CourtListener 10860182•Valencia v. Barrios CA6
Texte intégral
Filed 5/15/26 Valencia v. Barrios CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
H053148
JOSE MANUEL VALENCIA, (Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. 2012-1-CP-020002)
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
KORINA BARRIOS,
Defendant and Respondent.
SANTA CLARA COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT
SERVICES,
Intervenor and Respondent.
In the trial court, Jose Valencia filed a “petition for bill of review” (capitalization
& boldface omitted) seeking, among other things, to terminate the child support awarded
in this action and reimbursement for garnished wages. The trial court denied the petition
and a subsequent petition for rehearing. Valencia appeals from these denials.
However, Valencia has not included in the appellate record any documents
concerning the actions earlier in the case that he is seeking to overturn. As a
consequence, we are not in a position to determine that there was any error in the trial
court. In addition, to the extent that Valencia’s arguments are discernible, they are based
upon misconceptions of the applicable legal requirements and principles. Accordingly, as
explained below, we conclude that Valencia has failed to demonstrate any error and
therefore affirm the challenged orders.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The DCSS Child Support Suit1
In March 2011, the Santa Clara County Department of Child Support Services
(DCSS) sued Valencia (and named Korina Barrios as the other parent) to establish
parental obligations for a minor child, C.B.V., born in 2009. In February 2012, the trial
court entered judgment, finding Valencia and Barrios to be C.B.V.’s parents and ordering
Valencia to pay monthly child support of $323 and unpaid previous support of $3,222.
B. Valencia’s Custody Petition
In April 2012, Valencia filed a petition for custody and support as well as a
petition to establish a parental relationship with C.B.V. The case was consolidated with
the DCSS’s earlier suit, and in May 2012 a judgment was entered. Over the following
decade the trial court entered orders relating to custody, visitation, and support. Although
neither the May 2012 judgment nor, indeed, any documents before 2024 are included in
the clerk’s transcript, on our own motion we take notice of the February 2012 judgment,
as well as the summons and complaint filed by DCSS in the 2011 case.
C. The Petition for Bill of Review
In September 2024, Valencia filed a “Petition For Bill Of Review” (boldface
omitted) and an accompanying affidavit. Valencia asserted that he did not receive a valid
summons: Valencia referenced a summons described as Exhibit A but the record does not
1 The facts regarding 2011 child support case are drawn from pleadings that were
not included in the clerk’s transcript but were attached to Valencia’s Civil Case
Information Statement and his response to an order to show cause. On our own motion,
we take judicial notice of the summons, complaint, and judgment issued in the 2011 case
brought by the Santa Clara County Department of Child Support Services.
2
contain the exhibit. Valencia similarly asserted that an “Administrative order” was
invalid, but he does not otherwise identify the order, and while he referenced the order as
Exhibit B, the order is not contained in the record either. Valencia also claimed violations
of the separation of powers doctrine and due process. As noted above, in the petition,
Valencia requested that the trial court terminate all child support and reimburse him for
previously garnished wages.
In December 2024, Valencia filed a “Notice Of Special Visitation” (boldface
omitted), which appears to have been intended to indicate that he was making a special
appearance to challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction over him. The following month, in
January 2025, the trial court held a hearing on Valencia’s petition for a bill of review, and
on February 6, 2025, it issued an order denying the petition.
D. The Petition for Rehearing
On January 29, 2025, after the hearing on his petition for bill of review but before
issuance of the order denying the petition, Valencia filed a “Petition for Rehearing.”2
Valencia asserted the purpose of this new petition was “to exhaust administrative
remedies” and allow the “regulatory agency an opportunity to cure the errors before a
judicial review.”
The petition for rehearing asserted seven errors: (1) the trial court issued a
summons lacking a judicial signature and seal, and consequently respondent did not
receive valid service of process; (2) the trial court issued an administrative order lacking
a judicial signature and seal as required by rule 12(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure; (3) the trial court’s power to make, enforce, and adjudicate child support
orders violates the separation of powers doctrine; (4) the trial court lacked subject matter
2 The docket shows that an amended Petition for Rehearing was filed on
February 19, 2025; however, the amended petition is not included in the record on
appeal.
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jurisdiction; (5) suits by public agencies or entities for child support create a conflict of
interest; (6) the trial court’s classification of Valencia as a non-custodial parent violated
Valencia’s “Natural Parental Autonomy Rights” (boldface omitted); and (7) Valencia was
denied due process because the consequences of establishing paternity were not fully
disclosed.
In March 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the petition for rehearing. On the
day of the hearing the court issued a minute order denying the petition, and on
April 15, 2025, an “Order After Hearing” was filed.
Valencia filed a notice of appeal on April 3, 2025, purporting to appeal from orders
entered on January 22 and March 24, 2025. After this court issued an order to show
cause, Valencia filed a letter brief attaching the February 6, 2025 order denying the
petition for bill of review and the April 15, 2025 order denying the petition for rehearing,
and we deemed Valencia’s notice of appeal filed on April 15, 2025. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.104(d); see In re Joshua S. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 261, 272 [“ ‘notices of appeal are to
be liberally construed so as to protect the right of appeal if it reasonably clear what [the]
appellant was trying to appeal from’ ”].) Additionally, we treat his petition for bill of
review as a motion to set aside a void judgment (see Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d))
and therefore deem the orders denying that motion and the petition for rehearing to be
appealable post-judgment orders. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2); see Doppes v.
Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1008-1009.)
II. DISCUSSION
Because respondents have not filed briefs, we resolve this appeal based solely on
Valencia’s opening brief and the record that he has provided, as augmented by the court.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2).) Even as augmented, this record is not sufficient
to overcome the presumption of correctness that we must apply to the trial court’s ruling
and demonstrate any reversible error. In addition, as explained below, to the extent that
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Valencia’s arguments are discernible, they are largely based on misconceptions
concerning the relevant procedures and law.
A. The Presumption of Correctness
We begin with the presumption of correctness. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of
appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and
the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the
judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609 (Jameson); see also
Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [“ ‘A judgment or order of the lower
court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it
on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.’ ”].)
Appellants have the burden of overcoming the presumption of correctness. To do
so, they must demonstrate that the trial court committed reversible error, which means
appellants must designate “ ‘an adequate record.’ ” (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th 594 at
p. 609; see also Osgood v. Landon (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 425, 435 (Osgood).) Without
an adequate record, error cannot be demonstrated, and the presumption of correctness
requires that issues be resolved against appellants. (Ibid.) Appellants also must show
where in the record any error occurred.
In addition to an adequate record, appellants “must present meaningful legal
analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to the fact in the record that
support the claim of error.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 (S.C.); see also
WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894
(WFG); United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 156
(United Grand).) Appellate courts are “ ‘not required to search the record . . . seeking
error’ ” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246 (Nwosu)), and they are “not
bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke
5
(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830). Consequently, “ ‘ “[a]ny statement in a brief
concerning matters in the appellate record . . . must be supported by a citation to the
record.” ’ ” (Wentworth v. Regents of University of California (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
580, 595; see also WFG, at p. 894 [“[W]e may decide that the appellant has forfeited a
point urged on appeal when it is not supported by accurate citations to the record.”].) In
addition, “ ‘ “[c]ontentions supported neither by argument nor by citation of authority are
deemed to be without foundation and to have been abandoned.” ’ ” (In re Phoenix H.
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 845 (Phoenix); see also Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 (Benach) [A “conclusory presentation, without pertinent
argument or an attempt to apply the law to the circumstances of this case, is inadequate,”
and a reviewing court will “treat the issue as abandoned.”].) In short, “conclusory claims
of error will fail.” (S.C., at p 408.)
These rules apply equally to a party such as Valencia representing himself on
appeal. (Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1246-1247.) A self-represented party is
“ ‘treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration
than other litigants and attorneys. [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at p. 1247; Barton v. New United
Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210.)
B. The Record
Valencia cannot overcome the presumption of correctness and demonstrate
reversible error because he has not provided an adequate record of the proceedings being
reviewed. In his notice designating the record, Valencia designated only four documents:
the petition for bill of review, the petition for rehearing, the notice of special visitation,
and the affidavit in support of the petition for bill of review. As a consequence, the
record on appeal does not include the judgment imposing child support that Valencia
seeks to terminate or the wage garnishment order for which he seeks reimbursement. In
addition, the record does not contain either the summons or the “Administrative Order”
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that Valencia contends were invalid. Nor is there any evidence of the proceedings that
Valencia contends violate the separation of powers and create a conflict interest, the basis
for the trial court’s exercise of personal and subject matter jurisdiction, the restrictions
allegedly imposed on Valencia’s rights, or the failure to make disclosures.
On this record, we cannot review whether the trial court acted appropriately in
denying Valencia’s petitions. If the appellate record “does not contain the evidence
before the trial court,” the reviewing court must “conclusively presume[] that the
evidence sustained the [trial court’s] findings.” (Kubon v. Kubon (1958) 51 Cal.2d 229,
232; see also Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187
[affirming judgment where inadequate record contained “only selected excerpts from the
clerk’s transcript” and no “reporter’s transcript or the exhibits presented at trial”]; Estate
of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992 [“Where no reporter’s transcript has been
provided and no error is apparent on the face of the existing appellate record, the
judgment must be conclusively presumed correct as to all evidentiary matters . . . . The
effect of this rule is that an appellant who attacks a judgment but supplies no reporter's
transcript will be precluded from raising an argument as to the sufficiency of the
evidence.”].)
C. Valencia’s Legal Arguments
Even if we had a record sufficient to assess Valencia’s arguments, we still would
reject those arguments because they are based on misconceptions or inadequately
developed.
1. The Summons
Valencia argues that the summons issued in this case was defective because it
lacked a judicial signature and seal. Because Valencia has not identified the summons in
question or included it in the record, it is impossible to determine whether in fact the
summons lacked such a signature or seal, and for that reason alone we must resolve this
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issue against Valencia. (See Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th 594 at pp. 608-609; Osgood,
supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 435; WFG, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 894; United Grand,
supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 156.) Moreover, even if we assume that Valencia is referring
to the summons issued in the 2011 suit brought by DCSS, his argument fails because it is
based on a misconception.
Citing federal statutes and cases from the federal courts and other states, Valencia
asserts that a summons must have a “judicial signature and a seal.” However, the
summons in the 2011 DCSS suit contained a seal. Moreover, under California law, a
judicial signature is not required. Instead, the Code of Civil Procedure expressly states
that a summons should be by signed by the clerk: “Except as otherwise required by
statute, a summons shall be directed to the defendant, signed by the clerk and issued
under the seal of the court in which the action is pending . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 412.20, subd. (a), italics added).) We also note that, contrary to Valencia’s suggestion,
the requirement is the same under federal law. (See 28 U.S.C. § 1691 [“All writs and
process issuing from a court of the United States shall be under the seal of the court and
signed by the clerk thereof,” italics added].)
2. Sufficiency of the Order
Valencia argues that the trial court erred in issuing an “Administrative order”
without a judicial signature and seal. However, Valencia does not identify this order, and
as the proceedings in the trial court in this matter were not administrative in nature, it is
impossible even to guess what order Valencia is referencing. In any event, in California
courts, orders do not require a judicial signature and seal. To the contrary, the Code of
Civil Procedure states that orders need only be “made or entered in writing.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1003 [“Every direction of a court or judge, made or entered in writing, and not
included in a judgment, is denominated an order.”].) Accordingly, it is well-settled that
even minute orders, though unsigned and lacking a seal, are valid. (See Southwestern
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Law School v. Benson (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 9; In re Marcus (2006) 138
Cal.App.4th 1009, 1015-1016; People v. Gordon (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 711, 716.)
3. Separation of Powers
Valencia contends that some child support orders violate the separation of powers
doctrine. Because Valencia does not identify the orders that he is challenging, it is not
possible to determine if they violate the doctrine, and Valencia’s separation-of-powers
argument fails for that reason alone.
In addition, in arguing that child support orders combine the powers of all three
branches of government, Valencia is mistaken. Valencia contends that creating support
orders is a legislative function, enforcing the orders is an executive function, and only
adjudicating disputes over orders is a judicial function. In fact, enactment of statutes is a
legislative function (see, e.g., See Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State (2001) 25
Cal.4th 287, 299-300), and applying statutes to the particular facts of a case by issuing
child custody and support orders is a judicial function. (Vergara v. Ouse (2025) 116
Cal.App.5th 1238, 1246; Fam. Code, § 3022.) In addition, enforcement of child custody
orders combines both executive and judicial powers. When a court determines that an
order has been violated and provides a remedy for the violation, it is performing a judicial
function. Executive powers are exercised only in executing the remedies imposed by the
court or by deciding to prosecute persistent violations of the orders.
4. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Valencia asserts that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction “due to the
lack of ‘Standing’ on the part of the Petitioner(s).” (Boldface & some capitalization
omitted.) As Valencia himself was the petitioner in this action, and thus obviously
believed himself aggrieved, this argument is puzzling. In addition, to the extent that he is
challenging the standing of DCSS in the 2011 suit consolidated with Valencia’s suit, in
which DCSS sued to establish parental obligations for C.B.V., Valencia is incorrect.
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Under California law, local support agencies such as DCSS “represent the public interest
in establishing, modifying, and enforcing support obligations” (Fam. Code, § 17406,
subd. (a)), and such agencies “have the responsibility for promptly and effectively
establishing, modifying, and enforcing child support obligations” (id., § 17400,
subd. (a)(1)). Thus, DCSS plainly had standing to sue to establish and enforce Valencia’s
parental obligations. Moreover, California courts have subject matter jurisdiction over
child support matters. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Haugh (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 963,
977.)
In the subject matter jurisdiction section of his argument, Valencia also asserts that
“Petitioner(s)” failed to state a valid claim and asserted a claim “unsupported by
affidavits or any factual evidence.” However, Valencia once again fails to identify who
“Petitioner(s)” is or are. In addition, he does not identify the claim brought, much less
explain why it is either invalid or unsupported by evidence. As a consequence, the
asserted invalidity of the claim of “Petitioner(s)” is entirely conclusory and therefore
inadequate. (S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408 [“conclusory claims of error will
fail”]; see also Phoenix, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 845 [“Contentions supported neither by
argument nor by citation of authority are deemed to be without foundation and to have
been abandoned.”]; Benach, supra, 149 CalApp.4th at p. 852 [“conclusory presentation,
without pertinent argument or attempt to apply the law to the circumstances of this case,
is inadequate”].)
5. Bias and Conflict of Interest
Valencia also contends that “the state” impermissibly acted as both a party and the
tribunal in this case. In fact, the State of California was not a party to this case. The
original action was brought by the DCSS, a county agency, not by the state, and it is well
established that judges and other adjudicators are generally afforded a presumption of
impartiality. (Haas v. County of San Bernardino (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1017, 1025.) In
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addition, the case was heard by the Superior Court for the County of Santa Clara, and
while the court is part of California’s judiciary system, Valencia does not—and, as far as
we are aware, cannot—offer any authority suggesting that the state’s judiciary system
should be equated with the state as a whole and disqualified from considering any cases
brought on behalf of the People of the State of California—including presumably all
criminal cases. As a consequence, this argument is also conclusory and inadequate.
(Phoenix, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 845; Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852; S.C.,
supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)
6. Parental Autonomy Rights
Valencia contends the trial court’s decision to classify him as a “Non-Custodial
Parent” infringed upon his “natural Parental Autonomy Rights” and violated due process.
(Boldface & underlining omitted.) Valencia appears to be challenging the determination
in the trial court’s 2012 judgment that Barrios rather than Valencia has custody of C.B.V.
However, Valencia did not challenge that determination in his petition for bill of review,
which sought only to terminate child support and reimbursement of garnished wages.
Moreover, any challenge to the determination is clearly untimely. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.104(a)(1).)
While Valencia also asserts that he was denied due process, he fails to explain
how the procedures employed by the trial court were unfair or prejudicial. Nor does he
offer any meaningful argument or analysis concerning due process. As a consequence,
his due process argument is conclusory and inadequate. (Phoenix, supra, 47 Cal.4th at
p. 845; Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852; S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at
p. 408.)
7. Disclosures
Valencia asserts a “[f]ailure to give full disclosure of all material information and
legal consequences” of acknowledging paternity. However, Valencia does not identify
11
when this failure occurred, much less point to any evidence in the record establishing the
asserted failure. Nor does he explain how the asserted failure impacted any of the rulings
that he now challenges. Valencia merely cites a federal regulation requiring hospitals,
state birth record agencies, and others participating a “voluntary paternity establishment
program”—but not courts—to disclose certain information. (See 45 C.F.R.
§ 303.5(a)(2).)
8. Personal Jurisdiction
Finally, Valencia asserts that personal jurisdiction was not proven. In support of
this assertion, Valencia highlights two “pivotal” affidavits: his “Affidavit In Support Of
Notice Of Special Visitation” and an “Affidavit Rebutting All Minimum Contacts and
Presumptions.” (Boldface omitted.) While there is a “Notice Of Special Visitation”
(boldface omitted) resembling the first affidavit in the clerk’s transcript, there is nothing
concerning the second affidavit. In addition, while the Notice of Special Visitation cites
some out-of-state and federal cases concerning special appearances, neither the notice nor
Valencia’s brief analyzes any of the factors that authorize a court to exercise personal
jurisdiction. (See Fam. Code, § 5700.201, subd. (a) [authorizing court to “exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual” if, among other things, he or she was
served within the state, entered a general appearance, filed a responsive document,
resided in the state and provided prenatal expenses or support, engaged in sexual
intercourse in the state and the child may have been conceived by that act, filed a
declaration or paternity, or if the child resides in the state as a result of the acts of the
individual]; § 5700.205, subd. (a) [continuing exclusive jurisdiction based on residence of
obligor, obligee, or child].) Nor does Valencia explain how the trial court could lack
personal jurisdiction over him in a case that he chose to bring in California. (See, e.g., In
re Marriage of Fitzgerald & King (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1425 [“Due process
12
permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction . . . where the defendant consents to
jurisdiction”].)
III. DISPOSITION
The February 6, 2025 and April 15, 2025 orders are affirmed.
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____________________________
BROMBERG, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
DANNER, ACTING P. J.
____________________________________
CHUNG, J.
Harmon v. The Romero Institute et al.
H053222
Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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