In re K.C. CA2/5

CourtListener 10862471Calctapp20 mai 2026

Texte intégral

Filed 5/20/26 In re K.C. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re K.C., a Person Coming Under B349771
the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, 24PSJP00035A)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

V.R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stacy Wiese, Judge. Affirmed.
Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Office of the County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, County
Counsel, and Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
The juvenile court assumed dependency jurisdiction over
minor K.C. (Minor) after she was found with V.R. (Mother) and
Mother’s male companion in a car containing drug paraphernalia.
The juvenile court ultimately terminated Mother’s parental
rights. We consider whether the parental benefit exception
should have forestalled that termination.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Proceedings Leading to Dependency Jurisdiction
Minor was born in September 2017. Mother has five older
children who are not involved in this case: G.R. (born in 2006),
X.R. (born in 2009), J.R. (born in 2010), R.C. (born in 2012), and
S.C. (born in 2014). Minor, R.C., and S.C. have the same father,
J.C. (Father), who is not a party to this appeal.1 Mother’s
parental rights to the two oldest children (G.R. and X.R.) were
terminated in 2009, and Minor’s other siblings (J.R., R.C., and
S.C.) are subject to legal guardianship or have legal guardianship
proceedings pending. Siblings R.C. and S.C. are under the
guardianship of Minor’s paternal aunt and uncle—as we shall
discuss, they are also Minor’s prospective adoptive parents.
Father reported Mother resided in a sober living home
when Minor was born and Minor lived with Father and her
paternal grandmother for the first three years of her life. Mother
visited Minor “sporadic[ally]” during this period. Minor remained
in the care of her paternal grandmother after Father was
deported to Mexico. Father subsequently agreed that Mother,
who appeared to be “stable,” should care for Minor. Father

1
The juvenile court also terminated Father’s parental rights.

2
thought he would continue to have contact with Minor, but
Mother “changed her number and cut him off.”
Mother previously came to the attention of child welfare
authorities in May 2019 when she and her boyfriend were
involved in a domestic dispute in a school parking lot.
Allegations of emotional abuse were deemed “inconclusive”
because Minor and her siblings had “no contact” with Mother.
Mother came to the attention of child welfare authorities again in
June 2022, when she brought Minor to the emergency room
because Minor had ingested a CBD gummy. Mother told a social
worker she was homeless and Minor had been staying with her
maternal grandmother for a couple weeks, but Minor ingested
the gummy when Mother left Minor in a car with her boyfriend
“who smokes methamphetamines.” A few months later, in
October 2022, authorities received a report that Minor was found
with Mother’s boyfriend in a car that contained “[u]sed needles”
and a “meth pipe” while Mother was inside a gas station.
Mother and Minor most recently came to the attention of
the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (the Department) in April 2024, when the Pomona Police
Department received a report of a child inside a car with two
adults in possession of drug paraphernalia. When a police officer
approached the car, Mother left on foot with Minor. Police
reported the car was “full of drug paraphernalia” and “it
appeared that [Mother’s male companion] was about to ‘shoot
up’ . . . .”
A police officer found Mother and Minor about a half mile
from the car and called the Department.2 Mother told officers she

2
Social workers had contacted the Pomona Police
Department about a week earlier concerning a report that a

3
and Minor had spent the last two nights in the car in which they
were initially spotted—a car she thought was abandoned.
A social worker arrived a short time later. She observed
Mother “crouched on the floor holding [Minor] with both arms
around her . . . .” Mother had bruising around one of her eyes.
When police officers asked Mother to stand, Minor “started to
stand up” and Mother “pulled [her] back down.” Mother told
Minor “to keep holding on to her and to hug her.” When the
officers attempted to lift Mother, she “began yelling and telling
[Minor] to keep hugging her and not to let go.” When the officers
placed Mother in handcuffs, she “continued yelling, directing
[Minor] to keep holding on.” Mother “had [Minor’s] right leg
between her legs and [M]other was squeezing trying to hold
[Minor], so officers had to pry [M]other’s legs apart to release
[Minor].” Minor cried and screamed as she witnessed Mother
continuing to fight and yell at the officers.
Mother was arrested for misdemeanor child endangerment.
(Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (b).) A criminal protective order
barring Mother from contact with Minor (among other things)
was issued in April 2024.
The Department filed a two-count petition alleging Minor
was at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm. The
petition cited the drug paraphernalia and illicit substances found
“within access to [Minor]” and Mother allowing her male
companion to have unlimited access to Minor while under the
influence of illicit substances.

woman matching Mother’s description had suffered domestic
violence and was abusing drugs in the presence of her children.

4
The juvenile court ordered Minor placed with her maternal
grandparents in April 2024. Minor was moved to the home of her
paternal aunt and uncle (guardians for Minor’s siblings, R.C. and
S.C.) the following June.
The Department was initially unable to reach Mother, but
she appeared in juvenile court in early June 2024. Later that
month, the juvenile court ordered monitored visitation for Mother
pending modification of the criminal protective order. A couple
weeks after that, the Department reported Mother had not been
in contact with either the Department or Minor. By late July, the
juvenile court issued a minute order indicating receipt of a
modified criminal protective order and requiring the Department
to provide Mother a written visitation schedule. The Department
was still unable to reach Mother, and Minor’s maternal
grandmother told a social worker Mother was in a residential
treatment program and subject to a 14-day “bl[a]ck out” period.

B. Adjudication and Disposition
The juvenile court took dependency jurisdiction over Minor
at an adjudication hearing in August 2024. Prior to the
disposition hearing the following month, the Department
reported Mother had called to request visits but she could not be
reached at the number she provided when social workers
attempted to follow up and arrange visits.
Mother was present at the disposition hearing, but walked
out at one point saying, among other things, she did not “want to
hear [any] of this” and insisting she had done “nothing wrong.”
The juvenile court bypassed reunification services for Mother and
ordered monitored visitation.

5
C. Visitation and Placement
In a status review report filed in March 2025, the
Department reported Minor was “comfortable and happy” in the
home of her aunt and uncle, who wanted to adopt her. Minor had
established a strong bond with her siblings R.C. and S.C., and
with her aunt, whom she called “mommy.” She was attending
school and receiving mental health services.
Minor’s aunt also consulted with clinicians about instances
of Minor smearing feces on walls and stealing; a therapist
reported Minor was “making as much progress as she possibly
can for her age.” Minor’s aunt, social worker, and another
clinician agreed it was best not to tell Minor that Mother was
permitted to call Minor because Mother “ha[d] not made herself
available.” Department social workers repeatedly called and sent
emails to Mother to arrange for visitation between August 2024
and December 2024, but Mother either hung up or could not be
reached.
In a status review report filed in May 2025, the
Department reported Minor continued to do well in the care of
her aunt and uncle. Minor referred to them as her mom and dad.
Minor’s aunt was a “big advocate for [Minor’s] needs” and was
“patient and loving” in her interactions with Minor.
Mother had 16 phone calls with Minor in April and May
2025, but Mother did not “ma[k]e herself available to [the
Department] to create an in-person visitation schedule.” Minor’s
aunt, who monitored the phone calls, reported Mother violated
various rules—including discussing the dependency proceedings
with Minor and exhibiting slurred speech.
Minor did not mention calls with Mother in her (Minor’s)
weekly meetings with a therapist, but the therapist noted there

6
were “some dysregulations with [Minor’s] behaviors” in “mid-
April and early May” (around the same time that Mother had
increased phone contact with Minor, though Minor’s teacher at
school was also absent for a period around the same time).
Nonetheless, Minor was “acting age appropriate for her
circumstances and what she ha[d] been through.” In May 2025,
Minor was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and
attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder.
In a report filed at the end of September 2025, the
Department reported that after repeated, unsuccessful attempts
to reach Mother, Mother called a social worker to demand in-
person visits in June 2025. Mother indicated it was difficult for
her to travel to a halfway point between her location (Pomona)
and that of the caregivers (Lucerne Valley) and suggested that
the requirement to schedule a social worker to monitor the visits
was an unnecessary obstacle. The social worker explained the
caregivers were not obligated to drive Minor to Mother’s location
or to monitor visits.
Mother had one in-person visit with Minor at a McDonald’s
in Hesperia in early July 2025. Prior to the visit, a social worker
and Minor’s aunt told Minor that she would be seeing Mother.
Minor “smiled and acted excited,” and when asked “what she
wanted from the visit,” she “responded that she wanted the gifts
that [Mother] promised her.” When the aunt suggested gifts
should not be the only thing she wants from Mother, Minor
“stated that she misses her.” At the beginning of the visit,
Mother and Minor hugged and kissed and said they missed each
other. Mother was “engaged” and Minor “appeared happy”
during the visit; the two played together and watched videos.
The social worker monitoring the visit noted Mother repeatedly

7
asked Minor whose idea it was to cut her hair and who bought
her pants. This visit was the only in-person contact (outside of
court hearings) Mother had with Minor between April 2024
(when Minor was detained) and October 2025.
Following the in-person visit in early July 2025, Mother
missed two phone visits—one because she called early and one
because Minor did not feel like talking—and failed to timely
confirm the next scheduled in-person visit. On a subsequent call,
Mother scolded Minor for learning a dance Mother deemed
inappropriate and “started angrily asking [Minor] why she is
refusing to talk to her”—apparently a reference to the phone visit
that Minor declined. Minor explained “she was in the pool and
didn’t feel like talking.” Mother “got angry” and told Minor “she
needs to answer her calls.” When Minor attempted to “change
the subject of the conversation by asking [M]other to read her a
book,” Mother “started cussing at someone in the background and
was not paying attention,” so Minor’s aunt ended the call.
Minor’s aunt reported that, “on many occasions,” Mother
would “scold[ ], lie[ ] and question[ ] [Minor’s] love for her[,]
making their interactions negative.” Minor told a social worker
she was “half sad and half happy” when Mother missed phone
calls.
As of July 2025, Minor said she was “okay with having her
relatives adopt her.” The following month, though, Minor told
social workers she was “‘fine’” and felt safe in the care of her
paternal aunt and uncle, but she did not want to be adopted
because she preferred to live with Mother or her maternal
grandmother. However, she “went back and forth mentioning
that she wanted to live in the current placement and visit with
[M]other and [maternal grandmother].” Minor referred to

8
Mother by her first name in conversation with a social worker
and referred to her aunt and uncle as her mother and father.

D. Termination of Parental Rights
The juvenile court held an October 2025 permanency
planning hearing to consider termination of parental rights.
Mother was not present. The juvenile court heard argument from
counsel on the parental benefit exception, determined the
exception did not apply, and terminated parental rights.
In making its ruling, the juvenile court found Mother’s
single in-person visit and sporadic phone calls were insufficient to
meet the first prong of the test articulated in In re Caden C.
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 to determine applicability of the parental
benefit exception. The juvenile court acknowledged it was
difficult for Mother to travel for in-person visits but emphasized
“17 phone calls in six months is nothing.”
As to the second prong of the Caden C. test, the juvenile
court found Minor would not benefit from a continuing
relationship with Mother because although visits had a “probably
pretty neutral” impact on Minor, Mother had “not been a mom” to
Minor—rather, she was “just that person who calls once in a blue
moon to see how [Minor] is.”
As to the third prong, the juvenile court concluded
terminating Mother’s parental rights would not have a
detrimental impact on Minor because “she d[id] not have a
relationship with [Mother]. Again, [Mother] call[ed] periodically.
She ha[d] seen her one time in six months. [Minor wa]s getting
an absolute home with her adoptive parents,” with whom she was
“happy.”

9
The following day, the juvenile court re-called the matter
because the court discovered Mother “was in custody in [the]
building” at the time of the permanency planning hearing the day
prior. The juvenile court explained that although it had already
terminated Mother’s parental rights, it would “go through the
[hearing] again with [Mother] and give her a chance to be heard.”
Mother addressed the court and explained that “towards
the end of [Minor] being taken, [Mother] did lose a little bit of
focus because [she] did not have [Minor].” Mother said she
“did . . . classes” and called Minor “[e]very chance [she] g[o]t.”
During calls, there was “not one second that it[ wa]s quiet on the
phone” because Minor would “tell[ ] [Mother] about her day,” ask
Mother if she had dreams about her, and ask Mother to tell her
stories. Mother “made up stories that only [Mother] and [Minor]
underst[oo]d.”
At this point, counsel for the Department asked that
Mother be sworn in to testify, and she was. Mother testified
Minor “ran to [her]” at their one in-person visit and Mother was
unable to attend additional in-person visits “because there [was]
no bus.” During phone calls, Mother testified, “there [was] not
one moment where [they were] not asking about each other,
making sure that [they] saw each other in each other[’]s[ ]
dreams.” Mother claimed her phone was stolen on multiple
occasions and she missed calls because “a lot of the time[ ] the
caretaker . . . did not answer [her] calls if [she] was a minute late
or seconds late.” Mother further testified that when Minor
declined calls, she subsequently told Mother she didn’t know
Mother was calling.
The juvenile court again concluded the parental benefit
exception did not apply, emphasizing it was “even more sure

10
today than [it] was yesterday” after having heard from Mother.
With respect to visitation, the juvenile court remarked that
although it was “sure” Minor was affectionate toward Mother on
phone calls, “[c]alling her 17 times in six months . . . [was] not
sufficient.” The juvenile court pointed out Mother had not called
Minor during the several weeks preceding the hearing while she
was in custody. Mother’s argument that the Department was to
blame for her lack of visitation was not persuasive. Moreover,
Minor did not benefit from occasional visits with Mother.
Finally, the court found terminating Mother’s parental rights
would not negatively impact Minor because she was being well
cared for in a home with two of her siblings.

II. DISCUSSION
Mother did not establish any of the three elements
necessary to successfully invoke the parental benefit exception.
Her single in-person visit with Minor over the course of the
dependency proceedings and sporadic phone calls did not amount
to the type of regular visitation needed to prevent termination of
parental rights. There is substantial evidence that Minor would
not benefit from continuing the relationship with Mother—
including Mother’s conduct during phone calls, Minor’s behavior
during periods when she was in regular contact with Mother, and
Minor’s “half sad and half happy” response to missed calls from
Mother. The juvenile court also reasonably determined that
terminating Mother’s relationship with Minor would not be
detrimental to Minor in light of the stability and other benefits
afforded by her prospective adoptive home.

11
A. Legal Framework
If a juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence at
a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing that a
child is likely to be adopted, “the court shall terminate parental
rights and order the child placed for adoption” unless, as relevant
here, it “finds a compelling reason for determining that
termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more”
enumerated exceptions.3 (§ 366.26, subds. (c)(1) & (c)(1)(B); see
also Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 630-631.) “The statutory
exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances
[citation], to choose an option other than the norm, which
remains adoption.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.)
The exception at issue here, the parental benefit exception,
applies if “termination would be detrimental to the child” because
the parent has “maintained regular visitation and contact with
the child and the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) A parent invoking the
exception in an effort to forestall termination of parental rights
bears the burden to demonstrate three things by a preponderance
of the evidence. First, the parent must show he or she had
“regular visitation and contact with the child, taking into account
the extent of visitation permitted.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at 636.) Second, the parent must show “the child has a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the
kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship.” (Ibid.) This element is affected by
“‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the

3
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

12
parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction
between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’” (Id.
at 632 [in conducting this assessment, “courts often consider how
children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their
parents”].) Third, the parent must show that “terminating that
[parental] attachment would be detrimental to the child even
when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new,
adoptive home.” (Id. at 636.)
Our review of the juvenile court’s ruling on the parental
benefit exception is for substantial evidence on the first two of
these elements and for abuse of discretion on the third. (Caden
C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 639-640.)

B. Analysis
1. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s finding that Mother did not establish
regular visitation
Mother does not dispute the juvenile court’s finding that
she had one in-person visit and 17 phone calls with Minor
between April 2024 and October 2025. Mother contends,
however, that she “visited to the extent that was permitted” and
cites various obstacles to her maintaining regular contact with
Minor. These include the criminal protective order that was in
place until July 2024, her difficulty reaching the Department, her
inconsistent access to a phone and transportation, and Minor’s
aunt’s strictness regarding scheduled call times.
Mother’s arguments address only some of the gaps in her
contact with Minor and, taken together, do not demonstrate a
lack of substantial evidence for the juvenile court’s finding that
this element was not satisfied. The protective order was only an

13
impediment to visitation for the first few months of the
dependency proceedings, and the Department reported it reached
out to Mother to schedule visits after it was modified. Mother’s
transportation difficulties did not explain the lack of consistent
phone calls.4 Mother’s contention that the caregiver was
uncooperative in facilitating phone calls with Minor rests on
some unsupported assertions (e.g., that a five-minute grace
period meant the caregiver was required to answer calls before
the scheduled time), but even assuming Mother’s claims are well-
founded, they still do not explain more than a handful of her
many missed calls. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 640 [on
substantial evidence review, the juvenile court’s “determinations
should ‘be upheld if . . . supported by substantial evidence, even
though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the
trial court might have reached a different result had it believed
other evidence’”].)

2. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s determination that Minor would not
benefit from continuing the relationship
Substantial evidence also supports the juvenile court’s
determination that Minor would not benefit from continuing the
relationship. The affection that Mother and Minor had toward
one another, which the juvenile court acknowledged, is not
dispositive as to this element. (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75

4
Mother was able to contact the Department at times when
she had no calls with Minor and, as the juvenile court
emphasized, she did not attempt to call Minor when she was in
jail.

14
Cal.App.5th 303, 318 [“the beneficial relationship exception
demands something more than the incidental benefit a child
gains from any amount of positive contact with her natural
parent”].) Although Mother accords great emotional weight to
her discussions of dreams and private stories with Minor, our
inquiry is focused on the child (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
632), and contact with Mother appeared to have a negative
impact on Minor. A therapist who worked with Minor observed
“some dysregulations with [Minor’s] behaviors” when Mother was
calling consistently in April and May 2025. Mother also violated
various rules established to protect Minor during phone calls—
including discussing the case and having slurred speech—and
interrogated or scolded Minor on occasion. Minor also expressed
partial relief when Mother failed to call.

3. The trial did not abuse its discretion in
determining that terminating Mother’s parental
rights would not be detrimental to Minor
The third element of the parental benefit exception
requires courts to consider “whether it would be harmful to the
child to sever the relationship and choose adoption. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B); see also id., subd. (c)(1)(D).) Because terminating
parental rights eliminates any legal basis for the parent or child
to maintain the relationship, courts must assume that
terminating parental rights terminates the relationship.
[Citations.] What courts need to determine, therefore, is how the
child would be affected by losing the parental relationship—in
effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home
without the parent in the child’s life. [Citation.]” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at 633.) In other words, the juvenile court

15
“decides whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs
‘the security and the sense of belonging a new family would
confer.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Here, Minor had spent more than a year in the care of her
prospective adoptive parents: her aunt and uncle who also served
as the legal guardians for two of her siblings. Minor appeared
happy and comfortable, and she referred to her aunt and uncle as
mom and dad—in significant contrast to occasional references to
Mother by her first name. Minor’s aunt, in particular, was a “big
advocate for [Minor’s] needs” and took an active role in Minor’s
mental health services. There is nothing in the record to indicate
Minor suffered any detriment as a result of the extended periods
in this case during which Mother failed to call or visit. To the
contrary, there was a correlation between behavioral issues and
the resumption of contact with Mother.
Mother, however, emphasizes Minor’s statements
indicating she did not want to be adopted.5 That does not take
full account of the record before us. The record shows Minor
equivocated on the question of adoption: sometimes saying she
was “okay” with adoption and sometimes saying she wanted to
live with Mother or maternal grandmother. That sort of
equivocation does not warrant setting aside the juvenile court’s
balancing of benefits and harms.
Mother also suggests the juvenile court should have
selected legal guardianship as the permanent plan for Minor

5
Minor was eight years old on the date of the section 366.26
hearing, so the statutory exception to termination of parental
rights where “[a] child 12 years of age or older objects to
termination of parental rights” does not apply. (§ 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(B)(ii).)

16
because this was her siblings’ situation and “no evidence showed
paternal aunt and uncle would want [Minor] replaced if they
were her legal guardians” as opposed to her adoptive parents.6
But this is not a relevant consideration in applying the parental
benefit exception. “‘At a permanency plan hearing, the court may
order one of three alternatives: adoption, guardianship or long-
term foster care. [Citation.] If the dependent child is adoptable,
there is a strong preference for adoption over the alternative
permanency plans.’ [Citation.] ‘Once the court determines the
child is likely to be adopted, the burden shifts to the parent to
show that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the child under one of the exceptions listed in section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1),’” including the parental benefit exception. (In
re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1224-1225.) Put more
succinctly, the potential availability of an alternative permanent
plan is not itself grounds for a detriment finding and a departure
from the Legislative preference for adoption.

6
Mother’s argument disregards an October 2025
Department report that indicates Minor’s aunt and uncle were
not interested in legal guardianship.

17
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.

We concur:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

MOOR, J.

18

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.