CourtListener 10865083•Estate of Reyes CA2/6
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Filed 5/27/26 Estate of Reyes CA2/6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
Estate of WILLIAM REYES, 2d Civ. No. B347987
Deceased. (Ventura County
Super. Ct. No.
2024PRTR024726)
PETER REYES,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
EDWARD REYES,
Objector and Respondent.
Peter Reyes appeals a probate court order finding that his
father properly amended a trust to disinherit Peter after his
mother died. The trust incorporated an exhibit that allowed
amendment by a surviving spouse. There is no ambiguity in the
language of the trust. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. Declaration of Trust
On April 27, 2011, spouses William Reyes and Julia Reyes
executed a Declaration of Trust (Declaration), which created the
Reyes Trust Dated April 27, 2011 (Trust). The Trust designated
William and Julia1 as trustees. Their sons, Peter and Edward,
were named beneficiaries. Article IV of the Declaration
permitted amendment by both trustees while they were alive:
“During our joint lifetimes, we may amend any of the trust terms
by a writing signed by both of us and delivered to the Trustee.” It
also stated, “No amendment shall be valid unless the Trustee
accepts such, except for an amendment removing the Trustee.”
William and Julia signed the Declaration as settlors and trustees
and had it notarized.
Article I of the Declaration required the Trustee to
“distribute the trust estate according to the attached Exhibit A.”
Exhibit A, titled “Distribution of Trust,” was neither signed nor
notarized, and was attached following the Declaration’s signature
page.
Exhibit A contained terms for the distribution of Trust
property while William and Julia were both alive, after the death
of one of the spouses, and upon the death of the surviving spouse.
Article II of Exhibit A stated that if Julia died first, William was
required to allocate Julia’s half of the community property and
any of her separate property to a separate, irrevocable trust
called the “Disclaimer Trust.”
Article II, section B of Exhibit A allowed the surviving
spouse to amend the remainder of the Trust: “After the death of
1 Because all individuals have the same last name, we use
first names for clarity.
2
the deceased spouse, the surviving spouse shall have the power to
amend, revoke or terminate this trust but not any Disclaimer
Trust.”
Upon the surviving spouse’s death, Exhibit A directed the
successor trustee to hold the Trust estate for the life of Peter and
Edward. The successor trustee had the discretion to distribute
money to the sons and to allow either son to live rent free on
William and Julia’s home property.
II. Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust
Julia died March 23, 2020. In April 2022, William executed
an Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust, disinheriting
Peter (Amended Declaration). The Amended Declaration states
that by the terms of the previous Declaration, the Trust “may be
amended by me as the surviving settlor at any time by an
instrument in writing signed by me.”
William declared: “I have transferred and delivered to
myself as Trustee . . . all right, title, and interest in all of my real
and personal property . . . in any form whatsoever, to be
administered and distributed as provided in this instrument,
together with any additional assets that may be added to this
Trust.” He stated his intent that “all real and personal properties
owned by me” are “part of this Trust.” The Amended Declaration
includes the family home and all non-retirement bank and
investment accounts. It does not mention the Disclaimer Trust.
The Amended Declaration provides that after William dies,
Edward shall receive the Trust estate. William expressly stated
that he “intentionally failed to provide” for Peter.
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III. Litigation
William died April 8, 2023. On November 13, 2023,
Edward’s attorney mailed and emailed Peter a notice pursuant to
Probate Code2 section 16061.7 and a copy of the Trust documents.
In May 2024, Peter initiated a probate proceeding to
suspend and remove Edward as trustee of the Disclaimer Trust
and compel Edward to provide a copy of the Disclaimer Trust. In
December 2024, in the same proceeding, Edward filed a petition
for instructions pursuant to section 17200. Edward sought a
finding that Exhibit A to the original Declaration was valid and
allowed William to amend the Trust.
The trial court granted Edward’s petition in part. It found
that Exhibit A of the Declaration was a valid portion of the Trust
executed by William and Julia. It also found that William could
amend the Trust but not the Disclaimer Trust. On February 18,
2025, the court entered the order with its findings.
DISCUSSION
The principal question is whether Exhibit A to the
Declaration permitted William to amend the Trust and disinherit
Peter. For the following reasons, we conclude that it did.
I. Standard of review
Unless the interpretation of a trust depends on extrinsic
evidence, the interpretation of the trust is reviewed de novo.
(Doolittle v. Exchange Bank (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 529, 539-540
(Doolittle).) Here, only the Declaration, Exhibit A, and the
Amended Declaration were presented to the trial court. Because
interpretation of the Trust documents does not turn on extrinsic
evidence, we independently interpret the documents. (Ibid.)
2 Statutory references are to the Probate Code, unless
otherwise indicated.
4
Edward argues that the trial court’s predicate finding, that
Exhibit A was part of the original signed instrument, is a factual
determination entitled to substantial evidence review. We need
not resolve that question because the result is the same under
either standard. As discussed below, the record unambiguously
supports the conclusion that Exhibit A was incorporated into the
Trust: the signed Declaration expressly references Exhibit A in
both its Table of Contents and Article I, and the document would
be incomplete without it.
II. Analysis
1. Section 16061.8 does not bar Peter’s challenge to the Amended
Declaration
Edward asserts that Peter is barred from challenging the
contents of the Trust because he did not bring an action to
contest the Trust within 120 days from service of the notice
pursuant to section 16061.7, as set forth in section 16061.8. That
deadline, however, does not apply because Peter is not contesting
the Trust under section 16061.7. Rather, he seeks to invalidate
the Amended Declaration so he can remain a beneficiary. That is
enforcement of a trust, not a trust contest and is not time-barred
by the 120-day deadline. (Packard v. Packard (2025) 108
Cal.App.5th 1284, 1292.)
2. The Declaration and Exhibit A unambiguously allowed
William to amend the Trust
Peter argues that the original Declaration is ambiguous
because Exhibit A is inconsistent with the Declaration. We
disagree. Article IV of the Declaration governed amendment of
the Trust while William and Julia were alive. Exhibit A
governed amendment after one of them died.
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The Declaration stated that distribution of the Trust estate
shall comply with Exhibit A. Exhibit A set forth the distribution
of the Trust estate in three distinct scenarios: 1) while William
and Julia were both alive, 2) after Julia died, and 3) after
William, the surviving spouse, died.
If only Julia died, William was obligated to transfer Julia’s
half of the community property and her separate property to a
Disclaimer Trust, which was separate and irrevocable. Exhibit A
allowed William to amend, revoke, or terminate the Trust but not
the Disclaimer Trust. In other words, the integrated Trust
(including Exhibit A) allowed William to remove Peter as a
beneficiary of the Trust only, not the Disclaimer Trust, after
Julia died. He did so by executing the Amended Declaration in
April 2022.
A written instrument is ambiguous when, considering the
circumstances around its execution, its language is “ ‘ “fairly
susceptible to two or more constructions.” [Citations].’ ” (Ike v.
Doolittle (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 51, 74 (Ike).) The Declaration
governed amendment of the Trust during the settlors’ joint
lifetimes. Exhibit A governed amendments by the surviving
spouse after the other spouse died. While each amendment
scenario is contained in a different document, the amendment
provisions do not conflict. They are consistent and unambiguous.
Indeed, Peter does not argue that all of Exhibit A is void
because it is unsigned, undated, and unnotarized. Exhibit A,
after all, is the only place in the Trust that names him as a
beneficiary. He provides no legal reason for voiding only the
amendment provision while leaving the rest of Exhibit A in effect.
Peter suggests that perhaps the attached Exhibit A is not
the real Exhibit A referenced in the Trust. He argues, “[f]or all
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we know it could have been stapled to the Trust after [Julia]
passed.” But he provides no evidence that William fraudulently
altered the Trust after Julia died by replacing the real Exhibit A
with a version that allowed him to amend the Trust and
disinherit Peter. This is speculation, and without more evidence,
the trial court was not required to give the argument credence or
hold an evidentiary hearing.
The intent of the transferor is determined from the
instrument as a whole. (§ 21102, subd. (a).) All parts of an
instrument are to be construed in relation to each other so as to
form a consistent whole. (§ 21121.)
Article I of the Declaration directed the Trustee to
“distribute the trust estate according to the attached Exhibit A.”
The Declaration’s “Table of Contents” also identifies Exhibit A as
a component of the instrument. Reading the instrument as a
whole, as the Probate Code requires, Exhibit A is part of the
Trust. By signing the Declaration, William and Julia adopted
Exhibit A’s terms as their own. Exhibit A’s lack of a separate
signature does not diminish its legal force as part of the
instrument they executed.
When interpreting a trust instrument, its words “are to
receive an interpretation that will give every expression some
effect, rather than one that will render any of the expressions
inoperative.” (§ 21120.) “All parts of an instrument are to be
construed in relation to each other and so as, if possible, to form a
consistent whole.” (§ 21121.) Here, because the amendment
provisions in Article IV of the Declaration and Article II,
subdivision (B) of Exhibit A apply to two different scenarios,
joint-lifetime amendment by both settlors, and post-death
amendment by the surviving spouse, respectively, we need not
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strain to give both provisions “some effect” as part of a consistent
whole. They address different circumstances and operate
independently of one another.
3. No extrinsic evidence was necessary
Peter also contends that extrinsic evidence was required to
determine the intent of William and Julia. Extrinsic evidence,
however, is only admissible to resolve an ambiguity in the trust
document or a factual conflict. (Ike, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p.
74 [extrinsic evidence admissible to resolve ambiguity in trust
instrument].) Extrinsic evidence may also be introduced to show
that seemingly unambiguous language has a “latent ambiguity”
which is subject to a different interpretation. (In re Estate of
Russell (1968) 69 Cal.2d 200, 207.)
For the reasons discussed above, there is no ambiguity
between the Declaration and Exhibit A. Nor did Peter proffer a
factual conflict requiring resolution in an evidentiary hearing.
Peter never introduced extrinsic evidence in the trial court
showing that the Trust documents are subject to more than one
meaning or that Exhibit A was stapled to the Declaration after
Julia’s passing. Accordingly, Peter forfeited any right to present
extrinsic evidence. (Truck Ins. Exchange v. AMCO Ins. Co. (2020)
56 Cal.App.5th 619, 635.)
Neither Ike, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th 51, nor Wells Fargo
Bank v. Marshall (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 447 (Wells Fargo),
supports Peter’s arguments. Those cases turned on ambiguities
in the trust instruments that required resolution. (Ike, supra, 61
Cal.App.4th at pp. 74-76; Wells Fargo, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 454, 457-458.) “Particularly in the field of interpreting trusts
and wills, each case depends upon its own peculiar facts, and
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‘ “precedents have comparatively small value . . . .” ’ ” (Wells
Fargo, at p. 453.)
Absent an ambiguity or factual conflict, there was no need
for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing.
4. The Amended Declaration did not amend the Disclaimer Trust
Peter argues that even if Exhibit A and its amendment
provision were effective, William impermissibly amended the
entire Trust, including the Disclaimer Trust. This argument also
fails.
Even though the Amended Declaration does not mention
the Disclaimer Trust, Exhibit A provided that the Disclaimer
Trust is separate and irrevocable. In the Amended Trust,
William declared that it applied to his “real and personal
property” that was “owned by [him].” William thus emphasized
that the Restatement only pertained to property that was owned
by him.
We agree with the trial court that the Amended
Declaration pertained only to Trust property not included in the
Disclaimer Trust.
5. Julia intended to allow William to amend the Trust
Finally, Peter maintains it was never Julia’s intent that
Peter be disinherited. The Trust’s language answers this.
Exhibit A reflected that after one spouse died, the surviving
spouse could “amend, revoke or terminate” the Trust. As to
William’s portion of trust property, therefore, Julia intended
William to have the ability to amend it in whatever way he chose,
including eliminating Peter’s distribution rights.
Peter’s reliance on Brock v. Hall (1949) 33 Cal.2d 885
(Brock) is misplaced. The doctrine in Brock implies gifts to fill
gaps where a trust is silent and has no application here where
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the instrument expressly addresses the surviving spouse’s power
to amend. (Id. at p. 891.)
6. Peter’s contentions raised for the first time on appeal are barred
Peter contends for the first time on appeal, that a letter
written by Edward’s trust administration counsel referring only
to the 2011 Trust shows the original Trust, and not William’s
amendment, is operative. A post-execution letter by counsel,
however, sheds no light on the settlors’ intent at the time of
execution. (§§ 21101, 21102, subd. (a).)
Peter also argues for the first time on appeal, that the
Trust limited Exhibit A to distribution of trust assets and did not
authorize Exhibit A to change the amendment procedure. He
forfeited this argument by not raising it in the trial court. (Truck
Ins. Exchange, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 635.) Were we to
reach the merits, the argument would fare no better. The
Declaration incorporated Exhibit A in its entirety. It did not
limit that incorporation to Exhibit A’s distribution provisions. To
read the incorporation so narrowly would require us to disregard
Article II, subdivision (B) altogether, rendering it inoperative in
violation of the rule that every expression in an instrument must
be given effect. (§ 21120.)
The trial court correctly found that Exhibit A is a valid part
of the Trust and that William had authority to amend it following
Julia’s death. Because the Trust documents are unambiguous, no
extrinsic evidence was admissible. Peter’s remaining contentions
are foreclosed by the plain language of the instrument.
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order granting Edward’s petition
in part. Costs are awarded to respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
VAN ROOYEN, J.*
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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Roger L. Lund, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Law Offices of Barron E. Ramos and Barron E. Ramos for
Petitioner and Appellant.
Law Office of Fred Rosenmund and Frederick Rosenmund
and Charles A. Hamm for Objector and Respondent.
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