CourtListener 10859049•Safety-Kleen Solvent Cases CA2/7
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Filed 5/14/26 Safety-Kleen Solvent Cases CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
SAFETY-KLEEN SOLVENT B331176
CASES
MICHAEL BREUNING et al., (JCCP 4601;
Los Angeles County Super.
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Ct. No. BC460754)
v.
SAFETY-KLEEN SYSTEMS, INC.,
et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
STUART RONALD MURPHY, (JCCP 4601;
Los Angeles County Super.
Plaintiff and Appellant, Ct. No. 19STCV38830)
v.
SAFETY-KLEEN SYSTEMS, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, William F. Highberger, Judge. Affirmed.
Metzger Law Group, Raphael Metzger, Scott P. Brust, and
Brian P. Barrow for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Edlin Gallagher Huie & Blum, Jeremy D. Huie; Harris
Beach Murtha Cullina, Daniel R. Strecker, and Brian D.
Ginsberg for Defendant, Appellant, and Respondent Safety-Kleen
Systems, Inc.
Jones Day, Edward Patrick Swan, Jr.; Trails Law Group,
Stefanie Warren; Complex Appellate Litigation Group, Johanna
Schiavoni, and Melanie Gold for Defendant and Respondent
Petro Source Investments, Inc.
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, Robert
Cooper, and Daniel S. Hurwitz for Defendant and Respondent
BC Stocking Distributing.
______________________
Michael and Rebecca Breuning and Stuart Ronald Murphy
(collectively plaintiffs) appeal from judgments entered in favor of
Safety-Kleen Systems, Inc. (Safety-Kleen), Petro Source
Investments, Inc. (Petro Source), and BC Stocking Distributing
(BC Stocking) on their tort claims based on occupational exposure
to toxic chemicals in a Safety-Kleen solvent. Both the Breunings’
and Murphy’s actions were part of Judicial Council Coordinated
Proceedings that were established in 2009, Safety-Kleen Solvent
Cases (Super. Ct. L.A. County, JCCP4601). Plaintiffs argue the
trial court erred in granting the defendants’ motions in limine
seeking exclusion at trial of deposition testimony taken in 1998
for a separate case. The trial court determined the deposition
testimony was hearsay to which no exception applied, including
the exception for former testimony under Evidence Code
2
section 1291, subdivision (a)(2) (section 1291(a)(2)),1 as the
California Supreme Court recently interpreted that exception in
Berroteran v. Superior Court (2022) 12 Cal.5th 867 (Berroteran).
We agree and affirm the judgments.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Breuning Lawsuit
The Breunings filed their lawsuit in May 2011. In their
first amended complaint, the Breunings alleged causes of action
against Safety-Kleen, Petro Source, and BC Stocking for
negligence, strict liability for warning defect, strict liability for
design defect, fraudulent concealment, breach of implied
warranties, and loss of consortium. The Breunings alleged that,
through his work as an automotive mechanic from 1975 to 1991,
Michael was exposed to Safety-Kleen’s solvents containing
various toxic chemicals. They alleged that, as a result of this
exposure, Michael developed urinary tract disease, including
glomerulonephritis and kidney failure. The Breunings further
alleged that the defendants knew of and fraudulently concealed
the nature and hazards of the chemicals to which Michael was
exposed.
In August 2021, the trial court (Judge Amy D. Hogue)
addressed the admissibility at trial of testimony from
23 depositions of current and former Safety-Kleen employees
taken in 1998 during discovery in Talley v. Safety-Kleen
Corporation (Super. Ct. Orange County, 1999, No. 784605)
(Talley). Relying on the Court of Appeal’s (since reversed)
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence
Code.
3
decision in Berroteran v. Superior Court (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th
518, reversed in Berroteran, supra, 12 Cal.5th 867, the court
ruled the deposition testimony was not inadmissible hearsay as
to Safety-Kleen under section 1291, the hearsay exception for
former testimony offered against a party to a former proceeding,
and as to the other defendants under section 1292, the hearsay
exception for former testimony offered against a party that was
not a party to the former proceeding.
After the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and
decided Berroteran, supra, 12 Cal.5th 867, Safety-Kleen filed a
new motion in limine in November 2022 to exclude at trial the
deposition testimony from the Talley case. It argued that, under
the multi-factor test set forth in Berroteran, the Breunings did
not satisfy the hearsay exception for former testimony under
section 1291(a)(2) because Safety-Kleen did not have the right
and opportunity to cross-examine the Talley deponents with an
interest and motive similar to that which Safety-Kleen would
have at the Breunings’ trial. Safety-Kleen also argued the
testimony was not admissible as party opponent admissions
under sections 1220 and 1222 because section 1291(a)(2)
controlled the admissibility determination and, even if it did not,
Safety-Kleen Corporation, the defendant in Talley and the
employer or former employer of the deponents, was a distinct
corporate entity that was dissolved as part of a bankruptcy
reorganization in 2003 and thus was not a party to the Breuning
matter.
Petro Source and BC Stocking joined in Safety-Kleen’s
motion. They also asserted neither of them was a party to the
Talley action. They acknowledged that some of the Talley
depositions had been cross-noticed in two related cases against
4
Safety-Kleen for which they were also named defendants:
Montiel v. Safety-Kleen Corporation (Super. Ct. L.A. County,
No. EC022324) and Rivas v. Safety-Kleen Corporation (Super. Ct.
L.A. County, No. VC026692). However, Petro Source and BC
Stocking asserted they had never received notice for or appeared
at any of the depositions.
In opposition, the Breunings argued the Talley depositions
were admissible (1) pursuant to the former testimony hearsay
exception under section 1291(a)(2) and Berroteran, because the
Talley deponents were located out of state, some were cross-
examined, and the depositions were videotaped, (2) under
sections 1220 and 1222 as admissions of a party opponent and its
authorized representatives, and (3) as nonhearsay evidence
meant to prove what Safety-Kleen knew or should have known at
the time of the depositions.
In January 2023, after a hearing, the trial court (Judge
William F. Highberger) granted the motion in limine. The court
concluded that the Breunings had not carried their burden to
show the Talley depositions were admissible under section
1291(a)(2) and that this provision governed the admissibility of
testimony from a former proceeding, not the other asserted
hearsay exceptions.
The Breunings then sought to designate the same
testimony from the Talley depositions that had been presented at
trial over Safety-Kleen’s objection in 2012 in Gillan v. Safety-
Kleen Systems Inc. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2012, BC358325)
(Gillan).2 In March 2023, Safety-Kleen (again joined by Petro
2 Safety-Kleen had objected to admission of the evidence
based on section 1291(a)(2). Gillan resulted in a mistrial during
the plaintiffs’ case-in-chief.
5
Source and BC Stocking) filed a motion in limine seeking
exclusion at the Breunings’ trial of the Gillan trial excerpts
consisting of the Talley depositions.
The Breunings opposed the motion as they did the prior
motion, arguing the deposition testimony that was admitted at
the Gillan trial was admissible under Evidence Code
sections 1291(a)(2), 1220, and 1222. The Breunings also
contended for the first time that the deposition testimony was
admissible under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.620, which
addresses use of depositions at trial.
In April 2023, after a hearing, the court granted the
defendants’ motion on the same grounds as the previous motion
in limine. The court concluded “[i]t would be an egregious error
to allow any of these archaic and incomplete discovery transcripts
to be used at trial.”
After the court granted the second motion, the parties
agreed to advance the trial date, and the court called the case for
trial. With the Breunings’ consent, Safety-Kleen moved for
judgment in its favor on the ground that the Breunings lacked
evidence to make out a prima facie case on each of their causes of
action. Petro Source and BC Stocking joined the motion. The
Breunings noted their objection to the court’s in limine rulings
but conceded that “as a practical matter” they could not prove
their case without the excluded deposition testimony. The court
granted Safety-Kleen’s motion and later entered separate
judgments in favor of Safety-Kleen, Petro Source, and
BC Stocking.
The Breunings appealed from the judgments.
6
B. The Murphy Lawsuit
In October 2019, Murphy filed a complaint alleging causes
of action against Safety-Kleen for negligence, strict liability for
warning defect, strict liability for design defect, fraudulent
concealment, and breach of implied warranties.3 Represented by
the same counsel that represented the Breunings, Murphy
alleged he developed end stage renal disease as a result of his
exposure to toxic chemicals in Safety-Kleen solvents through his
employment as a laborer, technician, and engineer between 1980
and 1995. He further alleged Safety-Kleen knew of and
fraudulently concealed the nature and hazards of the chemicals
to which he was exposed.
In May 2023, Safety-Kleen filed a motion in limine seeking
exclusion of the Talley depositions and the Gillan trial excerpts
consisting of those depositions. Safety-Kleen argued the evidence
should be excluded under section 1291(a)(2) and Berroteran as it
was in the Breuning matter, explaining the facts of Murphy’s
case were essentially identical to those at issue there.
In lieu of filing his own opposition, Murphy asked the court
to take judicial notice of the Breunings’ opposition briefs to
Safety-Kleen’s motions in limine regarding the Talley depositions
and Gillan trial excerpts, the corresponding declarations, and
“[a]ll other pleadings in the Safety-Kleen Solvent Cases (JCCP
No. 4601), especially the Breuning case (No. BC460754) that
contain any briefing and evidence that relates or may relate to
Safety-Kleen’s motions.” Murphy further acknowledged that he
expected the court would make the same ruling as in the
3 Murphy’s complaint named other defendants, including
BC Stocking and Petro Source, but they were dismissed.
7
Breuning matter and indicated that, if it did so, he would
likewise agree to advance the trial date and facilitate an adverse
judgment so he could expedite an appeal. Safety-Kleen opposed
Murphy’s requests for judicial notice but argued that if granted,
notice also should be taken of its replies in support of the motions
in limine in the Breuning matter.
At the June 2023 hearing, the court took judicial notice of
the oppositions to and replies in support of the in limine motions
in the Breuning matter but otherwise denied Murphy’s judicial
notice requests. The court granted Safety-Kleen’s motion in
limine, citing its reasoning in granting Safety-Kleen’s motions in
limine in the Breuning matter.
The court advanced the trial date and called the case for
trial; Safety-Kleen then moved for judgment on the ground that
Murphy lacked admissible evidence to make out a prima facie
case on each of his causes of action. Murphy consented to the
motion being presented and heard in this manner. The court
granted the motion and later entered judgment in favor of Safety-
Kleen.
Murphy appealed,4 and Safety-Kleen cross-appealed to
challenge the court’s ruling granting Murphy’s request for
judicial notice.
4 The Breunings and Murphy together filed one notice of
appeal purporting to appeal from the respective judgments in
their individual cases. Because cases in Judicial Council
Coordinated Proceedings remain separate actions with separate
judgments (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.545(c)), plaintiffs each
should have filed a separate notice of appeal and then moved to
consolidate the appeals. Nevertheless, we conclude we have
jurisdiction because the notice of appeal referred to both superior
court case numbers and the judgments in each of those cases.
8
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in granting the
motions in limine regarding the Talley depositions and the Gillan
trial excerpts consisting of the Talley deposition testimony.
Because the parties do not distinguish between the analysis of
the admissibility of the deposition testimony and the Gillan trial
excerpts consisting of that testimony we too will consider the
appeal as raising a single issue regarding the admissibility of the
Talley depositions.
A. Standard of Review
We generally review rulings on the admissibility of
evidence, including under section 1291, for abuse of discretion.
(See, e.g., Bowser v. Ford Motor Co. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 587,
622 (Bowser); see also McMillan Companies, LLC v. American
Safety Indemnity Co. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 518, 529 [“Like
many evidentiary rulings, orders on motions in limine are
generally reviewed for abuse of discretion.”].) “ ‘ “Under this
standard, a trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal
of the judgment is not required, unless the trial court exercised
its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ”
(Qaadir v. Figueroa (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 790, 803.)
Notwithstanding the general rule, plaintiffs contend we
should use the more rigorous standard of review applicable to an
order granting a nonsuit because the trial court’s rulings on the
motions in limine excluded “the bulk of the evidence” upon which
they based their claims. Plaintiffs rely on Edwards v. Centex
Real Estate Corp. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 15 (Edwards). In
Edwards, the motions in limine “were not directed to particular
9
items of evidence” but instead “constituted an objection to any
and all evidence.” (Id. at p. 27.) As a result, the court explained
that the order granting the motions at the outset of trial was “the
functional equivalent of an order sustaining a demurrer to the
evidence, or nonsuit.” (Ibid.)
Here, however, Safety-Kleen’s objection was to particular
evidence—testimony given in the Talley depositions—not all
possible evidence supporting plaintiffs’ claims. Unlike in
Edwards, the in limine rulings here were made while discovery
was still open, thus providing plaintiffs an opportunity to further
investigate and develop evidence supporting their claims. Given
these differences, the rulings here did not have the effect of a
nonsuit, and we review them for abuse of discretion. (See
Osborne v. Todd Farm Service (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 43, 51
[exclusion of two discrete categories of evidence—opinion
testimony and hearsay regarding the source of a defective hay
bale—but not all possible evidence supporting the plaintiff’s
claims was not equivalent to a nonsuit for which heightened
standard of review applied].)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding
the Talley Depositions in the Cases Against Safety-Kleen
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
the deposition testimony inadmissible under section
1291(a)(2)
Under section 1291(a)(2), “evidence of former testimony is
not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule” if the declarant is
10
unavailable5 and the former testimony is offered against a party
that “was a party to the action or proceeding in which the
testimony was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that
which” it would have at trial in the present case. (§ 1291(a)(2);
see Berroteran, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 882.) “For example, if a
series of cases arises involving several plaintiffs and but one
defendant, Section 1291 permits testimony given in the first trial
to be used against the defendant in a later trial if the conditions
of admissibility stated in the section are met.” (Cal. Law
Revision Com. com. ¶ 1, 29B pt. 5 West’s Ann. Evid. Code
(2015 ed.) foll. § 1291.)
In Berroteran, the Supreme Court resolved a split among
the Courts of Appeal on the application of section 1291(a)(2) to
deposition testimony taken in a prior proceeding. (See
Berroteran, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 875; § 1290, subd. (c) [“former
testimony” includes “testimony given under oath” in a “deposition
taken in compliance with law in another action”].) Berroteran
involved a prior federal class action against Ford Motor Company
regarding alleged defects in Ford’s diesel engines, from which
many possible class members, including Berroteran, opted out to
pursue their own suits against Ford. (Berroteran, at pp. 875,
878.) In the class action and subsequent related litigation in
California, nine out-of-state Ford employees or former employees
gave videotaped depositions regarding Ford’s knowledge and
concealment of the defects. (Id. at pp. 876, 878-880.) Ford
designated some of the deponents as persons most qualified. (Id.
5 The parties do not dispute that the Talley deponents were
unavailable to testify at either the Breuning or Murphy trials.
11
at p. 879.) After Berroteran sought to designate testimony from
those depositions to use at his trial, Ford moved in limine to
exclude the evidence pursuant to section 1291(a)(2). (Berroteran,
at pp. 876, 881-882.) The trial court granted the motion to
exclude, but the Court of Appeal granted Berroteran’s petition for
a writ of mandate and directed the trial court to reverse the
order. (Id. at p. 876.)
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal.
(Berroteran, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 887.) The court held section
1291(a)(2) “articulates a general rule ([but] not a categorical bar)
against admission at trial of prior testimony from a typical
discovery deposition.” (Berroteran, at p. 889.) “Although
depositions are sometimes conducted to preserve the testimony of
a witness for trial, many are commonly conducted for the purpose
of discovery. ... A discovery deposition … is normally intended as
a precursor to trial testimony—not as a substitute for such
testimony.” (Id. at p. 892.) Unlike at trial, “there is no fact-
finding audience at a deposition, and persuasion is ordinarily a
secondary consideration. Rather, the goal of an opposing party at
a discovery deposition is typically to ‘get a “fix” on’ adverse
witness testimony to be expected at trial [citation], without
unduly aiding the deposing party’s discovery efforts.” (Ibid.)
Thus, “the ‘interest and motive’ of the party opponent in
cross-examination at a discovery deposition is generally not, as
required by section 1291(a)(2), similar to that prevailing at trial.”
(Berroteran, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 892.) To the contrary, “[t]he
interest and motive of an opposing party at a discovery deposition
is ... often against cross-examination of the witness, in order to
avoid assisting the deposing party” by prematurely revealing
potential weakness in the witness’s testimony or in the opposing
12
party’s case. (Id. at p. 892.) Further, even if in theory there were
an interest and motive for cross-examination by the opposing
party at a discovery deposition, it is often not practical to conduct
full and effective cross-examination at a deposition because
discovery may be incomplete and the evidentiary record not yet
fully developed. (Id. at pp. 892-893.) Hence, there is a general
rule against admission at trial of prior testimony from a typical
discovery deposition. (Id. at p. 894.)
However, the party seeking admission of deposition
testimony from a prior proceeding can rebut this general rule by
producing “persuasive evidence” showing “the deposition sought
to be introduced, unlike a typical discovery deposition, featured
circumstances that provided the party opponent with an interest
and motive for cross-examination similar to that at trial,” such
that it satisfies the requirements of section 1291(a)(2).
(Berroteran, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 894-895.) In determining
whether former deposition testimony should be excluded under
the statute, the court must “conduct a factually intensive inquiry”
that starts with asking whether the parties either “intended, at
the outset, that the deposition serve as trial testimony” or
“subsequently reached agreement concerning use of the
deposition at trial in that case, or in other cases.” (Id. at pp. 900-
901; see ibid. [if “the parties manifested an intent to take the
deposition for the purpose of preserving the witness’s testimony
as a proxy for trial testimony,” “it may be inferred that all
counsel had, at that deposition, a right and opportunity to
examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that
which the party would have at trial in a future case—and hence
this key requirement of section 1291(a)(2), would, as general
matter, be satisfied”].) In circumstances “in which it is not
13
evident that the parties understood that a deposition was
intended for purposes other than discovery, the resulting
testimony is … generally not made admissible by
section 1291(a)(2).” (Berroteran, at p. 901.)
In the absence of such an understanding, the proponent
seeking to rely on the deposition testimony may still carry its
burden to demonstrate the opposing party had the required
interest and motive to cross-examine based on “various practical
considerations,” including: (1) the “timing of the deposition within
the context of the litigation, and special circumstances creating
an incentive for cross-examination,” such as the deposition taking
place “after the parties have been educated by discovery
conducted in earlier, similar lawsuits” or in anticipation of a
mediation or settlement conference; (2) whether the deponent
and the opposing party were close or aligned such that the
opposing party would likely not have found it necessary to cross-
examine; (3) circumstances that would have given the objecting
party a reason to anticipate the deposition might be a proxy for
trial testimony, such as the witness’s ill health or lack of
amenability to subpoena; (4) “[c]onduct at, and surrounding, the
deposition[,] and the degree of any examination conducted by the
opposing party,” such as “searching examination” that suggests
“testimony preservation was among the purposes of the
deposition”; (5) “particular designated testimony” showing the
opposing party had an interest and motive to cross-examine
concerning specific testimony; and (6) similarity of the objecting
party’s position in the two lawsuits. (Berroteran, supra,
12 Cal.5th at pp. 901-903.) The court emphasized this last factor
was not dispositive but was just one of the practical
considerations in determining if the objecting party had a
14
similarity of interest and motive to cross-examine. (Id. at
pp. 903-904, citing Cal. Law Revision Com. com. ¶ 4, 29B pt. 5
West’s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 1291, pp. 86-87.)
Plaintiffs’ counsel, who also took the Talley depositions,
confirmed to the trial court that there was no agreement between
the parties in Talley that the depositions would be used for that
trial or any other. Counsel added that Safety-Kleen “would not
stipulate to any such thing.” While plaintiffs assert on appeal
that the Talley parties all “intended,” “understood,” and “knew”
the depositions would be used at trial, they offer no support in
the record for these assertions.
Turning to practical considerations that could support a
conclusion that during the depositions Safety-Kleen had a similar
interest and motive to cross-examine the deponents as it would at
plaintiffs’ trials, plaintiffs have failed to respond to Safety-
Kleen’s evidence showing there were substantive factual
differences between the claims in plaintiffs’ cases and those in
Talley. The Breunings alleged Michael suffered from kidney
disease as a result of exposure to Safety-Kleen’s solvents between
1975 to 1991. Murphy alleged he suffered a kidney disease from
solvent exposure between 1980 and 1995. In Talley, the plaintiff
alleged he suffered acute myeloid leukemia, a form of cancer of
the blood and blood-forming organs, based on exposure to
solvents between 1988 and 1996. Moreover, the Talley plaintiff
alleged his condition was caused by benzene, whereas plaintiffs
alleged their conditions were caused by many toxic chemical
constituents in addition to benzene. Even if there was some
overlap, it was reasonable for the trial court to question if a party
in a case focused on the development of leukemia based on
exposure to benzene from 1988 to 1996 would have an interest
15
and motive to cross-examine in the manner of a party defending
at trial, 25 years later, cases focused on the development of a
kidney disease based on exposure to benzene and non-benzene
constituents from 1975 to 1995.
Plaintiffs also have not demonstrated the timing and
circumstances surrounding the Talley depositions created the
required interest and motive in cross-examination. The
depositions were taken between February and November 1998,
while the Talley plaintiff’s deposition was not taken until April
1999 and expert discovery continued into June 1999 before the
case settled that month. Because the depositions were taken
earlier in the case, the trial court could reasonably conclude
Safety-Kleen would not have been equipped to conduct full and
searching cross-examination at the time. (See Berroteran,
12 Cal.5th at pp. 892-893.)
Plaintiffs suggest that at the time of the Talley depositions
Safety-Kleen was aware it was under criminal investigation and
that bankruptcy proceedings were imminent, and as a result
many of its employees were leaving the company—circumstances
that would have caused Safety-Kleen to have an interest in cross-
examining the current and former employees sitting for
depositions. Plaintiffs rely on the facts that the Securities and
Exchange Commission filed a complaint against Safety-Kleen in
2002 and Safety-Kleen declared bankruptcy in 2000. However,
plaintiffs fail to cite any evidence to suggest Safety-Kleen was
aware of these impending events when the Talley depositions
were taken in 1998 or that consideration of these future events
informed its approach to defending the depositions.
Plaintiffs also argue the “potential future unavailability” of
the Talley deponents at trial generated a strong interest in and
16
need for cross-examination at the depositions. While they assert
Safety-Kleen “knew that the witnesses—all residents of Illinois—
would not be testifying live at trial in California,” plaintiffs again
identify no evidence supporting their assertion. They do not
show any deponent stated he or she would not or could not
appear at trial. And even if the deponents were located out of
state, nearly half were employees of Safety-Kleen at the time of
their depositions, and the others were former employees. While
Safety-Kleen could not guarantee its employees would remain in
its employ or order the former employees to appear at trial,
plaintiffs point to no evidence suggesting the relationships
between Safety-Kleen and the deponents were anything but close
and aligned. As the trial court observed in rejecting plaintiffs’
argument, at the time of the depositions, “Safety-Kleen had a
reasonable expectation at the time of trial they could buy [the
deponents] a first class ticket and put them on a plane from
Illinois to California and get them on the witness stand and then
and only then put on their case in chief.” Plaintiffs have not
shown this conclusion was unreasonable.
Plaintiffs also focus on the fact that Safety-Kleen engaged
in some cross-examination of seven or eight of the Talley
deponents. But when challenged by the trial court, plaintiffs
could not point to a single example in any of these depositions of
“searching” cross-examination that Berroteran indicated would
weigh in favor of admission. (Berroteran, supra, 12 Cal.5th at
p. 903.) While plaintiffs now contend two of the cross-examined
witnesses were questioned on matters beyond the scope of their
direct examinations, plaintiffs forfeited the argument by failing
to identify these examples in the trial court, even after being
pressed by the court to provide examples. (See
17
Truck Ins. Exch. v. AMCO Ins. Co. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 619,
635 [“ ‘arguments raised for the first time on appeal are generally
deemed forfeited’ ”].) In any event, the record shows one of the
two witnesses was only asked five questions on cross-examination
while the other was questioned on the single subject of another
witness’s honesty. Neither example demonstrates a great
interest in preserving witness testimony for trial. And although
plaintiffs point out that the Talley plaintiff’s counsel concluded
one of these two depositions by stating he would “preserve [the]
videotape [of the deposition] in sealed fashion until time of trial,”
they provide no corroboration for their suggestion that this
indicated the deposition was meant to serve in lieu of trial
testimony.
Finally, plaintiffs emphasize that the Talley depositions
were videotaped. The trial court found this factor alone to be
insufficient, explaining “if you’re a thoroughly careful advocate
and care to invest in your cases, you would videotape at a
discovery deposition because you want to use for dramatic effect
[in front of the jury],” but also “the fact [that] you videotaped
doesn’t prove that Safety-Kleen knew that it was its first, last,
and only opportunity to put forward its own direct evidence.”
With no other considerations favoring admission here, the trial
court’s conclusion was consistent with Berroteran, which
explained that, “[s]tanding alone, the videotaping of a deposition
may not trigger a motive and interest to cross-examine.” (See
Berroteran, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 897.)
In sum, the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion to
exclude the Talley depositions under section 1291(a)(2) because
plaintiffs did not meet their burden to show Safety-Kleen had a
18
similar interest and motive to cross-examine the Talley
deponents as it would at trial in plaintiffs’ cases.
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting
plaintiffs’ other asserted bases for admissibility
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred because,
notwithstanding section 1291(a)(2), the Talley depositions were
admissible pursuant to the hearsay exceptions under
sections 1220 and 1222, under Code of Civil Procedure
section 2025.620, and as nonhearsay statements.
a. Sections 1220 and 1222
Plaintiffs argue the deposition testimony met the hearsay
exceptions for admissions by a party opponent under section 1220
or authorized admissions under section 1222. Section 1220
applies to a declarant’s statements that are “offered against the
declarant in an action to which he is a party.” Section 1222
extends this hearsay exception to statements made “by a person
authorized by the party to make a statement or statements for
him concerning the subject matter of the statement.” (§ 1222,
subd. (a); see also Bowser, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 611
[because a corporation can only speak through its officers and
agents, “statements assertedly made by a corporation are not
usually analyzed as party admissions under … section 1220, but
rather as authorized admissions under … section 1222”].)
The trial court rejected plaintiffs’ argument regarding
sections 1220 and 1222, concluding section 1291(a)(2) was
controlling regarding the admissibility of former testimony in
discovery depositions in prior actions. The court explained:
“That a corporate defendant’s witness at a deposition may make a
statement helpful to plaintiff (as is to be expected if the discovery
is worth plaintiff counsel’s investment of time and effort) and
19
that such a statement, standing in isolation may be seen to be an
admissible admission against interest under [sections] 1220 or
1222 does not answer the question of whether a discovery
deposition can be used at trial in later litigation involving other
parties, not those on the docket when the deposition was taken.
The answer to that question is controlled by the statute most
directly on point, [section] 1291(a)(2).”
We agree with this conclusion. Plaintiffs’ argument, if
accepted, would have broad consequences for discovery
depositions of party opponents and effectively undermine the
analytical framework set forth in Berroteran and the general rule
that decision articulated against admission at trial of former
testimony from a discovery deposition.6 The concerns Berroteran
identified about admitting such evidence apply with equal—if not
greater—force when considering prior discovery depositions of a
party opponent or its corporate representatives. In that setting,
“a party would be unlikely to have a motive or reason at a
deposition of its own witness to disprove anything” through cross-
examination and “concluding otherwise would substantially
expand and complicate deposition practice, forcing it to take on
the character of a full-blown liability trial.” (Berroteran, supra,
12 Cal.5th at p. 899.) If deposition testimony by a party were
automatically admissible against that party in any proceeding in
6 In Berroteran, the former deposition testimony at issue was
of persons most qualified and other current or former employees
of the party opponent in the prior and instant actions.
(Berroteran, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 878-880.) Berroteran
expressly declined to consider the applicability of section 1222,
given the narrow issue on which review was granted. (See
Berroteran, at p. 889, fn. 19.)
20
perpetuity under sections 1220 and 1222—as plaintiffs’ argument
effectively posits—a party would be compelled to anticipate how
that testimony might be used in lawsuits that are filed
potentially years or even decades in the future. A party might
then feel obligated to conduct cross-examination not because the
current litigation demands it, but out of concern that a future
plaintiff might seek to introduce the deposition testimony against
the party. Berroteran’s analytical framework, requiring courts to
undertake a fact-specific inquiry to ensure admission of only that
deposition testimony which is given under a sufficiently similar
interest and motive in cross-examination, exists precisely to
guard against this outcome.7
Plaintiffs rely on dicta in Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010)
191 Cal.App.4th 486, 524 stating, “ ‘Any statement, oral or
written, made by [a party is] admissible as to [that party] under
the hearsay exception for party admissions,’ ” including “prior
testimony, whether given in a deposition, during the arbitration
hearing, in judgment debtor proceedings, or in another matter.”
Unlike here, Greenspan involved the attempted use of deposition
testimony taken in the same action during earlier post-judgment
discovery. (Id. at p. 506.) Because Greenspan did not involve the
admissibility of former testimony taken in a prior action, the
7 Because we conclude sections 1220 and 1222 do not make
former deposition testimony of a party or its authorized agent
admissible under circumstances where section 1291(a)(2)
governs, we need not address Safety-Kleen’s alternative
contention that those exceptions do not apply because Safety-
Kleen is not the “ ‘legal equivalent of the “Safety-Kleen”
Defendant which was defending the prior litigation’ ” due to the
reorganization following the bankruptcy proceedings in 2000.
21
court had no occasion to consider the effect of section 1291(a)(2),
and Berroteran was not yet decided. The court’s reference to the
admissibility of former testimony given in “another matter” is
merely dictum and of no import here. (See Areso v. CarMax, Inc.
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 996, 1006 [“Mere observations by an
appellate court are dicta and not precedent, unless a statement of
law was ‘necessary to the decision, and therefore binding
precedent ….’ ”].)
b. Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.620
Plaintiffs also argue the Talley depositions were admissible
under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.620, which allows for
specified uses of deposition testimony at trial “against any party
who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition, or
who had due notice of the deposition and did not serve a valid
objection ..., so far as admissible under the rules of evidence
applied as though the deponent were then present and testifying
as a witness.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.620; see Berroteran,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 894; LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 939, 948.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.620 has a number of
provisions allowing for admission in court proceedings of
deposition testimony in different contexts (see subdivisions (a)
through (g)), but the only one that is applicable to testimony from
a former proceeding is subdivision (g). That provision states,
“When an action has been brought in any court of the United
States or of any state, and another action involving the same
subject matter is subsequently brought between the same parties
or their representatives or successors in interest, all depositions
lawfully taken and duly filed in the initial action may be used in
the subsequent action as if originally taken in that subsequent
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action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.620, subd. (g).) However, to be
admissible under section 2025.620, subdivision (g), a deposition
taken in an “initial action” must have involved the same parties
on both sides (and the same subject matter) as in the “subsequent
action.” (Ibid.) Because plaintiffs were not parties to the Tally
lawsuit, the depositions in that case are not admissible in their
cases under section 2025.620, subdivision (g). (See Bowser,
supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 618-619 [depositions of Ford
employees taken in a class action against Ford were not
admissible under § 2025.620, subd. (g), in trial in separate case
against Ford brought by unnamed class member because the
depositions were not taken in an action “between the same
parties”].)
None of the other provisions of Code of Civil Procedure
section 2025.620 applies here. The Law Revision Commission
comment to Evidence Code section 1290 states, “[D]epositions
taken in another action are considered former testimony under
Section 1290, and their admissibility is determined by
Sections 1291 and 1292,” while “Code of Civil Procedure
Sections 2016-2036 deal comprehensively with the conditions and
circumstances under which a deposition taken in a civil action
may be used at the trial of the action in which the deposition was
taken.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com. ¶ 1, 29B pt. 4 West’s Ann.
Evid. Code (2015 ed.) foll. § 1290; accord, N.N.V. v. American
Assn. of Blood Banks (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1395; Fairbank
et al., Cal. Prac. Guide: Civil Trials and Evidence (The Rutter
Group 2025) ¶ 8:1397.) Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in concluding the Talley depositions were not
admissible under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.620.
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c. Nonhearsay use
Plaintiffs contend some portions of the Talley depositions
were admissible because they were to be used at trial for
nonhearsay purposes, such as showing what Safety-Kleen knew
or should have known at relevant times and not for the truth of
the matter. (See § 1200, subd. (a) [hearsay is an out-of-court
statement offered for its truth].) However, neither in the trial
court nor on appeal have they pointed to any specific testimony
that they claim would be admissible on this basis. Thus, they
failed to establish any particular out-of-court statement could be
admitted for a nonhearsay purpose. (See People v. Mataele (2022)
13 Cal.5th 372, 413 [“ ‘“The proponent of proffered testimony has
the burden of establishing its relevance, and if the testimony is
comprised of hearsay, the foundational requirements for its
admissibility under an exception to the hearsay rule. [Citations.]
Evidence is properly excluded when the proponent fails to make
an adequate offer of proof regarding the relevance or
admissibility of the evidence.’ ”].)
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding
the Talley Depositions as to Petro Source and BC Stocking
Although the Breunings appealed from the judgments in
favor of Petro Source and BC Stocking, they do not specifically
challenge the trial court’s granting of the defendants’ joinders in
Safety-Kleen’s motions in limine. In any event, the Breunings do
not contest Petro Source’s and BC Stocking’s assertions that they
did not receive notice of or an opportunity to cross-examine at the
Talley depositions.
For the depositions that were cross-noticed in the related
Montiel and Rivas cases—to which Petro Source and BC Stocking
24
were parties—section 1291(a)(2) governed the admissibility of the
deposition testimony. Without evidence showing Petro Source
and BC Stocking had notice of the depositions, the trial court
could reasonably conclude the defendants did not have the
requisite “right and opportunity to cross-examine” the witnesses
in the prior action in which the testimony was given.
(§ 1291(a)(2).)
As for the depositions that were solely noticed in the Talley
case—to which Petro Source and BC Stocking were not parties—
the deposition testimony would be admissible only if it met the
qualifications for the hearsay exception under section 1292,
which allows for admission in a civil action of the former
testimony of an unavailable witness if “[t]he issue is such that
the party to the action or proceeding in which the former
testimony was given had the right and opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that
which the party against whom the testimony is offered has at the
hearing.” (§ 1292, subd. (a).)
As discussed, plaintiffs have not shown Safety-Kleen had
the same interest and motive to cross-examine the Talley
deponents as it would have in the Breunings’ trial; for the same
reason section 1291 is not satisfied, the requirements of
section 1292 are not met. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding the Talley depositions as to these
defendants.8
8 Petro Source and BC Stocking moved for “summary
affirmance,” arguing plaintiffs had forfeited any argument
regarding them by not mentioning them in their opening brief.
The motions for summary affirmance are denied as moot.
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DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed. Safety-Kleen’s cross-appeal
challenging the trial court’s order granting Murphy’s request for
judicial notice is dismissed as moot. Petro Source’s and
BC Stocking’s motions for summary affirmance are denied as
moot. Safety-Kleen, Petro Source, and BC Stocking shall recover
their costs on appeal.
STONE, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
FEUER, J.
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