CourtListener 10864474•Yancey v. The State of Cal. CA4/3
Texte intégral
Filed 5/26/26 Yancey v. The State of Cal. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
BRIANA YANCEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G064596
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2022-01254629)
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
AND DENYING PETITION FOR
Defendant and Respondent. REHEARING; NO CHANGE IN
JUDGMENT
It is hereby ordered that the opinion filed on April 28, 2026, be
modified as follows:
On page 15, replace heading III.C. in its entirety with the
following:
C. CMD's Salary Correction and Accounts Receivable Were Not Authorized
Under Article XVI, Section 6 of the California Constitution
There is no change in the judgment.
The petition for rehearing is DENIED.
DELANEY, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOODING, J.
BANCROFT, J.*
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
2
Filed 4/28/26 Yancey v. The State of Cal. CA4/3 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
BRIANA YANCEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G064596
v. (Super. Ct. No.
30-2022-01254629)
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Robert S. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.
Request for Judicial Notice. Denied.
Salusky Law Group, Anna R. Salusky, and Dionisios Aliazis for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Chris A. Knudsen, Assistant
Attorney General, Gary S. Balekjian and Jacqueline H. Chern, Deputy
Attorneys General for Defendant and Respondent the State of California.
* * *
Yancey sued her former employer, State of California acting by
and through the California Military Department (CMD), for (1) violation of
Government Code section 19257 (section 19257)1 and California Code of
Regulations, title 2, section 243.3, subdivision (b), (2) discrimination in
violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code,
§ 12900 et seq; FEHA), and (3) Labor Code section 1102.5. The trial court
granted CMD’s motion for summary judgment. Yancey timely appealed.
We reverse the trial court’s blanket order sustaining CMD’s
evidentiary objections, which were based on multiple grounds and required
individual attention. We also reverse the court’s ruling on Yancey’s first
cause of action under Government Code section 19257 and California Code of
Regulations, title 2, section 243.3, subdivision (b). We find the court erred
when it determined Government Code section 19257 was not applicable
because Yancey’s cause of action involved a salary dispute rather than an
offer of state employment. However, we affirm the court’s finding on Yancey’s
second cause of action for an alleged FEHA violation because Yancey failed to
establish a triable issue of fact on the issue of pretext. Similarly, we affirm
the trial court’s ruling on the third cause of action under Labor Code section
1 All further statutory references are to the Government Code
unless otherwise stated.
2
1102.5 because undisputed evidence proved CMD would have terminated
Yancey’s employment regardless of Yancey’s complaint.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Yancey applied for a military instructor position with CMD in
June 2015. At the time, Yancy had earned a bachelor’s degree. The parties
agree the military instructor position is a classification. Within the
classification, the alternate range criteria determine the legal requirement
that must be met by the employee before the employee can be placed in a
specific pay range. Under the alternate range criteria, an individual working
an 11-month schedule with a bachelor’s degree, like Yancey, was eligible for
range 2. In order for an individual to be eligible for range 4, they need to have
earned a bachelor’s degree and 24 upper division or graduate units which
were not counted toward the degree.
Yancey was nominated for an appointment as a military
instructor at STARBASE Los Alamitos, a program for CMD, in July 2015.
Although Yancey’s offer letter did not specify what range she was placed in,
the offer letter indicated her salary would be $4,478.00 per month. Yancey
accepted CMD’s offer and began work on July 7, 2015.
A week after she started, Yancey reviewed her pay and was
confused about it. Thus, Yancey emailed Angie Miller, the personnel manager
of Human Resources for CMD, for clarification. Miller explained to Yancey
that she was erroneously placed in Range D at the time of her hire. However,
because the letter ranges apply to individuals on 12-month schedules, and
because Yancey was on an 11-month schedule, Yancey should have been
placed in a numerical range. Miller told Yancey CMD was “putting in for a
salary exception,” which would allow CMD to hire Yancey at a hire above
3
minimum,2 apparently to match the pay in range D. Miller later informed
Yancey that she had corrected Yancey’s pay range to Range 4 at $4,207.50
per month. However, because Yancey qualified for the hire above minimum,
CMD granted Yancey a 5 percent increase in pay and Yancey’s salary was
$4,417.87 per month. This was close to the range D pay CMD initially offered
to Yancey.
Some four years later, in September 2019, one of the military
instructors complained they were being paid incorrectly. Kimberly Deane, the
Chief of Human Resources for CMD, had her staff investigate the issue. They
discovered some of the military instructors had been keyed into the wrong
pay option and were erroneously overpaid. In order to alleviate the accounts
receivable that would have been issued because of the overpayments, CMD
asked all the military instructors to submit proof of any educational credits
they had obtained after hiring. Yancey submitted proof of additional credits,
and based on this, CMD placed her in Range 5 and then Range 6. This new
placement prompted CMD to issue Yancey back pay.
Yancey subsequently became pregnant and went on maternity
leave in February 2020. CMD extended her leave multiple times through
March 2021. During her leave, in September 2020, CMD advised Yancey it
2 The human resources department that governs CMD, CalHR,
provides a hire above minimum procedure, which allows payment above the
minimum rate in the salary range of a classification when it “is necessary to
obtain a person with extraordinary qualifications.” To request a hire above
minimum for a specific individual, CMD must document and retain the basis
for the hire above minimum in a separate file. The documentation should
include CalHR forms 684 and 678. Because CMD does not have delegated
authority to grant a hire above minimum, CMD is required to send all hire
above minimum requests to CalHR for approval.
4
had incorrectly placed her in Range 4 when she was hired. Moreover, CMD
had misinterpreted the alternate range criteria when it subsequently placed
Yancey in Range 5 and Range 6. Deane and her staff asked CalHR if they
could backdate a hire above minimum to the time Yancey was hired, but
CalHR declined because it had no record of a hire above minimum being
requested or approved for Yancey at the time she was hired. Consequently,
CMD informed Yancey it had corrected her pay to reflect the correct
placement, Range 2. Yancey’s new pay was $2,089 per month. CMD informed
Yancey that an accounts receivable would be set up to correct the $109,448.86
overpayment covering the period between August 2017 and August 2020, and
she could set up a payment plan. CMD later corrected the overpayment
amount to $76,307.07.
On February 22, 2021, CMD sent Yancey a 30-day notice to
return to work. In the notice, CMD explained it required Yancey to return to
work because of its business need to maintain the STARBASE program.
CMD subsequently sent Yancey an “Options Letter” where it indicated she
could return to work or separate from state service via service retirement or
voluntary resignation. Yancey responded, explaining she could not return to
work at her new salary, she was not eligible to retire, and she would not be
resigning. Yancey asked for a call with CMD and her union representative.
Yancey did not return to work on March 22, 2021. She was subsequently
absent without approved leave for five consecutive working days, March 22,
2021 through March 26, 2021. CMD then terminated Yancey.
In June 2021, Yancey filed a merit issue complaint with the State
Personnel Board (SPB) Appeals Division. She alleged CMD was attempting
to collect overpayment of wages in violation of Government Code section
5
19257 and California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 243.3, subdivision
(b). The SPB determined CMD took appropriate action when it discovered its
“range placement” error and when it corrected its errors by changing
Yancey’s range retroactively.
On April 13, 2022, Yancey filed a complaint with the Department
of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH). In her DFEH complaint, Yancey
alleged CMD discriminated and retaliated against her for incidents occurring
after she took pregnancy disability leave on February 6, 2020. DFEH closed
Yancey’s complaint the same day she filed because she requested an
immediate right to sue notice.
Yancey filed her complaint in this action on April 20, 2022. The
operative complaint, her second amended complaint (SAC), alleged three
causes of action: (1) Violation of Government Code section 19257 and
California Code of Regulations, title 2, Rule 243.3, subdivision (b); (2)
Disability Discrimination in Violation of the FEHA; and (3) Retaliation in
Violation of Labor Code section 1102.5. CMD moved for summary judgment,
and the court granted it. The court subsequently entered judgment in CMD’s
favor.
Yancey timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
YANCEY’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Yancey asks us to take judicial notice of printouts of screenshots
from the CalHR’s online “Human Resources Manual.” “Judicial notice may
not be taken of any matter unless authorized or required by law.” (Evid.
Code, § 450.) Matters that are subject to judicial notice are listed in Evidence
6
Code sections 451 and 452. A matter ordinarily is subject to judicial notice
only if the matter is reasonably beyond dispute. (Post v. Prati (1979) 90
Cal.App.3d 626, 633.) In the instant matter, Yancey claims we may take
judicial notice of the printout under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision
(c).
Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c) allows for permissive
judicial notice of “[o]fficial acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of the United States and of any state of the United States.”
(Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).) Yancey’s request for judicial notice is, however,
not directed at an official act of the State of California. Instead, her request is
for a printout of a screenshot of a website Yancey claims indicates an official
act of the executive. Yancey fails to point us to any authority establishing
judicial notice of such a printout is proper. Because we agree with CMD that
California law suggests a court may not take judicial notice of the factual
content of a website (Searles Valley Minerals Operations, Inc. v. State Bd. of
Equalization (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 514, 519), we deny Yancey’s request for
judicial notice.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER ON CMD’S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
We next address Yancey’s contention that the trial court erred in
making its evidentiary rulings in connection with the motion for summary
judgment. Yancey submitted a four-page declaration, with 14 exhibits. Those
exhibits spanned over 75 pages. CMD submitted 20 objections to portions of
Yancey’s declaration and some of its exhibits. Each of these objections was
based on multiple grounds. The trial court sustained all but four of these
objections in their entirety, without explanation.
7
Generally, we review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th
335, 405.) Under this standard, we reverse an evidentiary ruling only if the
appellant makes a showing that the trial court exercised its discretion in an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a
miscarriage of justice. (People v. Avitia (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 185, 193.)
This standard, however, assumes the trial court met its
obligation with respect to ruling on evidentiary objections. “[I]n the summary
judgment setting, . . . a trial court presented with timely evidentiary
objections in proper form must expressly rule on the individual objections,
and if it does not, the objections are deemed waived and the objected-to
evidence included in the record.” (Demps v. San Francisco Housing Authority
(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 564, 578.) Moreover, “expressly rul[ing] on the
individual objections” (ibid.) does not mean ruling as the trial court did here,
by simply issuing a blanket order sustaining 14 of 20 objections without
identifying any particular basis. As noted above, for all its objections, CMD
offered multiple grounds for exclusion. More specifically, for the 14 sustained
objections, CMD offered between two and four objections. Because of the
court’s blanket ruling, we have no way of knowing whether the court accepted
all of the grounds or just one. (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178
Cal.App.4th 243, 255 (Nazir) [when a trial court issues a blanket ruling on
numerous evidentiary objections without providing any reasoning, there “is
hardly a ruling, as it could not provide any meaningful basis for review”]; see
Sambrano v. City of San Diego (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 225, 235 [although
summarily ruling on numerous evidentiary rulings is a common labor-saving
8
practice in law and motion courts, the objections in this case needed
individual attention].)
For example, CMD objected to Exhibit I—a five-page email
thread between Deane and Yancey attached to Yancey’s declaration—on the
grounds it was (1) irrelevant, (2) constituted inadmissible hearsay, and (3)
lacked foundation and evidentiary support. We disagree. In the email, Yancey
questions whether her offer letter is legally binding. Therefore, the emails
contained in Exhibit I tend to prove Yancey reported conduct she believed
violated state law. Therefore, they are probative of Yancey’s retaliation cause
of action. Moreover, the authentication and foundation for the emails were
established by the recipient, Yancey. Yancey’s testimony provided “evidence
sufficient to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the
evidence claims it is.” (Evid. Code, § 1400.) Finally, the emails are not
hearsay because they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted—that Yancey’s employment offer was not legally binding—but to
prove Yancey reported conduct she believed violated state law.
Given the sweeping nature of the objections, 20 objections to an
eighty-page document, multiple bases for each objection, and the problematic
nature of some of the objections, we conclude the trial court’s blanket ruling
sustaining 14 of the objections, without reasoning, was an abuse of discretion.
(See Nazir, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 257 [“order sustaining all but one of
defendants’ objections was a manifest abuse of discretion”].) Thus, the
objected-to evidence will be used in reviewing the trial court’s ruling on the
summary judgment motion. (Ibid.)
What is more, the erroneous ruling excluding Exhibit I alone
demonstrates “there is a reasonable probability that a result more favorable
9
to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.”
(Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144
Cal.App.4th 785, 815; see Evid. Code, § 354.) Later in this opinion, we
determine the trial court properly dismissed Yancey’s Labor Code section
1102.5 cause of action. In our analysis, we rely on the emails in Exhibit I in
determining Yancey engaged in protected activity. Although we determine
Yancey’s cause of actions fails on the second element, without Exhibit I,
Yancey would not be able to establish she engaged in protected activity by
reporting or opposing conduct she believed violated state law. In sum, we find
the court’s blanket order sustaining CMD’s evidentiary objections was not
harmless.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER GRANTING
CMD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Yancey contends the trial court erred in concluding she had not
established any triable issue of fact regarding her claims for (1) violation of
Government Code section 19257 and California Code of Regulations, title 2,
section 243.3, subdivision (b), (2) discrimination in violation of FEHA, and (3)
retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5.
A. Standard of Review
The court may grant a motion for summary judgment or
summary adjudication when “‘“all the papers submitted show that there is no
triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.”’” (Campbell v. FPI Management, Inc. (2024) 98
Cal.App.5th 1151, 1161; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Regents of
University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618.) “A
10
defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of presenting
evidence that a cause of action lacks merit because the plaintiff cannot
establish an element of the cause of action or there is a complete defense.”
(Sabetian v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1054, 1068; see Code
Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25
Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).)
“Where, as here, the defendant moves for summary judgment on
the grounds that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s [cause of action]
cannot be established, the defendant must present evidence that either
‘conclusively negate[s] an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action’ or ‘show[s]
that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain,’ evidence
needed to establish an element . . . .” (White v. Smule, Inc. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 346, 354; see Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 853–855; Doe v.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 657.) “‘Only
after the defendant carries that initial burden does the burden shift to the
plaintiff “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to
the cause of action . . . .”’” (Fajardo v. Dailey (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 221, 225–
226; see Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, at pp. 849–850.) “There
is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a
reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party
opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”
(Aguilar, at p. 850, fn. omitted; see Lemm v. Ecolab Inc. (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 159.) “‘An issue of fact can only be created by a conflict of
evidence. It is not created by “speculation, conjecture, imagination or guess
work.”’” (Carlsen v. Koivumaki (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 879, 889.)
11
“‘“‘“We review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all
the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers except that to
which objections were made and sustained.”’ [Citation.] We liberally construe
the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve
doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”’” (Hampton v. County
of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340, 347; see Wawrzenski v. United Airlines,
Inc. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 663, 684.)
B. The Trial Court Erred in Granting the Motion for Summary Judgment for
Violations of Government Code Section 19257 and California Code of
Regulations, title 2, section 243.3, subdivision (b)
Yancey contends the trial court improperly interpreted section
19257 when it determined CMD was not statutorily bound to pay her the
compensation CMD promised for the services she rendered.
We conduct a de novo review of this purely legal issue of
statutory interpretation. (City of Glendale v. Marcus Cable Associates, LLC
(2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1376.) Our fundamental task in interpreting a
statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate its purpose.
(Cummins, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 478, 487.) We “look first
to the words of the statute, which are the most reliable indications of the
Legislature’s intent.” (Ibid.) We do not construe those words in a vacuum but
rather consider them in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.
(Ibid.) If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning
controls. (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 83.)
If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable construction,
then we may look to extrinsic materials, including legislative history. (Ibid.)
12
We start with the statutory language and framework. Section
19257 provides: “Any person acting in good faith in accepting an appointment
or employment contrary to this part or the rules prescribed hereunder, shall
be paid by the appointing power the compensation promised by or on behalf
of the appointing power or, in case no compensation is so promised, then, the
actual value of any service rendered and the expense incurred in good faith
under such attempted appointment or employment, and has a cause of action
against the appointing power therefor.”
California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 243.3, subdivision
(b) provides: “An employee who accepted an appointment in good faith that is
subsequently voided or corrected shall retain only the compensation provided
for in section 9 of the Board’s regulations. In all cases, compensation shall be
corrected on a prospective basis.” In relevant part, California Code of
Regulations, title 2, section 9 provides: “The word ‘compensation’ as used in
Government Code Section 19257 includes salary, . . . salary step
advancement . . . and eligibility for a salary above the minimum rate when
legally appointed to the class. . . . [¶] ‘Compensation’ as used in Government
Code Section 19257 does not include tenure in a position, seniority credits,
permissive reinstatement, eligibility, mandatory reinstatement rights,
eligibility to take promotional examinations, career credits, permanent or
probationary status and service toward completion of the probationary
period; nor continuity of service when used to determine the employee’s right
to or eligibility for any of the foregoing.”
CMD asserts we must interpret Government Code section 19257
and California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 243.3 to apply to an
appointment to a classification, not to changes to steps or salary ranges
13
within that classification. In support of its contention, CMD relies on
Geftakys v. State Personnel Board (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 844, 857 (Geftakys).
Geftakys is distinguishable. There, the court found Government Code section
19257 did not apply where a computer error accidentally designated certain
civil servants at a higher pay scale than they were entitled to. (Id. at p. 855.)
The State notified the affected employee of the overpayment error, fixed the
mistake, and commenced recouping the overpaid amounts in monthly
installments deducted from the employee’s salary. (Id. at p. 856.) The
appellant sought a writ of mandate directing the state to stop deducting the
overpayment. The trial court denied the petition and the appellate court
affirmed. The Geftakys court determined [Government Code] section 19257
did not apply because “[i]t ha[d] never been contended by any party to th[e]
case that appellant’s appointment to class hearing officer I was made ‘. . .
contrary to this part or the rules prescribed hereunder . . . .’” (Id. at p. 862.)
Unlike in the case at hand, in Geftakys the employee knew the higher pay
scale was temporary and that the temporary raise would be removed. (Id. at
p. 863.)
Here, Yancey alleged she acted in good faith in accepting
employment with CMD at a set rate. CMD did not present any contrary
evidence on this point. These facts are more closely aligned to those in Piccini
v. California Emergency Management Agency (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 685
(Piccini). There, an applicant received and accepted an offer for a civil service
position. (Id. at p. 687.) Shortly before the applicant was scheduled to begin
work, the agency informed him that the position he was hired for had been
eliminated. (Ibid.) Because the applicant had “actually rendered service or
incurred expenses in good faith under his attempted appointment, [the
14
applicant] stated a claim for estoppel within the scope of section 19257.”
(Picciniat p. 689.) Most relevant here, the Piccini court specifically explained
“section 19257 expresses a legislative policy that recognizes a cause of action
in favor of someone who accepts an offer of state employment in good faith in
violation of the rules and statutes that govern state hiring.” (Ibid.)
It appears the trial court determined Piccini did not apply here
because Piccini concerned “‘an offer of state employment’ rather than a salary
dispute.” The issue here, however, does not concern a salary dispute. Rather,
Yancey challenges CMD’s attempt to change her original offer of
employment, specifically the compensation CMD offered and which she
accepted in good faith. Because the trial court erroneously determined
Government Code section 19257 and California Code of Regulations, title 2,
section 243.3 did not apply to CMD’s salary reduction, the court erred in
granting CMD’s motion for summary judgment.
C. CMD’s Salary Correction and Accounts Receivable were Not Prohibited
Under Article XVI, Section 6 of the California Constitution
For the first time in its respondent’s brief, CMD alleges it was
authorized to correct Yancey’s salary and initiate an accounts receivable
because the California Constitution bars public agencies from making gifts of
public funds. In relevant part, article XVI, section 6 of the California
Constitution provides “[t]he Legislature shall have no power to . . . make any
gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value
to any individual . . . .” “The term ‘gift’ in the constitutional provision
‘includes all appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or
enforceable claim,’ even if there is a moral or equitable obligation.” (Jordan v.
Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 450.) As we have
15
explained above, here Yancey has an enforceable claim under Government
Code section 19257, and thus, the funds CMD alleged it overpaid her are not
a “gift” under the California Constitution. As discussed below, additional
cases cited by CMD do not persuade us otherwise.
In Aebli v. Board of Education, 62 Cal.App.2d 706 (Aebli), a
government agency erroneously interpreted salary schedules and resolutions,
and erroneously overpaid employees over a ten-year period. (Id. at pp. 712.)
Once the agency discovered its mistake, it deducted the overpayment from
the employees’ salaries for the previous two years. (Ibid.) On appeal, the
Aebli court held overpayments “by a governmental agency under either
mistake of fact or law may be recovered from the payee.” (Id. at p. 727.) But,
the Aebli case does not concern Government Code section 19257, nor does it
rely on article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution. Moreover, the
Aebli case states “that the general rule is that estoppels will not be invoked
against the government or its agencies except in rare and unusual
circumstances.” (Id. at p. 729, italics added.) As noted above however,
“general expressions of estoppel doctrine do not control” in cases where
Government Code section 19257 applies. (Piccinini, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th
685, 689.)
In Holtzendorff v. Housing Authority of Los Angeles (1967) 250
Cal.App.2d 596 a government agency reimbursed an employee for legal fees
incurred by the employee in defending a criminal charge of embezzlement.
(Id. at p. 601.) Unlike the case here, in Holtzendorff, the fees and thus the
compensation arose from personal acts unconnected with the employee’s
official duties. (Id. at p. 634.)
16
D. Yancey’s First Cause of Action Does Not Fail as a Matter of Law Under
Section 19838
CMD next contends it was required to collect the alleged
overpayments made to Yancey under section 19838. Section 19838 states, in
relevant part: “(a) When the state determines an overpayment has been made
to an employee, it shall notify the employee of the overpayment and afford
the employee an opportunity to respond prior to commencing recoupment
actions.” (§ 19838, subd. (a).)
In support of its contention that section 19838 applies, CMD
again relies on Geftakys, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d 844 for support. As we have
explained, Geftakys does not apply to the case at hand. Moreover, section
19838 applies when a state agency has determined an overpayment has been
made to an employee. We do not dispute this application in general. However,
the issue of whether CMD overpaid Yancey and subsequently retroactively
reduced Yancey’s salary in the first place remains unresolved. Thus,
determining that CMD properly initiated an accounts receivable to recover
alleged overpayments would be premature at this point.
E. Yancey Was Not Required to Exhaust Judicial Remedies
CMD contends Yancey is precluded from arguing her initial
placement in Range 4 was correct because Yancey failed to file a petition for
writ of mandate challenging the SPB’s August 17, 2021 determination. More
specifically, CMD contends the SPB’s decision is binding on Yancey and
precludes her from relitigating the issues of whether she should have been
placed in Range 4 upon hire and whether CMD took appropriate action by
retroactively placing her in Range 2.
17
Generally, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before
filing a lawsuit. (Williams & Fickett v. County of Fresno (2017) 2 Cal.5th
1258, 1267.) An administrative remedy “‘is exhausted only upon “termination
of all available, nonduplicative administrative review procedures.”’” (Ibid.)
“The exhaustion rule ‘“is not a matter of judicial discretion, but is a
fundamental rule of procedure . . . binding upon all courts.”’” (Id. at p. 1268;
see Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 70, [the exhaustion
requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to seeking relief through the
courts].) Even where the administrative remedy does not resolve all issues or
provide complete relief, the exhaustion requirement is still favored because it
may reduce the scope of litigation. (Plantier v. Ramona Municipal Water Dist.
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 372, 383.) If an employee was a party to a “quasi-judicial
administrative agency proceeding” that resulted in a final administrative
decision, that decision will be binding in later civil actions unless the
employee exhausts his judicial remedies by challenging the administrative
decision by writ of mandate. (Johnson, at p. 61.)
For this doctrine to apply, CMD must show the SPB
determination possessed “a judicial character.” (Wassmann v. South Orange
County Community College Dist. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 825, 846–847.)
“Indicia of proceedings undertaken in a judicial capacity include a hearing
before an impartial decision maker; testimony given under oath or
affirmation; a party’s ability to subpoena, call, examine, and cross-examine
witnesses, to introduce documentary evidence, and to make oral and written
argument; the taking of a record of the proceeding; and a written statement
of reasons for the decision.” (Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources
Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921, 944.)
18
In this case, the SPB’s decision did not possess judicial character.
There was no testimony given under oath, no ability to subpoena, and no
party was able to call, examine, or cross-examine witnesses. For these
reasons, the SPB’s decision and Yancey’s failure to file a writ challenging the
decision do not preclude us from addressing Yancey’s claim regarding her
initial placement.
F. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting the Motion for Summary
Adjudication on Yancey’s FEHA Cause of Action
1. Applicable Law
FEHA prohibits employers from discriminating against
employees on various grounds, including “sex.” (§ 12940, subd. (a).) “Sex,” in
turn, is defined to include “[p]regnancy or medical conditions related to
pregnancy,” “[c]hildbirth or medical conditions related to childbirth,” and
“[b]reastfeeding or medical conditions related to breastfeeding.” (§ 12926,
subd. (r)(1).)3
“Section 12945 of the FEHA, known as the Pregnancy Disability
Leave Law (PDLL), is based on the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)) and ensures equal employment opportunity by
affording specific protections for pregnant employees.” (Paleny v. Fireplace
Products U.S., Inc. (2024) 103 Cal.App. 5th 199, 207.) Section 12945
supplements provisions of sections 12926 and 12940 that apply to pregnancy-
related medical conditions by delineating additional employment practices
3 Section 12945 provides additional protections for women who
are pregnant or have related medical conditions, including by prohibiting
an employer from “refus[ing] to allow an employee disabled by pregnancy, . . .
or a related medical condition to take a leave for a reasonable period of time
. . .” (§ 12945, subd. (a)(1).)
19
that are unlawful “unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification.”
(§ 12945, subd. (a).)
Section 12945 addresses two distinct protections available to
employees disabled by or in need of accommodation due to pregnancy,
childbirth, or a related medical condition. First, employees disabled by such a
condition are entitled to pregnancy-related disability leave. Specifically, it is
unlawful for an employer to refuse to allow an employee disabled by
pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition to take a leave of
absence for a reasonable period, not to exceed four months. (§ 12945, subd.
(a)(1).) Second, section 12945 entitles an employee to accommodation “for a
condition related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condition” if
such accommodation is requested by the employee and recommended by her
health care provider. (§ 12945, subd. (a)(3)(A).) In short, “section 12945
affords important protections to employees affected by pregnancy, over and
above the protections of section 12940.” (Lopez v. La Casa de Las Madres
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 365, 381.)
Because employees rarely have direct evidence of an employer’s
improper intent, California courts have adopted a three-part burden-shifting
analysis in wrongful employment termination cases known as the McDonnell
Douglas test. (McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792
(McDonnell Douglas); Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317,
354–55 (Guz).) The test requires the plaintiff-employee to first establish a
prima facie case of discrimination. (Guz, at pp. 354–355; Yanowitz v. L’Oreal
USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 (Yanowitz).) A prima facie showing of
discrimination under FEHA generally requires that the plaintiff show (1) she
“was a member of a protected class”, (2) she “was qualified for” or
20
competently performing her job, (3) she “suffered an adverse employment
action”, and (4) “some other circumstance suggesting discriminatory motive.”
(Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1004.)
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer is
required to offer a legitimate, nonretaliatory or nondiscriminatory reason for
the adverse employment action. (See Morgan v. Regents of University of
California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 68.) When the employer has
demonstrated a legitimate reason for an adverse employment action, “an
employee seeking to avoid summary judgment cannot simply rest on the
prima facie showing[] but must adduce substantial additional evidence from
which a trier of fact could infer the articulated reasons for the adverse
employment action were untrue or pretextual.” (Loggins v. Kaiser
Permanente Internat. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1113, italics added
(Loggins).) Although an employee’s evidence submitted in opposition to an
employer’s motion for summary judgment is construed liberally, it “remains
subject to careful scrutiny.” (King v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 426, 433 (King).) The employee’s “subjective beliefs in an
employment discrimination case do not create a genuine issue of fact; nor do
uncorroborated and self-serving declarations.” (Ibid.) The employee’s
evidence must relate to the motivation of the decision makers and prove, by
nonspeculative evidence, “an actual causal link between prohibited
motivation and termination.” (Id. at pp. 433–434.)
2. Analysis
Yancey argues she was terminated because of temporary
disability caused by her pregnancy. Even assuming Yancey established a
prima facie case of wrongful termination, thus shifting the burden to CMD to
21
show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory justification for its
decisions to reduce Yancey’s salary and terminate her, we find she failed to
raise a triable issue of fact in response to CMD’s rationale.
a. CMD’s Justification for Terminating Yancey
CMD explained it reduced Yancey’s salary after discovering it
had improperly placed her and other employees in a salary range they did not
qualify for and thus had overpaid them. CMD noted it identified these errors
after reviewing all military instructors’ salaries following a report that
another employee was being paid incorrectly in 2019. The audit of the
military instructors’ salaries lasted over a year. CMD further explained it
required Yancey to return to work after her one year of maternity leave
because students were returning to STARBASE Los Alamitos for in-person
instruction towards the end of 2020 after COVID-19 restrictions had
loosened. Thus, according to CMD, there was an operational need for Yancey
to return to work. Because Yancey did not return to work and was absent
without approved leave for five consecutive days, CMD invoked the absence
without leave (AWOL) statute and terminated her. Based on these facts, we
find CMD offered substantial evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or
nonretaliatory basis for its decisions to reduce Yancey’s salary and later
terminate her.
b. Yancey’s Showing of Pretext
To avoid summary judgment, Yancey must offer substantial
evidence that CMD’s stated rationale for her termination or salary reduction
is untrue or pretextual. “The plaintiff’s burden is to prove, by competent
evidence, that the employer’s proffered justification is mere pretext; i.e., that
the presumptively valid reason for the employer’s action was in fact a
22
coverup. (Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1042) In responding to the
employer’s showing of a legitimate reason for the complained-of action, the
plaintiff cannot ‘“simply show the employer’s decision was wrong, mistaken,
or unwise. Rather, the employee ‘“must demonstrate such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable
factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence,’ [citation] and
hence infer ‘that the employer did not act for the [ . . . asserted] non-
discriminatory reasons.’”’”’” (McRae v. Department of Corrections &
Rehabilitation (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 377, 388–389 (McRae).) Yancey failed
to create a triable issue of fact on this issue.
Yancey alleges she established pretext based on the timing of her
employment termination—i.e., CMD terminated her and reduced her salary
after the birth of her son and while she was on protected leave. According to
Yancey, the timing “allows for an inference that the adverse employment
actions were motivated by [her] history of disability.” Although the timing of
Yancey’s termination established Yancey’s prima facie burden, an issue
which CMD contests, it does not suffice to also carry her burden of showing
pretext after CMD set forth legitimate reasons for its decision. (Loggins,
supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1112–1113.) Put another way, after CMD
established a legitimate basis for terminating Yancey, Yancey could not meet
her burden of showing pretext solely by recycling the presumption arising out
of the timing of the termination. To hold otherwise “would eviscerate the
McDonnell Douglas framework for resolving claims at the demurrer or
summary judgment stage, because the same minimal showing required of the
plaintiff to raise a prima facie case would also suffice to preclude the
23
employer from obtaining summary judgment notwithstanding otherwise
unrebutted proof of articulated legitimate reasons for the employment
termination.” (Loggins, at pp. 1112–1113.) Thus, Yancey’s “evidence of a
temporal proximity ‘only satisfies [her] initial burden.’” (Id. at p. 1112, italics
added.)
Yancey also contends she established a pretext because CMD’s
act of reducing her wages was unlawful and could not constitute a legitimate
business decision. As CMD notes, Yancey cites no authority for her
contention. In any event, her assertion is incorrect. ‘“A “pretext for
discrimination” means more than an unusual act; it means something worse
than a business error; “pretext” means deceit used to cover one’s tracks.’
[Citation.] . . . ‘[T]he overall correctness or desirability of the reasons
proffered is not relevant . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Grube v. Lau Industries, Inc.
(2001) 257 F.3d 723, 730.) It is not enough for the plaintiff to show the
employer’s reasons were mistaken or unwise, instead the plaintiff “‘“must
demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions” ‘“in the employer’s proffered legitimate
reasons that a reasonable factfinder” could conclude that the stated reasons
are not credible, and that the employer’s true motive was retaliatory. (McRae,
supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 389.) Here, Yancey’s claim that CMD
“unlawfully” reduced her wages is essentially an allegation that CMD made a
business error. This act by CMD, therefore, does not, as Yancey argues, show
pretext.
24
G. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting CMD’s Motion for Summary
Adjudication on Yancey’s Cause of Action for Violation of Labor Code
section 1102.5
1. Applicable Law
Labor Code section 1102.5 “provides whistleblower protections to
employees who disclose wrongdoing to authorities” (Lawson v. PPG
Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 709 (Lawson)), as well as
to employees who refuse to participate in illegal activities. (See Nejadian v.
County of Los Angeles (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 703, 718.)
Labor Code section 1102.5 provides that an employer “shall not
retaliate against an employee for disclosing information, or because the
employer believes that the employee disclosed or may disclose information, to
a government or law enforcement agency, to a person with authority over the
employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover,
or correct the violation or noncompliance . . . if the employee has reasonable
cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal
statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule
or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the
employee’s job duties.” (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (b).) Subdivision (c) of the
statute states, in relevant part: “An employer . . . shall not retaliate against
an employee for refusing to participate in an activity that would result in a
violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a
local, state, or federal rule or regulation.” (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (c).)
Claims for retaliation under this Labor Code provision are
subject to a different analysis than those under FEHA. “We instead look to
[Labor Code] section 1102.6, which ‘provides the governing framework.’
25
[Citation.] To sum up the statute’s requirements: ‘First, it places the burden
on the plaintiff to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
retaliation for an employee’s protected activities was a contributing factor in
a contested employment action. . . . Once the plaintiff has made the required
showing, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate, by clear and
convincing evidence, that it would have taken the action in question for
legitimate, independent reasons even had the plaintiff not engaged in
protected activity.’ [Citations.]” (Vatalaro v. County of Sacramento (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 367, 379–380 (Vatalaro); see Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at
p. 718.)
While we “liberally construe plaintiff’s [evidentiary] showing and
resolve any doubts about the propriety of a summary judgment in plaintiff’s
favor, plaintiff’s evidence remains subject to careful scrutiny. [Citation.] We
can find a triable issue of material fact ‘if, and only if, the evidence would
allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party
opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.’”
(King, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 433.)
2. Protected Activity
A disclosure within the meaning of Labor Code section 1102.5,
subdivision (b) need not be akin to a legal memo citing specific statutes. (Ross
v. County of Riverside (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 580, 592–593 [reversing
summary judgment against a former prosecutor who alleged he was fired for
recommending the dismissal of a criminal case because although he did not
expressly cite “his belief continued prosecution would violate the defendant’s
due process rights as well as a prosecutor’s ethical obligations under state
law” to his superiors, the statute “does not require such an express
26
statement. It requires only that an employee disclose information and that
the employee reasonably believe the information discloses unlawful
activity”].) The statute requires a disclosing employee to have reasonable
cause to believe the information disclosed would reveal a violation of law.
(Vatalaro, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 382.) Although the employee need not
cite any specific statute or regulation to their employer, a finder of fact must
have some benchmark against which to assess reasonableness. (People ex rel.
Garcia-Brower v. Kolla’s, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 719, 734 [explaining that the
“‘reasonable cause to believe’” clause in the statute “imposes a requirement of
objective reasonableness and excludes from whistleblower protection
disclosures that involve only disagreements over discretionary decisions,
policy choices, interpersonal dynamics, or other nonactionable issues”].)
Here, Yancey contends she had a reasonable belief her
acceptance of an appointment should have been legally binding. Yancey
communicated her complaint about the legality of her salary change to
Deane. Specifically, in an email dated November 6, 2020, Yancey asked
Deane to show her “where it says offer letter is not legally binding?” For
purposes of this appeal, we assume Yancey engaged in protected activity by
virtue of this email by reporting or opposing conduct she believed violated
state law.
3. CMD’s Reasons for Its Employment Decisions
We next turn to the trial court’s ruling that CMD submitted
evidence of legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for its adverse employment
actions. CMD alleged its actions were based on legitimate business reasons
because Yancey “voluntarily resigned pursuant to the AWOL statute after
[Yancey] did not return to work as required on March 22, 2021 and was
27
absent without approved leave for five consecutive working days.” CMD was
required to show not only that its actions in terminating Yancey’s
employment were based on legitimate business reasons, but that it would
have taken the same actions for those reasons even if Yancey “had not
engaged in” the alleged whistleblower activities. (Lab. Code, § 1102.6; see
Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 713–714 [“plaintiffs may satisfy their
burden of proving unlawful retaliation” under Lab. Code, § 1102.5 “even
when other, legitimate factors also contributed to the adverse action”].)
Because CMD would have the burden at trial to prove these facts
by clear and convincing evidence, it was required on summary judgment to
“present evidence that would require a reasonable trier of fact” (Aguilar,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 845) to find it “highly probable” (Conservatorship
of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 996) CMD would have taken the same actions
regardless of Yancey’s alleged whistleblower activities. (See Aguilar, at p. 851
[“how the parties moving for, and opposing, summary judgment may each
carry their burden of persuasion and/or production depends on which would
bear what burden of proof at trial”]; Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood
Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1053 [“‘where the . . . ultimate
burden of proof will be by clear and convincing evidence, the higher standard
of proof must be taken into account in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment or summary adjudication’”].)
CMD offered admissible evidence of the following: Yancey had
been on leave of one sort or another for more than one year, beginning
February 6, 2020. Yancey extended her leave, which was originally scheduled
to end August 17, 2020. On September 21, 2020, Yancey advised CMD she
would be going on unemployment after her disability leave expired, and on
28
December 28, 2020, she advised CMD she would continue on unemployment
through the new year. CMD continued to approve Yancey’s leave and had
held her position open for her the entire time.
On November 6, 2020, Yancey sent an email to Deane reading, in
relevant part: “Can you show me where it says [the] offer letter is not legally
binding?” This is the protected activity underlying Yancey’s Labor Code
section 1102.5 claim.
On February 22, 2021, CMD sent Yancey a return to work notice,
requiring she return to work no later than March 22, 2021. Yancey did not
return to work on March 22, 2021 and was absent without approved leave on
five consecutive working days, March 22 through March 26, 2021. On April 1,
2021, CMD sent Yancey a notice of AWOL separation, effective March 26,
2021.
The undisputed evidence establishes CMD continued to hold
Yancey’s position open for her for more than four months after she sent the
November 6 email. A return to work notice was not sent to Yancey
immediately after she sent the November 6 email, or after she advised CMD
in December that she would again be extending her leave. CMD did not
terminate Yancey’s employment after she sent the November 6 email; indeed,
it did not do so until after the 30-day period specified in the return to work
notice had expired. The foregoing meets the requirement of clear and
convincing evidence that CMD would have terminated Yancey’s employment
effective March 26, 2021 even if she had not sent the November 6, 2020
email.
None of this evidence was disputed by Yancey. The trial court
overruled all of Yancey’s evidentiary objections. On appeal, Yancey does not
29
challenge these rulings (although she did challenge the court’s order
sustaining some of CMD’s objections to the evidence she offered in opposition
to the motion).
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s ruling on Yancey’s FEHA and Labor
Code section 1102.5 causes of action. We reverse and remand the court’s
ruling on the Government Code section 19257 cause of action. Parties shall
bear their own costs on appeal.
DELANEY, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOODING, J.
BANCROFT, J.*
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
30
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.