CourtListener 10864475•Walker v. Gilligan CA2/1
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Filed 5/26/26 Walker v. Gilligan CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
LUKE WALKER, B349571
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25STCV07041)
v.
VINCE GILLIGAN,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Rolf M. Treu and James I. Montgomery,
Judges. Affirmed.
Luke Walker, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp, Elaine K. Kim, James D.
Berkley for Defendant and Respondent.
____________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Plaintiff and appellant Luke Walker, a self-represented
litigant, sued defendant and respondent Vince Gilligan for
copyright infringement. In the operative second amended
complaint, Walker averred that Gilligan copied Walker’s script
when Gilligan created a television series titled Breaking Bad.
Walker also sought leave to file an amended pleading that would
have added a cause of action for fraudulent concealment against
Gilligan. Gilligan demurred to the second amended complaint,
arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over Walker’s cause of action for copyright infringement. The
court agreed with Gilligan, entered a judgment of dismissal, and
denied Walker’s two motions to vacate the dismissal.
Additionally, two trial judges assigned to this action rejected
Walker’s attempts to disqualify them.
Walker’s challenge to the orders denying his requests to
disqualify the two judicial officers is not properly before us.
Further, Walker fails to show the trial court erred in dismissing
this action because Walker does not challenge the court’s rulings
that it lacked jurisdiction over his copyright infringement claim
and that the Copyright Act preempts his proposed fraudulent
concealment claim. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it
“raise[s] no substantial issues of law or fact . . . .” (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.)
2
A. Procedural Background2
We summarize only those facts pertinent to our disposition
of this appeal.
On March 12, 2025, Walker filed his initial complaint
against Gilligan, alleging a single cause of action for copyright
infringement. Two days later, Walker filed a first amended
complaint.
On April 25, 2025, Walker filed a second amended
complaint, again alleging a single cause of action against Gilligan
for copyright infringement. Walker averred Gilligan copied
Walker’s script titled Speed Queen when Gilligan created a
television series called Breaking Bad.
On May 27, 2025, Gilligan demurred to the second
amended complaint, arguing the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over Walker’s copyright infringement cause of action.
That same day, Walker moved for leave to file a proposed third
amended complaint that alleged a copyright infringement cause
of action and a state-law fraudulent concealment cause of action.
On June 4, 2025, Walker filed another motion for leave to file his
proposed third amended complaint. On June 17, 2025, the trial
court vacated the hearings on Walker’s two motions for leave to
2 We derive our Procedural Background in part from
undisputed aspects of the trial court’s rulings, admissions made
by the parties in their appellate briefing, and Gilligan’s
assertions that Walker does not contest in his reply. (See
Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of
Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 772, fn. 2, 773–774
(Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs) [employing this
approach].)
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amend in light of the forthcoming July 3, 2025 hearing on
Gilligan’s demurrer.
On July 3, 2025, the trial court, Judge Rolf M. Treu
presiding, heard Gilligan’s demurrer, ruled that the second
amended complaint should be dismissed because Walker did not
timely seek leave to file that amended pleading, and directed
Gilligan’s counsel to submit a proposed judgment of dismissal.
The court also vacated the July 28, 2025 hearing Walker had
scheduled on a third motion for leave to amend that he had filed
on the date of the hearing on Gilligan’s demurrer.
On July 10, 2025, Walker moved to vacate the dismissal
under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b).
On August 4, 2025, the trial court heard and denied
Walker’s motion to vacate. The court found Walker had not
offered any evidence or argument showing relief was warranted
under Code of Civil Procedure section 473. The court further
found that Walker had cited no authority that required the court
to hear a pending request for leave to amend before dismissing
the second amended complaint, “the demurrer to the [second
amended complaint] was well taken on substantive grounds, . . .
and allowing amendment to file the [third amended complaint]
would have been a futile act.” Also on that date, the court signed
and filed the judgment of dismissal.
On the date the trial court denied Walker’s motion to
vacate and issued the judgment of dismissal, that is, on
August 4, 2025, Walker filed a motion to vacate the dismissal
order and the order denying his first motion to vacate.
4
On August 11, 2025, Judge Treu struck Walker’s statement
seeking to disqualify him from presiding over the action.3 Also
on that date, the case was reassigned to Judge James I.
Montgomery.4 On August 20, 2025, Judge Montgomery struck
Walker’s statement seeking to disqualify him from the case.
On September 5, 2025, Judge Montgomery heard and
denied Walker’s second motion to vacate. The court reasoned
that Walker’s filing was, in effect, a motion for reconsideration
that he failed to support with any new or different facts,
circumstances, or law. Also on September 5, 2025, Walker
appealed from the judgment of dismissal, and stated in the notice
of appeal that he also sought review of “related orders denying
Motion[s] to Vacate (Aug 4, 2025; Sept 5, 2025), refusal to grant
leave to file [the third amended complaint], and orders striking
disqualification motions.”5
3 Judge Treu had vacated the hearings on Walker’s
motions for leave to amend, heard Gilligan’s demurrer and ruled
that Walker’s second amended complaint was subject to dismissal
for failure to timely seek leave to amend, heard and denied
Walker’s first motion to vacate, and signed the judgment of
dismissal.
4 The case register indicates the matter was reassigned to
Judge Montgomery as an “[i]nventory [t]ransfer.”
5 Although Walker seeks review of these “related orders”
in his appeal from the judgment, he does not claim they are
separately appealable.
5
B. The Orders Rejecting Walker’s Attempts To
Disqualify Two Judicial Officers Are Not Properly
Before Us
“[A] petition for writ of mandate is the exclusive method by
which a party may seek review of the question of the
disqualification of a judge.” (Brown v. American Bicycle Group,
LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 665, 672.) Therefore, the orders
rejecting Walker’s attempts to disqualify Judges Treu and
Montgomery are not properly before us. (See ibid.)6 Although
“ ‘a [party] may assert on appeal a claim of denial of the due
process right to an impartial judge[ ]’ ” (see Brown, at p. 673),
Walker does not raise any such claim in his briefing.
C. Walker Fails To Demonstrate The Trial Court Erred
In Entering the Judgment of Dismissal
As we noted in our Procedural Background, the trial court
dismissed Walker’s second amended complaint because Walker
did not timely seek leave to file that pleading. (Part A, ante.) In
its August 4, 2025 order denying Walker’s first motion to vacate,
the court further ruled: (1) Gilligan’s demurrer to the second
amended complaint was “well taken” because federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over Walker’s claim of copyright
infringement; and (2) granting leave to amend would have been
6 We note that on September 11, 2025, this court denied
Walker’s petition for writ of mandate challenging Judge
Montgomery’s August 20, 2025 order striking Walker’s statement
of disqualification. We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of
Walker’s petition for writ of mandate and this court’s order
denying that petition in case No. B348667. (Evid. Code, §§ 452,
subd. (d), 459.)
6
futile because Walker’s proposed third amended complaint
(a) reasserted the copyright infringement claim over which the
court lacked jurisdiction and (b) raised a fraudulent concealment
cause of action that is preempted by the Copyright Act.
As we explain below, Walker does not rebut the
presumption of correctness accorded to the trial court’s rulings
that Gilligan’s demurrer was meritorious and the fraudulent
concealment claim is preempted. We also reject Walker’s
challenge to the court’s orders denying his motions to vacate
because that appellate claim hinges on his assertion the court
erred in denying him leave to amend.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment without reaching the
court’s alternative basis for dismissing the action, that is, Walker
did not timely seek leave to file the second amended complaint.
(See part C.1, post [noting that we may affirm the judgment if it
is correct on any theory].) We also do not address Gilligan’s
contentions that (1) Walker failed to plead the essential elements
of his fraudulent concealment cause of action, (2) that claim is
time-barred, and (3) any error in denying leave to amend was
rendered harmless by Walker’s subsequent filing of another
lawsuit against Gilligan.7
7 We thus deny as moot Gilligan’s motion for judicial notice
of the complaint and docket sheet from Walker’s subsequent
action against Gilligan. (See Association for Los Angeles Deputy
Sheriffs, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 796, fn. 30 [holding that a
reviewing court may “deny[ ] a request for judicial notice of
‘materials . . . not relevant to [the court’s] determination of the
issues on appeal’ ”].)
7
1. Standards of Review
“The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the
complaint as a matter of law, and it raises only a question of law.
[Citations.] On a question of law, we apply a de novo standard of
review on appeal.” (Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004)
118 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1420.)
“ ‘We review the trial court’s decision not to grant leave to
amend for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] “ ‘[W]e must decide
whether there is a reasonable possibility the plaintiff could cure
the defect with an amendment. [Citation.] If we find that an
amendment could cure the defect, we conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, no abuse of discretion
has occurred. [Citation.] The plaintiff has the burden of proving
that an amendment would cure the defect.’ [Citations.]”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Black v. Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th
677, 685 (Black).)
“ ‘ “Even when our review on appeal ‘is de novo, it is limited
to issues which have been adequately raised and supported in
[the appellant’s opening] brief. . . .’ ” [Citation.] To succeed[,] . . .
[an appellant] must first establish error . . . . “ ‘[T]he most
fundamental rule of appellate review is that an appealed
judgment or order is presumed to be correct.’ [Citation.] It is the
appellant who bears the burden of overcoming that presumption.”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] To ‘rebut[ ] the presumption of correctness
accorded to the [lower] court’s decision,’ the appellant must
‘ “ ‘ “supply[ ] the reviewing court with some cogent argument
supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.” ’
[Citation.]” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Cruz v. Tapestry, Inc.
(2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 943, 953–954.)
8
“ ‘ “ ‘ “We are not bound by the trial court’s reasoning and
may affirm the judgment if correct on any theory.” ’ [Citation.]”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Black, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 685.)
The rules of appellate procedure apply to Walker even
though he is a self-represented party. (Scholes v. Lambirth
Trucking Co. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 590, 595.) Accordingly,
Walker “ ‘ “is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration
than other litigants and attorneys. [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]”
(Ibid.)
2. Walker does not contest the trial court’s finding that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his copyright
infringement cause of action
Title 28 United States Code section 1338, subdivision (a)
provides that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to . . .
copyrights,” and that “[n]o State court shall have jurisdiction over
any claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating
to . . . copyrights.” (See 28 U.S.C. § 1338, subd. (a).) This statute
confers upon “federal courts . . . exclusive jurisdiction over
copyright infringement causes of action.” (See Benitez v.
Williams (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 270, 275, italics added, citing,
inter alia, 28 U.S.C. § 1338.)
Applying the above statute to the instant case, the trial
court found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Walker’s
cause of action for copyright infringement. Walker does not
contest this ruling. In fact, he intimates in his reply brief that
the court was “jurisdictionally barred” from adjudicating his
“copyright claim . . . .” Walker thus fails to overcome the
presumption of correctness accorded to the court’s rulings that
9
Gilligan’s demurrer was “well taken” and that granting Walker
leave to replead this cause of action would have been futile.
3. Walker does not challenge the trial court’s ruling that
his proposed fraudulent concealment cause of action
is preempted by the Copyright Act
“ ‘A state law cause of action is preempted by the Copyright
Act if two elements are present. First, the rights that a plaintiff
asserts under state law must be “rights that are equivalent” to
those protected by the Copyright Act. [Citations.] Second, the
work involved must fall within the “subject matter” of the
Copyright Act . . . . [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Melchior v. New
Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 791
(Melchior).)
In concluding the Copyright Act preempts Walker’s
fraudulent concealment cause of action, the trial court remarked,
“The fraudulent concealment claim arises out of the same
underlying facts as the copyright infringement claim.
Specifically, the Proposed [third amended complaint] alleges that
‘[Gilligan] knowingly concealed the origin of core creative
elements used in Breaking Bad that were derived from Speed
Queen.’ ” (Italics added.) The court also indicated that Walker
intended to “ ‘assert rights equivalent to the exclusive rights
protected by federal copyright law.’ ”
Walker offers no rebuttal to the trial court’s ruling that his
state-law fraudulent concealment cause of action is preempted by
federal law. Instead, Walker argues the court abused its
discretion in denying him leave to amend because there was “a
reasonable possibility” he could allege facts “showing why [his
fraudulent concealment cause of action] could not have been
discovered earlier despite diligence.” This contention concerns
10
only the timeliness of the claim. It has no bearing on whether
Walker asserts “ ‘ “rights that are equivalent” to those protected
by the Copyright Act’ ” or whether “ ‘the work involved . . . fall[s]
within the “subject matter” of the Copyright Act . . . . [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” (See Melchior, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 791.)
Hence, Walker fails to discharge his burden of showing he could
amend his pleading to aver a viable fraudulent concealment
claim against Gilligan.
DISPOSITION
We deny as moot the motion for judicial notice filed by
defendant and respondent Vince Gilligan on April 23, 2026. We
affirm the judgment. Gilligan is awarded his costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
WEINGART, J.
11
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