CourtListener 10865076•Long v. Hemet Unified School Dist. CA4/1
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Filed 5/27/26 Long v. Hemet Unified School Dist. CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
TORI LONG, D085443
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. MCC2001964)
HEMET UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Raquel A. Marquez, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Finkel Firm and Sheryl L. Marx; The Cowan Law Firm and Jeffrey W.
Cowan, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Walsh & Associates, Dennis J. Walsh and Robert Kostrenich; Pollak,
Vida & Barer, Daniel P. Barer and Hamed A. Ghaemmaghami, for Defendant
and Respondent.
Tori Long appeals from the summary judgment entered against her in
the lawsuit she filed against Hemet Unified School District (the District),
where she was previously employed as a physical education and dance
teacher. Based on the District’s treatment of her as a transgender person,
Long’s lawsuit alleged several causes of action under the Fair Employment
and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code,1 § 12900 et seq.).
Long contends that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment, and that, at a minimum, it should have granted her leave to file a
third amended complaint to conform her allegations to the evidence she
presented in opposition to the District’s motion for summary judgment.
We conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
on the first cause of action for discrimination in violation of FEHA (§ 12940,
subd. (a)) as to Long’s claim that the District constructively discharged her
when it allegedly re-affirmed its policy excluding her from the locker rooms.
Further, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the fifth
cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination in violation of FEHA
(§ 12940, subd. (k)) because Long still has a viable underlying claim for
discrimination and because the District has not otherwise established that it
has taken all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination from occurring.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings on
those causes of action.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Long’s Employment With the District
Long was hired by the District as a physical education and dance
teacher at Hemet High School in 2013. At that time, Long presented as male
while at work. In April 2016, Long separately met with Hemet High School
principal Emily Shaw and the District’s Deputy Superintendent overseeing
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the
Government Code.
2
human resources, LaFaye Platter, to inform them of Long’s plan to transition
to female after the end of the 2015–2016 school year.
The customary practice at the school was for male physical education
teachers to supervise the boys’ locker room, and female physical education
teachers to supervise the girls’ locker room. Long had responsibilities for the
boys’ locker room during the 2015–2016 school year. After Long met with
Principal Shaw on April 4, 2016, but before Long met with Deputy
Superintendent Platter, Shaw sent an email to Platter and other human
resources administrators at the District informing them of Long’s planned
transition and observing that a nearby school district had recently dealt with
the transition of a transgender teacher. Shaw’s email stated, “With [Long]
being in a position of supervision over female/male students in the locker-
room I believe it is a touchier subject. [¶] Since this is uncharted territory for
[Hemet Unified School District] how would you like me to proceed?”
Long then met with Platter on April 6, 2016. According to Long’s
deposition testimony, Platter told Long “that [Long] will not be allowed into
the male or female locker rooms, period.” Moreover, as Long stated in her
declaration, Platter explained that the decision was based on Long’s
transgender status. Long testified during her deposition that she felt there
was nothing she could do about Platter’s directive, but she did not complain
at the time because she was afraid to do so.
According to Shaw, Platter subsequently informed her that Long and
Platter had “mutually agreed that [Long] would not supervise in the locker
room.” Shaw understood this to mean that although Long would no longer be
assigned to supervise students in the locker rooms, Long could still enter the
locker rooms when students were not present.
3
According to Long, her exclusion from the locker rooms during school
hours impacted her in multiple ways. First, she could not access the
equipment stored in the locker rooms, even though, as chair of the physical
education department, Long had responsibility for that equipment. As a
result, Long would arrive early at school to access the equipment, and at
times she would have to ask a student to obtain or return equipment for her,
which was humiliating. Second, there were faculty offices inside the locker
rooms, with a faculty bathroom inside those offices. As a consequence of the
District’s policy preventing Long from entering the locker rooms during
school hours, Long could not access the bathrooms there.2 According to
Long’s declaration, because she could not access the locker-room bathrooms
“[o]n one occasion (in about 2018), I soiled myself because I could not get to a
bathroom far away in time.”
At some point over the next three years, after Long had transitioned to
presenting as female, she took it upon herself to ignore Platter’s directive and
2 Referring to it as an “Apartheid” bathroom policy, Long contends in her
briefing on appeal that she was limited to using only a single specially
designated bathroom at the school. Among several examples, Long asserts
that the District “banned Ms. Long . . . from using every other restroom
available to other (non-transgender) faculty except a single bathroom across
the campus—that [the District] designated for the use of Ms. Long alone.”
She further contends “[the District’s] ‘Apartheid’ bathroom policy . . . forbade
Ms. Long from using all ladies bathrooms except for one assigned solely to
her.” The record does not bear out these claims. Undisputed evidence shows
that because Long was precluded from supervising in the locker rooms, she
could not use the staff restroom located within the locker rooms. The record
further shows that because Long was a dance teacher who taught many of
her classes in the dance studio, at Long’s request in June 2016, a male-
gendered bathroom near the dance studio was converted into a locked gender-
neutral staff bathroom that could be used by any staff member with a key,
including Long. However, nothing in the record suggests that Long was
limited to using only that specific bathroom at the school.
4
to start supervising students in the girls’ locker room.3 The record contains
only sparse information about when Long started once again entering the
locker rooms while students were present. According to Shaw, as of October
31, 2019, she was not aware that Long had resumed the activity of locker
room supervision.
In the fall of 2019, school staff became aware that because physical
education classes ended early so that students could change clothes, there
was a growing problem with some students from physical education classes
leaving the locker room area and causing disruptions in other areas of the
school prior to the end of the class period. To address that problem, Shaw
decided that for the last few minutes of each class period, a staff member
should be assigned to supervise the “commons door” that led from the
physical education area to the main part of the school campus. According to
Shaw, based on her belief that Long was not providing supervision in the
locker rooms as a result of Platter’s 2016 directive, she chose Long as the
teacher for that assignment.
The decision to assign Long to supervise the commons door was
communicated to Long on October 31, 2019, in an email by assistant principal
La Price Sanford. Sanford told Long, “It was decided that since you don’t
have to supervise either locker room, that you supervise the door going into
the commons.” Sanford further told Long she should “work with the PE staff
to make sure that they supervise students with all due diligence and if there
are students in the PE areas that should not be to have the teachers radio to
either an administrator or campus supervisors for assistance.” Long replied
3 Platter retired from her position in 2017. The record does not reflect
whether that fact had any impact on Long’s decision to resume the activity of
locker room supervision.
5
to Sanford, stating “I’m so confused” and asking if Sanford could immediately
come speak with her. According to Sanford’s description of the ensuing
conversation, she told Long “that under direction from Dr. Shaw to tell her
that she couldn’t supervise the locker room.” As Long stated in her
declaration, “Assistant Principal Sanford told me that she talked to Principal
Shaw and that Principal Shaw said that I was not allowed to go into the
locker room and that I would be forced to monitor the common area where the
security guards usually monitored.” (Italics added.)
Later that same day, Long sent an email to Sanford and Shaw. In that
email, Long provided details about her daily schedule, including that she was
supervising the girls’ locker room during first and fifth period. Long also
stated, “I’m not sure who told you that I do not supervise the girls locker
room—and this is not my first year doing it. Someone is sadly, misinformed.
Are you asking me not to help Marie in the mornings now and aid staff
during 5th period—when everyone [sic] PE teacher is on duty? I honestly do
not support that. But I will do what you all believe is necessary. I strongly
believe someone has jumped to conclusions, instead of just meeting with me
before a decision was made. I am approachable and will do whatever it takes
to support staff and students. And please tell me why I don’t have to
supervise the girls locker room?”
A few minutes after sending that email, Long sent a text message to
Shaw. The text stated, “I am very disappointed in the email I received from
[Sanford]. Did you actually believe that I don’t help the PE staff? And what’s
up with the comment that I don’t have to help supervise in the locker rooms.
I was so sure that we were pas[t] all of that. It’s been 4 years. I have always
felt comfortable sharing things with you, especially about my department and
personal life. I feel awful!” Shaw responded with a text that stated, “I am
6
very sorry that [sic] feel uncomfortable. I am willing to meet with you in
person.” Long responded, “How would you feel, Emily? I’m beyond feeling
uncomfortable. I’m sick to my stomach. But no worries, I’ll do whatever you
need me to do.” Shaw then texted that she was “truly sorry” but that “[t]his
is a conversation better had in person.”
Shaw explained during her deposition that she understood Long’s text
to be referring to the policy excluding Long from the locker rooms that was
implemented by Platter in 2016, and that when Long stated “it’s been 4
years,” Long was referring to her transgender status.
Shaw and Long did not end up having an in-person conversation. Long
contends she was waiting for Shaw to set up a meeting, and that, in addition,
she believed Sanford was going to speak with Shaw on her behalf. Shaw
states that she thought she had extended an open invitation for Long to meet
with her, which Long could have done by stopping by Shaw’s office as she had
done in the past, or by speaking with Shaw after a department chair meeting.
As a result of Shaw’s decision, Long was removed from supervising the
girls’ locker room, and she was instead assigned to supervise the commons
door. Long was the only physical education teacher who did not have locker
room responsibilities.
On January 5, 2020, during the school’s winter break, Long sent a
letter by email to the District’s assistant superintendent for human
resources, which stated she was resigning her employment effective January
6, 2020. The notice did not provide any information about why Long was
resigning.
7
B. Long’s Complaints Filed With the Department of Fair Employment and
Housing
On March 5, 2020, Long filed a charge of discrimination with the
California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH)4 and the
federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Long specified the
discrimination occurred from October 31, 2019, to January 5, 2020. She
provided the following factual description: “I have been working for Hemet
Unified School District since about 8/6/13 to about 1/5/20 as a Physical
Education Teacher at Hemet High School. On about 10/31/19, I was the only
PE teacher to be removed from locker room supervision duty and reassigned
to campus common door supervision duty. On about 1/5/20, I was
constructively discharged from my job. No reason was provided for the
reassignment or the constructive discharge. I believe that I was
discriminated against due to my sex-gender identity (transgender female), in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.”
On September 3, 2020, after retaining counsel, Long filed another
complaint with DFEH. The complaint did not set forth any specific factual
description of Long’s allegations and instead provided only boilerplate
allegations of discrimination, harassment and retaliation by the District and
Hemet High School, which were alleged to have occurred “on or about
January 31, 2020.” At Long’s request when filing the complaint, the DFEH
immediately issued a right to sue letter.
4 By legislative amendment to section 12901 in 2022, the name of DFEH
was changed to the Civil Rights Department. (Stats. 2022, ch. 48, § 30.)
Because the name DFEH was in use at the time Long filed the
administrative complaints at issue here, we refer to the department by that
name.
8
C. Long’s Lawsuit Against the District
Long filed a lawsuit against the District on October 6, 2020. The
operative second amended complaint (SAC) contains five causes of action.
The first cause of action alleges discrimination based on transgender
status in violation of FEHA. (§ 12940, subd. (a).) That cause of action states,
“During [Long’s] employment . . . [the District], through its supervisors,
engaged in actions that had a negative impact on the treatment of employees
who were transgender,” and it specifically avers that Long was
“constructively discharged” because of her transgender status.
The second cause of action alleges harassment based on transgender
status in violation of FEHA. (§ 12940, subd. (j)(1).) Specifically, that cause of
action states the District “shunned [Long] in her daily activities, refused to
allow her to enter the boys’ or girls’ locker rooms, and took other actions
directed toward [Long] to get her to quit her job because she is transgender.”
The third cause of action alleges retaliation in violation of FEHA.
(§ 12940, subd. (h).) With respect to that cause of action, Long states that she
“believes, and on that basis alleges, that her complaints about discrimination
and harassment because she is a transgender woman was a substantial
motivating reason for [the District’s] constructive discharge of [Long].”
The fourth cause of action alleges “failure to investigate” in violation of
FEHA.
The fifth cause of action alleges “failure to prevent discrimination,
harassment and retaliation” in violation of FEHA.
D. The Trial Court Grants Summary Judgment in Favor of the District
The District filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative
for summary adjudication. As to each cause of action, the District argued
(1) the statute of limitations barred Long’s causes of action to the extent they
9
arose from conduct occurring prior to September 3, 2019;5 and (2) based on
the evidence, Long’s claims had no merit. Further, as to the fourth cause of
action for “failure to investigate” in violation of FEHA, the District argued
that FEHA does not provide for such a cause of action.
The trial court ruled on the summary judgment motion in two stages.
First, after a hearing held on October 4, 2023, the trial court granted
summary adjudication on the second, third and fourth causes of action (for
harassment, retaliation and failure to investigate), but it requested
additional briefing on the first and fifth causes of action (for discrimination
and failure to prevent discrimination).
After receiving that briefing and holding another hearing on December
12, 2023, the trial court requested that the parties provide yet another round
of briefing as to the first and fifth causes of action. In response, the parties
filed the further briefing requested by the court, and Long filed a motion for
leave to file a third amended complaint, which the District opposed.
On March 15, 2024, the trial court issued orders (1) granting summary
judgment as to the remaining first and fifth causes of action; and (2) denying
Long’s motion for leave to file a third amended complaint.
The trial court concluded that summary judgment was warranted on
the first and fifth causes of action for two independent reasons. First,
“reinstatement of the locker room ban in October 2019 [was] not alleged in
the operative SAC as the reason[ ] for the constructive discharge. . . . [Long]
failed to allege in the SAC that her constructive termination was based on
anything more than her reassignment in October 2019 to monitor doors in
the common area.” According to the trial court, in the absence of any
5 On appeal, the District no longer relies on the bar of the statute of
limitations as a ground to support the judgment.
10
properly pleaded reinstatement of the locker room ban, “[a] reasonable person
in [Long’s] shoes would not be compelled to resign over the reassignment to
monitor doors in the common area.”
Second, the trial court explained that even if it “assumed that it was
alleged in the SAC that [Long] was ‘re-banned’ from the locker room in 2019,”
in the trial court’s view the evidence did not support Long’s contention that
the District reinstated the locker room ban. As the trial court stated, “the
undisputed evidence shows [Long] stopped abiding by the 2016 locker room
ban long before October 31, 2019, which Shaw apparently knew about,”6 and
“[Long] admits she had been routinely entering the locker room and no one
was enforcing the locker room ban.” Accordingly, if, as Long alleged, “Shaw
told Sanford that ‘[Long] was not allowed in the locker room,’ . . . the evidence
shows such comments were made only in reference to [Long’s] assignment to
supervise students at the common area doors instead of the locker room,” and
was not a reinstatement of the locker room ban.7 In addition, the trial court
6 The record contains no factual support for the trial court’s statement
that, when Shaw assigned Long to supervise the commons door, Shaw
“apparently knew about” the fact that Long was “routinely entering the
locker room.” On the contrary, Shaw’s declaration states, “I did not know
that [Long] had unilaterally decided to return to supervising inside locker
rooms until I heard her say that she had done so at her deposition on May 6,
2022.” At her deposition, Shaw was confronted with Long’s October 31, 2019
email to Shaw and Sanford, in which Long questioned the assignment to
supervise the commons door and informed Shaw that she had been
supervising the girls’ locker room for multiple years. Shaw stated she did not
“process it” at the time the email was sent.
7 The record also does not support the trial court’s statement that no
evidence supports a “reinstatement,” in October 2019, of the policy excluding
Long from the locker room. Sanford stated that Shaw told her to convey to
Long that Long “couldn’t supervise the locker room.” As Long described that
11
concluded that because Long did not inform the District about the intolerable
working conditions, she could not prevail on a claim of constructive discharge.
Having concluded that Long would not be able to establish
discrimination in violation of FEHA, the trial court also concluded there was
no merit to the fifth cause of action, which alleged that the District failed to
prevent that discrimination.8
In denying Long’s motion for leave to file a third amended complaint,
the trial court explained that “[t]he proposed amendment would be futile
because [Long] cannot show she was constructively discharged.”
The trial court subsequently entered judgment in favor of the District.
Long appeals from the judgment.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Legal Standards for Summary Judgment and Summary
Adjudication Motions
Because Long appeals following orders granting summary judgment
and summary adjudication, we first set forth the standards applicable to such
rulings.
A “motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers
submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that
conversation, Sanford told her that, according to Shaw, Long “was not
allowed to go into the locker room.”
8 The trial court’s tentative ruling, issued after the second round of
supplemental briefing, explained the trial court’s reason for concluding that
the fifth cause of action lacked merit, namely, that “[b]ecause the
discrimination claim fails, so too does this claim.” However, the trial court
neglected in its final ruling granting summary judgment to explain why it
found the fifth cause of action to be without merit. We infer that the trial
court intended to incorporate the reason set forth in its tentative ruling.
12
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant moving for summary judgment has the
initial burden of “showing that one or more elements of the cause of action
cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of
action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Once the defendant meets that
burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or
more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. (Id.)
“A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an
alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all
procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c.)
In reviewing a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary
adjudication, we “ ‘take the facts from the record that was before the trial
court when it ruled on that motion. [Citation.] “ ‘We review the trial court’s
decision de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and
opposing papers except that to which objections were made and sustained.’ ”
[Citation.] We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party
opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in
favor of that party.’ ” (Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 39.)
B. Long’s Challenge to the Summary Adjudication of the Second, Third
and Fourth Causes of Action
We begin our analysis with the summary adjudication of the second
cause of action for harassment in violation of FEHA, the third cause of action
for retaliation in violation of FEHA, and the fourth cause of action for failure
to investigate in violation of FEHA.
1. The Second Cause of Action for Harassment in Violation of FEHA
Under FEHA, it is unlawful “[f]or an employer, . . . because of . . .
gender identity [and] gender expression, . . . to harass an employee.”
13
(§ 12940, subd. (j)(1).) “Harassment of an employee . . . shall be unlawful if
the entity, or its agents or supervisors, knows or should have known of this
conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.” (Id.)
To prevail on a claim of harassment under FEHA, “an employee must show
she was subjected to harassing conduct that was (1) unwelcome; (2) because
of [membership in a protected class]; and (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive work
environment. [Citations.] In addition, she must establish that the offending
conduct was imputable to her employer.” (Bailey v. San Francisco Dist.
Attorney’s Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th 611, 627 (Bailey).)
Actionable harassment occurs “ ‘[w]hen the workplace is permeated
with “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult” [citation] that is
“sufficiently severe” or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment and create an abusive working environment’ ” (Yanowitz v.
L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1052–1053 (Yanowitz).) The
requirement that allegedly harassing conduct be sufficiently severe or
pervasive to create an abusive work environment “strikes a ‘middle path
between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and
requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury.’ ” (Bailey,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 628.) “Whether a work environment is reasonably
perceived as hostile or abusive ‘is not, and by its nature cannot be, a
mathematically precise test.’ [Citation.] ‘The working environment must be
evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances.’ [Citation.] ‘ “These
may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
performance.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “The required level of severity or seriousness
14
varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.” ’ ”
(Ibid.)
In her trial court briefing in opposition to the District’s motion for
summary judgment, Long focused on a single factual theory to support her
second cause of action for harassment. Specifically, Long argued that the
District’s decision to exclude her from the locker rooms over the course of
several years created “a continuing and ongoing environment of humiliation
for [Long].” As we will explain, Long’s reliance on the locker room policy to
support her harassment claim fails to persuade us.
“ ‘[H]arassment refers to bias that is expressed or communicated
through interpersonal relations in the workplace,’ ” and focuses on
“ ‘situations in which the social environment of the workplace becomes
intolerable because the harassment (whether verbal, physical, or visual)
communicates an offensive message to the harassed employee.’ ” (Bailey,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 627.) In contrast, “ ‘discrimination refers to bias in
the exercise of official actions on behalf of the employer.’ ” (Ibid.)
“ ‘ “[H]arassment consists of conduct outside the scope of necessary job
performance, conduct presumably engaged in for personal gratification,
because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives.” ’ ” (Roby v.
McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 707 (Roby).) Thus, “ ‘ “[c]ommonly
necessary personnel management actions . . . do not come within the meaning
of harassment. . . . These actions may retrospectively be found
discriminatory if based on improper motives, but in that event the remedies
provided by the FEHA are those for discrimination, not harassment. . . . This
significant distinction underlies the differential treatment of harassment and
discrimination in the FEHA.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
15
Here, the policy excluding Long from the locker rooms based on her
transgender status is best described as an example of alleged “bias in the
exercise of official actions on behalf of the employer” (Bailey, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 627), which took the form of a “personnel management
action.” (Roby, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 707.) Therefore, the existence of the
policy may support a claim of discrimination, but, without more, it does not
lend support to a claim of harassment. To be sure, in certain instances, the
same evidence might support both a claim for discrimination due to a
personnel management action and a claim for harassment. (Id. at pp. 707–
709.) However, in such instances, “some official employment actions done in
furtherance of a supervisor’s managerial role” will “have a secondary effect of
communicating a hostile message. This occurs when the actions establish a
widespread pattern of bias.” (Roby, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 709.) The record
does not contain evidence of any hostile message communicated in connection
with imposition of the policy excluding Long from the locker rooms.
In her opening appellate brief, Long focuses on additional items to
support her claim for harassment.
First, to support her claim for harassment, Long refers to a statement
in her declaration describing Shaw’s facial expressions when she and Shaw
were wearing similar clothes. Long states, “On one occasion in about 2018, I
went to Principal Shaw’s office, and realized that she and I were wearing
similar clothes. I saw Principal Shaw look at me in disgust. On a second
occasion in about 2019, I encountered Principal Shaw outside the Attendance
Office (by a ramp) and saw that she and I were wearing the same color (pink)
and style blouse. I saw Principal Shaw look at me with horror and disgust
when she saw that we were dressed the same. Her reactions were so strong
that it communicated plainly that she was appalled at being in a situation
16
where she would be associated with me due to our inadvertent ‘twins’ outfits
those two occasions.” However, no reasonable finder of fact could conclude
that Shaw’s facial expressions on two occasions, standing alone, constituted
conduct that was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
her employment and create an abusive work environment.” (Bailey, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 627.) Even assuming that Long correctly perceived that
Shaw’s facial expressions were due to Long’s transgender status, the
incidents described by Long fall under the rule that “ ‘ “[s]imple teasing,
offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)” ’ are not
sufficient to create an actionable claim of harassment.” (Id. at p. 628.)9
Next, Long contends that her harassment claim is supported by the
District’s conduct following an instance in which a student directed unwanted
conduct toward Long based on her transgender status. As Shaw described
the incident in her declaration, “The only incident involving any students
concerning [Long] that was reported to me occurred in September 2016. I
was informed by students on the dance team that a male student had posted
a picture and made comments about [Long] in a Snapchat message
distributed to other students. I informed [Long] of the incident prior to her
knowledge of it. . . . The student was disciplined accordingly by me for his
actions. Due to privacy, student discipline is not shared with anyone else
besides the student, the student’s parents, and appropriate administrators.
Student discipline is not shared with teachers. As a result of the discipline,
the student did not repeat the behavior.” During her deposition, Long
explained that she did not see the student’s Snapchat message, but she
9 Long’s appellate briefing also refers to the purported “Apartheid
bathroom ban” as evidence that Long experienced harassment based on her
transgender status. However, as we have explained, absolutely no evidence
in the record suggests that such a policy existed. (See fn. 2, ante.)
17
understood “there were vulgar comments that were made directly about me,
that there was a picture of my body, my back side with a thong on the
student’s social media page who had made a derogatory comment about me
and spoke about the LGBT community . . . in a negative way[,] . . . talking
about how he was not raised that way.”
Long contends that because the District would not disclose to her the
name of the student who posted the message, it created a hostile
environment constituting harassment for which the District is liable. The
contention is without merit. The undisputed evidence shows that when the
District learned of the student’s conduct, it took prompt action, which
prevented further harmful conduct. In so doing, the District fulfilled its duty
to “take immediate and appropriate corrective action” after learning of the
harassment. (§ 12940, subd. (j)(1).)10 Further, the evidence shows that the
District’s decision not to disclose the student’s identity to Long was based on
its general policy, rather than on any animosity toward Long.11
10 In her appellate reply brief Long states that her harassment claim is
also based on “evidence that the [D]istrict ‘outed’ Ms. Long’s transgender
status before she was ready to have it made public.” The argument is not
properly before us because it is raised for the first time in a reply brief.
(People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1218.) Moreover, Long fails to
provide a citation to evidence in the appellate record to support the
argument.
11 Long points to Education Code sections 49079, 48900.4 and 48900,
subdivision (i) as support for her contention that she was “entitled” to
information about the student’s identity. Those statutes require a school
district to inform a teacher of a pupil who has engaged in certain activity (Ed.
Code, § 49079, subd. (a)), including “harassment, threats, or intimidation,
directed against school district personnel or pupils, that is sufficiently severe
or pervasive to have the actual and reasonably expected effect of materially
disrupting classwork, creating substantial disorder, and invading the rights
of either school personnel or pupils by creating an intimidating or hostile
18
In sum, we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary
adjudication on the second cause of action for harassment in violation of
FEHA.
2. The Third Cause of Action for Retaliation in Violation of FEHA
Long’s third cause of action alleged retaliation in violation of FEHA.
That claim is based on the statutory provision making it unlawful for an
employer “to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person
because the person has opposed any practices forbidden under this part or
because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any
proceeding under this part.” (§ 12940, subd. (h).)
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under FEHA, “a plaintiff
must show (1) he or she engaged in a ‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer
subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal
link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action.”
(Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1042.) As stated in the statute, protected
activity refers to the activity of having “opposed any practices forbidden
under this part” or having “filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any
proceeding under this part.” (§ 12940, subd. (h); see also Yanowitz at
p. 1042.) “[A] retaliation claim may be brought by an employee who has
complained of or opposed conduct that the employee reasonably believes to be
discriminatory, even when a court later determines the conduct was not
actually prohibited by the FEHA.” (Yanowitz, at p. 1043.)
In her trial court briefing in opposition to the District’s motion for
summary judgment, Long argued that the evidence showed she engaged in
educational environment” (id., § 48900.4) or “[c]ommitt[ing] an obscene act or
engaged in habitual profanity or vulgarity” (id., § 48900, subd. (i).). Here,
there is no evidence that the student’s conduct rose to that level.
19
the protected activity of complaining to Sanford and Shaw about the policy
excluding her from the locker rooms, and that, in retaliation, the District
assigned her to supervise the commons door.12
However, that theory of retaliation is not supported by the evidence.
The undisputed evidence is that Shaw assigned Long to supervise the
commons door before Long complained about the reinstatement of the policy
excluding her from the locker rooms. Thus, Long cannot establish that, after
engaging in the protected activity of complaining about being excluded from
the locker rooms, she was subject to any adverse employment action as a
result of having done so. (Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1042 [prima facie
case requires “a causal link . . . between the protected activity and the
employer’s action.”].)
3. The Fourth Cause of Action for Failure to Investigate in Violation
of FEHA
Long’s fourth cause of action was labeled “failure to investigate in
violation of the FEHA.” (Capitalization omitted.)
The District’s motion for summary judgment argued that “[t]here is no
separate cause of action under the FEHA for ‘failure to investigate’
discrimination or harassment. Rather, the FEHA only makes it unlawful for
employers to fail ‘to prevent’ discrimination or harassment.” (See § 12940,
subd. (k) [making it unlawful for an employer “to fail to take all reasonable
12 In her opening appellate brief, Long contends that the protected
activity at issue in her retaliation cause of action consisted of her
complaining to Sanford and Shaw “about the order barring her from entering
the bathroom.” Long states that, as a result of that complaint, Shaw
“reinstated the ban prohibiting Ms. Long from entering the locker rooms.”
Long’s argument is untethered to the facts. As we have explained there was
no order barring Long from entering the bathrooms at the school, and thus no
evidence that Long complained about any such ban.
20
steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring”].)
That theory is set forth in Long’s fifth cause of action for “failure to prevent
discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of the FEHA.”
(Capitalization omitted.)
In her opposition brief in the trial court, Long did not attempt to set
forth any legal basis for her fourth cause of action that was separate from her
fifth cause of action. Instead, she argued, “Whether or not [Long’s] claims for
Failure to Investigate and Failure [to] [P]revent should be one or two causes
of action, the fact remains that, for both, the underlying claims are fully
supported.” Accordingly, the trial court granted summary adjudication on
the fourth cause of action on the following basis: “[Long] does not dispute
that this claim is duplicative of the 5th cause of action for failure to prevent
discrimination, harassment and retaliation. Though it is titled ‘failure to
investigate,’ the allegations are nearly identical to the allegations supporting
the failure to prevent claim. . . . And [Long] does not make any distinction
between these two claims in the opposition.
On appeal, although Long does not clearly explain her position, she
apparently intends to challenge the summary adjudication of the fourth
cause of action for failure to investigate. In doing so, however, she continues
to combine that cause of action with the fifth cause of action as if they were
the same claim. Referring to both causes of action together, she states that
the trial court “erred in granting summary adjudication as to Ms. Long’s
‘failure to investigate and prevent’ claim.”
Long has not identified any statutory authority for her fourth cause of
action alleging “failure to investigate” in violation of FEHA that is distinct
from her fifth cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination,
21
harassment, and retaliation in violation of FEHA. Accordingly, we affirm the
summary adjudication in favor of the District on the fourth cause of action.
C. Long’s Challenge to the Summary Judgment on the First and Fifth
Causes of Action
We next turn to the summary judgment on the first cause of action for
discrimination in violation of FEHA and the fifth cause of action for failure to
prevent discrimination and retaliation in violation of FEHA.
1. The First Cause of Action for Discrimination in Violation of
FEHA
FEHA makes it “an unlawful employment practice . . . (a) For an
employer, because of . . . gender identity [or] gender expression, . . . to bar or
to discharge the person from employment . . . or to discriminate against the
person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”
(§ 12940.) Long contends that the District discriminated against her due to
her gender identity or gender expression as a transgender woman when it
reaffirmed the policy excluding her from the locker rooms in 2019. According
to Long, that policy adversely affected the terms, conditions, or privileges of
her employment and led to her constructive discharge.
a. Long’s Complaint With DFEH and Her SAC Adequately
Identify the Policy Excluding Long From the Locker Rooms
as a Basis for Her Discrimination Claim
As an initial matter, before turning to the merits of Long’s cause of
action alleging discrimination in violation of FEHA, we address the District’s
attempt to limit the scope of that claim.
Long explained during the litigation of the summary judgment motion
that her discrimination claim was based on the fact that, in October 2019, the
District reaffirmed the policy excluding her from the locker rooms. However,
on appeal, the District contends that Long is not permitted to base her
discrimination claim on that theory because it purportedly was not raised in
22
Long’s administrative complaints to DFEH and was not pled in the SAC.
According to the District, for the purpose of its summary judgment motion,
Long’s discrimination claim must be limited to a claim of constructive
discharge based on the District’s decision to assign Long to supervise the
commons door. Based on that limitation, the District would have us
disregard the evidence that, as of 2019, the District reaffirmed its policy of
excluding Long from supervising students in the locker rooms due to her
transgender status. As we will explain, we reject the District’s attempt to
limit the basis for Long’s discrimination claim in that manner.
“An employee who wishes to file suit under the FEHA ‘must exhaust
the administrative remedy provided by the statute by filing a complaint with
the’ DFEH, ‘and must obtain from the [DFEH] a notice of right to sue.’
[Citation] ‘The timely filing of an administrative complaint’ before the DFEH
‘is a prerequisite to the bringing of a civil action for damages.’ ” (Pollock v.
Tri-Modal Distribution Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 918, 931.) “To
exhaust his or her administrative remedies as to a particular act made
unlawful by the [FEHA], the claimant must specify that act in the
administrative complaint, even if the complaint does specify other cognizable
wrongful acts.” (Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1994)
29 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1724 (Martin).) “ ‘[T]he failure to exhaust an
administrative remedy is a jurisdictional, not a procedural, defect,’ and thus
that failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a ground for a defense
summary judgment.” (Ibid.)
The District contends that Long did not exhaust her administrative
remedies to be able to bring a discrimination claim premised on the theory
that the District reaffirmed its policy excluding her from the locker rooms in
23
2019.13 We disagree. In her administrative complaint filed on March 5,
2020, Long alleged that on October 31, 2019, she “was the only PE teacher to
be removed from locker room supervision duty and reassigned to campus
common door supervision duty,” which she believed was based on her “sex-
gender identity (transgender female).” In determining whether this
statement sufficiently encompasses Long’s allegation of discrimination in this
lawsuit, we must construe the statement “liberally in favor of plaintiff” and
“in light of what might be uncovered by a reasonable investigation.” (Nazir v.
United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 268.) Our role is to examine
whether Long’s discrimination claim in this lawsuit is “ ‘like and reasonably
related to’ ” her complaint to DFEH. (Wills v. Superior Court (2011)
195 Cal.App.4th 143, 154; see also Cal. Code Regs, tit. 2, § 10003 [mandating
that DFEH “liberally construe all complaints to effectuate the purpose of the
laws the department enforces . . . .”].) As we interpret Long’s DFEH
complaint, because it complains that she was “removed from locker room
supervision” due to her “sex-gender identity (transgender female),” it
reasonably encompasses Long’s claim in this lawsuit that the District
discriminated against her in October 2019 when it reaffirmed its policy
excluding her from supervising students in the locker rooms due to her
transgender status.
13 In the trial court, the District did not make an exhaustion argument in
its moving papers for summary judgment. The District identified the issue
during the second hearing on the summary judgment motion, and the trial
court requested that the parties provided briefing to address it. Because the
issue is jurisdictional (Martin, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1724) and could, in
any event, be raised on remand, we exercise our discretion to address it here,
even though it was not within the scope of the District’s summary judgment
motion.
24
Next, in relying on the principal that “ ‘[t]he burden of a defendant
moving for summary judgment only requires that [the defendant] negate
plaintiff’s theories of liability as alleged in the complaint’ ” (Ahn v. Stewart
Title Guaranty Co. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 168, 181–182), the District argues
that “Long failed to allege in the SAC that her constructive termination was
based on anything more than her reassignment in October 2019 to monitor
the doors in the common area.” The argument lacks merit.
In its general factual allegations, the SAC alleges that when Long
notified the District of her planned transition, she was instructed that she
was “not allowed to enter neither the boy[s’] nor girl[s’] locker room,” and
“[t]his mandate lasted up until her forced resignation.” The complaint
further alleges that on October 31, 2019, Long was informed that “her job
responsibilities were being changed to that of campus security as she now
had to monitor the doors in the commons area. Ms. Long was stunned about
the demotion. No non-transgender Physical Education teachers were
assigned this task.” (Capitalization omitted.) The first cause of action for
discrimination in violation of FEHA reincorporates these allegations, without
singling out any of them. That cause of action alleges, based on all of the
foregoing factual allegations, that “[d]uring [Long’s] employment . . . [the
District], through its supervisors, engaged in actions that had a negative
impact on the treatment of employees who were transgender,” and that Long
was “constructively discharged” because of her transgender status. We
conclude that although the SAC could have been more precise about the facts
surrounding the District’s assignment of Long to supervise the commons
doors and the relationship of that assignment to the policy barring Long from
the locker rooms, the complaint nevertheless does identify the District’s
exclusion of Long from the locker rooms based on her transgender status.
25
Further, the SAC alleges that the policy existed until the end of Long’s
employment. Those allegations fulfill the requirement of “giv[ing] fair notice
to the opposing party of the theories on which relief is generally being
sought.” (Howard v. Omni Hotels Management Corp. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th
403, 422.)14
b. The District Did Not Establish Long Would Be Unable To
Prevail on Her First Cause of Action Alleging
Discrimination in Violation of FEHA
Having rejected the District’s attempt to limit the scope of Long’s
discrimination cause of action, we turn to the question of whether summary
judgment was warranted on that cause of action.
“In employment discrimination cases under FEHA, plaintiffs can prove
their cases in either of two ways: by direct or by circumstantial evidence.”
(DeJung v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 533, 549 (DeJung).)
“When a plaintiff proffers circumstantial evidence, California courts
apply the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States
Supreme Court for trying claims of employment discrimination . . . based on a
theory of disparate treatment.” (DeJung, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th 533, 549.)
At the first stage, “[t]o state a prima facie case for discrimination in violation
of the FEHA, a plaintiff must establish that (1) she was a member of a
protected class, (2) she was performing competently in the position she held,
(3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) some other
circumstance suggests discriminatory motive. [Citation.] Once an employee
14 Because we conclude that the SAC sufficiently pleads the theory that
the District discriminated against Long based on its policy excluding her
from the locker rooms in 2019, we need not, and do not, consider Long’s
contention that the trial court erred in denying her motion for leave to file a
third amended complaint that would more clearly plead that theory of
discrimination.
26
establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises, and
the employer is required to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the adverse employment action. [Citation.] If the employer produces a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, the
presumption of discrimination drops out of the picture, and the burden shifts
back to the employee ‘to attack the employer’s proffered reasons as pretexts
for discrimination, or to offer any other evidence of discriminatory motive.’ ”
(Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital Assn. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 568, 577 (Ortiz).)
“This framework is modified in the summary judgment context: ‘ “[T]he
employer, as the moving party, has the initial burden to present admissible
evidence showing either that one or more elements of plaintiff’s prima facie
case is lacking or that the adverse employment action was based upon
legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors.” ’ [Citation] ‘If the employer meets its
initial burden, the burden shifts to the employee to “demonstrate a triable
issue by producing substantial evidence that the employer’s stated reasons
were untrue or pretextual, or that the employer acted with a discriminatory
animus, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the employer
engaged in intentional discrimination or other unlawful action.” ’ ” (Ortiz,
supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at pp. 577–578, italics omitted.)
The burden-shifting test does not apply, however, when the plaintiff
presents direct evidence of discrimination. (De Jung, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th
at p. 550.) “Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact of
discriminatory animus without inference or presumption.” (Ibid.) “ ‘Where a
plaintiff offers direct evidence of discrimination that is believed by the trier of
fact, the defendant can avoid liability only by proving the plaintiff would have
been subjected to the same employment decision without reference to the
27
unlawful factor.’ ” (Trop v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc. (2005)
129 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1145.)
The District’s motion for summary judgment proceeded under the
assumption that Long was relying on circumstantial evidence to prove
discrimination, and it accordingly applied a burden shifting analysis. Long in
contrast contended she provided direct evidence of discrimination that made
the burden shifting analysis inapplicable.
Continuing to view this case as controlled by the burden shifting
analysis applicable to circumstantial evidence cases, the District argues on
appeal that summary judgment was warranted on the discrimination cause
of action for two reasons. First, based on its view that the basis for Long’s
discrimination claim is limited to the District’s decision to assign her to
supervise the commons door, the District argues it has presented admissible
evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for assigning Long to that
duty, which Long will not be able to show is pretextual. Second, the District
argues that even if there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether it
acted with a discriminatory motive, Long nevertheless cannot establish an
adverse employment action as a result of any discrimination because she
cannot show she was constructively discharged. We address these arguments
in turn.
i. Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason
In contending that it had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
actions that Long targets in this lawsuit, the District states, “Long appears to
argue that her reassignment to monitor the commons doors must be based on
discriminatory intent. In doing so, she ignores [the] valid and necessary
purpose of the assignment: to prevent physical education students’ access to
other part[s] of campus and the resulting disruption to other classrooms.”
28
The District also points out that the role of supervising students was within
Long’s duties as a teacher, and that, at some point, at least one other physical
education teacher was assigned to supervise the commons door.
This argument is not persuasive because, as we have discussed, Long’s
complaint to DFEH and her SAC show that the focus of Long’s discrimination
claim is not the District’s decision to assign Long to supervise the commons
door in October 2019. Instead, Long’s claim of discrimination is based on the
District’s decision to reaffirm the policy excluding Long from the locker
rooms.
When Long’s discrimination claim is understood to be based on the
District’s policy excluding Long from the locker rooms, that claim is
supported by direct evidence of discrimination that makes the burden shifting
analysis inapplicable. (De Jung, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 550.)
Statements by Shaw and Long that appear in the record provide direct
support for findings that (1) the District, through Platter in 2016,
implemented a policy excluding Long from the locker rooms that was
expressly based on Long’s transgender status; and (2) the same policy, still
based on Long’s transgender status, was reaffirmed by Shaw in October 2019.
The District does not attempt to argue otherwise, and it proffers no
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the locker-room policy.
Accordingly, when Long’s claim of discrimination is understood as
being based on the policy excluding her from the locker rooms, the District
has failed, in its motion for summary judgment, to “present admissible
evidence showing that the adverse employment action alleged by Long was
‘based upon legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors.’ ” (Ortiz, supra,
37 Cal.App.5th at p. 577.) On the contrary, the record contains direct
29
evidence that the District took action against Long precisely because of her
status as a transgender person.
ii. Adverse Employment Action
The District next argues that regardless of whether there is a triable
issue of material fact as to whether it acted against Long out of a
discriminatory motive, Long nevertheless cannot prevail on her
discrimination claim because she will not be able to establish any adverse
employment action.
FEHA’s provision making it unlawful for an employer to commit
discrimination requires an “adverse employment action” (Yanowitz, supra,
36 Cal.4th at p. 1049; Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355),
which the statute defines as either (1) discharge; (2) discrimination in
compensation; or (3) discrimination “in terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.” (§ 12940, subd. (a).) FEHA “protects an employee against
unlawful discrimination with respect not only to so-called ultimate
employment actions such as termination or demotion, but also the entire
spectrum of employment actions that are reasonably likely to adversely and
materially affect an employee’s job performance or opportunity for
advancement in his or her career.” (Yanowitz, at pp. 1053–1054.) Thus, “the
phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges’ of employment must be interpreted
liberally and with a reasonable appreciation of the realities of the workplace
in order to afford employees the appropriate and generous protection against
employment discrimination that the FEHA was intended to provide.” (Id. at
p. 1054.)
Long argued in the trial court that she suffered an adverse employment
action both because she was constructively discharged and because, even
without constructive discharge, the District’s policy excluding her from the
30
locker room impacted the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.
According to Long, the locker-room policy impacted the terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because it (1) deprived Long of the faculty offices in
the locker rooms, (2) “forced her to arrive early or leave late” so she could
access the locker rooms, (3) “deprived [her] of access to instructional
materials during the school-day,” (4) required her to “embarrassingly ask
students to retrieve items from the locker room,” and (5) “deprived [her] of
convenient restroom facilities.” However, focusing solely on Long’s contention
that she was constructively discharged due to the policy excluding her from
the locker rooms, the District argues that Long will not be able to satisfy the
requirements for showing a constructive discharge and thus cannot establish
an adverse employment action.
“Constructive discharge occurs when the employer’s conduct effectively
forces an employee to resign. Although the employee may say, ‘I quit,’ the
employment relationship is actually severed involuntarily by the employer’s
acts, against the employee’s will. As a result, a constructive discharge is
legally regarded as a firing rather than a resignation.” (Turner v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1244–1245 (Turner).) “In order to
establish a constructive discharge, an employee must plead and prove . . .
that the employer either intentionally created or knowingly permitted
working conditions that were so intolerable or aggravated at the time of the
employee’s resignation that a reasonable employer would realize that a
reasonable person in the employee’s position would be compelled to resign.
For purposes of this standard, the requisite knowledge or intent must exist
on the part of either the employer or those persons who effectively represent
the employer, i.e., its officers, directors, managing agents, or supervisory
employees.” (Id. at p. 1251.) “The conditions giving rise to the resignation
31
must be sufficiently extraordinary and egregious to overcome the normal
motivation of a competent, diligent, and reasonable employee to remain on
the job to earn a livelihood and to serve his or her employer.” (Id. at p. 1246.)
“In order to amount to a constructive discharge, adverse working conditions
must be unusually ‘aggravated’ or amount to a ‘continuous pattern’ before the
situation will be deemed intolerable.” (Id. at p. 1247.) “[T]he standard by
which a constructive discharge is determined is an objective one—the
question is ‘whether a reasonable person faced with the allegedly intolerable
employer actions or conditions of employment would have no reasonable
alternative except to quit.’ ” (Id. at p. 1248.)
The District argues that no reasonable person in Long’s situation would
be compelled to resign. However, in making that argument, the District
frames the issue as whether reassignment to supervise the commons door
constituted sufficiently intolerable or aggravated working conditions to
compel Long’s resignation. The District points out that (1) at some point, at
least one other teacher was assigned to perform that same task and did so
without complaint or experiencing humiliation; and (2) supervision of
students was well within Long’s normal duties as a teacher. The District’s
argument fails because Long’s discrimination claim is actually based on the
District’s reaffirmation of the policy excluding her from the locker rooms in
October 2019, not merely her reassignment to supervise the commons door.
As Long states, she found the policy excluding her from the locker
rooms to be humiliating, and the reaffirmation of that policy was “the last
straw,” in response to which she resigned. As Long described in her text to
Shaw, after finding out about the reaffirmation of the policy excluding her
from the locker rooms she “fe[lt] awful” and was “sick to [her] stomach”
because she believed they were “pas[t] all that” due to the passage of time.
32
Indeed, in October 2019, it had been more than three years since Long
transitioned to presenting as female at work, but Shaw nevertheless
reaffirmed that Long was still excluded from the school’s locker rooms. Those
facts are sufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether a
reasonable person in Long’s position would be compelled to resign due to the
demeaning and humiliating nature of the policy against her as a transgender
person.15
The District further contends that Long will not be able to establish
constructive discharge because she purportedly did not complain to the
District that the policy excluding her from the locker rooms was intolerable.
However, because the discriminatory policy was implemented by supervisory
employees at the District, there was no legal requirement that Long notify the
District that she found the policy to be intolerable before resigning. “[A]n
employee seeking to establish a constructive discharge must show that the
employer either intentionally created or knowingly permitted the intolerable
working conditions, and that the intent or knowledge must exist on the part
of the employer or those persons who effectively represent the employer,
including supervisory employees.” (Ortiz, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 579.)
The policy at issue here was intentionally created by the District, through its
supervisors, giving the District sufficient knowledge of the discriminatory
policy’s existence without any further action by Long.
15 Because we conclude that Long presented evidence sufficient to raise a
triable issue as to whether she was constructively discharged, we need not,
and do not, consider Long’s alternative argument that the evidence showed
that she suffered an adverse employment action due to the impact of the
District’s locker room policy on the terms, conditions or privileges of her
employment. (Cf. Ortiz, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 580 fn. 6.)
33
In sum, the District has failed to show that Long will be unable to
prevail on her first cause of action for discrimination in violation of FEHA.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on that
cause of action.
2. The Fifth Cause of Action for Failure To Prevent Discrimination
or Harassment
FEHA makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail to take all reasonable
steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring.”
(§ 12940, subd. (k).) Long’s fifth cause of action alleges that the District
violated this provision.
“[C]ourts have required a finding of actual discrimination or
harassment under FEHA before a plaintiff may prevail under section 12940,
subdivision (k).” (Carter v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (2006)
38 Cal.4th 914, 925, fn. 4.) Based on this principle, the District argued in the
trial court that summary judgment was warranted on the fifth cause of action
because Long would be unable to prevail on her underlying harassment or
discrimination claims. Here, however, as we have explained, a triable issue
of fact exists as to the first cause of action for discrimination that precludes
summary judgment. Accordingly, the District is unable to prevail on
summary judgment as to the fifth cause of action by establishing lack of
merit to each of Long’s underlying claims.
In the trial court, the District made an alternative argument for
summary judgment on the fifth cause of action. Specifically, the District
argued that it could not be held liable on the failure-to-prevent cause of
action because it has “policies and procedures” relating to prevention of
harassment, discrimination and retaliation. (Cf. California Fair Employment
& Housing Com. v. Gemini Aluminum Corp. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1004,
1025 [to prevent discrimination, apart from prompt investigation of a
34
discrimination claim, “[o]ther reasonable steps an employer might take
include the establishment and promulgation of antidiscrimination policies
and the implementation of effective procedures to handle complaints and
grievances regarding discrimination”].) In support of that argument, the
District relied on two exhibits. The first exhibit was Long’s signature when
she was hired in 2013, by which she verified that she had received various
information, including the “Board Policy-Sexual Harassment,” “Board Policy-
Nondiscrimination in District Programs” and “Board Policy-
Nondiscrimination in Employment.” The second exhibit was an excerpt from
Long’s deposition confirming that she had received those documents.
However, in support of its summary judgment motion, the District did
not include any of the relevant policies themselves. We know only that Long
received the policies, whatever they may contain. Without any information
about what policies and procedures the District has adopted to try to prevent
discrimination, the District has not met its burden on summary judgment to
establish Long will be unable to prove that the District “fail[ed] to take all
reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination . . . from occurring”
(§ 12940, subd. (k)) as alleged in the fifth cause of action.
We accordingly reverse the trial court’s ruling granting summary
judgment on the fifth cause of action.
35
DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment, and we remand for further proceedings on
the first cause of action for discrimination in violation of FEHA and the fifth
cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination in violation of FEHA.
Long shall recover her costs on appeal.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, Acting P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
36
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