CourtListener 10863047•People v. Guy CA4/1
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Filed 5/21/26 P. v. Guy CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D087606
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. FSB20002681)
WILLIAM JAMES GUY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino,
Cheryl C. Kersey, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded for
resentencing.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Robin Urbanski, Donald W. Ostertag, Juliet W. Park, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
William James Guy appeals from a judgment imposed after a jury
convicted him of first-degree murder and found true related firearm
enhancement allegations. He contends that: (1) the trial court violated
Code of Civil Procedure1 section 231.7 by overruling his objection to the
prosecutor’s peremptory challenges against two Hispanic female prospective
jurors during jury selection; and (2) the court erred by finding true and
relying on aggravating circumstances at sentencing without any waiver of the
right to jury trial. We reject Guy’s first contention but accept the Attorney
General’s concession as to the second. We therefore reverse the sentence,
remand for resentencing, and otherwise affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts of the underlying offense are not relevant to the issues Guy
raises on appeal. We therefore include only a brief summary of the trial
evidence.
On August 5, 2020, around 11:00 p.m., Dylan Moi’s body was
discovered at an intersection near Guy’s residence in Mentone,
San Bernardino. Moi had suffered a gunshot wound to his left hip and
another fatal gunshot wound to his head. There was methamphetamine
and amphetamine in his system. He had a pocket knife in his shorts.
The day after the shooting, a friend of Guy’s asked him about it.
Guy said he shot somebody in self-defense. He said he was in his yard
when the person climbed over his fence and came at him with a knife.
Guy felt compelled to draw his firearm and shoot him three times. After
this conversation, Guy’s friend contacted law enforcement.
Law enforcement arrested and interviewed Guy. After initially
denying involvement, Guy admitted shooting Moi. He explained that Moi
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2
started yelling and screaming and then took out a knife and rushed towards
him. As Moi rushed towards him with the knife, Guy shot him two or three
times. Guy felt he had no choice but to shoot Moi. During the interview, Guy
wrote an apology letter saying, “I apologize for the crime I’ve committed. I
feel so sick with myself and can’t sleep.”
A jury found Guy guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a)) and found true allegations that he personally used a firearm (Id.,
§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b)), personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm (Id., § 12022.53, subd. (c)), and personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death (Id.,
subd. (d)).
The trial court sentenced Guy to 50 years to life in state prison,
calculated as follows: 25 years to life for the first degree murder; a
consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement under Penal
Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d); a stayed upper term sentence of 10
years for the firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.5,
subdivision (a); and stayed terms of 10 years and 20 years for the firearm
enhancements under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c).
DISCUSSION
I
Guy contends the trial court violated section 231.7 by overruling his
objection to the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges against Hispanic female
Prospective Juror Nos. 28 and 26 during jury selection. We provide
additional factual and legal background before addressing the merits of Guy’s
arguments.
3
A. Voir Dire of Prospective Juror No. 28
After the court seated the first group of 12 prospective jurors in the
jury box, the court and counsel conducted voir dire of this initial group.
Prospective Juror Nos. 28 and 26 were both in this group. The court first
conducted voir dire of each of these 12 prospective jurors individually, then
the parties each conducted voir dire of this panel.
During the court’s initial questioning, Prospective Juror No. 28, a
Hispanic female, stated that she “work[ed] for Los Angeles County Office of
Education with incarcerated youth in a mental health camp.” She said she
was married, her husband owned a construction business, she had served on
a civil jury about 15 years before, and she had no family or friends who were
in law enforcement or were charged with a crime. When the court asked
whether she could “be fair and impartial on everything,” she responded, “I
believe I can.”
Regarding her employment, the court asked, “because of the area
working with juveniles in mental health treatment, do you have a degree in
psychology or social work?” Prospective Juror No. 28 responded that she did
not. She explained that she “work[ed] in the classroom” as “staff support.”
She received continuous training in mental health issues but did not do any
diagnostic work.
Defense counsel began his voir dire of this panel by asking the jurors,
“what was the first thought that came to your mind” upon hearing that his
client was charged with murder. One prospective juror volunteered, “He’s
young.” Another said, “I thought he was young and sad.” A third stated:
“Same. I saw him, and he was very young, and it was pretty sad.”
Prospective Juror No. 28 answered: “I was thinking, being with a mental
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health background, that he had any issues at the time that maybe he was
going through.”
During the prosecutor’s voir dire, he stated, “A few of you brought up
this morning your observation of how the defendant appears young. I expect
the evidence in this case will show the victim was young.” The prosecutor
asked, “Can you think of any reason why the defendant’s appearance and his
young age, as well as the victim’s young age, would impact your ability to
return a verdict?” After asking another prospective juror, the prosecutor
turned to Prospective Juror No. 28 and asked, “How about you, ma’am . . . is
there any reason why you think your work experience -- actually noticed
when you mentioned your employment that I think you looked over at me.
Was there a reason for that?” She responded, “No.” The prosecutor followed
up by asking, “do you feel that your employment could impact your ability to
return a guilty verdict in this case?” She said, “No.”
The prosecutor later addressed Prospective Juror No. 28 again
regarding “a topic [she] brought up this morning about mental health issues.”
He asked: “[W]ould you agree with me a murder is an inherently irrational
act? Taking someone’s life, unless done in absolute self-defense, generally
would not be justified.” She agreed. The prosecutor asked, “You had
questions – you kind of [had] a reaction wondering if there [were] mental
health aspects, right?” She responded in the affirmative. The prosecutor
stated that he did not “expect there’s going to be mental health evidence in
this case” but asked the prospective juror whether she would “want to know
the answers to those questions?” She responded, “Not at all. Only what’s
presented to make our decision.”
The prosecutor inquired further about Prospective Juror No. 28’s
employment and the “types of things” she did. She responded that for seven
5
years, she had “worked with incarcerated youth at a camp” that was “a
mental health facility.” She “support[ed] them in the classroom, with their
programs, [and] their education.” If they struggled with reading, she
conducted after-school tutoring. She stated that the juveniles “have already
been sentenced, and they’re at camp pending to be sent out, whether they go
to foster care because we service a lot of homeless students.” The prosecutor
asked about what types of charges the juveniles faced, and she responded:
“Some of them, they don’t tell us. Some we find out. Some of the students let
us know. But that doesn’t discourage me or any service provided to them is
part of my job, not what they did or why they’re there.”
B. Voir Dire of Prospective Juror No. 26
In response to the court’s initial questioning, Prospective Juror No. 26, a
Hispanic female, said that she lived in both Colton and Big Bear Lake, was
not married, and did not attend school. She helped her mother clean Airbnb
rental properties full-time in Big Bear. She had never served on a jury, did
not know anyone who was in law enforcement or was a victim of a crime, and
had no issues with transportation. She believed her stepfather “got in an
argument with an officer, but that was a really long time ago, so I don’t know
anything about that.” She indicated that she “think[s] [she] can be fair.”
The court addressed Prospective Juror No. 26 about her youth: “Here is
a question, because the attorneys are going to ask you this. So you’re clearly
younger than everybody else sitting next to you.” The court continued: “Once
you’re in jury duty, sometimes people get really – they try to be persuasive
and show anger and they might, you know, be overbearing to you.” The court
then asked whether she would be able to “stand [her] ground.” Prospective
Juror No. 26 responded, “I think so.”
6
The court explained: “So I want you to listen to everybody, just like
everybody, you’re all ordered to listen to each other, but I don’t want you to
give in because you don’t have as much life experience, right? Because you’re
all going to look at the same witnesses and see the same exhibits, you’re all
going to get the same instructions on the law, and your vote regarding the
case is very important to the system and the attorneys. Okay? And that
would be one of the things is that if you don’t have a lot [of] time and
experience working in a group, for instance, or on the job and, you know, like
running a business like some of the other people, sometimes your confidence
isn’t as strong. But I still need you to hold your ground.” Prospective Juror
No. 26 responded, “If it helps, I was group leader in projects for school.” The
court replied, “It does help. It will help you sitting as a juror. So very good.
Thank you. So we’re going to keep you.”
Defense counsel asked Prospective Juror No. 26: “If you felt that you
were in immediate or in imminent [peril] of being harmed by someone, would
you protect yourself?” She started responding with, “I think it’s basic instinct
–” before she was interrupted by defense counsel, who said, “Your voice is
very soft. I wear hearing aids, so I don’t always hear soft voices. If you could
use the microphone, please.” She then responded, “I think it’s basic human
instinct, yes.”
Defense counsel also asked the jurors whether “any of you [have] ever
been afraid because you thought you might – you were either in trouble or
might be in trouble?” One prospective juror responded, “I guess, yes. When
you see a cop car behind you, you wonder what you did wrong.” When
defense counsel asked Prospective Juror No. 26, she responded, “Yes. I
basically stop breathing every time I see a cop car.”
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C. Defense Objection to Prosecutor’s Peremptory Challenges
After voir dire of the first group of 12 prospective jurors, both sides
passed for cause and the parties began exercising peremptory challenges.
The prosecutor exercised his first peremptory challenge against a
Hispanic male, his second peremptory challenge against a White male, his
third peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror No. 28, his fourth
peremptory challenge against a White female, and his fifth peremptory
challenge against Prospective Juror No. 26.
After the prosecutor’s third peremptory challenge to Prospective
Juror No. 28, defense counsel asked to approach and the court held a bench
conference off the record. After the prosecutor’s fifth peremptory challenge
to Prospective Juror No. 26, defense counsel objected “under the RJA [Racial
Justice Act]” as to the peremptory challenges against Prospective Juror
Nos. 28 and 26.2 Defense counsel stated that Guy is Hispanic. The court
noted, “He indicate[d] he also has some black and Indian.” Guy confirmed
that he was “mixed race.” The court stated that Guy “doesn’t clearly
res[o]nate, at least to the Court, with one nationality or another, specifically.
So I think that’s fair – a fair assessment. The two jurors that you have
2 Although section 231.7 is technically not part of the Racial Justice Act
(Pen. Code, §§ 745, 1473, subd. (e)), the statutes are closely related and the
record reflects that the prosecutor and the trial court understood defense
counsel was asserting an objection under section 231.7. (See People v.
Caparrotta (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 874, 896 [noting that section 231.7 and
the Racial Justice Act were enacted “in the same 2019-2020 legislative
session” and “section 3 of the Racial Justice Act contained a provision that
was similar to section 231.7 and would have become operative only if section
231.7 had not been enacted into law in the same session”].)
8
challenged . . . were clearly Hispanic females.” The prosecutor agreed that
Prospective Juror Nos. 28 and 26 were Hispanic females.
The court asked the prosecutor, “Would you like to respond to your
exercise of peremptory challenge[s] for Juror 28 and 26?” The prosecutor
responded by stating that Guy had “self-identifie[d] as African-American or
black” in his police interview, so he believed that Guy “was of mixed race,
primarily of African American descent.” The prosecutor also mentioned that
the victim was a Pacific Islander and that the “witnesses in this case are all
of mixed races.” Referring to “the non-exclusive statutory list in [section]
231.7, whether the objecting party, victim, or witness is of the same perceived
cognizable group as the excused juror,” the prosecutor argued that “race
would not be a factor in this case” and that “the two exercised peremptories
of Hispanic females” did not “have any bearing on the facts.”
The prosecutor further explained that this was not a case that involved
race or gender. Rather, this was “a homicide case in which the defendant
murdered the victim without any knowledge of what the victim looked like
and without any knowledge of who the victim was.” He stated: “There’s no
evidence to suggest that the case was racially motivated. And based on the
wide variety of ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds of the witnesses
involved, there’s no evidence to suggest that race, gender, or any other
cognizable issue would ever come up in this case.”
The prosecutor turned to “whether there were valid reasons for
excusing the jurors.” Regarding Prospective Juror No. 26, he argued that
there were “numerous race-neutral justifications for exercising a peremptory
challenge.” Specifically, he explained he excused this prospective juror
because she “ha[d] very limited life experience,” was “single, ha[d] no
children, relatively few ties to the community, [and] no prior jury experience.”
9
The prosecutor added: “I think when the Court was questioning her, you
know, I think the Court even had questions about whether she would be able
to make it to court. She was also soft spoken, as the Court will recall.”
The prosecutor then made a record “[w]ith respect to the number of
Hispanic females that continue to appear in the venire” and noted that there
were two Hispanic female prospective jurors in the jury box. The prosecutor
also mentioned that “[t]here [were] several other individuals who appear to
be of Hispanic descent in the jury” and that “everyone remaining in the
prospective jury venire appears to me to be of Hispanic or Latin descent.”
Defense counsel challenged the prosecutor’s justifications regarding
Prospective Juror No. 26. Defense counsel argued that the prospective juror
“was able to indicate to the Court that she [held] certain [leadership positions
for group projects] in high school.” He also stated: “When I engaged in her
cross-examination, she was very responsive. She was not meek at all. And
the reasons that Counsel is giving are not reasons that would normally be
given as to whether or not a juror can be fair. It’s clear he has a history.
Now he’s going down, and he’s very early in his peremptories, but he’s
showing, clearly, that he don’t like Hispanic females . . . . And the fact that
he perceives they’re not of the – my client’s race is irrelevant.”
The court began to rule on defense counsel’s objection as follows:
“All right. Well, as you both know, I’m not, of course,
familiar with the witnesses or any racial issues that may
come up during the trial. But what is clear is that the
venire as a whole has a significant number of Hispanic
females and males in the group. And, also, as I’ve noticed
previously, the jury panels that the Court sees generally on
a regular basis are ones that have a great deal of diversity.
This one is no exception to that.
10
“So there are two other Hispanic females in the jury box at
this point, and I would not – I would not be surprised if a
peremptory challenge was exercised to excuse both of them
for various reasons that have been stated in their
responses. With that said, I would really prefer not to go
through a challenge, a Wheeler-Batson challenge, every
time we have an exercise of peremptory since it appears
that the panel is overwhelming[ly] Hispanic, which is back
to the other issue is that your client is mixed race, but does
not look or appear primarily Hispanic. He does more look
and appear to be a light-skinned black male.
“With that being said, there’s an issue for the Court in that
if minorities, generally, are being excluded, the party
excluding those minorities must have a race-neutral reason
for that challenge. And the Court has listened to [the
prosecutor] and his reasons for the challenge, as to juror –
starting with Juror No. 28, which --”
The prosecutor then interrupted the court by saying, “I don’t think
we have a clear record with respect to 28 yet. I know we had an off-the-
record conversation briefly about it.” The court told the prosecutor, “Go
ahead and make your record.” The prosecutor stated that he had initially
“contemplated” exercising a for-cause challenge against Prospective Juror
No. 28 based on “her direct work with individuals who are incarcerated with
mental health issues.” He then explained that he exercised the peremptory
challenge because the prospective juror’s “first reaction upon hearing the
charges was not whether – what evidence was at issue, it was whether the
defendant had any mental health issues.” The prosecutor argued that
Prospective Juror No. 28 “appeared to be potentially biased against [the]
prosecution based on her initial response to the questions that were asked.”
The prosecutor also reiterated that race would not be an issue in this case,
there was no evidence to suggest “that a racial aspect factored into [his]
11
exercise of a peremptory challenge in this case,” and “there’s no reason to
believe that an objectively reasonable person would view a rationale as
related to either prospective jurors’ racial background.”
Defense counsel responded that “the Racial Justice Act does not
contemplate how many – what the venire panel is made of and how many –
how many Hispanic people and people of an identified race are there.” He
also argued that “[t]he prosecutor is showing a clear pattern of rejecting, at
this time, female Hispanics that otherwise seem neutral to me. And the fact
that there are other Hispanics on the jury panel is irrelevant. But he has this
pattern of excusing people, and it appears that for no other reason than their
race.”
The court responded:
“Hold on a second. I don’t think you can really say that,
because right now we have six jurors in the jury box, and
only one of those, that I can think about, which is the juror
sitting in Chair 8, is Caucasian. Everybody else is
Hispanic. So let’s – you know, let’s be mindful that your
client is not Hispanic, and the majority of jurors that have
been called into the courtroom are Hispanic. So the
majority of peremptory challenges are going to be to strike
Hispanic jurors.
“So that being said, though, I understand that you believe
that you made a prima facie case. The Court disagrees
with you in that the challenge of two individuals in a very
diverse panel is not sufficient for a prima facie showing.
However, the race-neutral reasons for the challenges that
have been given by [the prosecutor], the Court finds those
to be satisfactory.”
Regarding Prospective Juror No. 28, the court made the following
findings:
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“[Prospective Juror No. 28] stated that she was – worked in
mental health for juveniles. The issue before the panel is
how young your client appears and how sympathetic some
of those jurors are toward your client. She also stated she’s
staff support, so she’s in a supportive capacity for mental
health or mentally ill juveniles. And it appears from her
answers that she may be overly sympathetic towards your
client, which gives rise to the challenge exercised by the
People as to, potentially, internal bias.”
Regarding Prospective Juror No. 26, the court made the following
findings:
“[Prospective Juror No. 26 was a] Hispanic female who
lived in two places, which didn’t make a lot of sense to the
Court, because she works a lot in Big Bear, but now lives in
Colton and goes back and forth. I’m not sure what exactly
she does except cleaning Airbnbs with her mother. She has
no jury experience, no law enforcement experience, no
friends or relatives in law enforcement. So it appeared,
even though she was questioned, that she was very
immature and was not seeking any higher education since
graduation. Her age appeared to be 18, maybe 19 at the
most. So the exercise of a challenge due to her immaturity
appears to be appropriate and also race-neutral in this
case.”
The prosecutor noted that his first peremptory challenge had been to a
Hispanic male and his second to “a white male that was similarly young and
inexperienced and had no life experience.” The court further observed that
the prosecutor exercised another peremptory challenge against a White
female. The court concluded that out of five total peremptory challenges by
the prosecutor, two were exercised against Hispanic females. The court then
denied without prejudice defense counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s
exercise of the peremptory challenges “under section 231.7.”
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D. Governing Law
Before January 1, 2022, courts analyzed objections to allegedly
discriminatory peremptory challenges solely under the three-step inquiry
established by Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 and People v. Wheeler
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 258. In the first step of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, the
objecting party must establish a prima facie case by showing that the totality
of circumstances gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. (People
v. Jimenez (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 534, 548 (Jimenez).) In the second step, the
burden shifts to the other party to offer race-neutral justifications for the
peremptory challenges. (Ibid.) In the third step, the trial court must decide
whether the objecting party has proven purposeful discrimination. (Id. at
p. 549.)
“Recognizing the limitations of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry,” the
Legislature enacted section 231.7, “which creates new procedures for
identifying unlawful discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges.”
(People v. Jaime (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 941, 943.) “Under section 231.7, the
party objecting to the peremptory challenge is no longer required to make a
prima facie showing of racial discrimination.” (Ibid.) Instead, upon objection,
the party exercising the peremptory challenge must always state the reasons
for exercising the challenge. (§ 231.7, subd. (c).) The court must then
“evaluate the reasons given . . . in light of the totality of circumstances”
and sustain the objection if “there is a substantial likelihood that an
objectively reasonable person would view race, ethnicity, gender, gender
identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or
perceived membership in any of those groups, as a factor in the use of the
peremptory challenge . . . .” (Id., subd. (d)(1).) “The court need not find
purposeful discrimination to sustain the objection.” (Ibid.) The statute
14
defines an “objectively reasonable person” as someone who is aware of
“unconscious bias,” which “includes implicit and institutional biases.” (Id.,
subds. (d)(2)(A), (C).) The statute lists a variety of factors the court may
consider in making the totality of circumstances determination. (Id., subd.
(d)(3).)
Certain specified reasons for a peremptory challenge are defined as
presumptively invalid under section 231.7, and the presumption may only be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that those reasons are unrelated to
the prospective juror’s perceived membership in a protected group and have a
bearing on the juror’s ability to be fair and impartial. (§ 231.7, subd. (e).) As
relevant to Guy’s contentions on appeal, these presumptively invalid reasons
include “[h]aving a close relationship with people who have been stopped,
arrested, or convicted of a crime” (Id., subd. (e)(3)) or “[e]mployment in a field
that . . . serves a population disproportionately comprised of members” of a
protected group. (Id., subd. (e)(10).)
The trial court’s denial of an objection under section 231.7 must be
“reviewed by the appellate court de novo, with the trial court’s express
factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence.” (§ 231.7, subd. (j).) The
reviewing court “shall not impute” any findings that the trial court “did not
expressly state on the record.” (Ibid.) “The reviewing court shall consider
only reasons actually given” by the party exercising the peremptory challenge
“and shall not speculate as to or consider reasons that were not given to
explain . . . the party’s use of the peremptory challenge.” (Ibid.) If the
appellate court concludes “that the objection was erroneously denied, that
error shall be deemed prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the
case remanded for a new trial.” (Ibid.)
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E. Analysis
Guy first contends that the prosecutor’s stated reasons for excusing
Prospective Juror No. 28 were presumptively invalid under section 231.7,
subdivisions (e)(3) and (e)(10). The Attorney General argues Guy forfeited
this claim by not arguing that these reasons were presumptively invalid in
the trial court. As this court has explained in rejecting a similar claim of
forfeiture, however, once an objection to a peremptory challenge has been
made and the reasons for the challenge stated, “ ‘[i]t is then up to the trial
court to correctly apply the procedure set forth in section 231.7 when deciding
whether to sustain the objection’ [citation], and this includes determining
whether the proffered reason is presumptively invalid.” (People v. Aguilar
(2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 845, 854, fn. 7, italics added.) We therefore find no
forfeiture.
Based on our de novo review (§ 231.7, subd. (j)), we nevertheless
conclude that the prosecutor’s stated reasons for excusing Prospective Juror
No. 28 were not presumptively invalid. The prosecutor explained that he
had “contemplated” exercising a for-cause challenge against Prospective
Juror No. 28 based on “her direct work with individuals who are incarcerated
with mental health issues,” but he did not identify this as the reason for the
peremptory challenge. The prosecutor explained that he exercised the
peremptory challenge because this prospective juror’s “first reaction upon
hearing the charges was not whether – what evidence was at issue, it was
whether the defendant had any mental health issues” and she “appeared to
be potentially biased against [the] prosecution based on her initial response
to the questions that were asked.” The prosecutor was clearly referring to
the answer Prospective Juror No. 28 gave when defense counsel asked the
jurors “what was the first thought” that came to mind upon hearing that Guy
16
was charged with murder, and she responded, “I was thinking, being with a
mental health background, that he had any issues at the time that maybe he
was going through.”
This was not a presumptively invalid reason under either of the
subdivisions cited by Guy. It was not based on Prospective Juror No. 28’s
“close relationship” with anyone who was stopped, arrested, or convicted of a
crime (§ 231.7, subd. (e)(3)) and it was not based on her “[e]mployment in a
field that . . . serves a population disproportionately comprised of members”
of a protected group. (Id., subd. (e)(10).) Rather, it was based on a specific
response she gave during voir dire which reasonably suggested to the
prosecutor that she would be less inclined to convict based on her mental
health background and the fact that her “first thought” upon learning Guy
was charged with murder was that he may have been going through mental
health issues at the time. As the trial court concluded, “it appears from her
answers that she may be overly sympathetic towards [Guy], which gives
rise to the challenge exercised by the People” due to her potential bias.
Accordingly, we reject Guy’s contention that the reasons given by the
prosecutor for excluding Prospective Juror No. 28 were presumptively
invalid.3
3 Even if the prosecutor had cited Prospective Juror No. 28’s employment
as a reason for the peremptory challenge, as opposed to a potential challenge
for cause, the record still does not reflect that she had a “close relationship”
with her students (§ 231.7, subd. (e)(3)) or that her “field” of employment
“serves a population disproportionately comprised of members” of a protected
group. (Id., subd. (e)(10).) These questions were not explored with her
during voir dire.
17
As for Prospective Juror No. 26, Guy argues that the record does not
support the prosecutor’s stated reasons for excusing her. We disagree. The
prosecutor’s stated reasons were that Prospective Juror No. 26 “ha[d] very
limited life experience,” was “single, ha[d] no children, relatively few ties to
the community, [and] no prior jury experience.” The prosecutor also noted
that “the Court even had questions about whether she would be able to make
it to court” and “[s]he was also soft spoken, as the Court will recall.”4 These
reasons are amply supported by the record, including Juror No. 26’s own
statements and the trial court’s observation that she appeared to be only
about 18 or 19 years old. Contrary to Guy’s suggestion, nothing in the record
suggests the prosecutor exercised this peremptory challenge because
Prospective Juror No. 26 gave confusing answers. Moreover, this is not a
case like People v. Uriostegui (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 271, in which the
prosecutor’s assertion that a prospective juror lacked life experience “was
based in part on the presumptively invalid reason of ‘lack of employment or
underemployment.’ ” (Id. at p. 280 [quoting § 231.7, subd. (e)(11).) Guy
makes no similar claim that the peremptory challenge against Juror No. 26
was based on lack of employment or underemployment, nor did the
prosecutor make any such suggestion.
In his reply brief, Guy argues for the first time that exclusion of jurors
based on their youth is prohibited under section 231.5.5 Guy has forfeited
4 Guy does not contend that being soft-spoken is a presumptively invalid
“demeanor” reason under section 231.7, subdivision (g)(1)(B).
5 Section 231.5 provides: “A party shall not use a peremptory challenge
to remove a prospective juror on the basis of an assumption that the
prospective juror is biased merely because of a characteristic listed or defined
in Section 11135 of the Government Code, or similar grounds.” The cross-
18
this claim by failing to raise it in the opening brief. (People v. Lee (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1164, 1190 (Lee).) In any event, excluding a juror based on youth
does not violate section 231.5 or 231.7. (People v. Hernandez (2025) 115
Cal.App.5th 256, 265–266.) Section 231.5 “prohibits age discrimination in
jury selection against persons age 40 or older but not those under age 25.”
(Id. at p. 266.) Moreover, “[y]oung people are not included in the groups
encompassed by section 231.7.” (Ibid.) “ ‘A potential juror’s youth and
apparent immaturity are race-neutral reasons that can support a peremptory
challenge.’ ” (Id. at p. 265.)
Finally, even though the reasons given by the prosecutor were valid
and supported by the record, section 231.7 still requires the court to evaluate
“the totality of circumstances” to determine whether “there is a substantial
likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view” race or gender
“as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge . . . .” (§ 231.7, subd.
(d)(1).) In this context, “a ‘substantial likelihood’ means more than a mere
possibility but less than a standard of more likely than not.” (Id., subd.
(d)(2)(B).) We make this totality of the circumstances evaluation taking into
account all relevant factors, including those listed in subdivision (d)(3). (See
referenced section prohibits discrimination or denial of public benefits based
on various categories, including “age.” (Gov. Code, § 11135, subd. (a).) It
further provides, “The protected bases referenced in this section have the
same meanings as those terms are defined in [Government Code] Section
12926.” (Gov. Code, § 11135, subd. (c).) Government Code section 12926,
subdivision (b) in turn states: “ ‘Age’ refers to the chronological age of any
individual who has reached a 40th birthday.” (Italics added.)
19
People v. Garcia (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 92, 108 (Garcia); Jimenez, supra, 99
Cal.App.5th at pp. 545–547.)
Based on our independent review of the totality of circumstances, we
conclude that an objectively reasonable person would not view race or gender
as a factor in these peremptory challenges. The prosecutor’s stated reasons
for exercising them (i.e., Prospective Juror No. 28’s comment about Guy’s
mental health and Prospective Juror No. 26’s own youth and lack of life
experience) were not explicitly or implicitly based on race or gender or
disproportionately associated with race or gender. (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(3)(E).)
These reasons were also supported by the record. (Id., subd. (d)(3)(F).)
The prosecutor questioned Juror No. 28 appropriately regarding her
unprompted comment about Guy’s mental health, which was a legitimate
area of concern. (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(3)(C)(i).) Although the prosecutor did not
question Juror No. 26 about her youth and lack of life experience, there was
“little need to” because the trial court had already done so. (Garcia, supra,
115 Cal.App.5th at p. 108 [prosecutor’s failure to question prospective juror
about his youth and lack of experience did not suggest these were pretextual
reasons “given that [defendant]’s own counsel did so at length”].) Moreover,
the prosecutor dismissed another White male prospective juror who “was
similarly young and inexperienced and had no life experience” and did so
without questioning him about it. (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(3)(C)(iii), (D).) Youth
was also a valid concern given Guy’s own youthful appearance. Several
prospective jurors specifically mentioned how young Guy appeared to be and
how “sad” it was, and the trial court commented to defense counsel, “The
20
issue before the panel is how young your client appears and how sympathetic
some of those jurors are toward your client.”6
As for the race and gender of the relevant individuals (§ 231.7, subd.
(d)(3)(A)), Guy was a mixed-race male and Prospective Juror Nos. 28 and 26
were both Hispanic females. Although Guy was part Hispanic, he identified
himself as African-American or Black in his police interview and the
prosecutor believed he was “primarily of African American descent.” The
trial court confirmed that Guy did not appear to be primarily Hispanic and
looked to be a light-skinned Black male. The victim of the homicide was
Pacific Islander and the witnesses were all of mixed races. The defense has
never disputed the prosecutor’s assertions that race had no bearing on the
facts of the case to be tried. (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(3)(B).) The defense has also
never argued that the prosecutor or his office had a history of discriminatory
peremptory challenges. (Id., subd. (d)(3)(G).) Finally, at the time of the
section 231.7 objection, five of the six prospective jurors still remaining in the
jury box were Hispanic, two of those were Hispanic females, and those
remaining in the venire who would take the place of any excused juror
appeared to be all or mostly Hispanic.
“[I]n the totality of circumstances, we conclude that there is not a
substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view
cognizable group membership as a factor in the prosecutor’s peremptory
challenge” of Prospective Juror No. 28 or Prospective Juror No. 26. (Jimenez,
supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 546.) Nothing in the record would suggest to an
objectively reasonable person that race or gender was a factor in these
6 According to the probation report, Guy was born in July 1999, which
made him 23 years old at the time of trial.
21
peremptory challenges or that they were attributable to conscious or
unconscious bias. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in overruling
defense counsel’s objection under section 231.7.7
II
Guy also contends the trial court erred in imposing upper terms on the
firearm enhancements based on aggravating circumstances that were not
“stipulated to by the defendant” or “found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial by the jury” or found true by the court after a waiver of the right to jury
trial. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(2).) The Attorney General concedes that
the trial court erred by finding these aggravating circumstances true at
sentencing without a waiver of the right to jury trial, and the court therefore
could not lawfully rely on these aggravating factors to impose the upper term
7 Guy does not assert any Wheeler/Batson argument apart from his
section 231.7 arguments. At least one court has suggested that the failure
of a section 231.7 claim necessarily defeats a related constitutional claim
under Wheeler/Batson. (People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 768, 808.)
We need not decide this question because the issue has not been raised.
Likewise, Guy did not argue in his opening brief that the trial court
improperly evaluated his section 231.7 objection using the Batson/Wheeler
framework. As the Attorney General candidly acknowledges in the
respondent’s brief, “portions of the record indicate that the trial court may
have applied the Batson/Wheeler standard,” including its references to
Batson/Wheeler and its finding that Guy had not made a prima facie
showing. Because Guy attempted to raise this issue for the first time in his
reply brief, it is forfeited. (Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1190.) Even if it
were not forfeited, however, we would find no error in the trial court’s
ultimate ruling based on our own de novo review of the record properly
applying section 231.7. (§ 231.7, subd. (j).) A ruling that is correct under the
law will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason.
(People v. Dawkins (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 991, 1004.)
22
of 10 years on the firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.5,
subdivision (a). We agree as well.
The information alleged multiple circumstances in aggravation relating
to both the crime and Guy. During trial, the parties agreed to bifurcate the
trial on the alleged aggravating circumstances. Although defense counsel
indicated that Guy intended to waive his right to jury trial on these
allegations, it appears this never happened. The record does not include
any such waiver or stipulation to any of the aggravating circumstances.
Despite the absence of a jury waiver, the court at sentencing found true
multiple of the charged aggravating circumstances. The court also imposed
the upper term of 10 years for the Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a)
firearm enhancement.8
We agree with the parties that the trial court erred by imposing this
upper term sentence based on aggravating circumstances that were not
“stipulated to by the defendant,” “found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial by the jury,” or found true “by the judge in a court trial” after a waiver of
the right to jury trial. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) Under the Sixth Amendment,
“any fact, beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction, that exposes a defendant
to harsher punishment, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt,
unless the defendant stipulates to its truth or waives a jury trial.” (People v.
Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1084, italics added.)
8 The sentencing triad for this enhancement is three, four, or 10 years.
(Pen. Code, § 12022.5, subd. (a).) As the Attorney General notes, the terms
the court imposed on the separate Penal Code section 12022.53 firearm
enhancements were not upper terms because section 12022.53 prescribes set
terms for each of these defined enhancements and does not give the court any
discretion to impose a low, middle, or upper term.
23
We also agree with the Attorney General’s concession that this error
is prejudicial and requires a remand for resentencing under People v. Lynch
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768–769, 775–776. Several of the aggravating
circumstances found true by the trial court were based on what the Supreme
Court in Lynch referred to as “a somewhat vague or subjective standard.”
(Id. at p. 775.) These include that “the crime involved great violence, great
bodily harm, and other acts showing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness,
and callousness” and that Guy had “engaged in violent conduct that indicates
a serious danger to society.” Because these aggravating circumstances are
inherently subjective and imprecise (id. at pp. 775–776), we cannot “conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the
aggravating factors relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term
sentence.” (Id. at pp. 768–769.) Moreover, the court could not lawfully have
imposed the upper term on the Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a)
enhancement without proper true findings or a stipulation to the truth of
“circumstances in aggravation . . . that justif[ied] the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term.” (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
We will therefore vacate the sentence and remand for a full resentencing
hearing. (See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [full resentencing on
all counts required when part of sentence is stricken on appeal].)
24
DISPOSITION
The sentence is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court
for a full resentencing hearing. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
BUCHANAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
KELETY, J.
RUBIN, J.
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