S.E. v. Kolstad CA6

CourtListener 10860209Calctapp15 mai 2026

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Filed 5/15/26 S.E. v. Kolstad CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

S.E., H052811
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 24DV000546)

v.

RYAN KOLSTAD,

Defendant and Appellant.

On July 24, 2024, the trial court granted a restraining order barring Ryan Kolstad
from contacting S.E., her son, and her mother as well as prohibiting Kolstad from
possessing firearms. (To protect respondent’s privacy, we refer to her by her initials
only.) (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(1).) Later, the court granted S.E. $3,131.50
in attorney’s fees. On appeal, Kolstad challenges these and other rulings on a myriad
grounds. We consider each of these challenges and, for the reasons explained below,
reject them.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Underlying Conduct

Although the record of the testimony at the hearing on the restraining order is
limited, it is possible nonetheless to piece together S.E.’s accusations and the evidence
supporting them from documents in the record, Kolstad’s admissions, and his description
of the testimony presented by S.E.
According to Kolstad, he and S.E. dated in 2023 from August or September to
October, but broke up due to S.E.’s “unsupportive and hurtful” comments about him. In
October 2023, Kolstad allegedly paid S.E. $1,200 to rent a room in her house but never
was able to use it. In addition, Kolstad contended that he contracted a urinary tract
infection from S.E., which cost over $1,300 to treat.
In January 2024, Kolstad sued S.E. in small claims court, seeking over $1,500 for
the rent paid and a pair of sunglasses. A hearing was held on the claim on April 5, 2024,
during which Kolstad claims that S.E. lied under oath. On April 11, 2024, the court ruled
that S.E. did not owe Kolstad any money and entered judgment in S.E.’s favor. Kolstad,
the court explained, had failed to state a claim for either the rent or the sunglasses.
After this ruling, Kolstad admitted that he continued to demand repayment.
Indeed, on May 3, 2024, Kolstad went to S.E.’s home and, according to S.E., banged on
the front door and left a note demanding the $1,200 he had paid for rent. Later that
month, S.E. requested a temporary restraining order.
Kolstad continued to demand that S.E. return $1,200 in rent payments and
reimburse his medical bills. In addition, on June 26, 2024, Kolstad returned to S.E.’s
home, again allegedly banging on her door. S.E. called the police and, according to
Kolstad, said that Kolstad was mentally unstable, had a firearm, and was stalking and
harassing her. The police arrested Kolstad, and the trial court issued an emergency
protective order against him.
B. The Restraining Order

On June 28, 2024, two days after the emergency protective order was issued, S.E.
requested a domestic violence restraining order against Kolstad. In this request, she
alleged that Kolstad was inflicting emotional harm by trying to contact her and showing
up at her house. S.E. also alleged that Kolstad was constantly mailing her mother and

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that her son, who was 10 years old at the time, was scared of him. S.E. alleged as well
that Kolstad had a handgun. The emergency protective order and several notes from
Kolstad were attached to the restraining order request. A temporary restraining order was
apparently issued on June 28, 2024.
Kolstad filed his own request for a domestic violence restraining order against S.E.
In it, Kolstad asserted that S.E.’s “capability of lying and false accusation truly knows no
bounds,” and he alleged that she had lied in small claims court and falsely accused him of
taking over $5,000 in clothing from her. Kolstad also alleged that S.E. was verbally
abusive and caused him emotional harm and damage to his reputation.
The parties agreed to proceed before a commissioner, and on July 24, 2024 a
hearing was held on both restraining order requests. At the hearing, both S.E. and
Kolstad testified, and S.E. provided the court with emails from Kolstad to her mother.
The trial court denied Kolstad’s request and granted S.E.’s. In particular, the court
granted a five-year restraining order against Kolstad barring contact with S.E., her son, or
her mother as well as prohibiting possession of firearms, firearm parts, or ammunition.
Kolstad moved for reconsideration. He contended that S.E. had lied in her
restraining order request and had presented insufficient evidence of abuse. Kolstad also
objected that the trial court did not allow a witness into the courtroom and failed to
examine the contents of his communications or to consider S.E.’s refusal to communicate
with him. Finally, he contended that the restraining order was unreasonably harsh and
would negatively impact his life.
In a subsequent hearing, another bench officer ruled that Kolstad had not
established a basis for reopening proceedings, but observed that a five-year restraining
order seemed too long and set a hearing for modification of the order. On
November 14, 2024, a hearing was held at which both S.E. and Kolstad testified.
Although the court found that it lacked authority to reopen, it reduced the restraining
order from five years to three years.

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S.E. requested $3,131.55 in attorney’s fees for a little under eight hours of work by
counsel who represented her in opposing the motion for reconsideration. Finding that
Kolstad’s claim that he was unable to pay this amount was not credible, S.E. was the
prevailing party, and the requested fees were reasonable, the trial granted the requested
fees in full.
On December 13, 2024, Kolstad filed a timely notice of appeal. Because the
restraining order hearing was neither reported nor recorded, Kolstad elected to proceed
with an agreed statement. However, he was unable to reach an agreement with S.E. and
subsequently sought a settled statement. The trial court rejected the statement proposed
by Kolstad, but issued a short, handwritten statement of its own.
II. DISCUSSION

Although Kolstad’s opening brief is only 21 pages long, in it he asserts that the
trial court committed more than two dozen errors. We discuss each asserted error below,
beginning with his objections to the court’s settled statement.
A. The Settled Statement

Because the hearing on the restraining orders was not transcribed or recorded,
Kolstad requested that the trial court issue a settled statement. However, the trial court
rejected the statement proposed by Kolstad and issued its own modified settled statement.
Although Kolstad did not file a proposed modification or objections to the trial court’s
modified statement (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(b)(2) [providing for proposed
modifications and objections]), he objects that the modified settled statement contains
misstatements and material omissions. As explained below, we cannot consider these
objections because we lack authority to review or change the modified settled statement
issued by the trial court.
1. The Proposed and Modified Statements

A settled statement is “a summary of the superior court proceedings approved by
the superior court.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(a).) Among other things, a settled

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statement must contain a “condensed narrative of the oral proceedings” (id.,
rule 8.137(d)(2)), which in turn “must include a concise factual summary of the evidence
and testimony of each witness relevant to the points” raised on appeal (id.,
rule 8.137(d)(2)(A)). In addition, any evidence or testimony not included in the
condensed narrative proposed by the appellant “will be presumed to support the judgment
or order appealed from.” (Ibid.)
Kolstad proposed a settled statement with only a cursory description of the
testimony presented by S.E. and him. For example, the proposed statement noted that
S.E. showed the trial court a copy of the June 26, 2024 emergency protective order,
which “was based on a 911 call in which Petitioner alleged that Respondent was stalking
her, mentally unstable, and possibly armed.” However, the proposed statement did not
describe the purpose for which S.E. submitted the order. The proposed statement also
noted that S.E. referenced dates and times of communications, but it did not identify the
communications or describe what S.E. said about them. Instead, the statement
commented on what S.E. did not say or do: For example, Kolstad’s proposed statement
asserted that the allegations S.E. made in her 911 call “were not substantiated at the
hearing,” that an e-mail to S.E.’s mother “was never submitted into evidence,” and that
S.E. “did not present evidence of harassing communications.”
Kolstad’s proposed statement also provided little description of his testimony. The
statement asserted that Kolstad “began to explain that he had gone to Petitioner’s
doorstep only after she failed to respond to prior communications[] and . . . he no longer
intended to return to her residence.” However, the statement does not indicate what this
explanation was or how much of it he was able to convey. The proposed statement
likewise noted that Kolstad “attempted to challenge Petitioner’s credibility by referencing
prior inconsistent statements . . . in a small claims proceeding,” but does not describe
those statements, Similarly, the proposed statement asserts that Kolstad testified that S.E.
“had misrepresented the purpose of $1,200 payment under oath” and “referenced

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concerns about a potential health issue he believed was related to being intimate” with
S.E., but does not state what S.E. represented the purpose of the payment to be, how that
representation was false, or what the health issue was.
Instead, Kolstad’s proposed statement largely focused on the conduct of the
restraining order hearing. For example, the statement asserted that Kolstad’s support
witness was not allowed to attend the hearing. It also asserted that while S.E. was
testifying the court “nodded in acknowledgement [that] the EPO was an automatic
indicator that a permanent DVRO is warranted and stated ‘[The Appellant] is harassing
you.’ ” Finally, Kolstad’s proposed statement asserted that “the trial court committed
clear legal and procedural error by interrupting [Kolstad] mid-testimony” after Kolstad
said that he did not intend to return to S.E.’s residence and then declaring “ ‘I know
you’re not . . . five years!’ ” Finally, according to the proposed statement, “[n]o
testimony was allowed from [Kolstad’s] support witness and no cross-examination of
[S.E.] occurred.”
The trial court did not certify the proposed statement as an accurate summary of
the restraining order hearing. Instead, the court issued a modified statement. According
to this statement, Kolstad “had a designated witness not designated as a support person”
and the “witness was asked to wait in [the] hallway until called,” but Kolstad “did not
present his witness.” The court’s statement also said that it “heard all evidence from both
parties,” and both parties were asked if they “had anything else to say,” but “indicated the
matter was submitted.”
The modified settled statement did not describe the testimony of either S.E. or
Kolstad or any of the evidence presented at the restraining order hearing. Kolstad does
not appear to have served upon the trial court any proposed modifications or objections to
the statement. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(g)(2) [authorizing proposed
modifications or objections].)

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2. The Notice of Misstatement

After the modified settled statement was included in the clerk’s transcript and the
record certified by the trial court, Kolstad filed a document titled “Notice of Misstatement
and Supplemental Clarification Regarding Settled Statement in Record on Appeal”
asserting that the modified settled statement contains misstatements and omits material
facts. In the notice, Kolstad repeats the assertion in his proposed statement that the trial
court “interrupted Appellant mid-testimony, announced his decision to grant a five-year
restraining order, and only afterward asked Appellant whether he had anything further to
add.” In a declaration accompanying the notice, Kolstad also asserts that “the courtroom
bailiff excluded my designated support person,” that the court “appeared to rely heavily
on the carbon copy of the Emergency Protective Order (EPO)” brought by S.E. “without
examining the underlying basis” for the order, and that no emails from Kolstad to S.E.’s
mother were introduced into evidence.
3. Analysis

This court has no authority to disregard the trial court’s modified settled statement
or to expand on its description of the proceedings below based on the assertions in
Kolstad’s notice and declaration.
The rule governing settled statements provides an extensive process for generating
such statements. The appellant proposes a statement (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.137(c)(1)), the respondent proposes amendments (id., rule 8.137(e)(1)), the trial
court corrects or modifies the statement (id., rule 8.137(f)(3)), and the parties review the
corrected or modified statement (id., rule 8.137(g)(2)). One object of this procedure is
“to conserve the time and effort of the reviewing court” by placing responsibility for
determining what occurred in the trial court in the hands of the trial court. (Burns v.
Browns (1946) 27 Cal.2d 631, 635 (Burns).) This procedure also recognizes that the trial
judge’s “familiarity with the trial and knowledge of what took place here makes him [or

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her] uniquely qualified to determine what the evidence was and whether it has been
correctly stated.” (Id. at p. 636.)
Accordingly, where, as here, “the litigant fails to convince the trial judge that his
proposed statement accurately reflects the proceeding in question, the action of the judge
who heard and tried the case must be regarded as final . . . .” (Cross v. Tustin (1951) 37
Cal.2d 821, 826 (Cross); see also Burns, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 636 [“When an
appellant . . . fails to convince the trial judge that his statement accurately reflects the
proceedings in question, the action of the trial judge, who heard and tried the case, must
be regarded as final.”]; People v. Castro (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 30, 32 (Castro) [“ ‘[F]ull
and plenary power over [a settled statement] is reposed in the trial judge, subject only to
the limitation that he does not act arbitrarily.’ ”]; Keller v. Superior Court (1950) 100
Cal.App.2d 231, 234 (Keller) [“The rule now appears to be well settled in this state that
when an appeal is taken . . . full and plenary power over [the appellate] record is reposed
in the trial judge . . . .”].)
There is an exception to the general rule that settled statements are final and not
subject to review on appeal where a statement is the result of “fraud and collusion.”
(Cross, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 825.) A party may challenge a settlement statement on
appeal “if a purported settled statement was surreptitiously prepared and filed without
any proceedings for settlement and without the knowledge of the [party] and the court.”
(Ibid.) That is not the situation here. The settled statement was requested by Kolstad.
He proposed a statement, but the trial court rejected it and issued a modified one instead.
There was no fraud or collusion in this procedure, only a “dispute between a trial judge
and a litigant as to what constitutes a correct statement of the oral proceedings at trial.”
(Id. at p. 826.) Such a dispute is not subject to appellate review. (Ibid.; see Cross, supra,
37 Cal.2d at p. 826; Castro, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at p. 32; Keller, supra, 100
Cal.App.2d at p. 234.)

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As a consequence, we must reject Kolstad’s objections to the trial court’s modified
settled statement. We also deny Kolstad’s request to take notice of alleged misstatements
in the settled statement, which has been deemed a request for findings or additional
evidence on appeal under Code of Civil Procedure section 909.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Kolstad contends that the trial court erred in issuing the restraining order against
him because the evidence presented by S.E. was insufficient. As explained below,
Kolstad has failed to demonstrate such error.
1. Relevant Legal Principles

“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is
ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the
basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error
that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609
(Jameson); see Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) In addition, “ ‘it is
presumed that the evidence is sufficient to support [the trier of fact’s] factual findings.’ ”
(Symons Emergency Specialties v. City of Riverside (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 583, 598
(Symons); see also Baxter Health Care Corp. v. Denton (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 333, 368
[“[T]he reviewing court must start with the presumption that the record contains evidence
sufficient to support the judgment.”].) Accordingly, to demonstrate an error, an appellant
must provide a record adequate to demonstrate the error. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43
Cal.3d 1281, 1295 (Maria P.).) If an appellant fails to provide such a record, it cannot
demonstrate error, and any assertions of error must be rejected. (Jameson, at p. 609
[“ ‘Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved
against [the appellant].’ ”].)
If an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented at a hearing or
trial, “ ‘the appellant must fairly summarize the facts in the light favorable to the
judgment.’ ” (Symons, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 598.) In particular, “[a]n appellant

9
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment must cite the
evidence in the record supporting the judgment and explain why such evidence is
insufficient as a matter of law.” (Rayii v. Gatica (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408
(Rayii); see also Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 (Foreman &
Clark) [“[I]f, as defendants here contend, ‘some particular issue of fact is not sustained,
they are required to set forth in their brief all the material evidence on point and not
merely their own evidence.”].) “ ‘Unless this is done the error is deemed to be waived.’ ”
(Foreman & Clark, at p. 881; see also Rayii, at p. 1408 [“[a]n appellant who fails to cite
and discuss the evidence supporting the judgment” and “cites and discusses only
evidence in her favor” cannot demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient and “waives
the contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment”].)
Even if the duty to fairly summarize the record is satisfied, an appellant
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence faces a “ ‘ “daunting burden.” ’ ” (Padideh v.
Moradi (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 418, 438 (Padideh).) In considering a claim of
insufficient evidence, “an appellate court . . . reviews the record for substantial evidence
supporting the challenged finding.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989,
1005-1006.) Evidence is “[s]ubstantial” if it is “ ‘of ponderable legal
significance,’ ‘reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.’ ” (Id. at p. 1006.)
Moreover, in determining whether there is substantial evidence, appellate courts have
“ ‘no power to judge . . . the effect or value of the evidence, to weigh the evidence, to
consider the credibility of the witnesses, or to resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the
reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom.’ ” (Leff v. Gunter (1983) 33 Cal.3d
508, 518 (Leff).) Instead, appellate courts “view the record in the light most favorable to
respondent, resolving all evidentiary conflicts and indulging all reasonable inferences to
support the judgment.” (Padideh, at p. 439.) Consequently, “ ‘it is of no consequence
that the trial court believing other evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences,
might have reached a contrary conclusion.’ ” (Perry v. Stuart (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th

10
472, 500, rehg. den. (June 25, 2025).) “[T]he power of an appellate court begins and
ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence contradicted
or uncontradicted which will support the finding of fact.’ ” (Foreman & Clark, supra, 3
Cal.3d at p. 881.)
Although Kolstad is proceeding pro per without the benefit of a lawyer, he is not
exempt from these rules. “Under the law, a person may choose to act as his or her own
attorney.” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247 (Nwosu).) However,
“pro per” parties are “ ‘treated like any other party’ ” and “must follow correct rules of
procedure.” (Id. at p. 1247; see also Elena S. v. Kroutik (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 570, 574
[“A self-represented party is treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but
no greater, consideration than other litigants having attorneys.”].)
2. Analysis

Kolstad’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the trial court’s
restraining order fails for two reasons: He has failed to provide a fair summary of the
evidence supporting the order, and he has not provided a record adequate to demonstrate
error.
a. The Duty to Provide a Fair Summary

Kolstad has not satisfied his duty to “ ‘fairly summarize the facts in the light
favorable to the judgment.’ ” (Symons, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 598.) That duty
requires appellants to “set forth in their brief all the material evidence on point and not
merely their own evidence.” (Foreman & Clak, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881.) Kolstad has
not done this. For example, Kolstad acknowledges that S.E. testified that she, her
mother, and her son were scared by Kolstad. However, he does not describe what S.E.
testified about this: He merely asserts—without explanation—that the statements made
by S.E. did not “constitute[] evidence of harassment, threat, or violence.” Similarly,
Kolstad states that the only evidence presented of past abuse or future harm were
“Petitioner’s uncorroborated and conclusory statements, contradicted by police

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recordings from May 3rd and June 26th, 2024, and lacking any showing of violence,
threats, or stalking”—but without describing what S.E. said or the police recordings
showed. These conclusory criticisms of S.E.’s testimony do not satisfy the duty to fairly
summarize the evidence requires. Accordingly, Kolstad’s objections to the sufficiency of
the evidence have been waived. (Foreman & Clark, at p. 881; see also Ryvii, supra, 218
Cal.App.4th at p. 1408.)
b. The Duty to Provide an Adequate Record

Kolstad’s objections to the sufficiency of the evidence also fail because he has not
satisfied his duty to present a record adequate to evaluate them.
The trial court’s settled statement fails to describe S.E.’s testimony concerning the
abuse she suffered. Indeed, the statement does not describe any of the evidence presented
at the July 24, 2024 hearing. It notes that the court “heard all evidence from both parties”
and “based decision on all evidence presented.” However, it does not describe that
evidence. As a consequence, the settled statement provides no basis for rebutting the
presumption that the evidence presented supported the trial court’s findings (Symons,
supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 598), and therefore it is not adequate to demonstrate that the
trial court made erroneous findings. (Maria P., supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1295; Jameson,
supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.)
Even if the trial court had adopted Kolstad’s proposed settled statement, Kolstad
still would have failed to provide a sufficient record. The proposed statement represents
that S.E. showed the court a copy of the June 26, 2024 emergency protective order, that
this order was issued based on allegations in a 911 call of stalking, mental instability, and
firearm possession, and that “[t]hese allegations were not substantiated at the hearing.”
However, the statement does not describe what S.E. said at the hearing and thus fails to
provide any basis for assessing whether that testimony substantiated her allegations. The
statement similarly notes that S.E. “referenced dates and times” of alleged harassing
communications but asserts that S.E. “did not present evidence of harassing

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communications” and, in particular, “provided no content or documents showing
harassment.” However, it does not describe what S.E. actually said concerning the
harassing communications.
Presumably, S.E. said something about these matters. Kolstad acknowledged in a
declaration submitted before the restraining order hearing that he had engaged in
“persistent” communications about S.E.’s alleged debt to him, that after losing in small
claims court he went to S.E.’s home to discuss getting the money back, and that later he
returned and was arrested. Similarly, in his motion for reconsideration Kolstad
acknowledged that S.E. asserted that he “banged” on her door in his first visit to her
home and scared both her son and mother. It is unlikely that S.E. was silent on these
matters when she testified, and without knowing what she said, it is impossible to
determine whether that testimony was sufficient to support a restraining order. Moreover,
as “[a]ny evidence or portion of a proceeding not included [in a proposed settled
statement] will be presumed to support the judgment or order appealed from” (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.137(d)(2)(A)), we must presume that S.E.’s testimony provided sufficient
support for the restraining order’s findings.
3. Kolstad’s Arguments

Kolstad makes several objections to the evidence supporting the restraining order,
but none are persuasive.
a. Type of Abuse

Asserting that a domestic violence restraining order “requires clear and convincing
evidence of past abuse or a credible threat of future harm,” in his opening brief Kolstad
argues that the evidence presented in support of the restraining order was insufficient
because S.E. failed to present evidence of “violence, threats, or stalking” and because he
was “not charged with, nor convicted of, any act of violence or harassment against
Petitioner.” This argument is based on several misconceptions.

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First, contrary to Kolstad’s assertion, the Domestic Violence Protection Act
(DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.) does not require clear and convincing evidence.
Instead, “[t]he DVPA requires a showing of past abuse by a preponderance of the
evidence.” (In re Marriage of Davila and Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226.)
Second, under the DVPA, violence and threats of harm are not the only grounds
for issuing issue a restraining order. Instead, a restraining order may be issued based on
evidence on “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.” (Fam. Code, § 6300, subd.
(a).) Moreover, the DVPA defines “ ‘abuse’ ” broadly to include not only “sexual
assault,” “bodily injury,” and placing a person “in reasonable apprehension of imminent
serious bodily injury” (id., § 6203(a)(1)-(3)), but also any behavior that may be enjoined
under Family Code section 6320 (id., § 6203(a)(4).) That section in turn covers a wide
range of conduct, including “molesting,” “stalking,” ”harassing,” “telephoning,”
“contacting,” and “disturbing the peace of the other party.” (Id., § 6320, subd. (a).)
“ ‘[D]isturbing the peace of the other party’ refers to conduct that, based on the totality of
the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” (Id.,
§ 6320, subd. (c).)
The restraining order was justified in order to prevent Kolstad from disturbing
S.E.’s peace. It was undisputed that Kolstad had a prior romantic relationship with S.E.,
he had a firearm, and he engaged in “persistent” communications concerning the money
that he believed S.E. owed him even after the small claims court rejected his claims.
Moreover, Kolstad went to S.E.’s home unannounced and uninvited in May 2024 and
again in June 2024. And when Kolstad did so that second time, S.E. called 911.
Especially in light of this call for emergency help, the trial court reasonably could have
found that Kolstad’s unannounced and uninvited visits to S.E.’s home to discuss claims
the small court had rejected destroyed her mental and emotion calm and, thus, constituted
“disturbing the peace” under the DVPA.

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b. Falsehoods

Kolstad also contends that the case against him was based on misrepresentations
and falsehoods. For example, he contends that the trial court “accepted Petitioner S.E.’s
demonstrably false statements as fact,” that recordings of her 311 and 911 calls showed
that S.E.’s allegations concerning him were “exaggerations and fabrications” and she lied
about the presence of her son in the house on June 26, that she used a “falsified June 26
911 call” and “false police statements,” that she falsely claimed that her son and mother
were scared of him, and that she misrepresented that his small claims case was resolved
on April 5, 2024. However, the record does not include the recordings or body cam
footage that Kolstad says contradict S.E.’s testimony, and Kolstad does not present any
other evidence supporting his claims of misstatements and use of false statements by S.E.
In addition, the small claims case was resolved, albeit on April 11, 2024, when the court
ruled that “Defendant does not owe plaintiff any money on plaintiff’s claim” because he
“has failed to state a claim.” (Boldface omitted.)
Even more fundamentally, in reviewing trial court rulings, appellate courts have
“ ‘no power to judge . . . the effect or value of the evidence, to weigh the evidence, to
consider the credibility of the witnesses, or to resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the
reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom.’ ” (Leff, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 518.)
To the contrary, “we accept all evidence supporting the trial court’s order,” “disregard
contrary evidence,” and “draw all reasonable inference to the affirm the trial court.”
(Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 581.)
For all these reasons, we reject Kolstad’s assertion that S.E. lied to the trial court.
c. Admissibility and Competence of the Testimony

Kolstad asserts that trial court’s findings were not supported by admissible
evidence, that S.E.’s testimony was “uncorroborated and conclusory,” and that she relied
on “hearsay statements unsupported by physical evidence, witness testimony, or police

15
findings of wrongdoing.” These assertions fail because Kolstad does not support them
with either citations to the record or legal analysis and argument.
“To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported
by citations to authority and citations to the fact in the record that support the claim of
error.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 (S.C.).) Appellate courts are “ ‘not
required to search the record . . . seeking error’ ” (Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at
p. 246), and they are “not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them” (In re
Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830). Accordingly,
“[c]ontentions supported neither by argument nor by citation of authority are deemed to
be without foundation and to have been abandoned.” (In re Phoenix (2009) 47 Cal.4th
835, 845 (Phoenix); see also People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153. 206 (Williams)
[“Points ‘perfunctorily asserted without argument in support’ are not properly raised.”].)
In other words, “conclusory claims of error will fail.” (S.C., at p 408.)
d. Documents

Kolstad also contends that the trial court relied on documents that were not
“properly authenticated,” “admitted into evidence,” or “entered into the record.” In his
briefs, Kolstad identifies two such documents: the emergency protective order and emails
from Kolstad to S.E.’s mother. However, there is no mention of either document in the
modified settled statement, and therefore there is no basis for concluding that these
documents were not properly authenticated, or that they were not admitted or entered into
the record. To the contrary, the minute order concerning the restraining order hearing
notes that S.E. provided the court with emails from Kolstad to S.E.’s mother, and absent
evidence to the contrary, we must presume that these emails were properly authenticated
and admitted into evidence. (See In re Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992
[“Where no reporter’s transcript has been provided and no error is apparent on the face of
the existing appellate record, the judgment must be conclusively presumed correct as to
all evidentiary matters.”].)

16
C. Fraud on the Court

In addition to asserting that the trial court was biased, Kolstad contends that the
restraining order must be vacated because it was obtained through fraud. In particular,
Kolstad asserts that S.E. “made fabrications to police on June 26, which are recorded on
police bodycam footage” and falsely testified that her son and mother, who were not at
the restraining order hearing, were afraid of him. However, Kolstad does not cite any
evidence showing what S.E. said to the police, much less establishing that these
statements were false or fraudulent; indeed, neither the policy bodycam footage nor
S.E.’s 911 call are included in the appellate record. As appellants bear the burden “to
provide an adequate record to assess error” (Maria P., supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1295), these
issues must be resolved against Kolstad. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609).
D. Bias and Due Process

Kolstad also argues that the trial court was biased and deprived him of due process
by prejudging that he had harassed S.E. Kolstad asserts that, during S.E.’s testimony, the
court said that “he’s harassing you” even though, according to Kolstad, S.E. never said
that she felt harassed. Kolstad also asserts that, when he testified that he was not going to
S.E.’s house again, the court interrupted him and said “I know you’re not—five years,”
which Kolstad argues indicates that the court already had decided to issue a five-year
restraining order (and was testifying from bench). This argument fails because it is not
supported by any citations to the record and, in fact, contradicts the settled statement.
As noted above, appellants are required to provide an adequate record of error
(Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609; Maria P., supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1295.)
Consequently, “[i]f a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the
record, the argument will be deemed waived.” (LA Investments, LLC v. Spix (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 1044, 1061 (LA Investments); see Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1246.) Here, Kolstad fails to cite any evidence in the record that the trial court found
harassment before S.E. finished her testimony or decided to impose a five-year

17
restraining order before Kolstad’s testimony concluded. For this reason alone, Kolstad’s
bias and prejudgment argument fails.
In addition, the trial court rejected Kolstad’s assertions about its conduct. The
settled statement proposed by Kolstad contained his assertions about the trial court’s
statements during S.E.’s and his testimony. However, the trial court refused to certify
Kolstad’s proposed statement. Moreover, the court issued a modified settled statement
with no mention of the statements that Kolstad asserts were made during his testimony
and S.E.’s. As the trial court’s description of the oral proceedings “must be regarded as
final” (Cross, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 826; see Burns, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 636; Castro,
supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at p. 32; Keller, supra, 100 Cal.App.2d at p. 234), we must reject
the statements omitted from the modified settled statement that Kolstad asserts.
In asserting that the trial court was biased, Kolstad also contends that there was no
evidence of harassment, threat, or violence supporting the restraining order and that the
trial court impermissibly treated S.E.’s generalized fears and the emergency protective
orders as automatic grounds for issuing a restraining order. As demonstrated above, the
trial court’s finding of abuse was in fact supported by substantial evidence that Kolstad’s
actions disturbed the mental and emotional calm of S.E. Moreover, even if the trial court
had erred in evaluating the evidence in the record, that error would not establish bias.
(See, e.g., People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112, overruled on another ground
in People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151 [“a trial court’s numerous rulings against a
party—even when erroneous—do not establish a charge of judicial bias”]; People v.
LeBlanc (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1079 [“[m]ere judicial error does not establish
bias”].)
E. Procedural Irregularities

Kolstad asserts that “serious procedural irregularities” in the restraining order
hearing denied him a fair opportunity to be heard. We examine the asserted irregularities
below.

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1. Kolstad objects the trial court failed “to provide fair hearing procedures
required under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act,” “to make the requisite statutory
findings,” or to conduct a jury trial on the restraining order. However, Kolstad provides
no argument or authority concerning the procedures required under the DVPA, the
findings required by the statute, or the right to a jury trial before issuance of a restraining
order. As a consequence, his arguments are inadequate. Because appellants bear the
burden of demonstrating error (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608-609), they “must
present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority,” and “conclusory
claims of error will fail.” (S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408; see also Phoenix,
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 845 [“ ‘ “Contentions supported neither by argument nor by
citation of authority are deemed to be without foundation . . . .” ’ ”]; Benach v. County of
Los Angeles (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 (Benach) [“This conclusory presentation,
without argument or attempt to apply the law to the circumstances of the case, is
inadequate.”].)
2. Kolstad objects that there was no court reporter at the restraining order
hearing and that the absence of any transcript or recording “hinders meaningful appellate
review,” which violates both due process and the California Constitution’s guarantee of
open and fair judicial proceedings. However, Kolstad was able to obtain a settled
statement describing the hearing, and he fails to offer any argument or authority holding
that, despite this option, a court reporter or recording is required. Consequently, here
again, Kolstad’s argument is inadequate. (Phoenix, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 845; Benach,
supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 852; S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)
3. Kolstad asserts a number of irregularities at the restraining order hearing.
He contends that the trial court: (1) improperly excluded his witness Michael DeWilde
without any inquiry concerning the witness’ role; (2) interrupted Kolstad’s testimony, cut
it short, and refused to hear material evidence; (3) did not allow cross-examination,
presumably of S.E.; (4) relied on documents that were not authenticated or admitted into

19
evidence; (5) relied on hearsay; and (6) admitted evidence of a prior uncharged act.
However, Kolstad cites no evidence in the record supporting these assertions, and the
settled statement offers no support. Accordingly, these procedural objections are
inadequate. (LA Investments, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1061; Nwosu, supra, 122
Cal.App.4th at p. 1246.) In addition, as noted above, Kolstad’s contention that the trial
court interrupted his testimony was rejected by the court. And, contrary to Kolstad’s
assertion, his witness was not prevented from testifying: According to the trial court’s
modified settled statement, the witness was “asked to wait in [the] hallway until called,”
but Kolstad “did not present” him.
4. Kolstad objects that, since entry of the restraining order, S.E. has “failed to
respond to any filings and continues to evade participation,” apparently by having
counsel appear on her behalf. Although Kolstad points to evidence of S.E.’s attempt to
have counsel appear on her behalf, he fails to explain how S.E.’s failure to respond and
attempt not to participate personally violated any legal requirement or prejudiced him.
Consequently, this objection is inadequate. (Phoenix, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 845;
Benach, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 852; S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)
D. Length of the Restraining Order

Kolstad asserts the trial court initially issued “an arbitrary five-year restraining
order.” However, the length of the restraining order was subsequently reduced to three
years, and Kolstad fails to explain how either the initial five-year period or the reduced
three-year period was unlawful or improper. Consequently, this objection is inadequate
as well. (Phoenix, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 845; Benach, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 852;
S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)
E. The Firearms Prohibition

Under Family Code section 6389 a person subject to domestic violence restraining
order such as Kolstad may not own, possess, purchase or receive either a firearm or
ammunition while the order is in effect. (Fam. Code, § 6389, subd. (a) [imposing

20
prohibition upon persons subject to protective orders under Family Code section 6218];
id., § 6218, subd. (a) [defining “ ‘[p]rotective [o]rder’ ” to include restraining orders
under Family Code section 6320].) Accordingly, in the restraining order hearing, the trial
court prohibited Kolstad from possessing any firearms, firearm parts, or ammunition.
Kolstad argues that this prohibition violates the Second Amendment as well as the Fifth
Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We consider each
of these arguments below.
1. The Second Amendment

Kolstad argues that the restraining order’s firearm prohibition unconstitutionally
burdens his Second Amendment right to bear arms because it was imposed without a jury
trial or individualized finding of dangerousness. He also argues that the prohibition was
improperly imposed on him because he has no criminal record, he was not charged or
convicted of any domestic violence crime, and the trial court made no finding that he
used or threatened violence. Because Kolstad did not argue in the trial court that the
restraining order violated the Second Amendment, he has forfeited any “as-applied”
challenge based on the particular facts of this case, and therefore Kolstad’s arguments
concerning his personal circumstances are not properly before us. (See, e.g., Zachary H.
v. Teri A. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1143-1144 (Zachary H).) In addition, because
Kolstad offers no legal analysis or authority in support of his contention that he was
entitled to a jury trial, we deem this argument abandoned. (See Phoenix, supra, 47
Cal.4th at p. 845.) However, we may entertain s facial challenge to the firearms
prohibition because such a challenge presents a pure question of law resolvable without
referring to the particular facts of the case. (Zachary H., at p. 1144; see In re Sheena
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889.)
To prevail on a facial challenge to a statute, a party must show that “the statute is
invalid ‘in the generality or great majority of cases.’ ” (People v. Buenrosto (2018) 6
Cal.5th 367, 388 (Buenrosto).) Citing the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in United

21
States v. Rahimi (2024) 602 U.S. 680 (Rahimi), Kolstad contends that the Second
Amendment permits prohibitions on firearms in domestic violence restraining orders only
if the orders are based on “particularized evidence of threat or violence.” In fact, Rahimi
did not consider whether such evidence is required. Because the defendant in that case
was found to have “committed ‘family violence’ ” and “posed ‘a credible threat’ to the
‘physical safety’ ” of his girlfriend and her child (Rahimi, at p. 687), the Court considered
whether a person found to pose such a threat may be prohibited from possessing a
firearm. (Id. at pp. 685-686.) It concluded that the Second Amendment “allows the
Government to disarm individuals who present a credible threat to the physical safety of
others.” (Id. at p. 700.)
We do not need to consider whether domestic violence restraining orders may
prohibit firearms possession absent such a threat. While, as noted above, the Family
Code authorizes restraining orders absent a threat of physical violence, the Code also
authorizes restraining orders based on sexual assault and intentional or reckless infliction
of bodily injury. (See Fam. Code, § 6300, subd. (a) [authorizing restraining orders upon
proof of “a past act or acts of abuse”]; id., § 6203, subd. (a)(1) [defining abuse to mean
“[t]o intentionally or reckless cause or attempt to cause bodily injury”]; id., § 6203,
subd. (a)(2) [defining abuse to mean “[s]exual assault”].) As a consequence, a substantial
number of restraining orders under the Family Code are against individuals who pose a
credible threat of physical violence to others and may be prohibited from possessing a
firearm under Rahimi. Accordingly, both before and after Rahimi, facial challenges under
the Second Amendment to Family Code section 6389 have been rejected. (See Mountain
View Police Dept. v. Krepchin (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 480, 500-502; Zachary H., supra,
96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1144-1145; Altafulla v. Ervin (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 571, 581-
582.)

22
2. The Fifth Amendment

In addition to arguing that Family Code section 6389 violates the Second
Amendment, Kolstad argues that the section violates the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition
against self-incrimination because it compels persons subject to such orders to relinquish
possession of firearms that may be illegally possessed. However, Kolstad does not
contend that he was in illegal possession of any firearms. Nor did he argue in the trial
court that he was forced to incriminate himself. As a consequence, here again, Kolstad
only may bring a facial challenge, and there plainly are many situations in which the
prohibition may be constitutionally applied because not all persons required to surrender
their firearms are in illegal possession. Moreover, even where individuals are in illegal
possession, under Family Code section 6389 a court “may grant use immunity for the act
of relinquishing the firearm or ammunition required under this section.” (Fam. Code,
§ 6389, subd. (d).) Thus, far from violating the Fifth Amendment “ ‘in the generality or
great majority of cases’ ” and being unconstitutional on its face (Buenrosto, supra, 6
Cal.5th at p. 388), it is unclear whether Family Code section 6389 ever violates the Fifth
Amendment.
3. Due Process

Finally, Kolstad argues that he was deprived of his fundamental right to keep and
bear arms without due process. In support of this argument, Kolstad repeats many of the
objections that he made to imposition of the restraining order: The trial court prejudged
the matter and testified from the bench, there was no court reporter or recording for the
restraining order hearing, no jury was impaneled, the trial court did not make factual
findings, his witness was improperly excluded, his testimony was interrupted, and the
trial court relied on documents that were not authenticated or admitted into evidence. We
reject these arguments for the reasons stated above.
Kolstad also asserts a new argument: “lack of notice.” However, Kolstad offers no
evidentiary support, legal argument, or authority for this assertion. As previously

23
demonstrated, such conclusory argument is inadequate. (Phoenix, supra, 47 Cal.4th at
p. 845; Benach, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 852; S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at
p. 408.)
F. Motion for Reconsideration

After the restraining order was issued, Kolstad filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the trial court granted in part and reduced the order’s duration from five years to
three years. Kolstad objects to several aspects of the proceedings on the motion. For
example, he notes that no court reporter was present during the primary hearing on the
motion, asserts that S.E.’s counsel presented “false narratives,” and contends that the trial
court’s ruling was unfair and that the court misconstrued the motion as seeking to modify
the restraining order rather than vacate it. However, as Kolstad’s opening brief states that
he is “appealing against the original restraining order,” it is unclear whether Kolstad is
challenging the reconsideration ruling in this appeal.
In any event, Kolstad’s objections are unfounded and inadequate. The trial court
recognized that Kolstad was seeking to vacate the restraining order, but ruled that he had
“not established a basis” for reopening and therefore the court lacked authority to do so.
In addition, other than citing to a minute order concerning the hearing on the motion for
reconsideration, Kolstad fails to offer any evidence that S.E.’s counsel presented false
narratives. Finally, although Kolstad asserts (without any supporting evidence) that the
trial court issued a restraining order of equal duration in a case involving worse conduct,
he fails to offer any legal argument or authority supporting his contention that the
supposedly different facts of that case warrant reversal of the restraining order in this
case. As a consequence, here again, Kolstad’s argument is inadequate. (Phoenix, supra,
47 Cal.4th at p. 845; Benach, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 852; S.C., supra, 138
Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)

24
G. Attorney’s Fees

Finally, Kolstad objects to the $3,131.55 in attorney’s fees granted S.E.’s counsel.
He objects that S.E. was allowed to obtain legal counsel while he remained self-
represented and that the motion for attorney’s fees was not timely served upon him.
However, Kolstad fails to offer any argument or authority suggesting that a party may not
retain counsel when the opposing party is self-represented. In addition, the record shows
that Kolstad was served with the attorney’s fees motion on October 1, 2024, and that a
hearing was requested on November 14, 2024 but not actually held until
December 5, 2024. As a consequence, service was timely. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1005,
subd. (b) [“Unless otherwise ordered or specifically provided by law, all moving and
supporting papers shall be served and filed at least 16 court days before the hearing.”].)
III. DISPOSITION

The restraining order dated July 24, 2024, the order dated November 14, 2024
denying the motion for reconsideration, and the order dated January 5, 2024 awarding
attorney’s fees are affirmed. Respondent is awarded costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

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____________________________
BROMBERG, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
GREENWOOD, P. J.

____________________________________
DANNER, J.

Ebro v. Kolstad
H052811

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