CourtListener 10862464•People v. Alejandre CA2/6
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Filed 5/20/26 P. v. Alejandre CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B344788
(Super. Ct. No. NA097123)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
GUSTAVO ALEJANDRE,
Defendant and Appellant.
Gustavo Alejandre appeals an order denying his request to
strike a firearm enhancement following a resentencing hearing.
He contends the trial court misapplied Penal Code1 section 1385,
subdivision (c) by failing to evaluate his projected level of danger
to the public in the future at the time of his earliest parole date.
We remand for the limited purpose of vacating the restitution
fine but otherwise affirm the judgment.
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Alejandre shot and killed a rival gang member, Jesus
Escapite, on October 7, 2013. Escapite was walking down the
street with a companion in an area claimed by both gangs.
Alejandre stopped his car when he saw Escapite, got out, and
shot him. Escapite fell to the ground after being shot. Alejandre
then shot him four or five more times as he lay on the ground.
(People v. Alejandre (July 27, 2016, B262253) [nonpub. opn.].)
The jury convicted Alejandre of first-degree murder and
possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury also found true
allegations that he personally discharged a firearm resulting in
death and committed the offenses for a criminal street gang.
Finally, the jury found Alejandre had served a prior prison term.
The trial court sentenced Alejandre to an aggregate prison
term of 51 years to life. Specifically, the court sentenced him to
25 years to life on the murder count, plus a consecutive term of
25 years for the firearm enhancement and an additional one year
for the prison prior. The court stayed the sentence on the gang
enhancement and firearm possession under section 654. The
court also imposed a $10,000 restitution fine under section
1202.4, subdivision (b). The judgment was affirmed on direct
appeal. (People v. Alejandre, supra, B262253.)
On January 28, 2025, the trial court held a full
resentencing hearing pursuant to Alejandre’s section 1172.75
request. The court vacated the one-year prison prior and struck
the gang enhancement but declined to strike the 25-year firearm
enhancement.
The trial court explained its decision not to strike the
firearm enhancement as follows:
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“I do not find it in the interests of justice and, in fact, I find
that, based on the facts of this case and the facts of his current
rehabilitation that has been presented to me, to be inadequate to
overcome the evidence that he would be a – it would – by running
it concurrently or striking it, it would be contrary to public safety
and not in the interests of justice, and therefore I am not doing
that.”
The trial court sentenced Alejandre to 50 years to life – 25
years to life for the murder conviction and an additional 25 years
for the firearm enhancement (with a concurrent two years for the
felon in possession conviction). The amended abstract of
judgment listed the same $10,000 restitution fine and the same
number of custody credits as in the original abstract of judgment.
Alejandre filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Alejandre contends the trial court misapplied section 1385’s
public safety standard in deciding not to strike the firearm
enhancement. He argues that the court focused on whether he
currently is a public safety threat rather than assessing whether,
looking forward, the public would be endangered if he were
paroled 25 years earlier (i.e. in 25 years to life rather than in 50
years to life) if the enhancement was stricken. Alejandre also
contends the court failed to award all his custody credits at the
time of resentencing. Finally, he argues that the $10,000
restitution fine should be vacated under section 1465.9,
subdivision (d), because the fine is more than 10 years old.
The People counter that Alejandre forfeited his argument
regarding the misapplication of section 1385 by failing to raise it
below and, in any event, the trial court correctly applied the
public safety standard in refusing to strike the firearm
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enhancement. The People agree that custody credits need to be
modified and the restitution fine should be vacated.
Section 1385
The state legislature amended section 1385, effective January
2022. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.) Section 1385, subdivision (c),
provides in pertinent part: “(1) Notwithstanding any other law,
the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance
of justice to do so . . . “(2) In exercising its discretion under this
subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to
evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the
mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present.
Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances
weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless
the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would
endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a
likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in
physical injury or other serious danger to others.”
A finding that dismissal of enhancements would endanger
public safety relieves the trial court of its obligation to consider
the mitigating circumstances listed in section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2). (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 297.)
As an initial matter, it is not clear from the record which of
the mitigating factors listed in section 1385 (c)(2)(A) through (I)
triggered the trial court’s public safety analysis. In his opening
brief on appeal, Alejandre argues that his youth at the time of the
offense (he was 25 years old) is a “strong mitigating factor.” He
cites California Rules of Court, rule 4.423, subdivision (b)(6) as
support.2 That he was 25 at the time he committed the crime,
2 California Rules of Court, rule 4.423, subdivision (b) lists
mitigating factors to be used in the selection of a prison term
4
however, is not an enumerated mitigating circumstance in
section 1385. Since the People concede this issue, we begin with
their claim of forfeiture.
Forfeiture
We conclude that Alejandre forfeited his objection to the
trial court’s application of the public safety standard by not
raising it below.
Under the doctrine of forfeiture, “complaints about the
manner in which the trial court exercises its sentencing
discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th
331, 356.) “Although the court is required to impose sentence in
a lawful manner, counsel is charged with understanding,
advocating, and clarifying permissible sentencing choices at the
hearing.” (Id., at p. 353.)
Here, Alejandre did not argue to the trial court that the
public safety analysis is “forward looking” – either in his
resentencing brief, or at the hearing when the court announced
its decision. Indeed, in his resentencing brief, Alejandre simply
asked the court generally to exercise its discretion under section
1385. There was no discussion of a mitigating circumstance or
any public safety argument. At the hearing, Alejandre’s counsel
again asked the court to exercise its discretion to strike the
enhancement and she mentioned Alejandre’s age at the time of
the crime, but there was no discussion of public safety. The trial
court engaged in that analysis on its own and Alejandre’s counsel
from the triad in a determinate term sentencing scheme. It does
not address dismissal of a prior in the interests of justice under
section 1385.
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did not object or even address the court again after the court
announced its decision.
“[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge
to a ruling if an objection could have been made but was not
made in the trial court.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287,
1293.) “The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring
errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be
corrected.” (Ibid.)
Nevertheless, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits
of Alejandre’s appeal and address the trial court’s public safety
decision below.
Public Safety Decision
We review the trial court’s determination that dismissal of
Alejandre’s firearm enhancement would endanger public safety
for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
287, 298.) “[A]n abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based
its decision on impermissible factors . . . or on an incorrect legal
standard.” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156.)
When the record is silent, the court is presumed aware of
the applicable law. (People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861, 866-
867; People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213; 1228.)
Moreover, “ ‘ “[a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to
support [a judgment or order of the trial court] on matters as to
which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively
shown.” ’ ’’ (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666
(Giordano).)
In deciding whether dismissing the firearm enhancement
would endanger the public under section 1385, subdivision (c),
the court must focus on public safety at the time the defendant
will be released from prison. (People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103
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Cal.App.5th 215, 228-229 (Gonzalez).) This is a “forward-looking”
assessment. The trial court must also take into consideration
whether, as here, the Board of Parole will eventually be required
to consider whether the public will be endangered by defendant’s
release. (Ibid.) A reduced sentence will “[pose] significantly less
danger to society if it is contingent on a finding at some future
date that the defendant no longer poses a threat to society.”
(People v. Williams (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1057, 1063-1064.)
In Gonzalez, the Court of Appeal held “the trial court erred
because it considered only whether [defendant] currently posed a
danger to the public when assessing if a dismissal of the firearm
enhancement would ‘endanger public safety.’ (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2).) In light of [defendant’s] sentence of 50 years to life for the
murder conviction, the trial court also should have considered the
date on which [defendant] could be released if the firearm
enhancement was dismissed and the fact that the release would
be subject to a review by the Board of Parole Hearings and the
Governor.” (Gonzalez, at pp. 230-231, italics omitted.)
Gonzalez is distinguishable. Here, the trial court did not
expressly limit its reasoning to Alejandre’s current or past
dangerousness. We must presume it considered the length of
Alejandre’s sentence in making its determination as there is
nothing in the record that establishes it did not. (Giordano,
supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 666.)
The trial court explained simply, “I find that, based on the
facts of this case and the facts of his current rehabilitation that
has been presented to me, to be inadequate to overcome the
evidence that . . . striking it, it would be contrary to public
safety . . . .” One reasonable reading of the court’s explanation is
that it was concerned by the brutality of the crime and
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Alejandre’s lack of significant rehabilitation after spending
nearly 10 years in custody. Without an established trajectory of
rehabilitation, looking forward to a parole date in 15 years
instead of 40 years raised a public safety concern.
The court was not required to state what time period it was
considering in deciding whether to dismiss the enhancement.
Indeed, if a trial court declines to dismiss an enhancement, it is
not mandated to use any “particular language” in doing so.
(People v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1157.) “We assume
the trial court was aware of and followed applicable law.” (People
v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 724.)
Custody Credits
When a defendant is resentenced, “the sentencing court
must recalculate and credit against the modified sentence all
actual time the defendant has already served, whether in jail or
prison, and whether before or since he was originally committed
and delivered to prison custody.” (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26
Cal.4th 20, 29, italics omitted.) However, “[n]o appeal shall be
taken by the defendant from a judgment of conviction on the
ground of an error in the calculation of presentence custody
credits unless the defendant first presents the claim in the trial
court at the time of sentencing, or if the error is not discovered
until after sentencing, the defendant first makes a motion for
correction of the record in the trial court which may be made
informally in writing. The trial court retains jurisdiction after a
notice of appeal has been filed to correct any error in the
calculation of presentence custody credits upon the defendant’s
request for correction.” (§ 1237.1)
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Accordingly, we decline to rule on the validity of Alejandre’s
custody credit argument until he first raises the issue with the
trial court.
Restitution Fine
The $10,000 restitution fine, imposed on February 19,
2025, is now more than 10 years old and should be vacated under
section 1465.9, subdivision (d).
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded for the trial court to vacate the
restitution fine and to amend the abstract of judgment
accordingly. The trial court shall forward a copy of the amended
abstract to the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
VAN ROOYEN, J.*
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
CODY, J.
* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution
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James D. Otto, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Sylvia W. Beckham, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Nicholas J. Wester and Amanda V.
Lopez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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