CourtListener 10860191•Mackie v. Hanover Insurance Co. CA1/3
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Filed 5/15/26 Mackie v. Hanover Insurance Co. CA1/3
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
LAURA MACKIE et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, A164404
v. (Contra Costa County
HANOVER INSURANCE Super. Ct. No. MSC 18-02264)
COMPANY, INC.,
Intervenor and Respondent.
Laura Mackie and Michael Hague (Plaintiffs) filed the underlying
negligence action against Brian Goldman, MD, A Medical Corporation
(Goldman Inc.), seeking damages for injuries they sustained when Brian
Goldman’s wife, Kimberly, struck them with her rental car before taking her
own life.1 Respondent Hanover Insurance Company (Hanover) intervened to
defend its insured and obtained summary judgment on behalf of Goldman
Inc. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Brian Goldman is a licensed psychiatrist. In 2014, he began providing
mental health services through his corporation, Goldman Inc. Brian’s wife
To avoid confusion, we often refer to the Goldmans by their given
1
names. No disrespect is intended.
1
Kimberly did administrative work for the company, using such titles as
practice manager, assistant secretary, and office administrator. Kimberly
mostly worked from home, and occasionally came to the office for meetings.
She was not compensated via Goldman Inc.’s payroll system, but instead took
“office draws” from the corporate account.
In July 2016, Laura Mackie was hired by Kimberly to work for
Goldman Inc. as an independent contractor. Mackie was retained as a risk
management consultant, to assist with a data breach that occurred when two
laptops containing confidential client data were stolen from Brian’s car.
Mackie also agreed to provide general administrative support.
Before Mackie went to work at Goldman Inc., she had known the
Goldmans for several years. Mackie first met Brian in 1997 when he treated
her son. A few years later, she worked for Brian as a paralegal, and by 2006
the two were close personal friends. Mackie also became friends with
Kimberly, and in around 2014 she was appointed as a guardian for the
Goldmans’ children in the event that both parents were to die. Mackie’s life
partner, Michael Hague, knew the Goldmans but had no relationship with
Goldman Inc., either as an employee or client.
In late July 2016, Kimberly asked Mackie to take over management of
Goldman Inc. because she no longer wanted to be involved with the business.
The Goldmans were having marital problems, so Kimberly went to Texas,
where she had family and wanted to live.2 Thereafter, in early September,
2 Our background summary is based on facts elucidated during the
summary judgment proceeding that Plaintiffs expressly acknowledged were
undisputed or failed to dispute with contradictory evidence. For example,
during oral argument before this court appellants’ counsel argued that
Kimberly did not move to Texas, but counsel did not dispute that Kimberly
went to Texas, and that she wanted to move there. Indeed, Mackie testified
at her deposition that Kimberly told Mackie she wanted to move to Texas.
2
Mackie discovered that Kimberly had misappropriated corporate funds from
Goldman Inc. Following that discovery, Mackie and Brian blocked Kimberly
from accessing the company’s accounts and programs. They also changed the
office locks to prevent Kimberly from gaining entry. Mackie and Brian had
conversations about formally terminating Kimberly’s employment but,
according to Mackie, she could never “ ‘get Brian to officially fire’ ” Kimberly.
In October 2016, Kimberly Goldman filed for divorce and found a job in
Texas. She also filed an application for spousal support, which was set for a
hearing on November 7 in the Contra Costa County Superior Court.
Meanwhile, Mackie assisted Brian with his divorce by handling his
paperwork, finding him an attorney, and preparing a declaration in support
of Brian’s opposition to Kimberly’s application for financial support. Prior to
the family court hearing, Brian told Mackie he had stopped taking his
vitamins because he was afraid Kimberly might poison him.
Kimberly returned from Texas to attend the November 7, 2016 hearing.
Plaintiffs voluntarily attended the hearing “for the sole purpose” of providing
emotional support to Brian.3 After the hearing, Kimberly “ran over Plaintiffs
and [Brian] in front of the courthouse with her rental car which she
personally rented, and then committed suicide.” Kimberly had twice
attempted to commit suicide prior to November 7, 2016. But she had “no
history of ever physically assaulting a co-worker or any non-familial adult,”
3 At oral argument, appellants’ counsel suggested there was a material
dispute as to whether Kimberly attended the divorce hearing in her capacity
as an employee of Goldman, Inc. We conclude otherwise from the record. In
their Response to Hanover’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts,
plaintiffs expressly acknowledged the following fact was undisputed:
“Plaintiffs voluntarily attended the divorce hearing for the sole purpose of
providing emotional support for Dr. Goldman.”
3
had never had a complaint filed against her or been the subject of a
restraining order, and had never been charged with any violent crime.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In November 2018, Plaintiffs filed a complaint for damages solely
against Goldman Inc. In July 2019, the court permitted Hanover to
intervene after Goldman Inc.’s former defense counsel withdrew from the
case due to a breakdown in his relationship with Brian Goldman. In October
2022, Plaintiffs filed their operative second amended complaint, which
alleged that Goldman Inc. and Hanover were each liable for negligently
causing them physical and emotional harm. The trial court sustained a
demurrer to Plaintiffs’ claim against Hanover without leave to amend, and
that ruling has not been challenged on appeal.
Plaintiffs’ Allegations Against Goldman Inc.
Plaintiffs allege that Goldman Inc. is liable for injuries they sustained
on November 7, 2016, because it negligently hired and retained Kimberly
Goldman as its employee. Facts alleged in support of this claim include the
following: when Goldman Inc. employed Kimberly it knew she was mentally
ill and dangerous; Plaintiffs were targeted by Kimberly because Mackie
discovered Kimberly’s embezzlement; and Brian Goldman refused to fire
Kimberly after Mackie’s discovery, thus exposing Plaintiffs to further danger.
Purporting to state two distinct causes of action, Plaintiffs allege that
Goldman Inc. had a general duty of care to ensure that any third party was
not exposed to foreseeable harm caused by an employee, and a specific duty
not to hire or retain Kimberly Goldman, given her mental health issues and
her ”dangerous propensity for physically aggressive behavior and violence
toward others.” Plaintiffs allege that Goldman Inc. breached its duties to
Plaintiffs by hiring and retaining Kimberly as an employee and by placing
4
her in a position of authority that required Plaintiffs to interact with her.
Plaintiffs allege further that, as a “direct and proximate result” of Goldman
Inc.’s decisions to hire and retain Kimberly in a position of authority,
Plaintiffs suffered devastating physical and emotional injuries.
Brian Goldman’s Declaration
Plaintiffs attach to their complaint a declaration that Brian Goldman
filed in a related insurance coverage action. Plaintiffs allege that Brian made
several disclosures in his declaration which constitute admissions of
Goldman’s Inc.’s liability. The ostensible purpose of the declaration was to
support Brian’s contention that Hanover was violating its duty to defend him,
and had erroneously rejected Plaintiffs’ offer to settle their negligence claim
against Goldman Inc. In that context, Brian made several statements that
Plaintiffs rely on here.
For example, Brian stated he had repeatedly advised Hanover that he
had hired Kimberly, “knowing full well that she was a danger to herself and
others and ill equipped to handle her responsibilities.” Brian stated he
“should never have hired” Kimberly to be an administrator for his medical
practice. According to Brian, Kimberly had mishandled the family finances
for many years, and had a spending addiction and mental health issues.
Brian stated that he “knew” Kimberly “was capable of having a psychotic
break and could possibly hurt” herself or others, and yet he hired her to run
his practice, and he did not fire her even after she was caught embezzling.
Brian also stated that there was “no doubt” in his mind that Kimberly
blamed Mackie “for her reduced access to [Goldman Inc.’s] assets” and, “for
that reason,” she targeted Mackie on November 7, 2016. Brian felt that
Goldman Inc. was “responsible” for Plaintiffs’ injuries, and he believed that if
Mackie had not discovered Kimberly’s “thievery” and limited Kimberly’s
5
access to corporate funds, Mackie would never have been targeted outside the
courthouse.
Summary Judgment
In December 2021, the trial court granted Hanover’s motion for
summary judgment, denying Plaintiffs’ cross-motion as moot. As the court
explained in its written order, to hold Goldman Inc. liable for negligence,
Plaintiffs would have to establish the following elements: “(1) the existence
of a legal duty to use due care; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) the breach as
a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.” (Federico v. Superior Court (1997)
59 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1210–1211 (Federico).) Plaintiffs could not establish a
duty of care that Goldman Inc. breached or proximate causation of Plaintiffs’
injuries, the court found.
Regarding duty, the court applied the general rule that a defendant has
no duty to protect a plaintiff from the criminal conduct of a third party unless
the defendant has a “special relationship” to the third party or the
foreseeable victim of the criminal conduct. (Citing Roman Catholic Bishop v.
Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1556, 1564 (Roman Catholic Bishop).)
The court recognized that Goldman Inc.’s status as Kimberly’s employer gave
rise to a duty of care, but found that Plaintiffs could not establish liability on
that basis because they could not show that hiring or retaining Kimberly
created an undue risk of harm to others, when viewed in light of the work
that Kimberly was hired to do. (Citing Federico, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1214.) The court rejected Plaintiffs’ theory that Goldman Inc. had a broad
duty to ensure the safety of any person that its employee encountered while
on the job. (See id. at p. 1215.)
The court also found that Plaintiffs could not establish a causal link
between the alleged negligence in hiring Kimberly, Kimberly’s employment
6
or work, and the harm Plaintiffs suffered. (Citing Phillips v. TLC Plumbing,
Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1133 (Phillips).) To the contrary, the court
found, the assault occurred during an “ ‘ “ ‘extramural activity.’ ” ’ ” It did not
occur at the workplace of Kimberly or the Plaintiffs, nor were any of them
engaged in their regular work. Thus, while the motivation for the assault
may have been subject to dispute, “it unquestionably took place outside of
[Kimberly Goldman’s] and Laura Mackie’s employment duties and
responsibilities.”
Underlying the court’s analysis was the issue of foreseeability,
examined according to “the category of negligent conduct at issue.” The court
found that “[p]rior suicidal ideation does not reliably indicate Decedent would
someday assault a work colleague with her vehicle outside a family law
hearing.” Thus, “[t]he foreseeability of that specific type of harm is simply
too speculative and the causal nexus too attenuated” to establish liability.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, effectively assuming
the role of a trial court, and applying the rules and standards that govern a
trial court’s determination of a motion for summary judgment.” (Building
Industry Assn. of Bay Area v. City of San Ramon (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 62, 73.)
Under those rules, summary judgment may be granted to the defendant “if
all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) The defendant bears the initial burden to show
one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that
there is a complete defense. (Aguilar, at p. 850.) If this burden is met, the
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burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a material factual issue exists as to the
cause of action alleged or a defense thereto. (§ 473c, subd. (p).)
II. Summary Judgment Was Properly Granted
Because Plaintiffs seek to hold Goldman Inc. liable in tort for the
criminal conduct of a third party, their claim is subject to the general rule
that “[a] person is ordinarily not liable for the actions of another and is under
no duty to protect another from harm, in the absence of a special relationship
of custody or control.” (Roman Catholic Bishop, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1564.) In cases involving a third party’s criminal conduct, a duty of care
may potentially arise from the defendant’s special relationship with the
person whose conduct needed to be controlled or with the foreseeable victim
of the criminal conduct. (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs contend they can prove the defendant owed them a duty of
care in this case because Kimberly was Goldman Inc.’s employee. “An
employer may be liable to a third person for the employer’s negligence in
hiring or retaining an employee who is incompetent or unfit.” (Roman
Catholic Bishop, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 1564.) This rule of direct
employer liability arises from the law of agency; a person who conducts an
activity through an agent may be liable for harm caused by that activity if the
person was negligent or reckless in the employment of an improper person to
do work that involved a risk of harm to others. (Id. at p. 1565; Rest.2d
Agency, § 213.) Liability results because the “the employer antecedently had
reason to believe that an undue risk of harm would exist because of the
employment.” (Roman Catholic Bishop, at p. 1565, quoting Rest.2d Agency,
§ 213, com. d.; see also Federico, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1213–1214.)
California follows this rule, which has been incorporated into the
Restatement Third of Agency. (Phillips, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th pp. 1139–
8
1140, citing Rest.3d Agency, § 7.05.) Establishing negligence liability under
this rule requires “ ‘some nexus or causal connection between the principal’s
negligence in selecting or controlling an actor, the actor’s employment or
work, and the harm suffered by the third party.’ ” (Phillips, at p. 1140.)
A claim for negligent hiring or supervision can be based on an
employee’s deliberate wrongdoing, but the requirements for direct employer
liability are “not easily met.” (Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Ledesma & Meyer
Construction Co., Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 216, 229–230 & fn. 13.) Goldman Inc.,
as the employer, has a “limited duty to exercise reasonable care in [its]
selection of employees.” (Federico, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 1213.) Given
the limited scope of this duty, we conclude summary judgment was properly
granted. Hanover carried its burden to establish that Plaintiffs cannot
satisfy the breach element of their negligence claim, and Plaintiffs failed to
respond with evidence creating a triable issue of material fact.4
The employer’s duty to exercise reasonable care in the selection of
employees “is breached only when the employer knows, or should know, facts
which would warn a reasonable person that the employee presents an undue
risk of harm to third persons in light of the particular work to be performed.”
(Federico, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 1214.) In the present case, Goldman
Inc. hired Kimberly as an office administrator, a job in which she had very
little personal interaction with anyone (except perhaps her husband). She
worked remotely, in her latter years going into the office only a handful of
times each year. Moreover, when Kimberly was hired, she had “no history of
ever physically assaulting a co-worker or any nonfamilial adult.” Together,
4 In light of our conclusions, we do not address Hanover’s argument
that Goldman Inc.’s duty of care as Kimberly’s employer was limited by policy
factors set forth in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, or that
Plaintiffs failed to establish proximate causation.
9
this evidence shows that Goldman Inc. did not fail to exercise due care by
employing Kimberly because it had no antecedent reason to believe that
hiring her to work as an office administrator would create an undue risk of
physical harm to others. Thus, Hanover carried its initial burden of proving
the breach element of Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring claim cannot be established.
In responding to Hanover’s summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs relied
on Brian Goldman’s declaration as proof that Goldman Inc. had prior
knowledge of Kimberly’s mental health issues, which left her ill-equipped to
do her job. However, the declaration Brian filed to obtain insurance coverage
for himself and financial compensation for his friends contains few
evidentiary facts that are relevant to prove Plaintiffs’ negligence claim.
Brian expressed remorse and culpability for ignoring his wife’s mental health
problems. He also offered conclusory opinions that Kimberly was not
equipped to do her job and that she posed a danger to herself and others. He
did not state facts to show how or why the specific decision to employ
Kimberly for the work that she was authorized to perform as an office
administrator created an undue risk that she would commit an assault.
On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that Brian’s declaration conclusively shows
that Goldman Inc. breached its duty of care, and that the trial court
committed two reversible errors by concluding otherwise.
First, Plaintiffs posit that the court erred by treating the fact that
Kimberly had no criminal record as dispositive. Plaintiffs argue that
California law focuses only on what the employer knew about the employee,
not on the employee’s criminal record. Moreover, they contend, requiring
“prior criminal evidence of something the current incident proves creates an
impossible circular standard and would render negligent hiring and retention
law meaningless.” This argument misreads the record at every turn. The
10
trial court did not rely solely on the fact that Kimberly had no criminal
record. The court observed that the undisputed record shows that when
Goldman Inc. hired and retained Kimberly she had never been charged with
or convicted of a violent crime, nor had a legal complaint or restraining order
been filed against her. The court also observed that “there is no admissible
evidence of violent acts by the Decedent prior to the incident on November 7,
2016,” and that even if Mackie’s deposition testimony regarding allegedly
violent interactions among members of the Goldman family were admissible,
there is no evidence Kimberly ever committed a violent act in the workplace.5
Moreover, Plaintiffs’ cited authority confirms the dispositive question is
whether the employer knew or should have known facts sufficient to warn a
reasonable person that hiring an employee into a particular role posed a
danger to others. (Federico, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 1214.) Evidence that
Kimberly had not engaged in dangerous conduct in the past is relevant to
this issue; Plaintiffs cite no authority for contending otherwise. Finally,
Plaintiffs’ contention that the assault itself proves Kimberly was violent is a
circular argument; the fact that Kimberly assaulted Plaintiffs after her
5 In moving for summary judgment, Hanover maintained there was no
evidence that (prior to the November 2016 incident) Kimberly was ever a
serious danger to anyone other than herself. Plaintiffs purported to dispute
the point by referencing Mackie’s deposition testimony that the Goldmans’
adult children had told her Kimberly became violent during arguments with
them. In its summary judgment order, the trial court sustained Hanover’s
hearsay objection to Mackie’s deposition testimony.
We reject Plaintiffs’ contention that the hearsay ruling was reversible
error. Plaintiffs fail to support this claim with meaningful analysis or
citation to relevant authority, and they acknowledge that the excerpt from
Mackie’s deposition testimony upon which they rely is not part of the record
on appeal. (See e.g., In re Marriage of Deal (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 613, 622,
and authority cited [appellant’s burden to “provide an adequate record on
appeal and to affirmatively show error”].)
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divorce hearing is not evidence that Goldman Inc. knew or should have
known that hiring her would pose a risk of harm to others.
Plaintiffs also argue the trial court committed reversible error by
excluding evidence of Brian’s “statements and professional observations” as
inadmissible expert opinions. Plaintiffs posit that Brian’s entire declaration
is admissible evidence because it constitutes an admission by a party under
Evidence Code section 1220, regardless whether his observations qualify as
expert opinion. Whatever doubts we may have about this legal theory, we
need not resolve because Brian’s declaration was not excluded from the
summary judgment evidence. When addressing whether the decision to hire
or retain Kimberly created an undue risk of harm, the court observed that
Brian’s personal opinion that Kimberly was “ ‘mentally unstable, suicidal and
often threatening’ ” was not dispositive, but the court did not exclude any
part of Brian’s declaration as inadmissible.
Conducting our de novo review, we have taken account of Brian’s
declaration, and conclude that it lacks sufficient evidentiary value to raise a
triable issue of material fact. Brian stated that Kimberly had mismanaged
their family’s finances and had “a spending addiction, as well as other mental
health issues.” Even if knowledge of these facts is imputed to Goldman Inc.,
Kimberly’s alleged shortcomings do not provide material support for
Plaintiffs’ theory that hiring her to do administrative work put others at a
risk of physical harm.
Brian also stated that he knew Kimberly “was capable of having a
psychotic break and could possibly hurt herself” or others.6 Brian’s
6 In their appellate briefs, Plaintiffs mischaracterize some statements
that Brian made in his declaration. For example, Brian did not admit that he
employed Kimberly despite knowing that she “ ‘would harm anyone.’ ” Brian
stated that after Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, Goldman Inc.’s former defense
12
professional experience may qualify him to offer an expert opinion but, as the
trial court noted, the conclusion about Kimberly’s mental health contained in
Brian’s declaration was not the result of a psychiatric examination. (See
Kelley v. Trunk (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 519, 524 [declaration that did not
disclose matter relied on to form expert opinion inadmissible at summary
judgment].) Moreover, “an opinion unsupported by reasons or explanations
does not establish the absence of a material fact issue for trial, as required for
summary judgment.” (Ibid.) Here, even if we assume Brian’s personal
opinion that his wife was mentally unstable and potentially dangerous was
informed by his professional experience, that opinion does not preclude
granting summary judgment. This is because Brian did not attest to
evidentiary facts about Kimberly’s actual conduct that could be used to show
that a reasonable person would assess Goldman Inc.’s decision to employ
Kimberly as an office manager as creating an undue risk of physical harm to
others.7
As we have noted, Plaintiffs also alleged that Goldman Inc. breached
its duty of care by retaining Kimberly after Mackie discovered Kimberly’s
alleged malfeasance. Plaintiffs contend the evidence supports this theory
because Brian admitted that Mackie advised him to fire Kimberly, and yet he
could not bring himself to do it. According to Plaintiffs, no reasonable
employer would retain a dangerous, mentally unstable employee after
counsel asked Brian whether he thought Kimberly had “violent tendencies or
would harm anyone,” and Brian “answered in the affirmative.”
7 Plaintiffs intimate that evidence Brian hid his vitamins out of fear
Kimberly would poison him shows that Goldman Inc. knew Kimberly was
dangerous. However, Brian did not disclose when or why he developed this
fear, or provide any factual information to establish a nexus between Brian’s
fear of poisoning and the work that Kimberly was hired to do for Goldman
Inc.
13
discovering a theft, and here Brian’s admission that he failed to heed
Mackie’s advice to fire Kimberly “establishes negligent retention beyond
dispute.” Again we reject this flawed argument.
To establish that Goldman Inc. failed to exercise due care by retaining
Kimberly, Plaintiffs have to show that retaining her to perform particular
work created an undue risk of harm. (Federico, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1214; see also Roman Catholic Bishop, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 1564
[employer who conducts an activity through an agent is liable only for harm
caused by that activity]; Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 66
Cal.App.4th 1333, 1341 [“Failing to require a connection between the
employment and the injured party would result in the employer becoming an
insurer of the safety of every person with whom its employees come into
contact, regardless of their relationship to the employer”].) If there were
evidence that Kimberly performed some job function for Goldman Inc. after
the embezzlement was discovered, perhaps that circumstance could present a
triable issue, but here the evidence shows that Kimberly had stopped
working and gone to Texas before Mackie made her discovery. And after
Kimberly’s malfeasance was discovered, Kimberly was denied access to
Goldman Inc.’s systems and locked out of its office.
In light of this undisputed evidence, the parties’ debate as to whether
Kimberly remained formally an employee of Goldman Inc. after her financial
malfeasance was discovered is beside the point. Because Goldman Inc. no
longer engaged her to conduct any activities on its behalf, it was not liable for
her conduct.
We recognize that at least one California court has held that, as a
matter of law, “an employer does not owe a plaintiff a duty of care in a
negligent hiring or retention action for an injury or other harm inflicted by a
14
former employee on the plaintiff.” (Phillips, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1141, 1144.) And we accept, for purposes of this appeal, Plaintiffs’
contention that there is a conflict in the evidence as to whether Goldman Inc.
effectively terminated Kimberly’s employment before she assaulted the
Plaintiffs. For that reason, we do not rely on the bright-line rule of Phillips
and do not hold that Goldman Inc. owed the Plaintiffs no duty. Instead, we
follow Federico in holding that, because the employer owed Plaintiffs a duty
that is narrowly defined, on the undisputed facts of this case there was no
breach of that duty as a matter of law. (See Federico, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1213–1214.) Even assuming Kimberly was still technically an
employee on November 7, 2016, Plaintiffs fail to show that Brian’s alleged
refusal to fire her created an undue risk of harm to others. Instead, the
undisputed facts indicate that Kimberly was precluded from performing any
work for Goldman Inc. after the embezzlement was discovered.
In Federico, a hairstyling school was sued by the victim of an act of
sexual molestation committed by one of the school’s employees. (Federico,
supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 1210.) The plaintiff had met the employee at the
school, which his mother attended, on several occasions. Then one Sunday,
the employee took the plaintiff on an outing to Old Sacramento, and the two
returned afterwards to the employee’s home, where the act of oral copulation
occurred. (Id. at pp. 1211–1212.) In reviewing an order denying the
employer summary judgment, the Federico court found there were triable
issues as to whether the employer knew, or should have known, that the
employee had a “history of deviant sexual conduct with young males,” and as
to whether the employee’s duties “would foreseeably bring him into contact
with minors.” (Id. at pp. 1212–1213.) Yet the court directed summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, finding as a matter of law that the
15
school’s decisions to hire and retain the employee did not breach the
employer’s “limited duty to exercise reasonable care.” (Id. at pp. 1213, 1215.)
In reaching this conclusion, the Federico court hewed to the principles
outlined above and set forth in the Restatement and in Roman Catholic
Bishops. Although “it was foreseeable” that the employee would come into
contact with young males at the hairstyling school and he “was actually
introduced to plaintiff at the business place,” the plaintiff could not establish
liability under a free-wheeling foreseeability theory. (Federico, supra, 59
Cal.App.4th at p. 1215.) “[A]n employer’s liability must be determined in the
context of the specific duties the work entails.” (Ibid.) And there was
nothing about the employee’s work history or the nature of the job the
employee was being hired into that indicated he would pose “a threat of harm
to minors he might encounter in the course of his work.” (Ibid.)
Similarly, here, there was nothing about Kimberly’s work history or the
nature of her responsibilities as an office manager that indicated she would
pose a threat of physical harm to others in the course of this work. In the
case before us, the connection between the employer and Plaintiffs’ injuries is
at least as tenuous as it was in Federico, in the sense that Kimberly
assaulted her husband and Plaintiffs immediately after a family court
hearing in a divorce case, an event that had nothing to do with Goldman Inc.
or its decision to employ Kimberly, and Plaintiffs were present solely to
provide emotional support to Brian. But even if there could be a factual
dispute as to whether Mackie’s discovery of Kimberly’s embezzlement played
some role in motivating Kimberly’s assault, that dispute would not be
material to the outcome of this case. Given the undisputed evidence,
including that before the assault Kimberly had never been violent except
perhaps in family disputes, and that Kimberly was employed at Goldman Inc.
16
in a capacity that caused her to have little interaction with others, we
conclude Hanover has established it is entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to Hanover.
TUCHER, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
FUJISAKI, J.
PETROU, J.
Mackie et al. v. Hanover Insurance Company, Inc. (A164404)
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