Voice of San Diego v. San Diego Unified School Dist.

CourtListener 10865193Calctapp27 mai 2026

Texte intégral

Filed 5/11/26; Modified and Certified for Partial Pub. 5/27/26 (order attached)

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

VOICE OF SAN DIEGO et al., D084327

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2018-
00026433-CU-WM-CTL)
v.

SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Keri G. Katz, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Felix Tinkov, Felix Tinkov; and Glen Smith for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
John David Loy for First Amendment Coalition as Amicus Curiae on
behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Quarles & Brady, Jeffrey P. Michalowski and Jessika B. Russell for
Defendant and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

The California Public Records Act (CPRA; Gov. Code,1
§ 7920.000 et seq.) imposes a duty on an agency to determine whether a
public records request seeks any disclosable records in its possession within
10 days from receipt of the request, or up to 24 days if there are “unusual
circumstances.” (§ 7922.535, subd. (b); see id., subd. (a).) If there are
disclosable records in the agency’s possession, the agency is then required to
make the records “promptly available.” (§ 7922.530, subd. (a), italics added.)
Contending that “promptly available” means “ ‘within days or a few
weeks’ ” of the initial 10- or 24-day deadline, Voice of San Diego and its
editor-in-chief Scott Lewis (sometimes together, Voice) alleged the San Diego
Unified School District (District) routinely obstructs and delays the disclosure
of public records. According to Voice, the District’s average time in producing
records responsive to its CPRA requests submitted over a five-year period
was 399 days. Voice filed a petition for writ of mandate asserting, among
other causes of action, a taxpayer claim pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 526a to enjoin the District’s illegal expenditure of public funds to
maintain the alleged unlawful CPRA practice.
The trial court rejected Voice’s interpretation of the CPRA, and found
the evidence did not prove the District engages in any unlawful practice of
delaying or withholding public records. Because the court had previously
adjudicated all other causes of action in favor of the District, it entered final
judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate.

1 All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless
otherwise stated.

2
We affirm. The CPRA does not precisely define the timeframe for the
actual production of requested records, and we cannot graft a “within days or
a few weeks” requirement onto section 7922.530, subdivision (a). Whether an
agency has promptly produced records is to be determined case-by-case
considering the scope and burden imposed on the particular agency by the
particular request. We further conclude substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s factual findings that the District did not maintain an unlawful
practice of violating the CPRA. Because there is no basis for a taxpayer
action where the challenged governmental conduct is legal, the trial court
properly denied the petition for writ of mandate.
BACKGROUND
I.
Overview of the CPRA and Taxpayer Action
To provide context for the issues in this appeal, we begin with a brief
overview of the CPRA and Code of Civil Procedure section 526a which
authorizes taxpayer actions.
A. The CPRA
The California Legislature enacted the CPRA in 1968. (Stats. 1968,
ch. 1473, § 39, p. 2945.) In doing so, the Legislature declared “access to
information concerning the conduct of the people’s business is a fundamental

and necessary right of every person in this state.” (§ 7921.000;2

2 Effective January 1, 2023, the Legislature recodified the CPRA. (See
§ 7920.005; Stats. 2021, ch. 614, § 2.) The recodification renumbered the
CPRA provisions but did not substantively change the law. (City of Gilroy v.
Superior Court (2026) 19 Cal.5th 38, 47, fn. 2 (Gilroy), citing §§ 7920.100–
7920.120.) We will refer to the current section numbers throughout our
opinion and cross reference the former section numbers where necessary.

3
Gilroy, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 51.) To advance this fundamental right, the
CPRA provides that “every person has a right to inspect any public record,
except as otherwise provided.” (§ 7922.525, subd. (a).) Unless the
Legislature has expressly provided an exemption, “ ‘ “all public records are
subject to disclosure.” ’ ” (Gilroy, at p. 51.)
The CPRA’s right of access was enshrined in the state Constitution by
the voters’ passage of Proposition 59 in 2004. The measure added Article I,
section 3, subdivision (b)(1), which states: “The people have the right of
access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business, and,
therefore, the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials
and agencies shall be open to public scrutiny.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3,
subd. (b)(1).) This right of access was implemented with the imperative that
“[a] statute, court rule, or other authority . . . shall be broadly construed if it
furthers the people’s right of access, and narrowly construed if it limits the
right of access.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).)
“The CPRA prescribes detailed procedures governing an agency’s
response to a public records request.” (Gilroy, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 52.) It
specifies two steps an agency must take in its response. First, the agency
must determine whether the request for public records seeks any disclosable
records in the agency’s possession within 10 days from receipt of the request,
and then “promptly” notify the requester of its determination and its reasons
for withholding any records. (§ 7922.535, subd. (a).) The agency is further
required to “state the estimated date and time when the records will be made
available” if it “determines that the request seeks disclosable public
records.” (Ibid.) The 10-day deadline may be extended only in six specified
“unusual circumstances” and, in any case, may not “result in an extension for
more than 14 days,” for a total of 24 days. (Id., subds. (b), (c)(1)–(6).)

4
Second, the agency must produce the requested records. Here,
section 7922.530, subdivision (a), provides that the agency “shall make the
records promptly available to any person upon payment of fees covering
direct costs of duplication, or a statutory fee if applicable.” (Italics added.)
Section 7922.500 further provides, “Nothing in [the CPRA] shall be construed
to permit an agency to delay or obstruct the inspection or copying of public
records.” Our high court has observed that these CPRA provisions “impose a
general duty on agencies to act promptly.” (Gilroy, supra, 19 Cal.5th
at p. 52.)
The CPRA authorizes any person seeking “to enforce that person’s right
under [the CPRA] to inspect or receive a copy of any public record or class of
public records” to bring an action for injunctive or declarative relief or a writ
of mandate to obtain judicial review of an agency’s decision not to disclose
requested records. (§ 7923.000.) If, after issuing an order to show cause, the
court determines “the public official’s decision to refuse disclosure is not
justified” under the CPRA, it “shall order the public official to make the
record public.” (§§ 7923.110, 7923.100.) Thus, the remedy available under
the CPRA is ordinarily a determination “whether a particular record or class

of records must be disclosed.”3 (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court

3 Although there is no claim the trial court erred in denying Voice relief
on its causes of action brought under the CPRA, the California Supreme
Court recently held that “declaratory relief under the CPRA is available in at
least some circumstances in which all existing responsive, nonexempt records
have been disclosed in response to a records request. An Agency’s disclosure
of those records does not necessarily moot a request for declaratory relief that
would ‘enforce that person’s right under this division to inspect or receive a
copy of any public record or class of public records.’ (§ 7923.000.) At a
minimum, declaratory relief is available under the CPRA where the
declaration would resolve an ongoing dispute regarding the parties’ rights
5
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 119, 127 (Santa Clara) [“The CPRA provides no
judicial remedy . . . for any purpose other than to determine whether a
particular record or class of records must be disclosed.”].)
B. Taxpayer Action
Although “the CPRA provides the exclusive remedy for resolving
whether a public entity has erroneously refused to disclose a particular
record or class of records,” a taxpayer citizen may bring an action under Code

of Civil Procedure section 526a4 to prevent fiscal waste from the
implementation and enforcement of policies and practices alleged to be
violative of the CPRA. (Santa Clara, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 130; see id.
at pp. 128–129.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 526a “authorizes actions by a resident
taxpayer against officers of a county, town, city or city and county to obtain
an injunction restraining and preventing the illegal expenditure of public
funds.” (Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258, 267, superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in Taking Offense v. State of California (2025)
18 Cal.5th 891, 914–919.) Its “primary purpose” is to “give a large body of
citizens standing to challenge governmental actions.” (Blair, at p. 269.)

and obligations in a manner that has some likelihood of affecting future
requests for public records or future conduct relating to such requests.”
(Gilroy, supra, 19 Cal.5th at pp. 45–46.)

4 “An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal
expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a
local agency, may be maintained against any officer thereof, or any agent, or
other person, acting in its behalf, either by a resident therein, or by a
corporation, who is assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year
before the commencement of the action, has paid, a tax that funds the
defendant local agency.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 526a.)

6
“[N]o showing of special damage to the particular taxpayer” is required, and
it is “ ‘immaterial that the amount of the illegal expenditures is small or that
the illegal procedures actually permit a saving of tax funds.’ ” (Id. at p. 268.)
The mere expending of time by any paid public employee in the performance
of illegal and unauthorized acts may constitute unlawful use of public funds,
warranting an injunction under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a. (Blair,
at p. 268.) All this, of course, makes clear that “[a] taxpayer action does not
lie where the challenged governmental conduct is legal.” (Lyons v. Santa
Barbara County Sheriff’s Office (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1503 (Lyons);
accord Coshow v. City of Escondido (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 687, 714
(Coshow).)
II.
Voice’s Petition for Writ of Mandate
Voice is an online news service based in San Diego. It devotes
extensive coverage to matters of public interest with a focus on local
government affairs. Reporting on education is particularly important to
Voice and its readers, with two or more reporters working on local school
issues at any given time. Like many news organizations, Voice relies heavily
on CPRA requests to obtain information from local, regional, and state
agencies for their reporting on government activities. From 2015 through
2020, Voice regularly submitted CPRA requests to the District, in such a
volume that Voice was the District’s most prolific requester of public records.
In May 2018, Voice filed a verified petition for writ of mandate against
the District, alleging that the District engages in “the regular and ongoing
practice . . . to delay, obstruct and withhold public records in a manner
contrary” to the CPRA. Voice asserted three causes of action under the
CPRA, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. In February 2021, Voice

7
amended its petition to add a taxpayer cause of action under Code of Civil
Procedure section 526a, and Lewis (Voice’s Chief Executive Officer and

Editor-in-Chief) as a plaintiff.5 As to this fourth cause of action, Voice
alleged the District’s use of public money to carry out its allegedly unlawful
CPRA practice constitutes an illegal expenditure of public funds that should
be enjoined.
III.
Proceedings Before Adjudication of the Taxpayer Cause of Action
The litigation that followed spanned six years. Discovery was
extensive, and so was the parties’ briefing of numerous issues that came
before the trial court in multiple proceedings. Here, we summarize the
proceedings before the court adjudicated the taxpayer cause of action.
A. District’s Motion for Summary Adjudication
On June 11, 2021, the trial court granted the District’s motion for
summary adjudication of a portion of the first cause of action and the third

cause of action under the CPRA, as against Voice only.6
In paragraph 34 of the first cause of action, Voice alleged the District
violated section 7922.535, subdivision (a) (former § 6253, subd. (c)), of the
CPRA “ ‘by failing to secure responsive records within the statutory 10-day
initial response period.’ ” The court determined this claim failed, as a matter
of law, because the CPRA “does not require agencies to ‘secure responsive
records’ within 10 days of receiving a request.” (Italics added.)

5 We will refer to the operative first amended verified petition for writ of
mandate as “the petition” throughout this opinion.

6 Lewis was not subject to the District’s motion for summary
adjudication because he had received insufficient notice of the motion.

8
The trial court also determined the third cause of action failed, as a
matter of law, because “the injunctive relief Voice seeks is an impermissible
‘comply with the law’ injunction.”
Accordingly, the trial court summarily adjudicated the
section 7922.535, subdivision (a), claim of the first cause of action and the

entire third cause of action in favor of the District against Voice.7
B. Voice’s 31 CPRA Requests at Issue
During the litigation, the trial court ordered Voice to prepare an index
of the public records requests for which it contends the District unlawfully
delayed responsive records. Voice identified 31 CPRA requests it made to the
District between October 8, 2015 and March 3, 2020, providing the dates of
submittal and only the dates of the last production of responsive records. In
contrast, the District provided all production dates, including the first dates
on which it provided records in rolling productions. This difference resulted
in a different calculation of the District’s production time in multiple
instances. The District also provided its justification for any delay in
production and an explanation of its general process for responding to CPRA
requests.

7 The trial court’s ruling on the District’s summary adjudication motion
is not properly before us. As we later discuss, Voice’s failure to specifically
challenge the court’s adverse ruling on its duty of determination claim under
section 7922.535, subdivision (a), results in forfeiture of this claim on appeal.

9
C. Hearing on the CPRA Causes of Action
The trial court bifurcated the hearing on the merits of the petition into
two phases. It first held a hearing to adjudicate the CPRA causes of action in
December 2022, and another hearing to adjudicate the taxpayer cause of
action in February 2024.
In its briefing for the December 2022 hearing, Voice identified just
three record requests as the basis for its CPRA causes of action. They were
numbered FY20152016.062, FY20152016.136 and FY20192020.151 (together,

misconduct requests).8 By these requests, Voice generally sought
information pertaining to allegations of sexual misconduct and abuse
perpetrated by a teacher employed at one of the District’s high schools. Voice
asserted the District delayed and withheld records responsive to these
requests, in violation of sections 7922.530 (former § 6253, subd. (b))
and 7922.500 (former § 6253, subd. (d)). Specifically, it contended the
District produced only non-responsive documents that were extensively
redacted. Voice sought a court order compelling the District to release all
responsive records and remove all improper redactions.
Relying on Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v.
Federal Election Commission (D.C. Cir. 2013) 711 F.3d 180 (Citizens), a case
interpreting the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Voice argued the
term “promptly available” in section 7922.530, subdivision (a), is to be
interpreted to mean production of responsive records must occur “ ‘within
days or a few weeks, . . . not months or years’ ” of the 10- or 24-day deadline

8 Because these CPRA requests were also litigated at the subsequent
hearing on the taxpayer cause of action, we describe them and the parties’
related contentions in further detail later in the opinion.

10
for the initial determination. The District responded there is nothing in the
CPRA that requires production of responsive records “within a specified
period of time,” and that the CPRA “provides no remedy for failure to timely
comply with a request for records.”
As to allegations that it improperly withheld records, the District
submitted the declaration of Jeffrey Day, its CPRA officer, to explain the
District’s general process of handling CPRA requests and its process in
responding to the three misconduct requests. Day averred the District did
not withhold any documents “in their entirety on the basis of privilege or
exemption” responsive to the first two requests, but did redact and withhold
responsive documents on the basis of student and employee privacy as to the
third.
Consistent with its ruling on the motion for summary adjudication, the
trial court rejected Voice’s argument that the 10-day deadline under
section 7922.535, subdivision (a) (former § 6253, subd. (c)) “governs the time
period within which records are to be made available.” The court noted the
plain language of section 7922.530, subdivision (a) (former § 6253, subd. (b)),
requires that records only be made “ ‘promptly available.’ ” On this point, the
court rejected Voice’s reliance on Citizens that “promptly available” under the
CPRA meant “ ‘within days or a few weeks’ ” of the initial 10-day deadline.
As to the District’s production for the misconduct requests, the trial

court found, with one limited exception,9 that Voice had failed to meet its

9 The trial court did find the District improperly redacted “ ‘the names of
the teachers who were the subject of allegations of assault and/or sexual
misconduct’ ” from records produced in response to the third misconduct
request. Accordingly, the court ordered the District to produce unredacted
records to the court or show cause by submitting a declaration supporting
why certain teacher names should not be produced. After the District filed a
11
burden of proving any CPRA violation. Specifically, the court found the
evidence did not establish the District improperly delayed, withheld, or
redacted any responsive records. Accordingly, on December 20, 2022, the
trial court denied the petition as to the first, second, and third causes of

action under the CPRA.10
IV.
Hearing on Taxpayer Cause of Action
The trial court adjudicated Voice’s remaining taxpayer cause of action
in February 2024. The parties submitted extensive briefings and numerous
witness declarations for this hearing. Together, they lodged nearly 5,500
pages of exhibits.
A. Voice’s Contentions
As noted, Voice alleged the District’s use of public funds to carry out its
unlawful practice of delaying and obstructing the release of public records
constitutes an illegal expenditure of public funds that should be enjoined
under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a. In its briefing for this hearing,
Voice explicitly framed that “[t]he question before the [trial c]ourt is whether
[the District] may ignore the legislative mandate under [the CPRA] requiring
disclosures be made promptly (Gov. Code, § 7922.530)” and that it was suing
“to enjoin waste of taxpayer funds by [the District] in its failure to comply
with the prompt disclosure requirements set forth in the CPRA.” As such,
the trial court understood this to be the dispute before it at the hearing on

declaration in response to the order to show cause, the parties stipulated that
Voice no longer wanted to pursue disclosure of the names.

10 The trial court’s ruling on the CPRA causes of action is also not
properly before us because, again, Voice does not specifically challenge it.

12
the taxpayer cause of action and that Voice had identified Government Code
section 7922.530’s duty of prompt disclosure, buttressed by section 7922.500’s
general prohibition against delay or obstruction, as the CPRA provision it

alleged the District “routinely abrogates.”11
Relying on Citizens, Voice again argued production of public records
under section 7922.530 “must be made within days or weeks, not months or

years”12 of the initial determination. (Capitalization and boldface omitted.)
Under this standard, Voice claimed that the District “blatantly disregards”
its duty to make prompt disclosures, instead “averaging 399 days to produce
records requested by Voice,” with its shortest amount of time being over a
month and its longest as over five years. (Capitalization and underlining
omitted.) Voice claimed that the District “constructed a system intended to
slow down CPRA responses,” including by employing a single CPRA officer
who lacked formal training and was “ignoran[t]” of the CPRA requirements;
whose absence brings the process to a “screeching halt” until he returns; and
whose process of working on groups of 10 to 12 requests at a time ensures

backlog and delay.13

11 On appeal, Voice does not claim the trial court misidentified the CPRA
provisions relied on by Voice for its taxpayer cause of action.

12 In its reply brief, Voice argued “production typically must be made
within a month.” (Capitalization and boldface omitted.)

13 In making this claim that the District “constructed a system intended
to slow down CPRA responses,” Voice resurrected its complaint—previously
rejected by the trial court when it granted summary adjudication of this issue
in favor of the District in June 2021, which Voice does not challenge—that
the District’s CPRA officer’s “efforts to gather records in response to the
public’s CPRA requests are routinely ignored [by the District’s record
custodians]” and, as such, the District does not meet its 10-day deadline for
13
B. District’s Response
The District again responded that the CPRA does not mandate “a strict
timeline” for public agencies to produce responsive records. Instead, the
District argued “promptness is relative to the request,” requiring the courts
to consider “the breadth, context, and specificity of the request, the nature of
the records requested, review [required] of such records, the volume of other
requests received, and the resources available to the agency.”
As to the 31 CPRA requests at issue, the District asserted the evidence
failed to show it intentionally delayed or withheld records responsive to them.
The District submitted two more declarations by its CPRA officer, Day, to
explain the District’s process of handling public records requests generally
and its process of responding to each of the 31 requests at issue, and the
declaration of Joseph W. Pannone, a municipal law attorney with expertise in
CPRA practices. We discuss the District’s response to Voice’s 31 CPRA
requests in detail later in our review of the court’s factual findings for
substantial evidence. Here we summarize Day’s and Pannone’s testimony
about the District’s process generally.
The San Diego Unified School District is the second largest school

district in California, with 181 schools.14 It receives a high volume of CPRA

the initial determination under section 7922.535, subdivision (a). Here, we
do not address Voice’s limited reference to section 7922.535; to the extent it
relies on this provision as a basis for its taxpayer cause of action on appeal,
we discuss it later and conclude it has not been preserved for our review.

14 We deny the District’s request for judicial notice of the “Departments
page” of its website because, as the District acknowledges, it was not
presented to the trial court. (See Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc.
(1996) 14 Cal.4th 444, fn. 3 [“Reviewing courts generally do not take judicial
notice of evidence not presented to the trial court. Rather, normally ‘when
14
requests each year. Day is the District’s single CPRA officer and is
responsible for receiving and responding to all public record requests, which
includes locating, collecting, and producing responsive documents to
members of the public.
Upon receipt of a public records request, Day first determines whether
the District has responsive documents in its possession within 10 days of the
request. If a request is overly broad or unclear, Day communicates with the
requester to help clarify or limit the request. He drafts a response with his
initial determination to the requester, sends it to the District’s attorney for
approval and, once approved, sends the final response to the requester.
At the same time, Day assesses where the requested records might be
within the District, which spans multiple departments and 181 schools, and
contacts individuals to obtain responsive documents. Depending on the
request, searches could require inquiry into both electronic and hard copy

documents located at any of the District’s multiple departments.15 At the

reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s judgment, an appellate court will
consider only matters which were part of the record at the time the judgment
was entered.’ ”].)

15 For requests that include e-mail, Day causes the Information
Technology (IT) department to run a search using terms and a potential date
range found in the request. Depending on the complexity of the search and
volume of e-mail involved, results may take “10 minutes to several days
later.” If the search volume is too large, IT will break the search into
“separate smaller searches” and even when it operates correctly, the volume
of e-mail returned may be too large to export, requiring IT to break the
search up into multiple smaller searches. If “the scope of the search is simply
too large,” IT may request that Day work with the requester “to narrow down
the search to a manageable scope.” And because IT runs only one search at a
time “to ensure each one completes properly,” the District prioritizes “time
sensitive search requests” such as those from police departments over others.
15
time the litigation commenced, the District maintained over 1 billion e-mails
on its network servers. Once Day receives the records, he reviews them for
responsiveness and conducts a second review to identify documents that must
be withheld or redacted based on attorney-client privilege, student privacy, or
other CPRA exemptions. Day sends these documents to the District’s
attorney for review and, once approved, Day sends the finalized documents to
the requester.
During the relevant five-year period, 2015 to 2020, the District received

an average of 320 requests per year.16 In 2015 and 2016, the District
processed requests in the order received, but since 2017 it has taken requests
out of order so that large requests do not delay narrower and less time
consuming requests. Day typically works on a group of 10 to 12 requests at a
time, adding a new request to the group only when one response is completed.
During this five-year period, the District received over 75 CPRA
requests from Voice. Day averred he has never been requested to delay or
withhold production of records from Voice, “other than for legitimate reasons”
such as verifying accuracy or completeness, and he has never delayed his

After the search is done and the e-mails exported, IT performs a quality
check and sends Day an Outlook data file containing the e-mails. Day then
reviews the e-mails for responsiveness to the request and does another
second-level review to determine if any need to be withheld or redacted for
attorney-client privilege, student privacy, or another applicable statutory
exemption. Day then sends the responsive documents, including proposed
redactions, to the District’s attorney for review and, if approved, to the
requester.

16 The District received 278 public record requests in the 2015–2016
school year; 326 in the 2016–2017 school year; 300 in the 2017–2018 school
year; 383 in the 2018–2019 school year; and 315 in the 2019–2020 school
year.

16
efforts to search for records for Voice “beyond the prioritizing that occurs for
all requests.” Day explained, to the contrary, he spent “substantially more
time” gathering and reviewing records for Voice than any other requester
and, in his view, Voice’s requests were “consistently the most vague and
overbroad.”
Pannone, a licensed attorney who has exclusively practiced municipal
law for more than 40 years, was offered as an expert on the CPRA practices
of various public agencies, including the school districts in Fresno, Long

Beach, and San Bernardino City; as well as the County of San Diego.17 Like
the District, these school districts also charge one employee with handling
CPRA requests from initial review to production of records. The County of
San Diego employs two CPRA officers, but both have other assigned duties.
Based on his experience as a city attorney representing the cities of Baldwin
Park, Bellflower, Culver City, Lompoc, Morro Bay, Palos Verdes Estates, and
South Pasadena, Pannone explained they too had only one employee (the city
clerk) assigned to handle CPRA requests.
According to Pannone, these cities’ and public agencies’ CPRA
processes are “substantially the same” as the District’s. In Pannone’s
opinion, the time to respond to a records request can vary depending on the
volume and type of documents sought, as well as the volume of other record
requests. And “[i]n some cases, depending on the breadth of the request and
the search terms, the number of records requiring review, the nature of the
records reviewed, and the volume of other requests, production of records

17 The trial court overruled Voice’s evidentiary objections to Pannone’s
declaration, and Voice has not challenged the court’s ruling on appeal.

17
may take over one year, or more to complete. In such cases, public agencies
sometime produce records on a ‘rolling basis.’ ”
C. Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court, for a second time, rejected Voice’s contention (and its
reliance on Citizens) that section 7922.530, subdivision (a), requires a public
agency to produce responsive documents within days or weeks of the initial
determination upon receipt of a request. Instead, the court interpreted the
term “promptly” in section 7922.530, subdivision (a), to “allow[ ] for an
evaluation of a variety of factors in assessing the promptness of an entity’s
production of records.”
Turning to the evidence, the trial court credited Day’s declarations
explaining the District’s response to each of the 31 CPRA requests and found
the evidence did not establish the District unlawfully delayed or withheld
responsive documents. It further credited Day’s and Pannone’s declarations
in rejecting Voice’s contentions that the District “constructed a system
intended to slow down CPRA responses.” Additionally, the court found “the
majority” of the requests “[we]re very broadly worded and cover[ed] extensive
periods of time.” The requests were also complicated by Voice often
requesting information in several formats, including final documents as well
as drafts, addendums, and modifications. Many of the requests required the
District to search and review both electronically stored and hard copy records
maintained by multiple departments across the District, and triggered
student or employee privacy exemptions that required redaction. And the
District was processing Voice’s requests amidst a heavy volume of public
record requests during the 2015 to 2020 time period. The court determined
all of these circumstances were relevant and justified the District’s
production time for Voice’s requests.

18
Because Voice failed to establish any unlawful CPRA practice, the trial
court found no basis for finding there was an illegal expenditure of public
funds within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 526a. This order
disposed of the last of Voice’s claims. Accordingly, the court entered a final
judgment in favor of the District denying the petition in March 2024.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Voice challenges the trial court’s denial of its petition only
as to the taxpayer cause of action. It contends the court erred in denying
injunctive relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a because, in its
view, the District maintains an unlawful practice of violating two provisions
of the CPRA: the duty of determination under section 7922.535, and the duty
of disclosure under section 7922.530. As we shall explain, Voice has failed to
preserve its section 7922.535 duty of determination claim. As to its
section 7922.530 duty of disclosure claim, Voice advances the same
arguments that it made in the trial court. In doing so, Voice fails to persuade
us of any error. We address Voice’s duty of disclosure claim first.
I.
“Promptly Available” Under Section 7922.530, Subdivision (a)
Relying once again on Citizens, Voice asserts section 7922.530’s term
“promptly available” means production of disclosable records must be made
within “a few days or weeks, not months or years” of the initial determination
that is made 10 or 24 days upon receipt of the request. Voice contends the
trial court erred in rejecting this construction, and instead construing the
provision to “ ‘allow[ ] for an evaluation of a variety of factors’ ” that are
“nowhere in the law.” We find no error, because we also disagree with Voice’s
construction of the statute.

19
“Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo.”
(Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 724.) “ ‘Our
fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s
intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’ ” (Ibid.) We begin by looking to
the statutory language, “ ‘giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do
not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory
framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to
harmonize the various parts of the enactment.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘If the language is
clear in context, our work is at an end. If it is not clear, we may consider
other aids, including the statute’s legislative history.’ ” (Gilroy, supra,
19 Cal.5th at p. 51.)
We turn to the language in section 7922.530, subdivision (a). It
provides, “Except with respect to public records exempt from disclosure by
express provisions of law, each state or local agency, upon a request for a copy
of records that reasonably describes an identifiable record or records, shall
make the records promptly available to any person upon payment of fees
covering direct costs of duplication, or a statutory fee if applicable.” (Italics
added.) By its plain text, section 7922.530, subdivision (a), does not set any
deadline expressed in number of days for the actual production of records.
(See Rittiman v. Public Utilities Commission (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1018,
1035 [construing former § 6253, subd. (b), the “[C]PRA does not set forth a
specific timeframe for actual production of requested records”]; Motorola
Communication & Electronics, Inc. v. Dept. of General Services (1997)
55 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1349 (Motorola) [same].)
To accept Voice’s argument, we would have to insert words such as
“days or weeks,” or some other quantification of time, into the statute. Doing
so would violate the cardinal rule that a statute “is to be interpreted by the

20
language in which it is written” (People v. Campbell (1902) 138 Cal. 11, 15),
and that “[w]e must presume the Legislature meant what it said, and we may
not add words to the statute under the guise of legislative interpretation”
(Linovitz Capo Shores LLC v. California Coastal Commission (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 1106, 1122, citing Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556,
562 [“Where the words of the statute are clear, we may not add to or alter
them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute
or from its legislative history.”]).
But unlike the duty of disclosure, the CPRA does precisely define the
time in which a public agency must comply with its duty of determination
under section 7922.535, subdivision (a). As noted, section 7922.535,
subdivision (a), provides that “upon a request for a copy of records,” a public
agency “shall, within 10 days from receipt of the request, determine” whether
the request seeks disclosable public records in its possession. The 10-day
deadline may be extended in specified “unusual circumstances” but, in any
case, may not “result in an extension for more than 14 days,” for a total
of 24 days. (§ 7922.535, subds. (b), (c)(1)–(6).) Thus, the Legislature clearly
knows how to draft language to impose precise deadlines for compliance with
a CPRA duty. That it did not do so with the duty of disclosure under
section 7922.530, subdivision (a), significantly undercuts Voice’s argument.
As the California Supreme Court has observed on many occasions, “the
CPRA describes its procedures . . . ‘in exceptionally careful detail.’ ”
(Haynie v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1061, 1073; accord Gilroy, supra,
19 Cal.5th at p. 52 [the “CPRA prescribes detailed procedures governing an
agency’s response to a public records request”].) Its silence regarding any
requirement, “suggest[s] that no such requirement exists.” (Gilroy, at p. 46.)
For this reason, our high court has declined to add to the CPRA a records

21
retention requirement (Gilroy, at p. 65), or a requirement that an agency
create a log of withheld documents as part of its initial determination
(Haynie, at pp. 1073–1074). The same result obtains here. Because the
Legislature chose not to define a precise deadline by which public agencies
must produce disclosable public records, we will not create one. (See id. at
p. 1074 [given the CPRA’s detailed scheme, “it would be inappropriate for us
to enlarge the agency’s burden under the guise of interpreting the statute”].)
Citizens does not persuade us to reach a different result. Although
judicial construction of the FOIA may serve to illuminate our analysis, “we
are not bound by decisions interpreting the FOIA” in interpreting the CPRA.
(Gilroy, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 60 [“general sensitivity to judicial construction
of the FOIA does not mean the CPRA and FOIA should be interpreted as
imposing the same requirements in all instances”].) The two statutes are to
be given “parallel construction” but only where “appropriate with respect to
the question presented and the circumstances of the case.” (Gilroy, at p. 60,
citing American Civil Liberties Union Foundation v. Deukmejian (1982)
32 Cal.3d 440, 451, italics added.)
The question presented in Citizens involved statutory construction of a
different term altogether: “what constitutes a ‘determination’ so as to trigger
the exhaustion requirement” to permit a requester to file his or her FOIA
suit. (Citizens, supra, 711 F.3d at p. 185, italics added; see id. at p. 182.)
Citizens interpreted the FOIA provision that is analogous to the CPRA’s
section 7922.535, subdivision (a)’s duty of determination—not
section 7922.530, subdivision (a)’s duty of disclosure, which is the provision at

22
issue here.18 (Citizens, at p. 184 [“The statutory timeline relevant” to
Citizens’ analysis of the exhaustion requirement was the “20-working-day
timeline” for the agency to provide its initial determination upon receipt of a
FOIA request].) Because there was no parallel construction of the relevant
statutory term before us, Citizens gives us no guidance.
As to the duty of determination, the Citizens court held that to trigger
the exhaustion requirement, “the agency must at least . . . gather and review
the documents” and “determine and communicate the scope of the documents
it intends to produce and withhold” within FOIA’s 20-working-day timeline.
(Citizens, supra, 711 F.3d at p. 188.) It was in clarifying that an agency’s
“ ‘determination’ does not require actual production of the records” under
FOIA (ibid.) that the court made the statement Voice continues to rely on.
The court said: “As to actual production, FOIA requires that the agency
make the records ‘promptly available,’ which depending on the circumstances
typically would mean within days or a few weeks of a ‘determination,’ not

months or years.” (Ibid.) We find this one-sentence dictum19 unhelpful

18 The FOIA provision is title 5 of the United States Code,
section 552(a)(6)(A)(i), which provides that “once an agency receives a proper
FOIA request, the agency shall: [¶] determine within 20 days . . . after the
receipt of any such request whether to comply with such request and shall
immediately notify the person making such request of such determination
and the reasons therefore, and of the right of such person to appeal to the
head of the agency any adverse determination.” (Citizens, supra, 711 F.3d
at p. 184.)

19 Aside from it being dictum, Voice’s reliance on this statement from
Citizens as supportive of a rigid timeline is misplaced because the court also
stated that after the initial determination is made within 20 working days
(30 in “ ‘unusual circumstances’ ”), “the agency may still need some
additional time to physically redact, duplicate, or assemble for production the
23
because it was unaccompanied by any statutory analysis of the language of

title 5 of the United States Code, section 552, subdivision (a)(3)(A),20 the
analogous provision to our section 7922.530, subdivision (a).
We therefore reject Voice’s invitation to “devise a specific deadline” for

an agency to produce responsive records under section 7922.530.21 By
choosing to state only generally that an agency shall make public records
“promptly available” upon payment of fees for their duplication, the
Legislature has opted for a deliberately flexible term, not a fixed time frame.

documents that it has already gathered and decided to produce. The agency
must do so and then produce the records ‘promptly.’ ” (Citizens, supra,
711 F.3d at p. 189, italics added.)

20 “Except with respect to the records made available under
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, and except as provided in
subparagraph (E), each agency, upon any request for records which
(i) reasonably describes such records and (ii) is made in accordance with
published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be
followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person.” (5 U.S.C.
§ 552, subd. (a)(3)(A).)

21 We have considered that the standard approach to statutory
interpretation in CPRA cases is “ ‘augmented’ ” by the constitutional
provision calling for a broad construction of the CPRA “ ‘if it furthers the
people’s right of access’ ” (Gilroy, supra, 19 Cal.5th at pp. 51–52, quoting Cal.
Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(2)), but we believe it does not compel a different
conclusion. Where the legislative intent is ambiguous, this constitutional
provision would require us “ ‘either to broadly or to narrowly construe [the
CPRA], whichever way will further the people’s right of access.’ ” (Gilroy, at
pp. 68–69.) “ ‘But this rule of construction does not require the courts to
resolve every conceivable textual ambiguity in favor of greater access, no
matter how implausible that result in light of all the relevant indicia of
statutory meaning.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Ardon v. City of Los Angeles (2016)
62 Cal.4th 1176, 1190.) As we have explained, we find no ambiguity in the
statutory language or legislative intent of section 7922.530, subdivision (a).

24
The dictionary definition of the term “prompt” means “being ready and
quick to act as occasion demands.” (Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dict.
Online (2026) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prompt#h3> as
of May 11, 2026, archived at <https://perma.cc/QH2L-AM52>, italics added.)
Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines the adverbial form “promptly” to
mean “ready and quick to act as occasion demands,” and further explains,
“[t]he meaning of the word depends largely on the facts in each case, for what
is ‘prompt’ in one situation may not be considered such under other
circumstances or conditions.” (Black’s Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 1214, col. 2,
italics added; see also Black’s Law Dict.(12th ed. 2024) p. 1470, col. 1
[defining “promptly” as “[q]uickly; without delay,” “[a]s soon as practicable
. . . [c]ontext is all-important”].)
Giving the term its plain and commonsense meaning, as we must, we
construe “promptly” in section 7922.530’s duty of disclosure to require an
agency to produce records quickly and without delay as the occasion

demands.22 Thus, whether an agency’s public records disclosure is made

22 The District has at various times stated that section 7922.530,
subdivision (a), imposes a duty to produce responsive records “in a reasonably
timely manner.” Voice responds it “take[s] no issue” with this phrase but
interprets that it “equates to [the] very same ‘days or a few weeks’ after
records come into the possession of the agency” standard. We disagree with
both parties. To the extent the District contends this is the proper statutory
construction of the phrase “promptly available,” we are not persuaded. The
words “reasonably timely” do not appear in the text of the statute, and they
are not necessarily synonymous with “promptly.” In our view, “reasonably
timely” conveys less urgency or priority than “promptly” demands and its
importation into the statutory text will introduce unnecessary confusion. The
reviewing court in Rogers v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 469, from
which the District draws its alternative phrase, briefly addressed a
petitioner’s contention that a trial “court erred in determining that the City
had complied in a reasonably timely fashion” with a public records request.
25
“promptly” depends on the circumstances of each case. This determination
necessarily requires consideration of the scope and burden imposed on the
particular agency by the particular request. Accordingly, we find no error in
the trial court’s conclusion that the term “promptly” in section 7922.530,
subdivision (a), “allows for an evaluation of a variety of factors in assessing

promptness of an entity’s production of records.”23
Appropriate factors to consider in assessing promptness include the
specificity and breadth of the request, the nature and location of the records
sought, the volume of data to be searched, the storage medium that must be
accessed, the level of review required for any exemptions and redactions, and
the complexity of the request; as well as the size, scope and complexity of the
business or activities of the agency responding to the request. So, for
example, a narrow and well-defined request that seeks easily accessible
records will logically result in faster production than an overbroad and vague
request that requires an agency to search through an enormous volume of
data for a needle in the haystack. Further still, an agency made up of a
single department that receives only a handful of public record requests each

Responding to this contention, the appellate court simply stated, “This latter
finding is supported by substantial evidence.” (Id. at p. 483.) Like Citizens,
the lack of statutory interpretation analysis renders the statement unhelpful
to us, and we decline to give it any weight.

23 The District, like the trial court, relies on Motorola, supra,
55 Cal.App.4th 1340, as support that section 7922.530 allows for an
evaluation of factors when assessing whether record production has been
prompt. We do not place much significance on Motorola here. Because it
involved the propriety of an attorney fees award, Motorola neither homed in
on compliance with section 7922.530 nor construed the phrase “promptly
available” beyond stating the CPRA “does not specify when records must be
produced to a requesting party.” (Motorola, at pp. 1344, 1349.)

26
year will logically be able to process productions faster than an agency
comprised of a myriad of departments that receives a far larger number of

requests annually.24
Additionally, we hold it is appropriate to consider whether external
circumstances beyond the control of the agency impacted its ability to access,
search for, collect, or examine the records sought—for example, a cyberattack
that disrupts servers or systems, or a state of emergency such as the
COVID-19 global pandemic that disrupts the agency’s normal operations.
Because the Legislature contemplated that similar circumstances would
impact an agency’s ability to comply with its duty of determination at the

first step,25 it would be illogical that these circumstances would also not be a

24 The CPRA applies to a broad range of public agencies, varying in size,
scope and complexity of public work. It defines a “public agency” to include
“any state or local agency” (§ 7920.525, subd. (a)), and a “ ‘state agency’
means every state office, officer, department, division, bureau, board, and
commission or other state body or agency, except those provided for in
Article IV [(legislative branch)] or Article VI [(judicial branch)] of the
California Constitution” (§ 7920.540, subd. (a)), which includes the Regents of
the University of California (ibid.) and the State Bar of California (id.,
subd. (b)). A “ ‘local agency’ ” includes a county, a city, a city and county, a
school district, a municipal corporation, a district, a political subdivision and
any of its board, commission, or agency, among others. (§ 7920.510.)

25 As we have noted, an agency is expressly permitted an extension
of 14 days to determine whether the request seeks disclosable public records
in its possession if one of six “unusual circumstances” exist and “only to the
extent reasonably necessary to the proper processing of the particular
request.” (§ 7922.535, subds. (b), (c).) These circumstances include: the “need
to search for and collect the requested records from field facilities or other
establishments that are separate from the office processing the requests”; the
“need to search for, collect, and appropriately examine a voluminous amount
of separate and distinct records that are demanded in a single request”; the
“need for consultation, which shall be conducted with all practicable speed,
27
relevant consideration in how much time the agency will require at the
second step of producing the requested records.
Voice argues the factors we have discussed, and relied on by the trial
court, are “found nowhere in the law.” But Voice misses the point. The
Legislature’s adoption of a deliberately flexible term to prescribe an agency’s
duty of disclosure allows consideration of such factors; its choice to not impose
the hard deadline Voice advocates is an implicit rejection of a “one-size-fits-
all” standard as inherently unworkable for all types of public record requests.
Promptness therefore necessarily requires a fact-intensive, case-by-case
analysis. And because it is a fact-intensive determination, we emphasize
that we have not set forth an exhaustive or exclusive list of relevant factors.
But neither is the list boundless. In this respect, we agree with Voice that
courts should not accept “any and every reason” an agency proffers as a
sufficient basis to find prompt disclosure. Courts are to be guided by the
CPRA’s constitutional imperative that public access to government records is
a fundamental right of citizenship. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(1) & (2).)

with another agency having substantial interest in the determination of the
request or among two or more components of the agency having substantial
subject matter interest therein”; the “need to compile data, to write
programming language or a computer program, or to construct a computer
report to extract data”; the “inability of the agency, because of a cyberattack,
to access its electronic servers or systems in order to search for and obtain a
record that the agency believes is responsive to a request and is maintained
on the servers or systems in an electronic format”; and the “need to search
for, collect, and appropriately examine records during a state of emergency
proclaimed by the Governor in the jurisdiction where the agency is located
when the state of emergency currently and directly affects, due to the state of
emergency, the agency’s ability to timely respond to requests due to staffing
shortages or closure of facilities where the requested records are located.”
(§ 7922.535, subd. (c)(1)–(6).)

28
II.
Substantial Evidence
Turning to the evidence on Voice’s allegations, the trial court found it
did not establish the District engaged in “any ‘illegal policies or practices’ ” of
improperly delaying production of responsive records to Voice’s requests, and
consequently there was no basis to find an illegal expenditure of public funds
within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 526a. The court
reached its conclusion after considering the evidence—which, all told,
consisted of over 5,500 pages of exhibits and declarations submitted by the
parties—and making detailed factual findings as to each of Voice’s
31 requests.
A. Governing Standard of Review
It is well settled that we independently review a trial court’s
interpretation of the CPRA but “factual findings made by the trial court will
be upheld if based on substantial evidence.” (Times Mirror Co. v. Superior
Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325, 1336; accord Castanares v. Superior Court
(2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 295, 303–304; San Lorenzo Valley Community
Advocates for Responsible Education v. San Lorenzo Valley Unified School
Dist. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1409, 1413; Sacramento County
Employees’ Retirement System v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 440,
454; see also Michaelis, Montanari & Johnson v. Superior Court (2006)
38 Cal.4th 1065, 1072 [on review of a trial court’s determination of competing
public interest factors under the CPRA, appellate court “should accept as true
the trial court’s findings of the ‘facts of the particular case’ ” if supported by
substantial evidence].) Despite settled law, Voice conspicuously avoids
addressing the substantial evidence standard in its challenge to the trial
court’s ruling on the alleged CPRA violations. Instead, it asserts that “[t]here

29
are no material facts in dispute” and as such this court must “proceed[ ]
solely under the de novo standard of review.” (Italics omitted.)
We disagree that the material facts are undisputed. Voice concedes as
much when in the same breath it states: “Certainly, [the District] does not
agree with [Voice’s] characterization of the facts.” Our review of the record
further reveals the parties heavily disputed the facts and the trial court
resolved conflicts in the evidence. For example, as we shall discuss in further
detail, the average length of delay itself was contested given that the parties
did not agree on the District’s production time. It is a fundamental rule of
appellate procedure that an appellant’s contention “ ‘should be tailored
according to the applicable standard of appellate review’ ” and a failure to
acknowledge or apply the proper scope of review “is a concession of a lack of
merit” of that contention. (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE
Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 465 (Sonic).)
Under the highly deferential substantial evidence test, we accept all
evidence and draw all reasonable inferences supporting the trial court’s
judgment or finding, looking only at the evidence supporting the successful
party and completely disregarding contrary evidence. (Schmidt v. Superior
Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 581–582 (Schmidt).) Substantial evidence
is evidence that is of ponderable legal significance, reasonable in nature,
credible, and of solid value (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989,
1005–1006); the testimony of a single credible witness may constitute
substantial evidence (In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614 (Mix)).

30
“Under this standard of review, parties challenging a trial court’s factfinding

bear an ‘enormous burden.’ ”26 (Schmidt, at p. 582.)
Because Voice resists the governing standard of review, it does nothing
on appeal to meet its enormous burden to demonstrate insufficient evidence.
As the appellant, Voice is required to demonstrate “on the basis of the record
presented to the appellate court,” that the trial court committed an error that
justifies reversal of the presumptively correct judgment. (Denham v.
Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th
594, 608–609 [judgment being challenged is presumed to be correct and error

26 We note that an even more difficult standard may apply to Voice.
Where the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party
with the burden of proof—here, Voice—did not carry its burden and that
party appeals, “ ‘it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as
whether substantial evidence supports the judgment.’ ” (Sonic, supra,
196 Cal.App.4th at p. 465.) “ ‘This follows because such a characterization is
conceptually one that allows an attack on (1) the evidence supporting the
party who had no burden of proof, and (2) the trier of fact’s unassailable
conclusions that the party with the burden did not prove one or more
elements of the case.’ ” (Ibid.) So “ ‘where the issue on appeal turns on a
failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether
the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law’ ”
and specifically, “ ‘whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted
and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no
room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a
finding.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 466.) Under this standard, “ ‘it is almost impossible’ ”
for the appellant to prevail “ ‘because unless the trial court makes specific
findings of fact in favor of the losing plaintiff, we presume the trial court
found the plaintiffs’ evidence lacks sufficient weight and credibility to carry
the burden of proof.’ ” (Patricia A. Murray Dental Corp. v. Dentsply
International, Inc. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 258, 270.) We do not proceed under
this standard, however, because the District did not raise it and even under
the traditional substantial evidence test we would find Voice has failed to
meet its burden on appeal to demonstrate error.

31
must be affirmatively shown by appellant].) Voice’s failure to carry or even
address this burden could very well end the inquiry. However, we have
reviewed the record and it provides substantial evidence to support the trial
court’s factual findings.
B. There Was No Finding, Nor Evidentiary Support, That the District
Averaged 399 Days in Production Time
We first address a finding the trial court did not make, and which Voice
continues to improperly assert on appeal: that the District’s average time in
producing responsive records to Voice’s CPRA requests is 399 days. This
purported fact is nowhere to be found in the court’s seven-page written ruling
setting forth its detailed factual findings. To the contrary, the court noted
that the parties dispute the District’s production time as to many of Voice’s
requests, and that was because Voice relied “exclusively on the date of the
last production,” whereas the District relied on “all production dates” which
included the first dates of rolling productions. (Italics added.) The court,
however, found it unnecessary to resolve this conflict because, “[r]egardless”
of the disputed production dates, Voice still “fail[ed] to establish any
improper delay in production of records.” Thus, there is no record support for
Voice’s continued assertion of this 399-days average.
But under the substantial evidence test, we look only at the evidence
supporting the District’s position as the successful party and completely
disregard contrary evidence that may arguably support Voice’s. (Schmidt,
supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 581–582.) Here, we first note the
uncontroverted evidence established that the District received over 75 public
record requests from Voice during the relevant five-year period. The
31 CPRA requests at issue are what Voice chose to identify; thus, any

32
averaging of the District’s production time is skewed by Voice’s selective
sampling of only forty-one percent of its total requests.
Second, in 10 of the 31 CPRA requests selected by Voice, the District

produced responsive records on a rolling basis.27 Voice, however, omitted the
dates of the District’s first release of responsive records for those 10 requests,
resulting in grossly misleading response times in some instances, which in
turn distorted any averaging of the District’s production time. We provide
two examples.
First, Voice asserted the District’s production time in response to its
request FY20162017.112 was 1,917 days. But including the first date when
the District began releasing records, the District’s production time began 78
days from the parties agreement on e-mail search terms.
Second, Voice asserted the District took 1,267 days to produce records
in response to its request FY20152016.062 (one of the misconduct requests).
Its computation ignored that the District actually completed production of
responsive records 24 days from receipt of the request. Instead, Voice
computed the length of days by using a date—more than three and half years
later—when the District voluntarily provided an additional 26 pages of
printed documents an employee inadvertently found in an unoccupied desk
drawer during a search to comply with a subpoena by a different entity.
Although the number of days from receipt of a request to production is
relevant, it is not, ordinarily, by itself dispositive of whether a production is
prompt (or not). The record here reveals the District completed production in

27 Rolling productions occurred for requests FY20152016.120,
FY20162017.022, FY20162017.033, FY20162017.060, FY20172018.044,
FY20172018.152, FY20182019.181, FY20192020.143, FY20162017.112, and
FY20172018.065.

33
about 120 days or less for a large number of Voice’s 31 requests and, as we
later discuss, the trial court found the time taken appropriately correlates to
the scope and burden of the requests. For example, the District produced
responsive records:

In 104 days for FY20152016.058,28 after Voice clarified the overbroad
request and redactions were made for student privacy.

In 121 days for FY20152016.071,29 with the request requiring a search
of physical files from multiple custodians and “hundreds of redactions, largely
consisting of confidential student information.”

In 59 days for FY20152016.107,30 which sought over a 10-year span of
records that had to be retrieved from an off-site storage.

28 FY20152016.058 sought “a copy (electronic if possible) of any and all
communications sent to Correia Middle School staff and/or teachers and/or
student club advisors and/or student club leaders at all related to student
club meeting rules, policies, limits and restrictions in the last month” to
include “any memos, emails or other type of communication sent by Correia
school site administrators or district officers to individual club
representatives at Correia or en masse to all student clubs and student
organizations.”

29 FY20152016.071 sought “(1) All complaints, investigation reports,
summaries, disciplinary recommendations and/or other disciplinary records,
claims, allegations, incident reports, hearing records, including evidence
presented in any such hearing, follow-up plans, and/or similar records
relating to allegations of misconduct, physical abuse, harassment,
inappropriate touching and similar activities relating to an incident occurring
on or about September 2, 2014 and involving [K.K.]; and (2) All
communications whether physical or electronic, not covered under the
attorney-client privilege relating to item #1 above.”

30 FY20152016.107 sought “Electronic copies of any and all records
reflecting conflict of interest and ethics training for the Board of Education
and other staff from 2005 to the present,” to include “any and all ethics
34
In 70 days for FY20152016.144,31 which required the District to
coordinate with a variety of departments to locate responsive documents.

In 71 days for FY20182019.013,32 in which the District started looking
for responsive documents the same day it received the request.

In 108 days for FY20182019.202,33 in which the District completed an
e-mail search eight days from receipt of the request and found over 1,000

training completion certificates on file during that timeframe,” and “[i]f no
such records are kept showing who has completed ethics training, . . . any
ethics training agenda items, staff reports and relevant minutes showing
attendees at ethics training sessions,” and “[i]f ethics training has not been
provided every other year as required by the enactment of A[ssembly]
B[ill] 1234,” the reason “why.”

31 FY20152016.144 sought “Any and all complaints filed at the school or
district level regarding the trees at Miramar Ranch Elementary, and any and
all records reflecting subsequent investigations, findings, actions taken and
complaint remedies and outcomes,” including “any and all reports and
assessments about the health and safety of Miramar’s trees by an arborist or
any other staff or consultant,” and “[i]f such an assessment . . . is contained in
a broader district report on tree health and safety, . . . provide the entire
report,” for the period of “January 1, 2013 to present.”

32 FY20182019.013 sought “student capacity of each district-run
school . . . , with the corresponding school code” and “[i]f possible, . . . the
capacity of only the district portion of each campus, not including any
capacity that’s already being used by a co-located charter school,” and “[i]f the
records . . . exist electronically in a single report or database, . . . the
information [is to] be provided electronically (ideally in spreadsheet form) by
email, rather than produced as individual school reports.”

33 FY20182019.202 sought “Any emails written between [S.C.], [T.L.],
[S.M.] and district area superintendents since Feb. 1, 2019 regarding federal
program monitoring findings about the district’s English-learner program,”
including “any emails between any combination of these employees, as well
as emails which may contain other recipients beyond those listed.”

35
e-mails to and from “high level” District officials that required careful review
and redactions for attorney-client privileged communications.

In 68 days for FY20192020.085,34 which sought, among other records,
a nine-year period of “public records showing the names, hire and fire dates
of any and all workers employed by the school district’s police force.”

In 34 days for FY20162017.095,35 and the District had made
arrangements for Voice to review the documents on an earlier date but no one
for Voice showed up.
In seven days with the first tranche of records and 124 days later for

final production for FY20172018.044,36 which was overbroad in categories of

34 FY20192020.085 sought “Public records showing the names, hire and
fire dates of any and all workers employed by the school district’s police
force, . . . from the beginning of FY 2010 to the present” and “[i]f a
comprehensive list is not available, . . . copies of whatever rosters or lists
were created from FY 2010 to present, even if they only offer a snapshot of
the workers at that time. For instance, if a roster was run or available for
July 1 of each year, with or without their hire and fire dates, such rosters are
requested,” and “[i]f any of this information is available in electronic
spreadsheet form, . . . for an electronic copy of that spreadsheet.”

35 FY20162017.095 sought “an electronic copy of the latest list of site
Facility Condition Index (FCI) scores maintained by the [D]istrict.
Specifically, . . . the most updated version of the information” shown in a
hyperlinked 2013 report, to include “this list regardless of whether it has
been presented to the ICOC or merely maintained by staff in facilities or
another department in this format or another format, like an excel
spreadsheet,” and to indicate “[i]f for some reason the [D]istrict does not have
a newer list showing individual site FCI scores any time after Feb. 7, 2013,”
and to indicate “[i]f there are plans to produce a new list before the end of the
fiscal year,” and “electronic copies of all Facility Condition Assessment (FCA)
reports for district sites with FCI scores above 30 percent since 2008, even if
the FCI subsequently fell below 30 percent following improvements and
repairs.”

36
records and, among other records, sought a seven-year period of dates and
amounts of “any and all payments made to law firms and/or individual
attorneys, regardless of funding source” and “annual compensation for each
employee in the legal services division,” and required “significant compilation
of information” to provide Voice’s preferred format.

In 116 days for FY20182019.181,37 which required the District to
gather cumulative and individual school reports over a three-year period

36 FY20172018.044 sought “The dates and amounts of any and all
payments made to law firms and/or individual attorneys, regardless of
funding source, from July 1, 2011 to the day this request is responded to. [¶]
If a description for each payment is readily available (i.e. the case name or
number, the nature of the service rendered or reason for the payment, like a
settlement, etc.), I ask the district to please provide that information. If the
payment information I seek can be pulled from the district’s check register
system or some other electronic payment system, rather than gathering
individual invoices, that is preferred. If possible, I ask that this information
be produced in electronic spreadsheet form by email, similar to the payment
spreadsheet produced in the past for request FY20152016.066, for example.
[¶] The annual compensation for each employee in the legal services division
from July 1, 2011 to present day. At a minimum, this should include
compensation for employees working in the Legal Services Office, Risk
Management, and Labor Relations Departments during that seven year
period. Please include the name, position and total compensation amount for
each employee each year. All organization charts for the legal services
division between July 1, 2011 and present.”

37 FY20182019.181 sought for school years 2015 to 2018, “The results of
the California Healthy Kids Survey for each school . . . [t]he results of the
California School Staff Survey for each school . . . [t]he results of the
California School Parent Survey (if it is administered) for each school” in the
District; “any spreadsheets or other documents maintained or created by the
district which aggregate the results of these surveys for each school,” and “[i]f
the results of these surveys are aggregated in a single or several documents,”
Voice indicated it “would be happy for these documents to supersede [its]
requests for individual school survey reports”; “[i]f such documents are
37
from a variety of departments and required an additional production when
Voice clarified it wanted individual school site reports, not the aggregate
reports it received.
In 119 days for FY20192020.143, which sought “[a]ny and all official”
class syllabuses for 2019–2020 English courses for “each high school” in the
District, including specifically “one up-to-date syllabus for each high school
English class.” The District notified Voice the request was overbroad,
explaining it had 15 comprehensive high schools and no standardized high
school English class syllabus. As a result, the District would be required to
collect a syllabus from each of over 100 English teachers during the

COVID-19 mandated school closures.38 Voice took 73 days to reject the
District’s proposal to narrow the request for faster production. Two weeks
later, the District produced the first tranche of 995 pages, and the final
production within 119 days.
Despite the evidence supporting the District’s position that Voice’s 399-
days average is incorrect and misleading, Voice continues to improperly rely
on it as its main evidence of the District’s unlawful practice of delaying or
obstructing disclosures in this appeal. Consequently, this is reason enough

historical and go back further than the three-year scope of [the] request,
please include all of that information as well. If they are not historical, but
rather created on a year-by year basis, please confine the request to [the]
three-year window. If any data is available for the current school year,
please also include it.”

38 All District employees began working remotely on March 16, 2020.
Appointment-based services for elementary schools began on
October 13, 2020 but the majority of District staff did not return until late
January 2021. For departments where in-person attendance was not
necessary (i.e. staff who did not work with students), such staff members did
not return until April 2022.

38
why Voice fails to demonstrate error by the trial court’s finding that the
predicate factual theory for its taxpayer cause of action was not proven.
C. No Unlawful District Practice or Policy of Delaying or Obstructing
Disclosures
We next discuss the trial court’s factual findings as to the District’s
production for the 31 CPRA requests, but we emphasize that Voice’s taxpayer
cause of action was predicated on an unlawful practice or policy of delaying or
obstructing disclosures by the District. For this reason, we are not concerned
with the trial court’s findings as to any one or a few CPRA requests, but with
its conclusion that there was no such unlawful practice or policy.
As support of the unlawful practice or policy, Voice claimed the District
“constructed a system intended to slow down CPRA responses,” including by
employing a single CPRA officer (Day) who lacked formal training and was
“ignoran[t]” of the CPRA requirements; whose absence brings the process to a
“screeching halt” until he returns; and whose process of working on groups of
10 to 12 requests at a time ensures backlog and delay. The trial court
rejected these claims, finding that Voice “offer[ed] no evidence” that the
District’s systems were designed to delay or obstruct prompt disclosures.
To the contrary, the trial court specifically credited Pannone’s
testimony that the District’s CPRA compliance methods are “substantially
the same” as the numerous other unified school districts and local city
governments. This included employing a single CPRA officer to handle
requests from initial review to production of records. The court also accepted
Pannone’s testimony, which was consistent with Day’s explanation of the
District’s processes, that “[t]he time to respond to a records request can vary
depending on the volume and type of documents as well as the volume of
other record requests and other duties of the [C]PRA officer. In some cases,

39
depending on the breadth of the request and the search terms, the number of
records requiring review, the nature of the records reviewed, and the volume
of other requests, production of records may take over one year, or more to
complete. In such cases, public agencies sometime produce records on a
‘rolling’ basis.”
Under the substantial evidence test, we do not reweigh the evidence or
reevaluate credibility. (Greisman v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
1310, 1322.) Moreover, Pannone’s testimony alone may constitute
substantial evidence for the trial court’s findings. (Mix, supra, 14 Cal.3d at
p. 614 [single credible witness constitutes substantial evidence].)
Relying on Day’s declarations, the trial court found the District’s
production time was justified given the scope and burden imposed on it by
Voice’s requests. As recounted, the court found “the majority” of Voice’s 31
requests were overbroad, sought records over “extensive periods of time,”
lacked specificity, and were complex because Voice often requested
information in a myriad of formats, and that these factors required the
District to expend time in seeking clarification or modification from Voice.
Additionally, the court found many requests required the District to search
and review both electronically stored and hard copy records across multiple
departments spanning 181 schools; and the nature of the records sought
required significant time for the legal department to review and redact for
exemptions, including student or employee privacy. Finally, the court found
that the District was processing Voice’s requests, with the burdens just
described, amidst a large volume of public record requests during the
relevant five-year period and, in some instances, during COVID-19 mandated
school closures. These are all proper factors in assessing an agency’s
promptness in production of records, as we have held. And our review of the

40
record finds substantial evidence to support the court’s finding of no pattern
of improper delay based on these factors.
A handful of Voice’s public records requests, viewed in the light most
favorable to the judgment, demonstrate that substantial evidence supports
the District’s production time as prompt under the circumstances.
Regarding the three misconduct requests, (FY20152016.062,
FY20152016.136 and FY20192020.151), Voice asserted that these requests
demonstrated a pattern of an unlawful CPRA practice. The trial court
rejected this claim because it had already found at the December 2022
hearing, that the District’s production was prompt relative to the
overbreadth, lack of specificity, and burden these requests imposed. Nothing
Voice presented in February 2024 changed the court’s prior ruling. Day’s
declaration supports the court’s findings and we will not reweigh the evidence
or Day’s credibility: FY20152016.062 was produced in 24 days;
FY20152016.136 was overbroad, necessitated clarification, and extensive
redactions before production; and FY20192020.151 was overbroad, lacked
specificity, required significant coordination between departments, and the
COVID-19 pandemic hampered production.
Turning to the other requests, Day’s declaration once again supports,
that the District acted promptly under the circumstances. For example,
FY20162017.112, submitted on April 5, 2017, sought:
“All emails sent or received by [employee name omitted] from
January 1, 2016 to December 1, 2016 that contain one or more of
the following words: ‘raise’; ‘pay’; ‘increase’; ‘salary’; ‘salaries’;
‘SDEA’; ‘budget’; ‘money’; ‘cash flow’; ‘TRANs’; ‘negotiations’;
‘negotiate’; ‘bargain’; ‘good’; ‘bad’; ‘wrong’; ‘right’; ‘January’; ‘May’;
‘revise’; ‘governor’; ‘San Diego County Office of Ed’; ‘SDCOE’;
‘Cindy’; ‘Lindsay’; ‘Richard’; or ‘LCFF[.]’ Please include any
earlier emails part of the email chain even if they fall outside the

41
time frame specified or do not contain one of the keywords.
Please also include any and all attachments.”

Given the breadth of this request and the use of grossly generic and
broad search terms, the District’s first search of its server yielded 31,771 e-
mails. The file was too large to be exported and caused the District’s system
and computers to crash multiple times. As a result, between July 2017 and
April 2018, the parties met and conferred numerous times regarding how to
narrow the request to avoid crashing the District’s system. Voice only agreed
to limit the time span, which did not alleviate the problem, and the broad
search terms continued to crash the system. On April 26, 2018, the District
told Voice the request was overbroad, lacked specificity, and consequently it
would close the request. Only then did Voice narrow its request by asking
the District to “run a search one month at a time with a couple key words at a
time.”
The District agreed, and three days later on May 1, 2018, the District
manually exported a file of one month’s worth of potentially responsive
records, consisting of 8,300 pages of e-mails. Because the District estimated
it would take 43 working days with one employee assigned solely to the task
of reviewing and making redactions, the District informed Voice it would
produce responsive records on a rolling basis. The District released the first
tranche of 464 pages on July 13, followed by 21 more tranches of records. By
the time production was complete for this request, on July 5, 2022, the
District had produced 12,725 pages of e-mails to Voice. Throughout the
process, the large export files containing the e-mail data continued to crash
the District’s system, which “further elongat[ed] the estimated review time.”
Although the District provided Voice with “many opportunities” to narrow the
search parameters or identify with more specificity the documents sought to

42
speed up production, “Voice refused to do so.” In the absence of a request
that “reasonably describes” identifiable records, like in this instance, the time
the District spent working with Voice to revise the request cannot be
attributed to the District.
Other requests were of a similar character. FY20162017.028 made the
following request:
“I am writing to request inspection of the following records: All
emails and/or electronic communication dated between August 1,
2015 and August 30, 2016 to and/or from the following
individuals: [24 e-mail accounts omitted] containing or related to
the following keywords: ‘on track’ ‘A–G’ and/or ‘A to G’ ‘grad,’
‘graduate’ and/or ‘graduation’ ‘dropout,’ ‘drop-out’ and/or ‘drop
out’ ‘charter school’ ‘credit recovery’ ‘inflation[’] and/or ‘inflate’
‘fail’ and/or ‘failure’ ‘Fs’ and/or ‘F’s’ ‘Ds’ and/or ‘D’s’ ‘92%’ and/or
‘92 percent’ ‘Voice of San Diego,’ ‘VOSD,’ ‘Voice,’ ‘Mario,’ and/or
‘Koran.’ ”
This request, too, was overbroad. The District tried, multiple times, to
conduct the search but its system crashed on two separate occasions due to
the breadth of the search terms. When the District was finally able to
complete the search, it yielded 131,971 e-mails. Day then informed Voice the
request was overly burdensome and would likely require extensive review
and redaction given that the search terms were connected to sensitive
information. Day asked Voice to narrow the search terms. Even with
modifications, the search produced 6,525 pages requiring significant
redactions. At the time, the District had a large volume of requests and was
processing requests in the order of receipt. Day produced 5,500 documents
373 days after the request.
Similarly, FY20192020.062 requested as follows:
“Please provide all public records relating to claims of physical
and/or verbal misconduct committed or otherwise related to
teacher [name omitted] from the beginning of his employment to
43
present. The responsive records should include, but not be limited
to, all claims, allegations, complaints, discipline records,
inquiries, investigations, reports, analyses, and similar materials
bearing on each incidence of misconduct. Please also keep in
mind that pursuant to Caldecott v. Superior Court (2015)
243 Cal.App.4th 212, 225 that the personnel file exemption found
at Government Code section 6254[, subdivision] (c) is inapplicable
as an exemption to this request unless the San Diego Unified
School District determined that the allegations are ‘so unreliable
that they “could not be anything but false.” ’ In other words, the
District need not have determine the allegations to be true or
well-founded, or to have imposed discipline on [the teacher], for
the mandatory release of such public records as provided in the
Caldecott case.”
This request required coordination with various departments to
compile responsive documents and substantial review and redactions given
the sensitive nature of the request. During this time period, the District was
receiving a high volume of public records requests. In an attempt to be more
efficient, the District was processing narrower requests that could be
completed in one or two days first, over broader requests that necessitated
compilation from multiple sources and review of a high volume of documents.
Additionally, COVID-19 closures complicated the production of documents, as

did the provision of a Marken39 notice to the teacher. After obtaining an
extension to respond, the teacher obtained legal counsel and objected to
release of the records. After discussions with the teacher’s legal counsel, the
teacher indicated he would not file a reverse CPRA action to prevent

39 Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School Dist. (2012)
202 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1266, recognized the viability of a “reverse-CPRA
action,” in which a third party who is the subject of a CPRA request may
bring suit to prevent disclosure of the records.

44
disclosure. The District then produced the records, 390 days from the date of
request.
In March 2017, Voice sought the following in FY20162017.099:
“[R]equest inspection of the following records: Annual staffing
counts for the district’s different employee groups going back to
at least 2006―07. At a minimum, I am asking for separate
unduplicated staffing counts for teachers, classified staff, pupil
services employees and administrators districtwide, excluding
charter schools. If possible, I ask that the staffing counts be
reported in either FTEs or as headcounts for all groups. Please
do not provide only an FTE count for one group and only a
headcount for another. If both numbers are available for each
group, I’d like both.”
Seeking documents over a period of 10 years for a variety of positions, this
request was also overbroad and vague. It required Day to contact numerous
employees to determine the locations of responsive documents. When Day
sought clarification from Voice regarding the preferred format, Voice did not
respond. When Day followed up again regarding the types of “counts”
requested, it took Voice more than a month to respond. The District
produced the request 207 days after the initial request, while facing a large
volume of prior requests that were being processed in the order of receipt.
In another example, Voice sought the following in FY20162017.101:
“The resumes and qualifications for all management employees
in both the budget and finance departments that are represented
by the Administrators Association of San Diego or hold a position
of a higher rank, such as director and executive director. All
resumes received from applicants interviewed in November 2016
for the position lead financial planning analyst. Scoring sheets
from all interview panelists for both rounds of interviews for the
position lead financial planning analyst that took place in
November 2016.”

45
This request lacked specificity because it did not identify any employees by
name. The “resumes and qualifications for all management employees” were
stored in individual personnel files, requiring Day to review the entire
personnel files of numerous employees to find the requested records. This
was an extremely time-consuming task. Likewise, the “resumes” of
“applicants” and “scoring sheets” were not located in a single location, but
across different departments, including an off-site record retention facility.
The responsive documents then required significant redactions, which also
had to be reviewed by counsel. Facing a large volume of other prior requests
and processing requests in the order of receipt, Day produced the records

in 312 days.40
On the whole, our review of the record finds substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that the District did not employ a practice or
policy of unlawfully delaying production of records for Voice’s requests.
Rather, as California’s second largest unified school district, the District is an
agency of sprawling size, managing a high volume of CPRA requests for
records that, by their nature, routinely implicate student and employee
privacy interests. To this particular agency, Voice regularly submits broad,
multi-questioned, and unspecific requests that, in many instances, required
time for the parties to negotiate clarification and narrowing of search terms;
and time for the District to coordinate with multiple departments to locate
responsive records, compile thousands of responsive documents kept in
various storage mediums, and make copious redactions to protect student

40 In two instances, the trial court credited Day’s declaration that the
District inadvertently withheld records due to human error. Two instances of
inadvertent withholding over the course of five years does not demonstrate a
pattern of illegal conduct.

46
and employee privacy interests. And, during part of the five years at issue,
the District, like all other schools in the state, closed its campuses under a
state of emergency mandate because of the unprecedented COVID-19
pandemic. Under these circumstances, and the governing standard of review,
Voice has failed to demonstrate substantial evidence does not support the
trial court’s factual findings that the District did not employ an unlawful
CPRA policy or practice of withholding or delaying disclosures.
III.
Forfeited Claims
In its opening brief on appeal, Voice asserts the District’s unlawful
CPRA practice also includes regularly violating its duty of determination
under section 7922.535, subdivision (a), by: (1) failing to “search, collect[ ] or
examin[e]” potentially responsive and disclosable records within the
statutory 10- or 24-day deadline; (2) failing to set forth the statutorily
required reasons for its initial determinations; and (3) “suspend[ing]” or
“postpon[ing]” CPRA operations when Day is absent from the office. It also
makes a fleeting assertion that the District regularly violated its duty to

assist a requester (§ 7922.600).41
Voice did not squarely raise any of these claims at the hearing to
adjudicate its petition as to the taxpayer cause of action, the denial of which
is the only decision it has challenged in this appeal. Consequently, they are

41 Section 7922.600, subdivision (a), provides, that upon a request for a
public record, the agency, to assist the requester in making an effective
request, “shall [in part and] to the extent reasonable under the
circumstances . . . assist the member of the public to identify records and
information that are responsive to the request or to the purpose of the
request, if stated.”

47
all forfeited. (Howitson v. Evans Hotels, LLC (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 475, 489
[“failure to raise an issue in the trial court typically forfeits on appeal any
claim of error based on that issue”].) Voice impliedly concedes it has forfeited
these claims because it is silent, in its reply brief, as to the District’s
assertion of forfeiture. (Rudick v. State Bd. of Optometry (2019) 41
Cal.App.5th 77, 89–90 [failure to respond to an argument in a reply brief
constitutes an implicit concession].)
Further, as to Voice’s claim that the District regularly violates
section 7922.535, subdivision (a), by failing to search, collect, and examine
disclosable records within the statutory 10- or 24-day period after receipt of a

request, we conclude it is also waived.42 As recounted, in its June 11, 2021
ruling, the trial court summarily adjudicated the exact same statutory
construction claim in favor of the District. There, Voice alleged the District
violated section 7922.535, subdivision (a), “ ‘by failing to secure responsive
records within the statutory 10-day initial response period.’ ” The court
determined this claim failed, as a matter of law, because the CPRA “does not
require agencies to ‘secure responsive records’ within 10 days of receiving a
request.” (Italics added.) But nowhere in its briefing on appeal does Voice
develop a separate argument, under a separate heading, challenging the trial
court’s summary adjudication ruling. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.883(a)(1)(A) [appellate briefs must state each point under a separate

42 We granted the First Amendment Coalition’s application to file an
amicus curiae brief in support of Voice. Amicus’s brief, however, focuses
solely on whether section 7922.535 requires an agency to locate, collect, and
review records responsive to a request before notifying the requester of its
determination. Because we conclude Voice’s section 7922.535 claim is not
properly before us, for the numerous reasons we have identified, we do not
address the arguments by amicus in its brief.

48
heading]; In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994 [appeal may be deemed
abandoned where appellant fails to abide by essential requirements of an
appeal, including the requirement of providing a “reason to reverse or even
modify” the order appealed]; Roe v. McDonald’s Corp. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th
1107, 1114 [failure to identify a challenged ruling in a separate heading and
analysis results in waiver].) Consequently, this argument is not before us.
We acknowledge our discretion to review unpreserved claims that
present purely legal questions, but we decline to exercise our discretion in
this case. The underlying facts are disputed. (See Cedars-Sinai Medical
Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 6 [unpreserved issues of law
may be considered for the first time on appeal if there are no disputed facts].)
But even without factual disputes, forfeiture is the proper outcome. This
litigation has spanned over six years, involved extensive discovery, and
adjudication of two writs to decision. Voice has had ample opportunity to
prosecute all of its claims in the trial court.
IV.
Conclusion
In sum, Voice has failed to carry its appellate burden of demonstrating
reversible error. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
determination that the District did not engage in any illegal policies or
practices of improperly delaying production of responsive records to Voice’s
requests. And because Voice failed to establish the challenged governmental
conduct was illegal, the trial court properly denied relief on its taxpayer
cause of action. (See Lyons, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 1503; Coshow,
supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 714.)

49
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The District shall recover its costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.

50
Filed 5/27/26
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

VOICE OF SAN DIEGO et al., D084327

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2018-
00026433-CU-WM-CTL)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING
SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL OPINION AND
DISTRICT, CERTIFYING OPINION FOR
PARTIAL PUBLICATION
Defendant and Respondent.
NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed on May 11, 2026, be modified as
follows:
1. On page 2, line 5 of the second full paragraph, delete the sentence
beginning with “According to Voice.” The paragraph is now modified to read
as follows:
Contending that “promptly available” means “ ‘within
days or a few weeks’ ” of the initial 10- or 24-day deadline,

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1110, this opinion is
certified for publication with the exception of parts II and III of the
Discussion.
Voice of San Diego and its editor-in-chief Scott Lewis
(sometimes together, Voice) alleged the San Diego Unified
School District (District) routinely obstructs and delays the
disclosure of public records. Voice filed a petition for writ of
mandate asserting, among other causes of action, a taxpayer
claim pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 526a to
enjoin the District’s illegal expenditure of public funds to
maintain the alleged unlawful CPRA practice.
2. On page 3, the fourth sentence of the paragraph above the
Background, revise the sentence beginning with “We further” to read as
follows:
We further conclude, in the unpublished portion of this
opinion, that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
factual findings that the District did not maintain an unlawful
practice of violating the CPRA.
There is no change in the judgment.
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on May 11, 2026, was not
certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause, it now
appears that the opinion should be partially published in the Official Reports
and it is so ordered.

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

Copies to: All parties

2

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