CourtListener 10863055•King v. Vires CA4/1
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Filed 5/21/26 King v. Vires CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
QUANDA KING, D085932
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2023-
00010362-CU-WE-CTL)
v.
BRADLEY VIRES et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Gregory W. Pollack, Judge. Affirmed.
Quanda King, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
FordHarrison and Alexander J. Harwin, for Defendants and
Respondents.
Quanda King appeals following summary judgment in favor of
defendants Bradley Vires, Yvonne Attard, Attard Property Management, Inc.
(APMI) and Joseph Boyle (collectively, Defendants).
On our de novo review, we conclude that the trial court properly
granted summary judgment, and we accordingly affirm the judgment.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Events Leading to the Unlawful Detainer Action
Effective November 1, 2019, King entered into a one-year residential
lease for a condominium owned by Vires (the Property). The Property was
professionally managed for Vires by APMI and Attard.
After the end of the one-year lease, Vires decided to sell the Property.
Accordingly, on November 3 2020, Vires (through Attard) served King by
mail with a notice that her tenancy would be terminated in 60 days (the 60-
Day Notice to Terminate the Tenancy).1 The notice stated that the tenancy
was being terminated because “Owner intends to withdraw the Premises
from the rental market.” After receiving the notice, King made an offer to
purchase the Property from Vires, with the condition that he provide
financing and carry the note for the purchase. Vires rejected that offer
because he was not able to satisfy the conditions, but he countered with an
offer to sell to King if she provided her own financing.
In mid-November 2020, Vires, through Attard, provided King with a
notice of inspection of the Property so that it could be shown to prospective
1 According to King, she received the 60-Day Notice to Terminate the
Tenancy on November 5, 2020. The record also contains a 60-Day Notice to
Terminate the Tenancy that, according to the proof of service, Attard
personally served on King on November 14, 2020.
2
buyers. King refused to allow entry, citing her medical condition and the
pandemic. Thereafter, on November 20, 2020, Attard sent King an email
stating that Vires was withdrawing the sale listing “[i]n an effort to respect
your wishes and request as he is not looking for any adversity during your
tenancy.” Attard further stated that she had “attached again the termination
of tenancy” and informed King that “in accordance with your termination of
tenancy you are also entitled to a pre-inspection which can be completed prior
to your move out.”
King initially disputed her obligation to pay rent for the last month of
her tenancy, as she contended that she had a right to “abatement” of the last
month’s rent. However, in early January 2021, King made payment of the
December rent.
On January 12, 2021, King sent a letter and two accompanying
attachments to APMI, in which she claimed a “right to not be evicted through
January 31, 2021 because I am unable to pay my rent.” King stated that the
right arose “under the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s order
dated September 1, 2020, and extended by Section 502 of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021.” The first attachment was a “Declaration Under
Penalty of Perjury for The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s
Temporary Halt in Evictions to Prevent Further Spread Of COVID-19,” in
which King affirmed that she was unable to pay her rent and would be
homeless or forced to live in close quarters with others if evicted.2 The
2 The declaration was submitted in an attempt to claim protections of the
federal eviction moratorium put in place by order of the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) from September 4, 2020 through December 31, 2020, and
which applied when certain conditions were satisfied. (85 Fed. Reg. 55292
(Sept. 4, 2020).) The moratorium was subsequently extended by
congressional action and additional CDC orders. (See Shaffer v. United
3
second attachment was a “Declaration of COVID-19-Related Financial
Distress,” which stated that it was based on Code of Civil Procedure section
1179.03, subdivision (f). By signing that declaration, King attested that she
was currently unable to pay her rent due to one or more specific
circumstances related to the pandemic.
Further establishing that she did not intend to vacate the Property,
King sent a letter to APMI on February 1, 2021, in which she enclosed a
check for 25 percent of the rent for February 2021.3 Vires did not negotiate
the check.4
B. The Unlawful Detainer Action
On February 8, 2021, Vires filed an unlawful detainer action against
King. On March 9, 2021, the trial court issued a ruling which acknowledged
that King had served a Declaration of COVID-19-Related Financial Distress,
but stated that “the declaration does not apply.” On March 16, 2021, King
sent an email to Vires offering to pay him “$10,000 to halt the eviction,”
which Vires rejected. On April 19, 2021, following a March 25, 2021 bench
trial, the trial court issued a judgment establishing that Vires was entitled to
possession of the premises. The trial of the unlawful detainer action was not
reported, and the trial court did not issue a statement of decision.
States (Fed. Cl. 2025) 178 Fed.Cl. 576, 578 [discussing the history of the
federal eviction moratorium].)
3 The attempted payment of only 25 percent of the monthly rental charge
was apparently based on King’s belief that the COVID-19 Tenant Relief Act
(Former Code Civ. Proc., § 1179.01, et seq.) was applicable to her situation.
4 Although King states that she “did not receive any notification of
rejection of this rent payment,” she presents no evidence showing that the
check was negotiated.
4
King filed an appeal of the judgment in the unlawful detainer action
and a motion to stay enforcement of the judgment pending appeal. Because
Vires wanted to expeditiously sell the Property, he reached an agreement
with King that he would not execute the writ of possession if she moved out of
the Property by July 5, 2021. King subsequently moved out by that date, and
within weeks, Vires successfully sold the Property.
C. The Litigation of the Instant Lawsuit
Almost two years later, in March 2023, King filed the instant lawsuit
against Vires, Attard, APMI and Joseph Boyle. Boyle was the unlawful
detainer assistant who helped Vires prepare the pleadings for the unlawful
detainer action. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6400, subd. (a) [defining “unlawful
detainer assistant”].)
King’s complaint alleged (1) wrongful eviction against all Defendants;
(2) retaliatory eviction against Vires; (3) fraudulent misrepresentation
against Vires, APMI and Attard; (4) intentional concealment against APMI;
(5) breach of duty against Vires and APMI; (6) breach of contract/month-to-
month tenant agreement against Vires; and (7) infliction of emotional
distress5 against all Defendants. The complaint focused on King’s contention
that Defendants “used falsified documents, omitted pertinent facts, and made
perjurious statements in sworn testimony to evict [her] during [a] national
and state eviction ban.” King alleged that the trial court in the unlawful
detainer action “relied on the false statements and intentional
misrepresentation to render a judgment against [her].”
5 The complaint does not specify whether King intended a claim for
negligent infliction or intentional infliction of emotional distress. King’s
subsequent briefing clarifies she intended a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
5
Defendants filed a summary judgment motion, which took two
alternative approaches. First, Defendants argued that, based on the
judgment against King in the unlawful detainer action, King’s lawsuit was
barred by the res judicata doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion.6
Second, Defendants argued that, based on the undisputed facts, none of the
causes of action had merit.7
6 There are two separate types of res judicata: claim preclusion and
issue preclusion. “Claim preclusion, the ‘ “ ‘primary aspect’ ” ’ of res judicata,
acts to bar claims that were, or should have been, advanced in a previous suit
involving the same parties. [Citation.] Issue preclusion, the ‘ “ ‘secondary
aspect’ ” ’ historically called collateral estoppel, describes the bar on
relitigating issues that were argued and decided in the first suit.” (DKN
Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824.) Both types of res
judicata require a final adjudication in the previous suit. (Id. at pp. 824–
825.)
7 The exhibits submitted by Defendants in support of their motion for
summary judgment were not originally included in the appellate record, and
we subsequently granted Defendants’ motion to augment the record with
those exhibits. King also filed a motion to augment. Several of the exhibits
in King’s motion to augment overlap with the exhibits in Defendants’ motion
to augment. We deny King’s motion to augment as to those exhibits because
augmentation is unnecessary due to our ruling granting Defendants’ motion
to augment. As to the remaining three documents that King identifies in her
motion to augment (exhibits 1, 2 and 3), King has not shown that those
documents were ever submitted to the trial court in connection with the
motion for summary judgment. Because “[a]ugmentation does not function to
supplement the record with materials not before the trial court” (Vons
Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444), we deny
King’s motion to augment as to those remaining exhibits.
On December 1, 2025, King filed a request for judicial notice, which
defendants have not opposed. The request for judicial notice contains various
documents that we may judicially notice because they are official public
records and legislative enactments. (Evid. Code, §§ 451, 452). We grant the
request for judicial notice, although we caution King that for statutory
provisions, there is no need to request judicial notice and submit copies of the
6
On December 13, 2024, the trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of Defendants, reaching only the issue of res judicata. Specifically, the
trial court concluded that each cause of action was barred by either claim
preclusion or issue preclusion due to the resolution of the unlawful detainer
action. The trial court did not reach Defendants’ alternative ground for
summary judgment, namely, that based on the undisputed facts, none of
King’s causes of action had merit.
On December 18, 2024, King filed a motion for reconsideration. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1008.)8 For the first time in that motion, King submitted
evidence suggesting that, in exchange for her agreement to dismiss her
appeal in the unlawful detainer action and to move out of the Property by a
specific date, the judgment in the unlawful detainer action was set aside and
the action dismissed without prejudice on July 23, 2021. King argued that,
accordingly, there was no final judgment in the unlawful detainer action to
support the application of res judicata.
statutes; a legal citation to a statute in a party’s appellate brief is sufficient.
8 King also filed a “request for statement of decision” pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure 632 on December 19, 2024. On January 3, 2024, the trial
court issued an order stating: “This court will not be issuing a Statement of
Decision under [Code of Civil Procedure section] 632, inasmuch as a
Statement of Decision is not required upon ruling on a motion for summary
judgment.” The order further explained, “At the time of oral argument, the
court advised the parties of its ruling and reasons therefor. Thereafter, the
court followed up with a written order under [Code of Civil Procedure section]
437c(g) specifying the reasons for its granting defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.” Although not clear from her opening appellate brief,
King has clarified in her appellate reply brief that she does not intend to
argue on appeal that she was entitled to a statement of decision pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure 632.
7
Specifically, in support of her motion King submitted: (1) a May 7,
2021 order by the trial court in the unlawful detainer action, which stayed
King’s lockout from the Property until July 6, 2021, and stated that “[Vires]
shall set aside judgment and dismiss the case without prejudice upon [King’s]
timely move-out;” and (2) the register of actions in the unlawful detainer
action, which showed the status of the lawsuit as “dismissed” and which
listed a July 22, 2021 “Declaration - Other (to Set Aside Judgment and
Dismiss Action Without Prejudice and Order Signed on 7/23/21) filed by
Vires, Bradley.”9
Two days later, while King’s motion for reconsideration was pending,
the trial court entered judgment in favor of Defendants on December 20,
2024.
On March 14, 2025, the trial court denied King’s motion for
reconsideration. The trial court explained that it lacked jurisdiction to grant
reconsideration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 because it had
already entered judgment.
King filed a notice of appeal from the judgment on March 14, 2025.
9 In her motion to augment filed with this court on September 11, 2025,
King submitted, as Exhibit 1, the order setting aside the judgment in the
unlawful detainer action and dismissing the action without prejudice, dated
July 23, 2021. As we have explained, augmentation of the record with that
exhibit is improper because it was not before the trial court. Nevertheless, in
the interest of understanding what occurred in the unlawful detainer action,
on our own motion we take judicial notice of the trial court’s July 23, 2021
order in the unlawful detainer action, which set aside the judgment and
dismissed the action without prejudice. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)
[authorizing judicial notice of the “[r]ecords of . . . any court of this state”].)
8
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards for an Appeal From a Summary Judgment Ruling
King’s appeal challenges the trial court’s ruling granting summary
judgment in favor of Defendants. “ ‘A trial court properly grants a motion for
summary judgment where “all the papers submitted show that there is no
triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (c).) “Because
this case comes before us after the trial court granted a motion for summary
judgment, we take the facts from the record that was before the trial court
when it ruled on that motion. [Citation.] ‘ “We review the trial court’s
decision de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and
opposing papers except that to which objections were made and sustained.” ’
[Citation.] We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party
opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in
favor of that party.” ’ ” (Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th
340, 347.)
“ ‘The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts
with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine
whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their
dispute.’ [Citation.] It necessarily follows that the pleadings frame the
issues on a motion for summary judgment. ‘[T]he burden of a defendant
moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff’s
theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need
not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the
pleadings.’ ” (Ahn v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 168,
181–182.)
9
B. Preliminary Issues
Before turning to the merits of the summary judgment motion, we
address three preliminary issues raised by King.
First, King contends that the trial court erred by sustaining
Defendants’ evidentiary objections to King’s evidence in opposition to the
summary judgment motion. Specifically, King objects that the trial court did
not sufficiently explain its reasons for sustaining the objections. However, in
designating the appellate record, King did not include the evidentiary
objections filed by Defendants. Because King has not provided us with the
evidentiary objections, we cannot meaningfully review King’s challenge to the
trial court’s ruling on them. By providing an inadequate record for our
review, King has failed to meet her burden to establish prejudicial error.
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 [based on the “fundamental
principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily
presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on
the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment,” “ ‘ “if the record is
inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of
the trial court should be affirmed” ’ ”].)
Next, King contends that the trial court erred in granting Defendants’
request for judicial notice. The request for judicial notice related to 14
different documents, most of which were filings in the unlawful detainer
action, and three of which were documents from other lawsuits that King has
filed. Although King’s appellate briefing is vague on the issue, she appears to
challenge only the ruling granting the request to take judicial notice for the
three documents from her other lawsuits. However, we see no indication that
King objected to the request for judicial notice in the trial court. Because
10
King did not object to the request for judicial notice in the trial court, she
may not, for the first time on appeal, contend that the trial court erred in
granting the request. (Younan v. Caruso (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 401, 406 fn. 3
[“failure to timely object to the propriety of judicial notice . . . is deemed a
waiver of that objection”].)
Finally, King contends that the trial court erred because its ruling on
the summary judgment motion was not detailed enough to comply with Code
of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (g). Under that provision, “Upon
the grant of a motion for summary judgment on the ground that there is no
triable issue of material fact, the court shall, by written or oral order, specify
the reasons for its determination. The order shall specifically refer to the
evidence proffered in support of and, if applicable, in opposition to the motion
that indicates no triable issue exists. The court shall also state its reasons
for any other determination.” (§ 437c, subd. (g).) Because King has not
established any prejudice from the deficiencies she perceives, we need not,
and do not, evaluate whether the trial court’s ruling complied with Code of
Civil Procedure section 437, subdivision (g). “The de novo standard for
appellate review of an order granting summary judgment frequently means
the lack of a proper order constitutes harmless error.” (Main Street Plaza v.
Cartwright & Main, LLC (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1057.) A purportedly
inadequate statement of reasons for granting a summary judgment motion
“presents no harm where, as here, our independent review establishes the
validity of the judgment.” (Soto v. State of California (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th
196, 199; Ruoff v. Harbor Creek Community Assn. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th
1624, 1627 [a trial court’s failure to perform its statutory duty under § 437c,
subd. (g) “does not automatically result in reversal” because “[w]e need only
11
determine whether the record establishes the [moving parties’] entitlement to
summary judgment in their favor”].)
C. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Was Properly Granted
King argues that the trial court improperly relied on the doctrine of res
judicata to grant summary judgment. In support of that argument, King
places heavy reliance on the order setting aside the judgment in the unlawful
detainer action, even though the trial court was not aware of that fact when
it ruled on the summary judgment motion. King further contends that the
requirements for the application of res judicata are not satisfied for several
additional reasons, regardless of the order setting aside the judgment.
Defendants take the position that any consideration of the order setting aside
the judgment in the unlawful detainer action is improper because King failed
to raise that argument in opposition to the summary judgment motion.
Defendants further contend that, even if we were to consider the order
setting aside the judgment in the unlawful detainer action, the requirements
of res judicata are nevertheless satisfied.
However, we need not, and do not, consider whether there is merit to
King’s contention that the trial court erred in relying on the doctrine of res
judicata to the motion for summary judgment. Although the trial court did
not reach Defendants’ alternative argument that King’s causes of action
lacked merit based on the undisputed facts, “[w]e will affirm an order
granting summary judgment . . . if it is correct on any ground that the parties
had an adequate opportunity to address in the trial court, regardless of the
trial court’s stated reasons.” (Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. v.
Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 115, 120.) Here, as we will explain,
regardless of whether the trial court reached the correct result in applying
the doctrine of res judicata, Defendants were entitled to summary judgment
12
because they established, based on the undisputed facts, that none of King’s
causes of action have merit.
a. Wrongful Eviction
The first cause of action alleges wrongful eviction against all
Defendants.
As pled in the complaint, King’s wrongful eviction claim is based on her
contention that Vires wrongfully instituted the unlawful detainer action even
though she served a Declaration of COVID-19-Related Financial Distress in
January 2021, and even though she continued to tender payment for the
monthly rent.
The complaint does not specifically identify any common law or
statutory basis for King’s wrongful eviction cause of action. However, King’s
memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment suggests
King intended to assert a cause of action under the common law. Specifically,
King cited Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009)
171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1039. That opinion explains the requirements for a
cause of wrongful eviction based on common law: “A person in peaceable
possession of real property may recover, in an action sounding in tort,
damages for injuries to his person and goods caused by the forcible entry of
one who is, or claims to be, the lawful owner or possessor.” (Ibid., italics
added.)
If King intended to allege a wrongful eviction cause of action based on a
common law theory, that cause of action is without merit because the
undisputed facts show that King did not suffer any forcible entry to the
Property. Instead, King relinquished possession of the Property after Vires
filed an unlawful detainer action, obtained a judgment, and then entered into
an agreement with King that she would move out of the Property by a specific
13
date. (Compare Spinks, at p. 1042 [“By dispossessing plaintiff without resort
to judicial process, defendants exposed themselves to potential tort liability
for wrongful eviction,” italics added].)
It is also possible that, because the wrongful eviction cause of action
focuses on King’s service of a Declaration of COVID-19-Related Financial
Distress in January 2021, King may have intended to base her wrongful
eviction cause of action on the COVID-19 Tenant Relief Act (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1179.01, et seq.).10 Broadly described, while that law was in effect, a
tenant who provided a declaration attesting to COVID-19 related financial
distress11 could not be found guilty of unlawful detainer based on
nonpayment of COVID-19 rental debt12 if the tenant also tendered 25
percent of the required rent. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1179.03, subd. (g)(1)(A).)
However, a tenant was not protected from an unlawful detainer judgment if
the termination of the tenancy was a “no-fault just cause” termination (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1179.03.5 (a)(3)(A)(ii)(I)), including termination based on
“[w]ithdrawal of the residential real property from the rental market.” (Civ.
Code, § 1946.2, subd. (b)(2)(B).)
10 The COVID-19 Tenant Relief Act was repealed as of Oct. 1, 2025,
(Stats. 2021, ch. 27 (A.B. 832), § 19), but it was in effect during the litigation
of Vires’s unlawful detainer action against King. We refer to the statutory
provisions as they existed at the time of the litigation of the unlawful
detainer action.
11 “COVID-19 related financial distress” refers to certain enumerated and
unenumerated “circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic that have
reduced a tenant’s income or increased a tenant’s expenses.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1179.02, subd. (b.))
12 “ ‘COVID-19 rental debt’ means unpaid rent or any other unpaid
financial obligation of a tenant under the tenancy that came due during the
covered time period.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1179.02, subd. (c).)
14
Here, the protection against unlawful detainer proceedings, as set forth
in the COVID-19 Tenant Relief Act is inapplicable because the termination of
King’s tenancy was based on a type of no-fault just cause that is excepted
from the scope of the COVID-19 Tenant Relief Act. Specifically, the record
supports no other reasonable inference than that Vires sought to terminate
King’s tenancy because he planned to withdraw the Property from the rental
market and sell it.
b. Retaliatory Eviction
The second cause of action for retaliatory eviction alleges that Vires
“retaliated against [King] for assertion of her rights under SB91 and AB
3088, [King’s] request for reasonable accommodations, and [King’s] request
for quiet enjoyment of rental unit free from landlord harassment.”13
In her memorandum in opposition to the summary judgment motion,
King specified that the cause of action for retaliatory eviction was based on
Civil Code section 1942.5. Among other things, that statute prohibits
landlords from bringing an action to recover possession “for the purpose of
retaliating against the lessee because the lessee . . . has lawfully and
peaceably exercised any rights under the law.” (Civ. Code, § 1942.5,
subd. (d).) As we understand King’s argument, she contends that Vires
retaliated against her by filing the unlawful detainer action after she served
13 The reference to “AB 3088” is a citation to the legislation that originally
enacted the COVID-19 Tenant Relief Act, along with other pandemic-related
legislation. (Stats. 2020, ch. 37.) The reference to “SB91” is a citation to
legislation enacted in January 2021, which amended the COVID-19 Tenant
Relief Act and enacted other pandemic-related legislation. (Stats. 2021,
ch. 2.)
15
the Declaration of COVID-19-Related Financial Distress in January 2021 and
after she claimed to have a right to “abatement” of the last month’s rent.
However, the record does not support a reasonable inference that Vires
filed the unlawful detainer action in retaliation for King’s exercise of her
legal rights. The undisputed evidence shows that in early November 2020,
Vires notified King that he intended to sell the Property, after which he
promptly listed the Property for sale. Those events occurred before King
provided the Declaration of COVID-19-Related Financial Distress in January
2021, and before she engaged in a dispute with Attard about rent abatement
in late December 2020. When King finally moved out of the Property, Vires
sold it within a few weeks. Based on those facts, the only reasonable
inference is that Vires filed the unlawful detainer action because he wanted
to sell the Property but King would not leave the premises. No reasonable
trier of fact could conclude that Vires filed the unlawful detainer action as
retaliation for King’s exercise of her legal rights.
c. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
The third cause of action alleges fraudulent misrepresentation against
Vires, APMI and Attard.
“ ‘To establish a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, the plaintiff
must prove: “(1) the defendant represented to the plaintiff that an important
fact was true; (2) that representation was false; (3) the defendant knew that
the representation was false when the defendant made it, or the defendant
made the representation recklessly and without regard for its truth; (4) the
defendant intended that the plaintiff rely on the representation; (5) the
plaintiff reasonably relied on the representation; (6) the plaintiff was
harmed; and (7) the plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s representation was
16
a substantial factor in causing that harm to the plaintiff.” ’ ” (Graham v.
Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 605–606 (Graham).)
As pled in the complaint, the cause of action for fraudulent
misrepresentation is based on two alleged misrepresentations. We discuss
each in turn.
i. Representation About King’s Provision of a Declaration
Required For the Federal Eviction Moratorium
First, the complaint alleges that during the litigation of the unlawful
detainer action, Vires checked a box on a form indicating that King “has not
provided a statement under penalty of perjury for the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention’s order for Temporary Halt in Evictions to Prevent
Further Spread of COVID-19 (85 Federal Register 55292).”14 The relevant
page of the completed form, with a footer indicating it is a page from
“Plaintiff’s Mandatory Cover Sheet And Supplemental Allegations—Unlawful
Detainer,” is attached as an exhibit to King’s complaint. King contends this
representation was false because she did, in fact, provide the declaration to
Vires on January 12, 2021.
As noted, the elements of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim include:
“ ‘ “(1) the defendant represented to the plaintiff that an important fact was
true; . . . (4) the defendant intended that the plaintiff rely on the
representation; (5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the representation; . . . ;
and (7) the plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s representation was a
substantial factor in causing that harm to the plaintiff.” ’ ” (Graham, supra,
226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 605–606.) Here, the first and fourth elements are not
14 The citation to “85 Federal Register 55292” refers to the federal
eviction moratorium discussed in footnote, 2, ante.
17
met because the representation was to the trial court in the unlawful detainer
action, not to King. The fifth and seventh elements are not met because,
even if the representation had been made to King rather than to the trial
court, King has not submitted any evidence that she reasonably relied upon
the representation or was harmed by her reliance. On the contrary, King
would have known the representation was false, and therefore would not
have relied on it, as she was the person who provided the declaration to
Vires.
ii. Representation About the Notice of Termination of Tenancy
The second factual basis for the fraudulent misrepresentation cause of
action is the allegation that Attard “submitted to the court a falsified [60-Day
Notice to Terminate the Tenancy] along with an[ ] altered proof of personal
service.” Those documents are attached as an exhibit to the complaint, and
King also attached them to her declaration in opposition to the summary
judgment motion.
The 60-Day Notice to Terminate the Tenancy indicates that Attard
signed it on November 3, 2020. The proof of service for that notice, which
indicates Attard signed it on January 28, 2021, states Attard personally
served the notice on November 14, 2020. In her appellate briefing, King
explains that because the proof of service is dated January 28, 2021, “the
falsity of this Notice is evident.”
King’s reliance on the 60-Day Notice to Terminate the Tenancy and its
proof of service does not support a cause of action for fraudulent
misrepresentation. For one thing, the fact that Attard signed the proof of
service on January 28, 2021 does not reasonably support an inference that
the 60-Day Notice to Terminate the Tenancy was falsified or that personal
service was not, in fact, made on November 14, 2020. Attard may have
18
simply prepared the proof of service on January 28, 2021, in preparation for
the unlawful detainer litigation, even though service was completed in
November 2020.
Moreover, as we understand King’s contention, the misrepresentation
was made to the trial court when the 60-Day Notice to Terminate the
Tenancy and its proof of service were submitted during the unlawful detainer
action. Evidence of an alleged misrepresentation made to the trial court does
not satisfy King’s requirements to show (1) a representation made to King,
(2) with the intent that she rely on it, (3) reasonable reliance by King on the
representation, and (4) harm due to that reliance. (Graham, supra,
226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 605–606.)
d. Intentional Concealment
As alleged in the complaint, the fourth cause of action for intentional
concealment, asserted only against APMI, is based on several alleged
instances of concealment. First, APMI allegedly concealed that King had
provided a “Declaration of Covid Related Hardship.”15 Second, APMI
allegedly concealed King’s “text messages” with “Holly” at APMI “which
would corroborate the month-to-month tenancy agreement.” Third, APMI
allegedly concealed that it served a different version of the 60-Day Notice to
Terminate the Tenancy that purportedly notified King of her rights under the
COVID-19 Tenant Relief Act. Although the complaint is not explicit about
whom the concealed facts should have been disclosed to, as we understand
King’s allegations, she contends that APMI was required to disclose those
facts to the trial court in the unlawful detainer action.
15 The record contains no document titled “Declaration of Covid Related
Hardship.” We infer that King intends to refer to one of the two pandemic-
related declarations that she sent to APMI on January 12, 2021.
19
The required elements of a cause of action for fraudulent
concealment16 are “(1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a
defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant
intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing
the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as
he or she did if he or she had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and
(5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression
of the fact.” (Graham, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 606.)
Based on the undisputed facts, the theory that APMI wrongly concealed
facts from the trial court does not satisfy the elements needed to establish a
claim for fraudulent concealment. Among other problems, King is unable to
satisfy the fourth element, which requires that “the plaintiff was unaware of
the fact and would not have acted as he or she did if he or she had known of
the concealed or suppressed fact.” (Graham, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at
p. 606.) King undisputably had knowledge of each of the facts that APMI
purportedly concealed from the court. Specifically, (1) King was the person
who created and provided the pandemic-related declarations to APMI in
January 2021; (2) King was one of the parties in the text messages with
“Holly”; and (3) King was the recipient of the earlier Notice of Termination of
Tenancy.
16 Although labeled a cause of action for “intentional concealment,” King’s
citation to Marketing West, Inc. v. Sanyo Fisher (USA) Corp. (1992)
6 Cal.App.4th 603, 612 in her memorandum in opposition to the summary
judgment motion establishes that the fourth cause of action is based on a
theory of fraudulent concealment. (See ibid. [setting forth “the elements of
an action for fraud and deceit based on concealment”].)]
20
e. Breach of Duty
The fifth cause of action for “breach of duty” is alleged against both
Vires and APMI. Although the body of the complaint states only “Breach of
Duty,” the first page of the complaint specifically identifies “AB 1482” as the
legal authority for the breach of duty cause of action. “AB 1482” is the bill
that was enacted as the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (Stats. 2019, ch. 597
(A.B. 1482) [enacting Civ. Code, §§ 1946.2, 1947.12–1947.13]). King’s
memorandum in opposition to the summary judgment motion confirms that
the fifth cause of action is based on the Tenant Protection Act of 2019,
arguing that summary judgment should be denied on the breach of duty
cause of action because “[King] has established triable issues of material fact
showing Defendants’ failure to comply with the duties imposed under
AB 1482, the Tenant Protection Act of 2019, codified in California Civil Code
§ 1946.2 et seq.” We accordingly evaluate the fifth cause of action to
determine whether King has a meritorious claim arising under the Tenant
Protection Act of 2019.
King contends that Vires and APMI violated the following provisions of
the Tenant Protection Act of 2019: (1) the prohibition on the termination of a
tenancy of at least 12 months unless the termination is for just cause as
defined in the statute (Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (a)); and (2) the requirement
that “[f]or a tenancy for which just cause is required to terminate the tenancy
. . . , if an owner of residential real property issues a termination notice based
on a no-fault just cause . . . , the owner shall, regardless of the tenant’s
income, at the owner’s option, do one of the following: [¶] (A) Assist the
tenant to relocate by providing a direct payment to the tenant as described in
paragraph (3). [¶] (B) Waive in writing the payment of rent for the final
21
month of the tenancy, prior to the rent becoming due.” (Civ. Code, § 1946.2,
subd. (d)(1).)
King’s contention that Vires and APMI violated these provisions of the
Tenant Protection Act of 2019 is without merit because King’s tenancy in
Vires’s condominium was not covered by the statute’s just cause provisions.
Specifically, section 1946.2 “shall not apply to the following types of
residential real properties or residential circumstances: [¶] . . . (8) Residential
real property that is alienable separate from the title to any other dwelling
unit, provided that both of the following apply: [¶] (A) The owner is not any of
the following: [¶] (i) A real estate investment trust . . . . [¶] (ii) A corporation.
[¶] (iii) A limited liability company in which at least one member is a
corporation.” (Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (e).) Because Vires is a natural
person who owned a condominium (i.e., separately alienable residential real
property), Vires’s tenancy in that condominium is not subject to the just
cause provisions of the Tenant Protection Act of 2019.17
f. Breach of Contract
The sixth cause of action is titled “Breach Of Contract/Month-To-Month
Tenant Agreement” and is asserted against Vires. The complaint alleges that
when King’s tenancy reverted to a month-to-month tenancy at the end of her
one-year lease in November 2020, Vires “breached the month-to-month lease
agreement by failing to acknowledge receipt of COVID Financial Hardship
17 The exemption from the just cause provisions of the Tenant Protection
Act of 2019 applies only if “[t]he tenants have been provided written notice
that the residential property is exempt from this section” using a specific
statement. (Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (e)(8)(B).) Evidence in the record
establishes that King was provided with the required statement as an
addendum to her lease.
22
Declaration from [King], by accepting [King’s] rent payments and
subsequently filing an Unlawful Detainer Complaint.”
To the extent the breach of contract cause of action is based on an
allegation that Vires accepted King’s rent but nevertheless evicted her, that
allegation is not supported by the evidence. Vires declared that, beginning
with the January 2021 rent, he did not negotiate the checks that King sent to
him. Although King’s declaration states that she sent Vires rent for
February and March 2021, after which she “did not receive any notification of
rejection of this rent payment,” King presents no evidence that Vires
negotiated the checks.
To the extent the breach of contract cause of action is based on Vires’s
filing of the unlawful detainer action despite King’s provision of a Declaration
of COVID-19-Related Financial Distress in January 2021, we have already
explained (in connection with the first cause of action for wrongful eviction)
that King’s provision of that declaration did not prevent Vires from
terminating her tenancy, as the reason for termination was Vires’s intention
to remove the Property from the rental market so that he could sell it. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1179.03.5 (a)(3)(A)(ii)(I)); Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (b)(2)(B).)
g. Infliction of Emotional Distress
The seventh cause of action for infliction of emotional distress alleges
that “[a]s a direct and proximate result of the unlawful conduct of Defendants
. . . [King] has suffered general damages including but not limited to shock,
embarrassment, physical distress and injury, humiliation, emotional distress,
stress and other damages.” Instead of separately identifying the conduct that
caused her to suffer emotional distress, the seventh cause of action relies
exclusively on the allegations of the preceding causes of action to identify the
distress-inducing “unlawful conduct.”
23
As we have explained, however, the first through sixth causes of action
are without merit and do not identify any “unlawful conduct” by Defendants.
Because those causes of action fail, the seventh cause of action, which is
dependent on them, fails as well.
h. Conclusion
As shown by the foregoing analysis, Defendants succeeded in
establishing a lack of merit to each of the causes of action alleged in King’s
complaint, based on the undisputed facts. Accordingly, the trial court
properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
D. King’s Motion For Reconsideration Was Properly Denied
As a final matter, King contends that her motion for reconsideration
was improperly denied. According to King, because she filed her motion for
reconsideration prior to entry of judgment, the trial court erroneously
concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion.
King’s argument is contrary to well-established case law.
“Numerous . . . cases state that a trial court may only rule on a motion for
reconsideration before entry of judgment. [Citations.] [¶] A final judgment
terminates the litigation between the parties and leaves nothing in the
nature of judicial action to be done other than questions of enforcement or
compliance. ‘Until entry of judgment, the court retains complete power to
change its decision . . . ; it may change its conclusions of law or findings of
fact. [Citation.] After judgment a trial court cannot correct judicial error
except in accordance with statutory proceedings. [Citations.] A motion for
reconsideration is not such a motion.’ ” (Ramon v. Aerospace Corp. (1996)
50 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1237–1238.) “Once the trial court has entered
judgment, it is without power to grant reconsideration. The fact that a
motion for reconsideration may have been pending when judgment was
24
entered does not restore this power to the trial court.” (APRI Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 176, 182.)
Accordingly, when the trial court entered judgment while King’s motion
for reconsideration was pending, it lost jurisdiction to rule on that pending
motion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on
appeal.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, J.
DO, J.
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