People v. Johnson CA1/2

CourtListener 10863425Calctapp22 mai 2026

Texte intégral

Filed 5/22/26 P. v. Johnson CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A172133
v.
FELIX MARTINEZ JOHNSON,
(Contra Costa County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. 042200737)

MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
After a contested hearing, the trial court found Felix Johnson in
violation of his probation and sentenced him to the four-year state prison
commitment that had been previously imposed but for which the execution
had been suspended as part of a negotiated plea agreement. Johnson now
contends that in committing him to prison, “the court mistakenly believed it
was bound by a stipulation in the plea agreement . . . .” Therefore, in
“automatically terminating probation and executing sentence,” Johnson
asserts that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion, requiring remand.
We see no mistaken understanding and affirm.

1 Because this appeal “raise[s] no substantial issue of law or fact,” we

resolve this case by memorandum opinion in accordance with California
Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1 and People v. Garcia (2022)
97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.

1
BACKGROUND
In 2022, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed a felony
complaint charging Johnson with six counts including the malicious
discharge of a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle, assault with a
semiautomatic firearm, and related offenses. It was also alleged that
Johnson had suffered two strike prior convictions. 2
On February 16, 2023, after being held to answer at a preliminary
hearing and the filing of an information, 3 Johnson entered into a negotiated
agreement in which he pled no contest to a felony charge of assault by means
of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 4 § 245, subd. (a)(4))
and admitted aggravating circumstances of great violence or bodily harm and
violent conduct indicating a serious danger to society (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a) & (b)(1)). 5 The court (Hon. D. Goldstein) sentenced Johnson to
the “upper term” of four years in state prison, the execution of which was
suspended for a period of two years while Johnson was placed on a grant of
“formal felony probation,” including varied terms and conditions.

2 We “will not recount the underlying facts of the case that put Mr.

Johnson on probation” because, as articulated in Johnson’s letter in
mitigation submitted before sentencing, Johnson did “not argue for the
imposition of either the mitigated or mid-term sentencing options.”
3 Johnson had previously entered into a plea agreement in which he

agreed to a sentence of six years in state prison that would be suspended
while he participated in a residential drug treatment program. After
Johnson was unable to secure placement in the treatment program, he was
permitted to withdraw his plea, charges were reinstated, and the case
proceeded to preliminary hearing.
4 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

5 The information was amended to enable Johnson to enter into this

plea agreement. The remaining counts were dismissed and the
enhancements stricken.

2
In accepting the plea agreement, the trial court expressed “great
reluctance” and “extreme concern for public safety.” It declined to sign “the
[stipulated plea agreement] submitted by the People,” which stated the
suspended sentence would be “automatically” imposed, because “[t]he court,
technically, is not bound or required to impose the [four-year state prison
sentence] for any probation violation.” But the court made “clear to
Mr. Johnson today that it’s highly likely to be imposed.” The court
emphasized, “this offer is something of a gift in my mind, and that I will take
any probation violation quite seriously, even if it doesn’t rise to the level of
the violent nature of this case . . . .” This case is “not a typical grant of
probation, where a failure to report to Probation is gonna result in time
served, a slap on the wrist and release from custody. [¶] This is a case where
the four-year suspended execution sentence will be taken extremely seriously
by the court.” Speaking directly to Johnson, the court cautioned, “there are
rules that you’re gonna have to follow, and even if you break certain rules
without resorting to violence towards anyone, you’re at extreme risk of
having the suspended prison sentence imposed.”
On August 12, 2024, the probation department filed a “Supplemental
Petition to Continue Probation in Revoked Status” 6 alleging that Johnson
had “failed to obey the law by shoplifting, using force against an officer,

6 The probation department had filed an initial “Petition to Revoke

Probation” on May 9, 2024, alleging Johnson “disobeyed the law” on April 17,
2024, “by violating” sections 211, 368, subdivision (b)(1), 69, subdivision (a),
and 594, subdivision (a)(1), “all felonies.” As the offenses were alleged to
have been committed in Berkeley, California, a separate complaint was filed
in Alameda County Superior Court, the outcome of which is not included in
this record. The Contra Costa County District Attorney’s Office did not
proceed to hearing on this May 2024 revocation petition, so we do not discuss
it further.

3
battering police officer, disturbing the peace, and resisting arrest.” At the
ensuing contested hearing, officers testified that when responding to a call of
an Estes 7 robbery, they observed Johnson running down Powell Street in
San Francisco while being pursued by an individual wearing a security
uniform. One uniformed officer chased Johnson onto a trolley, at which time
Johnson threw a 15- to 20-pound duffle bag at the officer’s chest, pushing the
officer back one to two feet. Johnson jumped off the trolley and continued to
flee through traffic, disobeying the officers’ commands to stop. Officers were
able to detain Johnson after he “hopped on one of the moving vehicles and
then rolled off the back trunk.”
As the officers attempted to place Johnson in a patrol vehicle, Johnson
“was stiffening his body, [and] straightening his feet making it difficult to
place him inside of the vehicle.” Once in the patrol car, Johnson lay down on
the backseat, so officers could not put a seatbelt on him; concerned for
Johnson’s safety, officers called an ambulance to transport him. After the
ambulance arrived, officers removed the handcuffs from Johnson to place him
on a gurney, but Johnson continued to pull his hands away and tried to sit
up. Johnson swung his knee towards an officer in “an attempt to knee [him]”
and kept “thrashing the legs around.” When Johnson was restrained on the
gurney, he continued to try to unbuckle himself from the restraints and sit up
such that he had to be handcuffed.

7 People v Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23. “What sets an Estes robbery
apart from a standard robbery is that force or fear is used not in the
acquisition of the property, but in the escape.” (People v. Robins (2020)
44 Cal.App.5th 413, 419, citing Estes, at p. 28.) Though not admitted for its
truth, the Estes robbery reference was permitted to explain the officers’
conduct and to show “the lawfulness of the detention.”

4
Throughout the officers’ detention efforts, which took about an hour,
“there was a lot of struggle over securing [Johnson’s] person” and threats by
Johnson such as, “Unlock the camera and get your ass beat”; “When the cuffs
come off, you all are going to get some”; “When the cuffs come off, you are
going to sleep”; “I am going to make sure I hunt you down”; “Remember this
face”; “When the wrists come off, someone is going to get K’d or caked”; “I am
going to fuck you up”; and “If you are working or not working, one of your
coworkers was going to feel that.”
At the conclusion of the probation violation hearing, the hearing court
(Hon. P. Scanlon) found that “the People have met their burden by a
preponderance of the evidence to show that Mr. Johnson did indeed violate
his probation terms.” Prior to the separately held sentencing hearing,
Johnson filed a letter in mitigation requesting the court “exercise its
discretion to reinstate [Johnson] on probation with whatever sanction the
court sees fit considering its finding . . . .” The letter represented,
“Mr. Johnson understands and agrees that should the court permanently
revoke probation that it will impose a 4-year state prison sentence” but
claimed Johnson “is capable of change” and requested the court “reinstate his
grant of probation with whatever custodial sanction the court deems
necessary to ensure public safety.”
At the subsequent sentencing hearing, Johnson expounded upon his
argument “that the court does have the legal authority to reinstate
Mr. Johnson’s probation if it chose to,” after which, the district attorney
recited the last sentence of the stipulated plea agreement that the court had
not signed in 2023: “ ‘Defendant stipulates, as an essential and binding
condition of this plea agreement, that if he were to be found in violation of his

5
probation for any reason, the full suspended prison term of four years --’
[n]ow this is underlined ‘-- shall mandatorily be imposed.’ ”
After reciting its review of the record—including the preliminary
hearing testimony for “the original case” upon which Johnson “is being
sentenced” and the transcript of the change of plea hearing—the court
imposed “the previously suspended execution of the upper term on . . . the
[section] 245, [subdivision] (a)(4), of four years State Prison.”
Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION
In arguing for remand, Johnson focuses on two of the hearing court’s
comments to suggest the court “was not exercising its discretion but was
automatically terminating probation and executing sentence based on any
violation . . . .” First, after defense counsel characterized Johnson’s conduct
as “simply a violation, which was . . . a somewhat de minimis resisting,” the
court “explained,” “It doesn’t matter if he spit on the sidewalk or committed a
new murder as far as a probation violation is concerned. He is supposed to
follow all of the terms and conditions.” Second, after the district attorney
recited the language from the stipulated plea agreement that the prison
sentence “shall be mandatorily imposed,” the court said, “That is what
Mr. Johnson agreed to.” Johnson asserts these statements mean the court
did not consider if reinstatement on probation was an appropriate sanction
before sentencing him to state prison. We disagree with this narrow reading
of the record and affirm.
Section 1203.2, subdivision (c) provides that upon the revocation and
termination of probation, “if the judgment has been pronounced and the
execution thereof has been suspended, the court may revoke the suspension
and order that the judgment shall be in full force and effect.” Even so, “the

6
sentencing court retains discretion to reinstate probation.” (People v. Medina
(2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 318, 323; People v. Bolian (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1415,
1421 [“The decision whether to reinstate probation or terminate probation
(and thus send the defendant to prison) rests within the broad discretion of
the trial court”].) Because of this “very broad” discretion, “ ‘only in a very
extreme case should an appellate court interfere with the discretion of the
trial court in the matter of denying or revoking probation. . . .’ ” (People v.
Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 443.) However, “ ‘a court that is unaware of
its discretionary authority cannot exercise its informed discretion.’ ” (Bolian,
at p. 1421.) Thus, if the record indicates the court “misunderstood or was
unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers,” we should remand for the
proper exercise of discretion, but if “the record indicates the court was aware
of its discretion or the record is merely silent,” then no remand is necessary.
(Ibid.)
The record here demonstrates that the trial court was well aware of its
sentencing authority to reinstate probation. At the conclusion of the
probation revocation hearing, Johnson waived time for sentencing in order “to
get together” some out-of-county documents. Then, prior to the sentencing
hearing, Johnson’s attorney submitted a letter in mitigation, which the court
on the record acknowledged receiving, that repeatedly requested the court
“exercise its discretion to reinstate [Johnson] on probation.” Last, at the
sentencing hearing, because of this “extensive” briefing, Johnson’s defense
attorney stated, “I am happy to submit.”
However, counsel then characterized the basis of Johnson’s probation
violation as “de minimis resisting.” In response, the court clarified its
understanding of the law and the scope of the violation it had found: “The
fact that the only thing presented and found was resisting arrest is what will

7
trigger the previously imposed sentence. Again, he’s already been sentenced;
it just hasn’t been executed pending his violation of probation. [¶] Please, do
not tell me that only a minor probation violation was shown. It’s debatable
whether the resisting that went on with the police officers was minor or not.”
Defense counsel returned to his request for the reinstatement of
probation, explaining, “I was describing the facts surrounding the nature of
the violation just to put forth my argument that the court does have the legal
authority to reinstate Mr. Johnson’s probation if it chose to. I was urging it
to choose that.” After brief additional comments from both counsel, including
the district attorney’s previously referenced recitation of the language of the
plea agreement, the trial court demonstrated its expansive review and
consideration of the record by reciting the charges originally filed against
Johnson; his prior strike convictions that were also serious and violent
felonies; the terms of the original plea agreement that had been withdrawn;
the preliminary hearing and resulting information with statements in
aggravation; the ultimate resolution of the case by which “Mr. Johnson pled
to a non-strike” but admitted the aggravating circumstances and waived
prior in-custody credits; and the letter in mitigation, which reiterated “all of
[the] factors [that] were known at the time of the sentence, which is why
[Johnson] got the sentence that he did.” The court then clearly stated the
basis for the sentence was the finding on the probation violation, not the
language of the plea agreement: “I am prepared to sentence him at this time,
based on the finding of his probation violation . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Wherein,
Mr. Johnson was accused of using force against the officer, battering a police
officer, disturbing the peace, and resisting arrest was found true after the
court heard from those officers.” (Italics added.)

8
Only then did the court “impose the previously suspended execution of
the upper term on Count 7, the [section] 245[, subdivision] (a)(4), of four
years State Prison.” Where the entire focus of Johnson’s argument was his
request for the reinstatement of probation, this record is not silent, nor does
it suggest the court was “ ‘unaware of its discretionary authority.’ ” (People v.
Bolian, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 1421.) Instead, it is a record replete
with details of Johnson’s criminal history demonstrating why the court did
not think the requested reinstatement of probation was appropriate.
Disagreement with a court’s ruling is not a basis for reversal. (See, e.g.,
People v. Torres (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 984, 988–989 [an appeal that “ ‘merely
affords an opportunity for a difference of opinion’ ” does not mean an
appellant has shown an abuse of discretion]; People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 378 [“a ‘ “decision will not be reversed merely because
reasonable people might disagree. ‘An appellate tribunal is neither
authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of
the trial judge’ ” ’ ”].) On this record, we see no abuse of discretion. 8
In any event, remand is unnecessary where “the record ‘clearly
indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion.”
(People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391.) Here, even assuming
arguendo the sentencing court misapprehended the scope of its discretion, the

8 For the first time on reply, Johnson argues the court failed to consider

“the nature of the violation and the defendant’s past performance on
supervision” in deciding whether to revoke probation and impose the
suspended sentence. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.435(a).) We do not consider
arguments raised for the first time on reply. (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th
527, 550, fn. 9 [issues “omitted from the opening brief” are deemed “waived”].)
Regardless, Johnson had the opportunity to provide the court with any
relevant information in his letter in mitigation, which, as the court noted,
merely presented the same facts that “were known at the time of the
sentence, which is why [Johnson] got the sentence that he did.”

9
court’s discussion of its review of the case files and Johnson’s criminal history
make us “virtually certain” that the court would impose the same four-year
prison sentence if we remanded the matter. (People v. Coelho (2001)
89 Cal.App.4th 861, 890.)
DISPOSITION
The revocation of probation and imposition of sentence is affirmed.

10
DESAUTELS, J.

We concur:

RICHMAN, ACTING P.J.

MILLER, J.

People v. Johnson (A172133)

11

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.