Marriage of Walther CA2/6

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Filed 5/20/26 Marriage of Walther CA2/6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re Marriage of KIRA and 2d Civil No. B340131
HOWARD WALTHER. (Super. Ct. No. 1440419)
(Santa Barbara County)

KIRA NEILSON,

Respondent,

v.

HOWARD WALTHER,

Appellant.

On April 29, 2017, a judgment was entered dissolving the
marriage of appellant Howard Walther (husband) and respondent
Kira Walther, now Kira Neilson (wife).1 Appearing in propria
persona, husband appeals the trial court’s order entered on

1 Wife states that she has “remarried and her last name is

now Neilson.”
August 19, 2024, after a 15-day evidentiary hearing. The order
denied husband’s 23 requests for various orders and ruled on his
28 requests for judicial notice.
Husband purports to appeal “an Order for sanctions
filed on 9/06/24,” 18 days after he had filed the notice of appeal
from the court’s order entered on August 19, 2024.2 The
sanctions totaled $72,476.87. Husband did not file a notice of
appeal from the sanctions order. Because husband’s opening
brief presents no argument as to the sanctions issue, we deem the
purported appeal of the sanctions order to be abandoned. (See
Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119-1120.)
Husband notes: “This dissolution . . . case . . . has been
pending in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara for eleven years
before ten judges, many of whom have been disqualified. . . .
During proceedings, [husband] filed two malpractice lawsuits
against his former seven attorneys.” He claims to have paid more
than $4.5 million “in attorneys’ fees, sanctions, and costs.”
This is husband’s fourth appeal concerning his marriage to
wife. (See In re Marriage of Walther (Feb. 22, 2022, B309062)
[nonpub. opn.]; In re Marriage of Walther (Aug. 17, 2016,
B267209) [nonpub. opn.]; In re Marriage of Walther (Nov. 30,
2015, B260104) [nonpub. opn.].)
The record on appeal is voluminous. It consists of an
8,750-page clerk’s transcript, an 18-page augmented clerk’s

2 In his opening brief husband asserts: “On 6/20/24, the

trial Court filed its Statement of Decision . . . followed by a final
Order on 8/19/2024, with an Order for Sanctions filed on 9/06/24.
This Order is appealable . . . .”

2
transcript, a 2,180-page reporter’s transcript, and a 125-page
augmented reporter’s transcript.3
Husband’s main claim is that the trial court erred in
refusing to set aside the judgment of dissolution, which required
him to pay monthly child support of $3,200 for two children.
Husband also contends: (1) the court erroneously failed to order
wife to appear for her deposition and to produce documents, and
(2) the court committed errors at the evidentiary hearing.
Wife has moved to dismiss the appeal because it was filed
after husband had been declared a vexatious litigant. We deny
the motion. Wife has also filed a motion to impose sanctions
against husband for taking a frivolous appeal.
We dismiss the purported appeal and affirm the order
entered on August 19, 2024, after the evidentiary hearing. We
grant wife’s motion for sanctions in the amount of $12,590.20.
We order husband to pay sanctions of $8,500 to the clerk of this
court.
Procedural Background
In January 2020 the Santa Barbara County Department of
Child Support Services (DCSS) filed in the marital dissolution
action (1440419) an order to show cause why husband should not
be held in contempt for failing to pay child support of $3,200 per
month from April 1 through December 1, 2019. In August 2021
the trial court ordered that, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation,
starting “May 1, 2021, neither party shall be obligated to pay
child support.”
On February 6, 2023, husband filed a request for order “To
Vacate the Void Marital [Dissolution] Judgement filed on

3 We grant wife’s motion to augment the record to include

the judgment of dissolution.

3
4/29/17.” The request was based on wife’s concealment of her
wages, overseas assets, and income from those assets. The
concealment allegedly constituted “[e]xtrinsic fraud” that
rendered the judgment of dissolution “VOID as a matter of law.”
Husband also requested that the court “change . . . [the] order for
child support filed on . . . 4/29/17.” On March 8, 2023, husband
filed another request for order vacating the judgment.
At a hearing in April 2023, the trial court ruled “that there
is no basis . . . to vacate the Judgment [of Dissolution] on any of
the bas[e]s that are urged” by husband in the request for order
filed on March 8, 2023. Husband told the court that he actually
wanted to “amend” the judgment, not to vacate it. It provided
that husband will sell real property in Arizona and that $105,000
from the proceeds will be paid to the Santa Barbara Superior
Court bank account. “The Court will hear and rule on the
motions filed by [the parties] and will determine the child
support owed, if any, and whether the funds should be disbursed
to [wife] or whether they should be returned to [husband].”
On August 15, 2023, the trial court began an evidentiary
hearing concerning various motions and requests for orders. On
October 4, 2023, before the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing,
DCSS requested that the order to show cause re contempt be
dismissed. DCSS explained, “[Husband] complied with the terms
of stipulation and order filed 6/28/2023 and $105,000 is now being
held by the court resulting from the sale of one of [husband’s]
properties.” The court dismissed the order to show cause.
On February 15, 2024, husband delivered his closing
argument in the evidentiary hearing. He argued that, during the
marriage, wife had breached her fiduciary duty by concealing
assets from him.

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After wife had delivered her closing argument, the trial
court stated: “[W]hen a divorce is concluded, . . . it is a reasonable
thing for a litigant to object if they have evidence that there are
assets that were not disclosed [by the other party] . . . [¶] . . . [I]t
seems to me that [husband] was concerned that those concealed
assets might be of great significance, that had they been known,
that they would have provided a basis for recalculation of child
support . . . .”
The court continued: “[T]he careful examination we have
made of all of the bank records and property records makes clear
that there is no asset of any kind or nature which wasn’t
disclosed in the dissolution proceeding, or which existed and was
not disclosed [at] the time . . . the settlement was drawn up.” The
court said it “found the testimony of [wife] to be entirely credible,
and largely unrefuted.” Thus, “the easy conclusion for the court
to draw is that there are no concealed assets, and that claims for
breach of fiduciary duty [by wife] have not been established . . . .”
After the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial
court issued an 18-page statement of decision. On August 19,
2024, the court filed its order based on the statement of decision.
On the same date, husband filed his notice of appeal.
The notice of appeal states that husband is appealing from
“[t]he judgment or order entered on 6/20/2024.” The statement of
decision was filed on that date. “[T]he general rule is that a
statement of decision is not an appealable order.” (In re Marriage
of Goldman (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1258, 1264, fn. 6.) We
construe the appeal to have been taken from the order filed on
August 19, 2024, which incorporates the statement of decision.

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Motion to Dismiss Appeal
On February 23, 2024, the trial court found husband to be a
vexatious litigant. It entered a prefiling order pursuant to the
vexatious litigant statutory scheme. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 391–
391.8.)
The order states that, “unless represented by an attorney,
[husband is] prohibited from filing any new litigation in the
courts of California without approval of the presiding justice . . .
of the court in which the action is to be filed.” “The term
‘ “[l]itigation” ’ is defined broadly as ‘any civil action or
proceeding, commenced, maintained or pending in any state or
federal court.’ [Citation.] A litigation includes an appeal . . . filed
in an appellate court.” (Garcia v. Lacey (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th
402, 406.) “[E]ach appeal . . . is ‘new’ to this court when it is filed,
thus qualifying as ‘new litigation’ within the meaning of [Code of
Civil Procedure] section 391.7, subdivision (a) . . . .” (McColm v.
Westwood Park Ass’n (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1220-1221
disapproved on another ground in John v. Superior Court (2016)
63 Cal.4th 91, 99, fn. 2 (John).)
Husband’s appeal was filed on August 19, 2024, six months
after the prefiling order. Wife has moved to dismiss the appeal
because it is new litigation filed without the presiding justice’s
approval. Husband claims the motion should be denied because
his Request for Order (RFO) dated March 8, 2023, as well as all
of his other “RFOs, Motions, [and] Requests for Judicial
Notices . . . arose from his Affirmative Defense against the
‘Criminal Contempt’ action initiated by DCSS for an alleged
nonpayment of $156,800.00 in back Child Support.”
On February 16, 2023, husband filed a document entitled,
“[Husband’s] Affirmative Defenses for Criminal Contempt for

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Non-payment of Child Support.” (Capitalization and bold
omitted.) Husband contended the marital dissolution judgment,
including the child support order, were void because of extrinsic
fraud. The extrinsic fraud was wife’s concealment of her assets.
Husband argued, “The law is well settled to the effect that refusal
to obey a void order of the Court is not a contempt and cannot be
punished as such.” Husband noted that, based on wife’s
fraudulent concealment of assets, in February 2023 he had “filed
a Request [for] Order to Vacate the Void Marital Settlement
Agreement.”
“[P]refiling requirements apply to unrepresented vexatious
litigant plaintiffs only, whether in the trial or appellate courts.”
(John, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 98.) They do not apply “to parties
who did not initiate the action in the trial court.” (Id. at p. 99.)
The criminal contempt action was initiated by DCSS, not
husband. Husband cannot be deemed to be the plaintiff in that
action. Husband’s requests for orders can reasonably be
construed as an effort to defend against the criminal contempt
action. “[Code Civ. Proc.] section 391.7’s prefiling requirements
do not apply to a self-represented litigant previously declared a
vexatious litigant seeking to appeal an adverse judgment or
interlocutory order in an action where he or she was the
defendant.” (John, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 93)
In a letter to husband dated February 8, 2023, wife’s
counsel claimed the action in question was initiated by DCSS. In
opposing husband’s request to depose wife, counsel wrote: “[Wife]
is not the subject of or involved in any of the pending litigation—
the pending issue is a contempt action for your failure to pay
child support which was filed by the Department of Child

7
Support Services (DCSS); [wife] has no involvement in that
action; therefore she cannot be subjected to a deposition.”
Accordingly, the prefiling order did not require husband to
obtain the presiding justice’s permission to file the present
appeal. Wife’s motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.
Trial Court’s Alleged Failure to
Require Wife to Disclose Her Notes
Wife testified via Zoom. When she began her testimony,
she possessed nine pages of “notes.” Husband's counsel requested
a copy of the notes. Wife’s counsel objected that disclosure of the
notes would violate the attorney-client privilege because wife had
shared the notes with her attorney.
The trial court denied husband’s request for a copy of the
notes. It rejected his claim that wife had “waived any attorney-
client privilege.” The court directed wife “to set aside her notes”
and answer all questions “from memory unless you tell us that, ‘I
need to look at my notes in order to answer that question.’” Wife
replied, “Okay. I don’t need to look at my notes.”
Husband contends that, in not requiring wife to turn over
her notes, the trial court “disobeyed” Evidence Code section 771.
It provides, “[I]f a witness, either while testifying or prior thereto,
uses a writing to refresh his memory with respect to any matter
about which he testifies, such writing must be produced at the
hearing at the request of an adverse party and, unless the
writing is so produced, the testimony of the witness concerning
such matter shall be stricken.”
Husband has failed to carry his burden of affirmatively
showing error. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 [“The
. . . court’s judgment is presumed to be correct, and it is
husband’s burden to affirmatively show error. [Citation.] To

8
demonstrate error, husband must present meaningful legal
analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts
in the record that support the claim of error”].) Evidence Code
section 771 provides that a writing must be produced if a witness
“uses [the] writing to refresh his memory with respect to any
matter about which he testifies.” Husband has not cited any
evidence showing that wife used the notes to refresh her memory.
In its statement of decision the court found, “No actual use of the
notes occurred during [husband’s counsel’s] examination [of wife];
nor was there evidence that any writing had been used to refresh
the witness’s memory.”
Furthermore, husband has failed to show that the notes
were not protected from disclosure by the attorney-client
privilege. (See Evid. Code, § 954; Sullivan v. Superior Court
(1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 64, 72 [“There is an apparent conflict
between Evidence Code section 771 and other statutes dealing
with the attorney-client privilege”].)
Trial Court’s Alleged Failure to Order Wife to
Appear for Deposition and Produce Documents
On February 3, 2023, husband served on wife a notice “to
Appear for her videotaped deposition, via online and to Identify &
Produce [specified documents] at the taking of her deposition,”
which was scheduled for February 13, 2023.
On February 16, 2023, husband moved for “Terminating
Sanctions” “on the grounds that [wife] and her Attorney . . . have
failed to appear for the scheduled 02/13/23 deposition and
failed to produce [wife’s] Concealed German, Russian Bank
Account Statements, Concealed Russian Apartment ownership
Documents, and related financial Documents.” Husband also

9
moved for an order compelling wife to produce the specified
documents.
At a June 5, 2023 hearing, the trial court denied husband’s
motion. The court reasoned: The notice of deposition “would
have required [wife] . . . to travel more than [] 150 miles if she
chose to attend in person. [¶] And there are some difficulties
with compelling people to appear by Zoom for depositions because
it limits their ability to confer with counsel . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] You
[husband], actually, set it on a court holiday, and when [wife’s
counsel] . . . responded with a date to meet and confer, you didn’t
get back to her. [¶] And when she tried to call you at that
process [sic], she was unable to reach you, so that there was
really no opportunity to work out the deposition on that date.
[¶] So, I’m not ruling out . . . at this moment the possibility that
a deposition of [wife] might be appropriate. But I do think that
this attempt on the shortest possible notice . . . without a
meaningful meet and confer, without any advance notice . . .
makes it inappropriate to compel that particular deposition to go
forward. [¶] So, I think it will take some closer analysis of the
concern you have raised about concealed assets to determine
whether or not there is a basis for a deposition or not.”
Husband responded: “Okay. I agree, your honor. Okay. I
agree with where you’re going with this. I agree with that. But
once we get to the point . . . [where] I can show you that she has
got concealed assets, she is going to have to be examined some
time.” The court replied, “That may be, and we have had some
discussion about that already.”
By expressly agreeing that the trial court’s ruling was
appropriate, husband forfeited his claim that it had erroneously
denied his motion. (In re N.S. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 816, 840 [“It

10
is settled that an appellant waives or forfeits the right to
challenge a ruling on appeal by agreeing with or acquiescing to
the ruling at trial”].)
Furthermore, husband has not shown that, in denying his
motion, the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. “In
general, we review the trial court's ruling on a motion to compel
discovery for an abuse of discretion, because the trial court is
vested with wide statutory discretion to manage discovery.”
(Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (2012)
209 Cal.App.4th 687, 692.) “ ‘Discretion is abused whenever, in
its exercise, the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the
circumstances before it being considered. The burden is on the
party complaining to establish an abuse of discretion . . . .’ ”
(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566.)
Finally, husband has not shown that it is reasonably
probable the result would have been more favorable to him had
he been permitted to depose wife. “[T]he so-called Watson
standard [People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818] applies
generally to all manner of trial errors occurring under California
law, precluding reversal unless the error resulted in a
miscarriage of justice.” (Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33
Cal.4th 780, 801 (Cassim).) “ ‘[A] “miscarriage of justice” should
be declared only when the court, “after an examination of the
entire cause, including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing
party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ ” (Id.
at p. 800.)

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Trial Court’s Alleged Failure to
Require Wife to Attend the Trial in Person
During the evidentiary hearing, the court permitted wife to
testify remotely via Zoom from her home state, Idaho. Husband’s
counsel objected, “[A] case like this requires the witness to be in
court.” On appeal husband claims, “The Trial Court was
disobedient to [Code of Civil Procedure] § 1987 by failing to
ensure that [wife] appear physically at trial.” The claim “is . . .
forfeited because it is not supported by meaningful analysis with
citation to authority.” (Blizzard Energy, Inc. v. Schaefers (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 832, 854.)
Claim that Trial Court Failed (1) to Timely Rule on Husband’s
Requests for Judicial Notice and (2) to Rule on All of His RFOs
In an 18-page order filed on August 19, 2024, the trial ruled
on each of husband’s 28 requests for judicial notice. Husband
claims, “By failing to hear and rule on [them] ‘at the earliest
practicable time’, the trial Court was disobedient to the Evid.
Code § 456: ‘If the trial court denies a request to take judicial
notice of any matter, the court shall at the earliest practicable
time so advise the parties and indicate for the record that it has
denied the request’.”
Husband has not shown that the trial court violated
Evidence Code section 456. Even if it had violated the section,
husband has not shown that it is reasonably probable a result
more favorable to him would have been reached had the court not
violated section 456. (Cassim, supra, 33 Cal.4th p. 801.)
Husband contends without further discussion: “[T]he trial
court broke its Agreement with [him] to hear and rule on all of
his pre-trial Motions, RFO’S, along with RJNs #1-28, which
contained his essential evidence in support thereof.” The

12
contention is forfeited because it is not supported by meaningful
analysis with citations to the record. (In re S.C., supra, 138
Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)
Claim that Trial Court Erroneously Failed to
Set Aside the Marital Dissolution Judgment
Husband claims the trial court erred “when it failed to set
aside the Marital Judgment when [wife] failed to disclose her
concealed assets . . . and her concealed financial transactions.”
But the trial court found that wife had not concealed any of her
assets. Indeed, the court concluded that husband had “presented
no evidence of omitted or concealed assets.” The court stated: “A
continuing theme in the case is that it was [husband’s]
responsibility to identify assets that he believes were concealed
from him in the divorce. He has at all times failed to do so.”
The trial court credited wife’s testimony and discredited
husband’s testimony. The court stated: “[Husband] exhibited
evasion of direct answers on cross-examination, often attempted
to divert discussion to topics more comfortable to his position and
was content to assert any suspicion he entertained as a fact.
[Wife] on the other hand made direct and informed responses to
virtually every question asked of her.” The court said it “found
the testimony of [wife] to be entirely credible, and largely
unrefuted.”
Husband in effect is arguing that the evidence is
insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that wife did not
conceal her assets or financial transactions. “When an appellant
contends there is insufficient evidence to support a finding of fact,
we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. [Citation.]
Under that standard of review, ‘the power of an appellate court
begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is

13
any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which
will support the finding of fact.’ [Citation.] In so doing, we accept
all evidence that supports the judgment, disregard contrary
evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences to uphold the
judgment. [Citation.] ‘It is not our role to reweigh the evidence,
redetermine the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicts in
the testimony, and we will not disturb the judgment if there is
evidence to support it.’ ” (Slone v. El Centro Regional Medical
Center (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1173 (Slone).)
“In every appeal, the appellant has the duty to fairly
summarize all of the facts in the light most favorable to the
judgment. [Citations.] ‘Further, the burden to provide a fair
summary of the evidence “grows with the complexity of the
record. [Citation.]”’ [Citations.] To meet its burden on appeal to
show a finding of fact is not supported by substantial evidence,
appellants cannot recite only evidence in their favor, but must
‘ “set forth in their brief all the material evidence on the point
and not merely their own evidence. Unless this is done the error
is deemed to be waived.” . . .’ ” (Slone, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1173.)
The record here is complex. Husband has not fairly
summarized all of the facts in the light most favorable to the
judgment. He recites only evidence in his favor. Accordingly,
husband has waived the substantial evidence issue.
“Assuming arguendo [husband] has not . . . forfeited his
substantial evidence contentions based on his improper
statement of facts as concluded above, we nevertheless conclude
he has failed to carry his burden on appeal to show the evidence,
including all reasonable inferences therefrom[] favorable to the

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trial court's findings and judgment[,] is insubstantial.” (Slone,
supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1175.)
Claim that Trial Court Erred in Failing to Allow
Four Witnesses to Testify at Evidentiary Hearing
Husband contends, “The trial Court did not allow any of
[husband’s] three expert witnesses, who were former federal
agents, to testify, and would not allow one of the primary
witnesses Morris Hodges (Hodges) to testify.” As to two of the
experts – Stanley Los, Jr., and John Sampson – husband does not
support his contention by references to the record. The
contention is therefore waived. “Every brief must support any
reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume
and page number of the record where the matter appears. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) The appellate court is not
required to search the record on its own seeking error. If a party
fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the
record, the argument will be deemed waived.” (LA Investments,
LLC v. Spix (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1061.)
As to the third expert – Larry Stewart – the trial court said
it would take judicial notice of his declaration and would read it
“with care and understanding,” which is “what we would get if we
called him to testify.” Based on Stewart’s declaration, “we have
what his testimony would be.” The court noted that this
procedure would save husband money because he would not have
to call Stewart “to the stand, and it [the declaration] is evidence
before the court.” Husband acquiesced in this procedure: “Okay,
your honor. With that in mind – so we’re finished with that,
then.” By his acquiescence, husband waived the issue. (In re
N.S., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 840.) In any event, husband
has not explained how the trial court’s ruling resulted in a

15
miscarriage of justice. (Cassim, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 800-
801.)
As to Morris Hodges, the trial court’s statement of decision
shows why it excluded his testimony. The court said: “[Husband]
wished to call a next-door neighbor, Morris Hodges, who had been
deposed in December 2016, whose testimony, he believed, would
refute claims that [wife] had made in 2014-2016 that [husband]
had been abusive. The offer was made during the evidentiary
hearing on omitted assets — about which Mr. Hodges was
necessarily ignorant. [Husband] again asked the court to
reconsider decisions on [wife’s] credibility made by prior judges
and to infer from the claimed fact that she testified falsely or
inaccurately in the prior proceedings that she should not be
believed when now denying that she omitted or concealed
community assets in her possession. The court excluded the
testimony as unduly time-consuming and unpersuasive. It
remained [husband’s] burden to show the existence of omitted
assets. This was not the way to accomplish the goal.”
The trial court did not err in excluding Hodges’s testimony.
Evidence Code section 352 provides, “The court in its discretion
may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a)
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury.” Wife’s allegedly false claim in 2014-2016
that husband was abusive had little relevance as to whether wife
was telling the truth in 2023 when she testified that she had no
concealed assets. The trial court reasonably concluded that the
probative value of Hodges’s testimony would be substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission would be unduly

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time consuming because it would require a mini trial concerning
the parties’ relationship in 2014-2016.
Wife’s Request for Sanctions for Taking a Frivolous Appeal
Wife has moved for an award of sanctions against husband
for taking a frivolous appeal. She requests attorney fees of
$11,840 (29.6 hours at $400 per hour) and costs of $750.20, for a
total of $12,590.20. We conclude the requested fees and costs are
reasonable.
“We have discretion to impose sanctions where the appeal
is frivolous. ‘ “An appeal is frivolous ‘only when it is prosecuted
for an improper motive—to harass the respondent or delay the
effect of an adverse judgment—or when it indisputably has no
merit—when any reasonable attorney would agree that the
appeal is totally and completely without merit. . . .’ . . .” ’ ”
(Champlin/GEI Wind Holdings, LLC v. Avery (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 218, 227.) “Sanctions for taking a frivolous appeal
‘should be used most sparingly to deter only the most egregious
conduct.’ ” (Clarity Co. Consulting, LLC v. Gabriel (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 454, 466 (Clarity).)
“When[, as here,] an appellant decides to represent himself
in propria persona, ‘he is entitled to the same, but no greater,
consideration than other litigants and attorneys. [Citations.]’
[Citation.] . . . A pro. per. litigant is held to the same restrictive
procedural rules as an attorney.” (Bistawros v. Greenberg (1987)
189 Cal.App.3d 189, 193.)
Any reasonable attorney would agree that husband’s
appeal is totally and completely without merit. Furthermore,
husband’s conduct in pursuing the appeal is particularly
egregious in view of the trial court’s warning when it decided to
impose sanctions against him. The court told husband: “[T]his

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seems to be an unending vendetta. [¶] . . . I have preached the
sermon that this should have been something that you let go of,
but it doesn’t seem possible for you to do that. [¶] [¶] This is . . .
a wrongly thought of, misguided, factually-unsupported claim
that should not be further pursued, and I don’t know how to
make that point forcefully . . . without issuing sanctions.”
The trial court continued: “[I]f every litigant who lost, even
in just divorce actions, would take the position you do that we
have to have many more years of litigation, . . . the justice system
would just collapse. [¶] It was . . . all we can do, through the
many judges that have heard these cases, to keep up with your
constant flow of new filings, and requests for judicial notice, and
actions for sanctions, and an annulment action after a final
divorce[4] . . . . There is just no end . . . to your creativity here,
and . . . it needs to stop.” “[T]he danger is that you’re incapable of
reassessing whether you’re . . . correct no matter what the court
says, and that you’re determined to let your view of justice
prevail. But that can’t be the case at this point.”
In view of the trial court’s warning to husband, it is
reasonable to infer that the appeal was taken for the purpose of
harassing wife. Husband told the court: “[A]ppeals, you know,
are very unlikely. You know that. It is very unlikely to prevail
on appeals . . . .”
In deciding to impose sanctions for taking a frivolous
appeal, we have considered husband’s apparent ability to pay the
sanctions. The trial court said: “There is property to pay; most

4 In In re Marriage of Walther, supra, B309062, slip opn. at

pp. 1-2, we affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing husband’s
petition “to nullify his dissolved marriage on the ground that
[wife] had committed fraud and bigamy.”

18
notably, the home in Santa Barbara. It is valuable. There are
other properties.” Wife’s counsel asserted: “[Husband] completely
fails to make any reference to his inheritance. And it is my
understanding that he has inherited something above
$7,000,000.00. [¶] He doesn’t reference it. . . . He has inherited
funds from his late mother, and property, and it is extensive.”
Husband did not dispute wife’s counsel’s statement.
We have also taken into consideration that husband is
experienced in appellate litigation. This is his fourth appeal in
this matter. In his third appeal, where he also appeared in
propria persona, he was clearly put on notice that he has the
burden of establishing that an error was prejudicial: “Without a
showing of prejudice, any error was harmless and therefore
cannot justify a reversal of the judgment.” (In re Marriage of
Walther, supra, B309062, slip opn. at p. 7.)
“This court has wasted its time and resources considering
[husband’s] appeal, which has only served as a drain on the
judicial system and the taxpayers of this state.” (Malek Media
Group, LLC v. AXQG Corp. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 817, 837.)
“ ‘ “Courts, with increasing frequency, have imposed additional
sanctions, payable to the clerk of the court, to compensate the
state for the cost to the taxpayers of processing a frivolous
appeal. [Citation.] The cost of processing an appeal that results
in an opinion has been estimated to be approximately $ 8,500.”
[Citations.] We find that additional sanctions in the amount of
$8,500.00 are appropriate.’ ” (Clarity, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p.
467.)
This opinion constitutes a written statement of our reasons
for imposing sanctions.

19
Disposition
The purported appeal from the trial court’s order imposing
sanctions of $72,476.87 is dismissed. The trial court’s order filed
on August 19, 2024, is affirmed. Wife’s motion for sanctions on
appeal is granted. For taking a frivolous appeal, sanctions are
imposed on husband in the amount of $12,590.20 to be paid to
wife, and $8,500 to be paid to the clerk of this court. All
sanctions shall be paid no later than 30 days after the date the
remittitur is issued. Wife shall recover from husband any costs
on appeal not included in the sanctions order. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.278(d).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.

20
Jed Beebe, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Howard Walther, in propria persona, for Appellant.
Law Offices of Stephanie J. Finelli and Stephanie J. Finelli,
for Respondent.

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