivision (d) and failed
to explain why it believed consecutive sentences were mandatory.
This claim, however, is forfeited, as “claims deemed waived on
appeal involve sentences which, though otherwise permitted by
law, were imposed in a procedurally or factually flawed manner.”
(People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354.)
10
within the trial court’s jurisdiction in Vallejo, California, as
opposed to Mexico.
F.C. testified that defendant put his fingers inside her
vagina more than 10 times. When asked, “Did this also happen
at the apartment in Vallejo?” she replied, “Yes,” but did not offer
any further information specifying how many of those instances
occurred in the apartment in Vallejo, as opposed to in Mexico.
F.C.’s testimony thus establishes that at least one act of sexual
penetration occurred in Vallejo, but it does not constitute
substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could
find the defendant guilty of at least two acts of sexual
penetration within the trial court’s jurisdiction. F.C.’s brief
testimony on this point is insufficient to support count 8.
Defendant argues that F.C.’s testimony is sufficient to
sustain two separate counts of aggravated sexual assault based
on sexual penetration under People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294,
315−316, which permits convictions based on a child victim’s
“generic” testimony regarding repeated acts of molestation where
the child describes the kind of acts committed with sufficient
specificity, the number of acts with sufficient certainty to support
the charged counts, and the general time period during which the
acts occurred. Defendant asserts that F.C.’s description of
defendant penetrating her with his fingers, her estimation that it
occurred more than 10 times, and her testimony that this “also
happen[ed]” in the apartment in Vallejo provided substantial
evidence under Jones for F.C.’s generic testimony to sustain two

11
separate counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child by sexual
penetration.
We are unpersuaded. Jones did not affirm convictions
based on generic testimony where the defendant argued that
some of the acts of molestation took place outside the court’s
jurisdiction. Here, F.C.’s testimony that digital penetration
“also” happened at the apartment in Vallejo does not describe the
number of acts that took place in Vallejo with sufficient certainty.
The frequency of the act is not specified, and F.C. did not provide
enough information for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that
any more than one instance of digital penetration took place at
the apartment in Vallejo.
Accordingly, the conviction on count 8 must be reversed.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting
Consecutive Sentences on Counts 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10
Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence that the
aggravated sexual assault of a child counts based on three
instances of rape (counts 4, 5 & 6), two instances of digital sexual
penetration (counts 7 & 8), and two instances of oral copulation
(counts 9 & 10) all occurred on separate occasions, as required for
the imposition of mandatory consecutive 15-year-to-life sentences
under section 667.6, subdivision (d). Because we have already
determined that the conviction on count 8 must be reversed due
to insufficient evidence, we focus only on the sufficiency of the
evidence to support consecutive sentences on counts 4, 5, 6, 7, 9,
and 10.

12
A. Statutory Framework
Section 667.6, subdivision (d)(1) states that “[a] full,
separate, and consecutive term shall be imposed” for each
violation of certain sex offenses if the crimes involve the same
victim on “separate occasions.” To determine whether several sex
offenses against a single victim were committed on separate
occasions, subdivision (d)(2) provides that the trial court must
consider whether “the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to
reflect upon the defendant’s actions and nevertheless resumed
sexually assaultive behavior.” (Id., subd. (d)(2).) This
determination cannot rest solely on the defendant losing or
abandoning the opportunity to attack, nor upon the duration of
time between offenses. (Ibid.)
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting
Count 7 as a Separate Occasion from Counts 4,
5, and 6
In reviewing the trial court’s determination that
defendant’s act of digitally penetrating F.C., as described in count
7, occurred on a separate occasion from the acts of rape
underlying counts 4, 5, and 6, we turn to F.C.’s testimony
regarding defendant’s actions. The prosecutor asked F.C.,
“Which of your body parts would [defendant] touch with his
fingers?” She responded, “My private parts.” When F.C. was
asked to describe the touching in more detail, she stated that
defendant would “pass over” her vagina with his fingers before
“sometimes” inserting them into her vagina and moving them
back and forth inside her. As noted previously, F.C. testified that

13
defendant sexually penetrated her with his fingers more than 10
times. After these descriptions of sexual penetration, F.C. stated
that there were times that defendant would touch her butt and
vagina before proceeding to raping her and more than 10 “other
times where [defendant] would touch [her] vagina with his hand
and it would not lead to him making [her] have sex[.]” F.C.’s
testimony thus provided substantial evidence that defendant
sexually penetrated her with his fingers several times
independent of and in addition to the three rapes covered by
counts 4, 5, and 6. A reasonable factfinder could infer from this
evidence that defendant’s act of sexual penetration as alleged in
count 7 occurred on a separate occasion from the rapes
underlying counts 4, 5, and 6.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting
Counts 9 and 10 as Separate Occasions from
Counts 4, 5, and 6
Defendant also argues there was insufficient evidence that
the acts of oral copulation (as alleged in counts 9 & 10) occurred
on separate occasions from the acts of rape (as alleged in counts
4, 5 & 6). Again, F.C.’s testimony refutes this contention.
The prosecutor explained in the closing argument that
counts 9 and 10 were based on defendant forcing F.C. to orally
copulate him. F.C. did not specify when defendant’s acts of
forcing F.C. to orally copulate him occurred in relation to the acts
of rape. She did, however, testify that defendant always wore a
condom, and sometimes used lubricant, when he raped her. She
testified to three specific incidents of defendant putting on a

14
condom before inserting his penis into her vagina. First, F.C.
testified that when defendant raped her around Thanksgiving
2021, defendant put on a condom his penis before inserting it into
her vagina (count 6). Next, on December 23, 2021, when
defendant ordered F.C. onto the living room floor in the middle of
the night, defendant put on a condom his penis and applied
lubricant before inserting it into F.C.’s vagina (count 5). Finally,
when defendant called F.C. into the bathroom of the Vallejo
apartment on December 24, 2021, he put on a condom before
inserting his penis into F.C.’s vagina (count 4). Therefore, F.C.’s
testimony establishes that defendant paused to put on a condom
(and sometimes lubricant) before raping F.C. on every occasion
for which he was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child
by rape (counts 4, 5 & 6).
As to counts 9 and 10, F.C. testified that when defendant
would make her orally copulate him, he would have her “kneel
down” by pushing down on her shoulders with his hands. Then
he would tell her to put her mouth on his penis, grab the back
part of her head, and move F.C.’s head back and forth by pulling
her hair.
The question is thus whether defendant pausing to put on a
condom and changing physical positions provided sufficient
opportunity for reflection such that the acts of oral copulation
occurred on separate occasions from the rapes under section
667.6, subdivision (d). “[A] finding of ‘separate occasions’ under
Penal Code section 667.6 does not require a change in location or
an obvious break in the perpetrator’s behavior: ‘[A] forcible

15
violent sexual assault made up of varied types of sex acts
committed over time against a victim, is not necessarily one
sexual encounter.’ ” (People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 104.)
A trial court may find that a defendant had a reasonable
opportunity to reflect upon his or her actions, even if the parties
never change physical locations. (People v. Irvin (1996)
43 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1071 (Irvin).) Additionally, it is not
necessary for there to be any break in a defendant’s control over
the victim for a trial court to find that a series of sexual acts
occurred on separate occasions. (People v. Plaza (1995)
41 Cal.App.4th 377, 385.)
In People v. King (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1325−1326
(King), the defendant’s momentary distraction by the headlights
of a passing car was sufficient to find that he had the opportunity
to reflect prior to the next sexual assault. There, the entire
assault, including the pause, lasted less than two minutes. (Id.
at p. 1290.) The victim estimated that defendant’s fingers were
inside of her for about 30 to 45 seconds before the lights passed
by, and then an additional 25 to 30 seconds after he reinserted
them, for a total of about “ ‘a minute, a minute and a half.’ ”
(Ibid.) The pause between these two assaults was therefore mere
seconds. The trial court observed that the defendant “could have
stopped” at the point when he saw the passing lights and
removed his finger and found that this momentary cessation in
assaultive behavior gave the defendant the opportunity to reflect
upon his actions. (Id. at p. 1325.) Finding no error, the
reviewing court affirmed the trial court’s determination that

16
“ ‘that this qualifies for a separate full consecutive term.’ ” (Id. at
p. 1325.)
Here, a reasonable factfinder could determine that
defendant paused between making F.C. orally copulate him and
raping her to put on a condom and/or lubricant. The act of
putting on a condom provided a sufficient pause in defendant’s
assaultive behavior to support mandatory consecutive sentencing
under section 667, subdivision (d). (King, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1325.) The trial court could reasonably conclude that the
time defendant took to withdraw his penis from F.C.’s mouth,
obtain a condom, unwrap it, and place it on his penis before
committing the rapes in counts 4, 5, and 6 provided a pause and
opportunity to reflect similar to King.
In addition, a reasonable trier of fact could find that
defendant had a sufficient opportunity to reflect when he
repositioned himself and F.C. between making her orally
copulate him and raping her. In Irvin, the reviewing court stated
that “a trial court could find a defendant had a ‘reasonable
opportunity to reflect upon his or her actions’ even though the
parties never changed physical locations and the parties ‘merely’
changed positions.” (Irvin, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 1071.)
Here, F.C. testified that when defendant made her orally
copulate him, he made her “kneel down.” This position differs
significantly from the positions during each of the three counts of
aggravated sexual assault of a child by rape. Before the rape
that took place around Thanksgiving 2021 (count 6), defendant
made F.C. lie down on the bed, placing his hands on her waist to

17
position her facing upwards. When defendant raped F.C. on the
living room floor on the night of December 23, 2021 (count 5), he
made F.C. lie down on her stomach and then pulled her waist
upwards so she was bending over in front of him. Lastly, before
defendant raped F.C. in the bathroom on December 24, 2021
(count 4), he grabbed F.C. by her waist, turned her around, and
shoved her against the door. In each of these instances,
defendant would have needed to withdraw his body from F.C. and
completely reposition her, whether he forced her to orally
copulate him before or after the act of rape. The change of
positions that necessarily took place between defendant making
F.C. orally copulate him while kneeling and the three acts of rape
supports a finding of separate occasions under Irvin, supra,
43 Cal.App.4th at p. 1071.
D. Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting
Count 7 as a Separate Occasion from Counts 9
and 10
Defendant finally argues that F.C.’s testimony did not
establish that his act of sexual digital penetration (as alleged in
count 7) occurred on a separate occasion from the acts of oral
copulation (as alleged in counts 9 & 10). As noted previously,
F.C. testified that when defendant would make her orally
copulate him, he would have her “kneel down” by pushing down
on her shoulders with his hands. Then he would tell her to put
her mouth on his penis, push her head, and grab hold of the back
part of her head. Defendant would then move F.C.’s head back
and forth by pulling her hair.

18
Given this testimony, it follows logically that defendant
would need to physically reposition F.C. from her kneeling
position if he were to sexually penetrate her using his hand
either before or after the acts of forced oral copulation.
Accordingly, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that
defendant had a reasonable opportunity for reflection between
making F.C. orally copulate him on her knees and sexually
penetrating her with his fingers. (Irvin, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1071 [change of positioning between sexual acts can constitute
sufficient opportunity for reflection under section 667.6,
subdivision (d)].)
DISPOSITION
The conviction on count 8 is reversed, and the sentence as
to that count is vacated. The trial court is directed to prepare an
amended abstract of judgment consistent with this disposition
and transmit a copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment is
otherwise affirmed.

BROWN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, J.
SWEET, J. People v. Rodriguez (A172863)


Judge of the Superior Court of Marin County, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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