Marriage of Lobbin CA4/1

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Filed 5/20/26 Marriage of Lobbin CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re the Marriage of KARLY K. LOBBIN
and STEPHEN M. LOBBIN.

KARLY K. LOBBIN, D086627

Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 23FL006654C)

v.

STEPHEN M. LOBBIN,

Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Rebecca F. Zipp, Judge. Affirmed.
Claery & Hammond, Lance R. Cleary, Frederick M. Medill and Kai W.
Lucid for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Karly Lobbin appeals from an order of the trial court denying Stephen

Lobbin’s1 request to modify his spousal support obligation. Specifically,
although the court denied Stephen’s request, Karly objects to the order on the
ground the court acted on its own initiative and without prior notice to give

her an admonition, known as a Gavron warning,2 that she has a duty to
become self-supporting within a reasonable amount of time. Karly also

complains the court denied her request for attorney fees under Family Code3
section 2030 without making the express findings necessary to support its
denial. Finding no merit in these contentions, we affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Karly and Stephen were married in early 2010 and separated 13 years
later. The pair have two children who were aged 14 and 11 at the time of the
proceedings underlying this appeal.
The parties entered into a marital settlement agreement (MSA), and it
was reduced to a judgment in November 2024. According to the papers
Stephen submitted in connection with the proceeding at issue in this appeal,

1 Because the parties share a last name, for clarity we will refer to them
by their first names.

2 A Gavron warning is a formal advisement given by the court to a
supported spouse, notifying them of their statutory duty to make reasonable
efforts to become self-supporting within a reasonable period; this advisement
serves as a warning that failure to do so may be a basis for the court to
decrease or terminate spousal support in the future. (See In re Marriage of
Gavron (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 705 (Gavron).)

3 Statutory references are to the Family Code.

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the judgment requires Stephen to pay Karly $15,000 per month in spousal

support.4
On March 3, 2025, approximately four months after judgment was
entered, Stephen filed a request for order (RFO) seeking to modify his spousal
support obligation. He also requested that Karly be ordered to pay some of
his attorney fees, which he claimed arose as a result of him spending his “own
time preparing for and defending [himself’]” in connection with various

dissolution-related proceedings.5 According to Stephen, his income is
variable, and since agreeing to the terms of the MSA, he had become unable
to pay the obligation set out in that document. He also asserted the
children’s ages meant they were “independent enough to allow both parties to
work full time.” The court set the hearing on Stephen’s RFO for
June 17, 2025.
In response to Stephen’s RFO, Karly sought recovery of her own
attorney fees under section 2030.
At the hearing on Stephen’s request to modify spousal support, the trial
court concluded Stephen failed to demonstrate a change in material
circumstances to support his request for a modification of the support order.
During the hearing, however, the court issued Karly a Gavron warning,
remarking that “there is an obligation for both parties to be self-supporting,
and to support their children, more importantly.” The court noted that Karly
“is educated” and indicated that because of the children’s ages, there were
many types of care that Karly could obtain for them that would allow her to

4 The judgment is not part of the record on appeal.

5 Stephen stated in his declaration he is a “30-year litigation attorney”
with his own practice.

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work in a professional capacity.6 The court then specifically warned Karly
she would need to “become self-sufficient, or as self-sufficient as possible
within a reasonable period of time.” The court would not expect her to do this
within “five months from divorce,” but, instead, a reasonable period of time
would likely be “a couple of years, given [Karly’s] education and the age of the
children.”
The court then denied Stephen’s request for attorney fees, noting he
was self-represented and therefore had incurred no attorney fees. In
addition, the court determined that even if Stephen had incurred attorney
fees, Karly had no ability to contribute to paying them and did not have
sufficient assets to pay for both parties’ attorney fees and costs.
The court also denied Karly’s request for attorney fees and costs. The
court acknowledged that while there initially appeared to be “a disparity in
access to funds,” once the court considered the “significant spousal and child
support obligations” Stephen had undertaken, no disparity in income or
access to funds remained. The court further found that Stephen did not have
the financial ability to pay for Karly’s counsel at that time.
Karly now appeals the court’s order. Stephen has not appeared in this
appellate matter.

6 Karly’s documents submitted in connection with Stephen’s RFO
indicated she had completed law school and was licensed as a real estate
agent.

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II.
DISCUSSION
A. The Court Did Not Err in Issuing Karly a Gavron Warning
Karly complains the trial court should not have issued her a Gavron
warning. She first asserts the court “exceeded its authority by adding a
Gavron warning to the spousal support order when no such warning was
included in the parties’ stipulated judgment.” She claims she specifically
negotiated to exclude a Gavron warning from the MSA, and the court “cannot
unilaterally add provisions” to the terms of a contract the parties negotiated.
Second, Karly argues Stephen presented no evidence to support the giving of
a Gavron admonition. Finally, Karly suggests that because the court issued
the Gavron warning without any specific request from Stephen, the court
failed to provide her adequate “notice and an opportunity to respond,” which,
she suggests, is a due process violation. Karly’s arguments are without
merit.
In Gavron, the court explained a supported spouse’s failure to become
self-supporting could, in an appropriate case, warrant modification of a
support order. Nonetheless, “[i]nherent in the concept that the supported
spouse’s failure to at least make good-faith efforts to become self-sufficient
can constitute a change in circumstances which could warrant a modification
in spousal support is the premise that the supported spouse be made aware of
the obligation to become self-supporting.” (Gavron, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d
at p. 712.) In the absence of a “reasonable advance warning that after an
appropriate period of time the supported spouse was expected to become self-
sufficient or face onerous legal and financial consequences,” the failure of the
supported spouse to become self-supporting cannot be a “change in
circumstance[]” supporting a modification. (Ibid.)

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“In 1996 . . . the Legislature codified the Gavron warning in Family
Code section 4330, subdivision (b) first making it mandatory then later
discretionary.” (In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43, 55–56,
fns. omitted.) This provision of the statute now reads: “When making an
order for spousal support, the court may advise the recipient of support that
the recipient should make reasonable efforts to assist in providing for their
support needs, taking into account the particular circumstances considered
by the court pursuant to Section 4320, unless, in the case of a marriage of
long duration as provided for in Section 4336, the court decides this warning
is inadvisable.” (§ 4330, subd. (b).)
As an initial matter, we conclude Karly has forfeited her challenge to
the issuance of the Gavron warning on the ground the court altered the
“material” terms of the MSA by doing so. Karly has failed to include the
judgment that incorporates the MSA in the record on appeal. She also has
not provided a separate copy of the MSA itself. “It is the burden of the party
challenging a judgment [or order] on appeal to provide an adequate record to
assess error.” (Nielsen v. Gibson (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 318, 324.) “ ‘[I]f the
record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the
decision of the trial court should be affirmed.’ ” (Gee v. American Realty &
Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.) Karly’s claim that the
court altered the terms of the MSA by giving her a Gavron warning cannot be
assessed because this court does not have the MSA before it.
Further, to the extent Karly argues there was insufficient evidence to
support the giving of a Gavron warning in this case, the argument fails. It is
the general policy of California that parties in dissolution cases become self-
supporting within a reasonable period of time. (§ 4320, subd. (l) [in assessing
whether and the extent to which to order spousal support, the court should

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consider, among other things, “[t]he goal that the supported party shall be
self-supporting within a reasonable period of time”].) Thus, the court has
great discretion to determine whether, and if so, when, to give a party a
Gavron warning. The statute does not require any particular evidentiary
standard be met before the warning may be given, and Karly cites no legal
authority supporting her contention that the court can give a Gavron
warning only if “evidence” is presented to the court to support it. And even if
some evidence were necessary to support the giving of a Gavron warning, in
this case, the court considered the ages of the children, as well as Karly’s
significant educational background, including her law degree, as factors
weighing in favor of giving her a Gavron warning. These circumstances
support the court’s determination that Karly should be given a Gavron
warning that she has a duty to become self-supporting within a reasonable
period, which the court suggested would be a few years after the warning.
Finally, to the extent Karly contends the trial court erred in giving her
a Gavron warning because Stephen did not request one in his RFO and she
therefore did not have notice or an opportunity to respond before the decision
to give her the warning, this argument is also without merit. There is
nothing in section 4330 requiring that a party request the giving of a Gavron
warning before the court can give it, and Karly cites no case authority to
suggest a request from a party is needed. In addition, although Karly
contends the giving of the Gavron warning in this situation somehow violated
procedural due process, as Gavron itself makes clear, the warning the court
gave Karly is designed to effectuate the receiving party’s procedural due
process rights by providing advance notice before the court modifies or ends
spousal support.

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In addition, the form Karly used to respond to Stephen’s RFO includes
a specific notice regarding the state’s goal that parties become
self-supporting, and indicated she might be issued a Gavron warning. In that
form, the following notice appeared: “When ordering spousal or domestic
partner support in a judgment, the court may advise (warn) the party asking

for support[7] to make reasonable efforts to become self-supporting within a
reasonable period of time, considering all the factors in Family Code
section 4320. The court may decide that this warning (often called a ‘Gavron’
warning) is not appropriate if the case involves a marriage or domestic
partnership of long duration (about 10 years or longer). Generally, failure to
become self-supporting after the court gives the warning can result in an
order to reduce the amount of the support award.” (Italics added.) Karly
stated in this same document that while she “is not self-supporting”
currently, she was requesting “at least ten years to get the children off to
college and her career started before there is any change in support.” Thus,
contrary to Karly’s position on appeal, she was provided notice the court
might issue a Gavron warning, and she appears to have understood why the
Gavron warning would issue and its relevance to her situation.
The court therefore did not err or violate Karly’s due process rights by
exercising its discretion under section 4330 to give her a warning that she
has a duty to become self-supporting within a reasonable period of time.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Karly’s Request for Fees
Karly contends the trial court failed to make the findings required by
section 2030 when it denied her request for attorney fees.

7 Karly acknowledged she was the party “asking for support” due to her
objection to Stephen’s request to modify the spousal support in the judgment.

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Section 2030 requires the trial court to ensure that each party in a
dissolution proceeding has access to legal representation “by ordering, if
necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one party . . . to pay
to the other party, or to the other party’s attorney, whatever amount is
reasonably necessary for attorney’s fees and for the cost of maintaining or
defending the proceeding during the pendency of the proceeding.” (§ 2030,
subd. (a)(1).) When a party requests fees under section 2030, the trial court
must make three express findings in ruling on the request: “[1] whether an
award of attorney’s fees and costs . . . is appropriate, [2] whether there is a
disparity in access to funds to retain counsel, and [3] whether one party is
able to pay for legal representation of both parties.” (§ 2030, subd. (a)(2);
In re Marriage of Morton (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1050 (Morton).) The
court’s express findings may be made “either in writing or orally on the
record.” (Morton, at p. 1050.) “The purpose of section 2030 is to ensure
parity. ‘The idea is that both sides should have the opportunity to retain
counsel, not just (as is usually the case) only the party with greater financial
strength.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Cryer (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039,
1056 (Cryer).)
We review a trial court’s decision not to award attorney’s fees under
section 2030 for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Nakamoto & Hsu
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 457, 469.) We view favorably all evidence in support of
the order and uphold findings of fact that are supported by substantial
evidence. (In re Marriage of Schleich (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 267, 295.) We also
consider whether the court followed established legal principles, as a failure
to do so is an abuse of discretion. (See Morton, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1039.) Nevertheless, our review begins with the presumption that the trial
court’s order is correct, and the appellant has the burden to affirmatively

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demonstrate reversible error. (Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th
514, 520.)
According to Karly, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
make the three express findings required by section 2030. She contends the
court “only made one of the three findings required by law,” and failed to
make findings on the first and third prongs set out in the statute. We
disagree.
Karly cites only the formal findings and order after hearing for her
contention that the court made a finding only with respect to the question of
whether there was a disparity in the parties’ access to funds to pay for
counsel. She fails to acknowledge the court made oral findings of fact on the
record at the hearing. The transcript from the hearing demonstrates the
court said the following in connection with Karly’s request for fees:
“Regarding [Karly’s] request for fees, that[, like Stephen’s request,] is also
denied. While there may be a disparity in access to funds[ ] without
considering the significant spousal and child support obligations that
[Stephen] has undertaken, when the Court considers those obligations, there
is no longer a disparity in income and access to funds. And I do not find that
[Stephen] has the financial ability to pay for [Karly’s] counsel at this time.”
The court’s statements touch on all three factors set out in section 2030,
subdivision (a)(2), in that they reflect the court’s determinations that an
award of attorney fees and costs is not appropriate, there is no true disparity
in access to funds to retain counsel between the parties given Stephen’s
support obligations, and neither party is able to pay for both parties’ legal
fees. These statements, made orally on the record, are sufficient to establish
the court met the requirements of section 2030. (See Morton, supra,

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27 Cal.App.5th at p. 1050 [oral statements made on the record are sufficient
under section 2030].)
To the extent one could challenge the court’s adherence to the findings
required under section 2030 because it failed to use the word “appropriate” as
mentioned in the first prong of subdivision (a)(2) of the statute, we conclude
any presumed error on this point is harmless. (See Morton, supra, 27
Cal.App.5th at p. 1051 [appellant must establish prejudice resulted from
court’s failure to make express findings on the three questions set out in
section 2030].) Prejudice in this context is established by showing there is
“ ‘a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error, a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached.’ ” (Morton, at
p. 1051.) The record reflects the court reviewed the evidence before it in
considering each party’s ability to access legal representation and weighing
whether there was sufficient parity of access to financial resources between
them, and in considering whether the reapportioning of fees between the
parties was appropriate. (See Cryer, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1056.) The
court noted that Stephen’s support obligations to Karly equalized the parties’
seemingly disparate income, making Karly better able to pay for her own
attorney fees while reducing Stephen’s ability to do the same. Similarly, the
court noted neither party was able to pay for both his or her own fees and the
other party’s fees. On this record it is clear the court would have denied
Karly’s request for fees even in the absence of any presumed error with
respect to the first prong of subdivision (a)(2).

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III.
DISPOSITION
The order of the trial court is affirmed. Stephen is entitled to costs on

appeal.8

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

RUBIN, J.

8 Stephen has not appeared on appeal and therefore may not have
incurred such costs.

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