People v. Mythong CA2/3

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Filed 5/21/26 P. v. Mythong CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B339795

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA006238
v.

ROTE MYTHONG,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard M. Goul, Judge. Affirmed.
Christopher L. Haberman for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Nancy Lii Ladner,
Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
In 1991, a jury convicted 16-year-old Rote Mythong of first
degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 with firearm
enhancements (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (a)(1)). He was
sentenced to 29 years to life in prison. In 2020, he was paroled
from prison and placed in Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) detention. Because his conviction was an
aggravated felony under federal immigration law, an
immigration judge ordered Mythong—a lawful permanent
resident at the time of his conviction—removed from the United
States under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 et seq.) An appeal of his final order of removal is
currently pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
On January 17, 2024, more than 30 years after his
conviction, Mythong filed a motion to vacate the conviction or
sentence pursuant to section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1), alleging
he did not understand the immigration consequences of a murder
conviction when he decided to go to trial, and if had he
understood, he would have vigorously tried to obtain an
immigration-neutral disposition. The trial court denied the
motion.
On appeal, Mythong contends that he did not meaningfully
understand the immigration consequences of his conviction and
that this error was prejudicial. For the reasons stated below, we
affirm the order.

1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Defendant’s background and prior criminal history
Mythong is ethnically Laotian and was born in Cambodia
in 1974. In Long Beach, California, Mythong joined the “Suicidal
Punks,” a subset of the “Sons of Samoa” gang, when he was 12
years old. In 1988, when he was 13 years old, he was placed on
informal supervision for trespassing. Approximately five months
later, in 1989, a petition was filed and the allegation of battery
was sustained. Mythong was placed home on probation. Later
that year, he was arrested for petty theft and was referred to a
work program as an alternative to incarceration. In October
1989, a petition was filed and the allegation of assault with a
deadly weapon was sustained. Mythong was ordered to camp
community placement. He spent nine months in the camp
program and was released on August 26, 1990. Approximately
one month after being released from camp, he was arrested for
resisting a peace officer. The disposition of that case is unknown.
II. Charges
On January 27, 1991, 16-year-old Mythong was arrested for
his involvement in the shooting death of John Clary on January
17, 1991. The District Attorney’s office filed a petition against
Mythong in juvenile court alleging murder (§ 187, subd. (a)).
Mythong entered a denial of the charges against him, and the
District Attorney filed a motion pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (c), requesting to
transfer the case to a court of criminal jurisdiction (adult
criminal court).
On March 13, 1991, Mythong appeared for a hearing on the
motion to transfer. In accordance with the probation

3
department’s recommendation that Mythong be found unfit for
juvenile court, the juvenile court ordered his case transferred to
adult criminal court. During a psychiatric evaluation, Mythong
told a psychiatrist that he declined a plea bargain offer for 18
years to life “for something I did not do.”
On October 11, 1991, a jury convicted Mythong of first
degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1) with firearm
enhancements (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
The probation department generated a report for the
probation and sentencing hearing in July 1991, recommending
that Mythong “be committed to state prison for the maximum
time possible.” The report stated that Mythong’s involvement in
the present offense was “not an isolated incident, but appears to
be a part of an established pattern of anti-social behavior” and
found “no question that his actions pose a substantial threat to
others.” The report further noted that Mythong “has been unable
to benefit from prior probation supervision, becoming involved in
more serious offenses, finally resulting in the death of another.”
After Mythong’s conviction, he was evaluated for his
amenability for the training and treatment offered by the Youth
Authority2 under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2 and
was found to be unamenable to treatment. The evaluation
considered “the seriousness of the instant offense as well as
[Mythong’s] history of escalating violence, plus the early onset of
delinquent behavior” and “deemed [him] to be intractable.” The

2 As of July 1, 2005, the correctional agency known as the
California Youth Authority became known as the Division of
Juvenile Facilities, which is within the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1710,
subd. (a).)

4
report noted Mythong denied his role in the murder, did not
demonstrate any remorse, appeared fixed into his antisocial
value system, and displayed little to no motivation to change his
behavior.
As a part of the amenability determination, a psychiatrist
wrote a report dated September 16, 1991. The psychiatrist found
that Mythong presented a “clear threat to the community,” and
recommended an “extended period of confinement in a highly
structured setting.”
The trial court sentenced Mythong to 29 years to life in
state prison, consisting of 25 years to life for the murder
conviction and the mid-term of four years for the personal use of
a firearm enhancement. On August 19, 1993, the judgment was
affirmed on appeal.3
In 2020, Mythong was paroled from prison and was
detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). An
immigration judge ordered him removed from the United States
and judicial review of his removal proceedings is currently
pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.
III. Section 1473.7 motion
On January 17, 2024, Mythong, through counsel, filed a
motion to vacate the conviction or sentence pursuant to section
1473.7, subdivision (a)(1). Mythong argued that his conviction
should be vacated because, as a sixteen-year-old, he did not
understand or consider the immigration-related consequences of

3 People v. Bush and Mythong (Aug. 19, 1993, B061644)
[nonpub. opn.].

5
proceeding to trial. He claimed that if “he had understood that
his conviction in this case would have guaranteed his deportation
to a country to which [he] had no ties nor memory, he would have
done everything in his power to remain in the juvenile system, or,
at least, sought to negotiate a plea deal in adult court that would
give him a chance to remain in the United States.” He argued he
would have attempted to negotiate an immigration-safe
disposition, such as a guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter.
Mythong further averred that if his case had been prosecuted
today, it would have been adjudicated in juvenile court.
The District Attorney filed an opposition to Mythong’s
motion and denied that any prejudicial error occurred. First, the
District Attorney noted that Mythong failed to present “any
contemporaneous, objective, corroborative evidence showing [he]
placed any importance on avoiding deportation in deciding to go
to trial.” The District Attorney also emphasized there was no
evidence that an immigration-safe plea would have been offered
or that the court would have accepted such an offer. The District
Attorney noted that Mythong was an active gang member
charged with murder. He had a lengthy history within the
juvenile justice system, which included dispositions of probation,
suitable placement, and camp. The District Attorney further
argued that Mythong did not present any contemporaneous
evidence to substantiate or corroborate his self-serving statement
that he would not have proceeded to trial had he known of the
immigration consequences of a conviction for murder.
IV. The superior court’s order
On July 25, 2024, the superior court held a hearing on the
motion to vacate. After hearing arguments from both parties, the
court denied the motion. First, the court found that Mythong was

6
not credible. Specifically, the court noted Mythong testified that
in 1991, he was unaware of any immigration consequences for a
murder conviction and he was never told by his attorney that
there would be immigration consequences. However, in his
declaration, Mythong stated, “ ‘I have no memory of my attorney
in juvenile court. I have no memory of being evaluated by a
psychologist, social worker, or anyone while I was in juvenile
court.’ ” The court found that there was a “direct conflict”
between Mythong’s testimony that he was never told about the
immigration consequences and his declaration that he had no
memory of his court proceedings. Because Mythong contradicted
himself, the court found that his testimony was self-serving and
unreliable.
Second, the court found Mythong’s claim that he would not
have gone to trial if he had known the immigration consequences
to be speculative, considering at the time of his trial, he
proclaimed his innocence and refused to take a plea “for
something [he] did not do.”
Third, the court found it “highly speculative” that the
District Attorney would have offered a disposition that included a
guilty plea to a charge that did not carry immigration
consequences. As the court stated, “[t]his was a murder. He
killed a human being. And there is nothing in the record that
indicates that there was any non-deportable offense which he was
offered and any non-deportable sentence which he was offered.”
The court found no indication that Mythong was or would have
been offered an opportunity to plead guilty to a charge that did
not carry immigration consequences. Ultimately, the court found
that Mythong’s motion was “based on speculation now,
speculation about what he was told back then[,] and speculation

7
about what he would have done with that information.”
Accordingly, the court denied the motion to vacate. Mythong
timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 1473.7
Under section 1473.7, a person who is no longer in criminal
custody may move to vacate a conviction on the ground that the
conviction was “legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging
the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend
against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse
immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.” (§ 1473.7,
subd. (a)(1).) To establish that a conviction was legally invalid on
this ground, a “defendant must first show that he did not
meaningfully understand the immigration consequences” of his
litigation strategy. (People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311,
319 (Espinoza).) “Next, the defendant must show that his
misunderstanding constituted prejudicial error.” (Ibid.)
Under section 1473.7, a misunderstanding of immigration
consequences is prejudicial if there is a “reasonable probability”
that, absent the misunderstanding, the defendant would have
adopted a different strategy. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p.
319.) Thus, where a defendant accepts a plea bargain, a
misunderstanding is prejudicial if “ ‘the defendant would have
rejected the plea if the defendant had correctly understood its
actual or potential immigration consequences.’ ” (Ibid.)
Similarly, where, as here, a defendant “decides to go to trial,
loses, and is sentenced, the defendant can establish prejudice”
under section 1473.7 “by showing there is a reasonable
probability that (1) he or she would have done something

8
differently—that is, would have taken another ‘path’ [citation]—
and (2) the alternate path would have resulted in an
immigration-neutral outcome.” (People v. Carrillo (2024) 101
Cal.App.5th 1, 20 (Carrillo).) “A reasonable probability does not
mean more likely than not.” (Id. at p. 19.) Instead, a reasonable
probability is “merely a reasonable chance, which is more than an
abstract possibility”—that is, a “probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Ibid.) In determining
whether there was a reasonable probability that a defendant
would have adopted a different strategy, courts “weigh all
relevant circumstances.” (Espinoza, at p. 321.) Such
circumstances include not only the defendant’s ties to the United
States, but also “whether alternative, immigration-safe
dispositions were available” and, in particular, “whether the
defendant would have had reason ‘to expect or hope’ that a plea
deal without immigration consequences ‘would or could have
been negotiated.’ ” (Id. at pp. 323–324.) As the moving party, the
petitioner in a section 1473.7 proceeding bears the burden of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 1473.7, subd. (f)(1);
see also People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 534 (Vivar).)
II. Standard of review
Appeals from section 1473.7 hearings are subject to
independent review. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319.)
Under this standard, “ ‘ “an appellate court exercises its
independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the
rule of law.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 319–320.) We “give deference to the
trial court’s factual determinations if they are based on ‘ “ ‘the
credibility of witnesses the [superior court] heard and
observed.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)

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III. Mythong has not established prejudicial error
The trial court found that Mythong was not credible and
that his current statements regarding his past lack of
understanding of the immigration consequences of a murder
conviction were unreliable and self-serving. We have no reason
to dispute the trial court’s factual determinations.
Even assuming Mythong established that in 1991 he did
not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of a
murder conviction, he has failed to demonstrate, through
objective evidence, that “his lack of understanding of immigration
consequences prejudiced his decision to go to trial.” (Carrillo,
supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 22.) Mythong can demonstrate
prejudice by showing “a reasonable probability,” that he “would
have taken another ‘path’ [citation] . . . and . . . the alternate path
would have resulted in an immigration-neutral outcome.” (Id. at
pp. 19–20.) “Factors particularly relevant to this inquiry include
the defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the
defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the defendant’s
priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the defendant
had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated
disposition was possible.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 529–
530.) “Objective evidence” to support a showing of prejudice
“includes facts provided by declarations, contemporaneous
documentation of the defendant’s immigration concerns or
interactions with counsel, and evidence of the charges the
defendant faced.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321.)
We acknowledge that Mythong had significant ties to the
United States at the time of his conviction—he came here as a
young child with his family as refugees, he lived in the United
States for over a decade, and he had no known remaining familial

10
ties to Cambodia. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 323 [noting
“a defendant’s deep and long-standing ties to the United States
are among the totality of circumstances that can support an
inference that immigration consequences were of paramount
concern at the time of the defendant’s guilty plea”].)
Nevertheless, we agree with the trial court that Mythong
speculated when he testified at the hearing that he might have
agreed to plead guilty to an immigration-neutral charge in
exchange for a longer sentence than what the District Attorney
allegedly offered.
The objective evidence supports that Mythong’s primary
concern in 1991 was proclaiming his innocence and avoiding
prison. Prior to sentencing on his murder conviction, Mythong
was assessed to determine whether he was amenable to the
treatment offered by the California Youth Authority. He stated
that he was not willing to accept a plea bargain with reduced
prison time “for something [he] did not do.” Mythong’s statement
from 1991 contradicts his current claim that he would have taken
a different path and pleaded guilty, rather than proceeding to
trial.
Moreover, we conclude that Mythong failed to present
evidence that at the time he chose to go to trial, he “had reason to
believe an immigration-neutral negotiated disposition was
possible.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530.) He presented no
evidence that the District Attorney would have agreed to
adjudicate his case in juvenile court or would have been
amenable to an immigration-neutral plea. All evidence indicates
that the District Attorney would not have been amenable to
either. Mythong’s crime was serious and the evidence against
him was strong. He had an extensive criminal history,

11
demonstrating escalating violence and a lack of rehabilitation.
He was an active gang member, and as stated in his evaluation,
“he appear[ed] to be fairly well fixed into his antisocial value
system as he display[ed] little to no motivation to change his
faulty thinking process.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 323
[noting the factors relevant to whether the prosecutor would offer
a plea include “the defendant’s criminal record, the strength of
the prosecution’s case, the seriousness of the charges or whether
the crimes involved sophistication, the district attorney’s
charging policies with respect to immigration consequences, and
the existence of comparable offenses without immigration
consequences”].)
Mythong mentions that the District Attorney’s offer prior to
trial “involved . . . accepting the murder charge in exchange for a
sentence of 18 years to life.” He argues that this offer
demonstrated “the prosecution’s willingness to negotiate.”
Preliminarily, other than the reference in Mythong’s statement to
the psychiatrist, there is no evidence that the District Attorney
ever extended any offer to him. Assuming the District Attorney
offered 18 years to life in exchange for pleading guilty to murder,
such an offer does not demonstrate a reasonable probability that
the District Attorney would have offered a charge with an
immigration-safe disposition. It would instead show the
prosecutor’s unwillingness to permit anything less than a
conviction for murder.
Nor can we simply presume that a trial court would have
approved a plea bargain for a lesser charge negotiated between
the District Attorney and Mythong. “In exercising their
discretion to approve or reject proposed plea bargains, trial courts
are charged with the protection and promotion of the public’s

12
interest in vigorous prosecution of the accused, imposition of
appropriate punishment, and protection of victims of crimes.
[Citation]. For that reason, a trial court’s approval of a proposed
plea bargain must represent an informed decision in furtherance
of the interests of society.” (In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924,
941.)
Mythong’s theory appears to be a mere “abstract
possibility” of an immigration-safe plea, and not a “probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Carrillo,
supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 19.) We conclude that Mythong has
not provided any evidence, aside from his own speculation, that
there was a reasonable probability that the District Attorney
would have entertained a plea to any lesser charge.4

4 Mythong asserts that “the stage was set for [his] attorney
to counteroffer a plea to voluntary manslaughter.” We need not
determine whether voluntary manslaughter was crime of violence
and thus an aggravated felony which would have rendered
Mythong removable from the United States under federal
immigration law. But we observe that several published and
nonpublished Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions indicate
that at the time of Mythong’s conviction in 1991, voluntary
manslaughter under section 192, subdivision (a) was understood
to be a crime of violence, though the Ninth Circuit had never
directly addressed the issue. (See, e.g., United States v. Bonilla-
Montenegro (9th Cir. 2003) 331 F.3d 1047, 1052 [finding
California conviction for voluntary manslaughter to be a crime of
violence within the meaning of sentencing enhancement
provision for offense of unlawfully entering or remaining in the
United States].)
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit had determined that
involuntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (b)) was a crime of
violence, and therefore an aggravated felony for immigration

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DISPOSITION
We affirm the order.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

HANASONO, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.

purposes. (See United States v. Springfield (9th Cir. 1987) 829
F.2d 860, 863; Park v. INS (9th Cir. 2001) 241 F.3d 1186, 1189.)
If involuntary manslaughter was considered a crime of violence,
it logically follows that voluntary manslaughter was also
considered a crime of violence for immigration purposes, since
voluntary manslaughter is an intentional killing and necessarily
involves the use of force. (See § 192, subd. (a).)

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