6 Bonene v. Derakhshan CA2/7

CourtListener 10858360Calctapp13 mai 2026

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Filed 5/13/216 Bonene v. Derakhshan CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

MELINDA BONENE, B341063

Plaintiff and (Los Angeles County Super.
Respondent, Ct. No. 22VECV00452)

v.

ASHKAN DERAKHSHAN,

Defendant and
Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Virginia Keeny, Judge. Affirmed.
Ashkan Derakhshan, in pro. per., for Defendant and
Appellant.
Bilal Law Group and Kamal A. Bilal for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

Melinda Bonene agreed to rent a guest house from Ashkan
Derakhshan. When Bonene saw the guest house, she liked its
privacy and the adjacent covered patio area with a pool table.
She understood the patio and pool table were private areas for
the tenant of the guest house to use. As Bonene was moving in,
Derakhshan told her that she would have to share the covered
patio area with him and that she could only use the pool table if
she invited him to play with her. Bonene was distressed by the
news and told Derakhshan that she no longer wanted to rent the
guest house. Derakhshan said he would refund the amount she
paid (more than $17,000 in prepaid rent and deposits) if she
moved out immediately. She did, but Derakhshan kept her
money. Derakhshan then sent a letter to Bonene’s employer
falsely accusing her of engaging in abhorrent and racist behavior
toward him and others.
Bonene sued Derakhshan for breach of contract, rescission,
unjust enrichment, fraud, defamation, false light/invasion of
privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. At the
court trial, the parties presented dramatically different accounts
of what happened. The court ruled that Bonene’s testimony was
credible and that Derakhshan’s was not. The court found in favor
of Bonene on all causes of action except fraud and awarded her
over $200,000, including $80,000 in punitive damages on her
defamation cause of action.
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s decision,
and Derakhshan has not demonstrated any prejudicial error.
Therefore, we affirm.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Bonene Leases Derakhshan’s Guest House and Pays
Six Months’ Rent in Advance
In September 2021 Bonene saw an advertisement for a
guest house for rent in Tarzana. The advertisement said the
guest house was on a gated property, allowed animals, included a
pool table, and was very “‘private.’” Derakhshan owned the guest
house and lived in the main house on the property.
Bonene met Derakhshan at the guest house on
September 5, 2021, and she decided to rent it. A covered patio
area with a pool table was adjacent to the guest house. Bonene
signed a lease and paid Derakhshan $17,100 (six months’ rent,
a security deposit, and a pet deposit) in exchange for a slight
reduction in the monthly rent and an early move-in date. (The
lease stated the tenancy would begin on October 1, 2021, but
Derakhshan said Bonene could move in on September 20, 2021.)

B. Bonene and Derakhshan Disagree About Certain
Terms of the Lease
Bonene got the keys to the guest house from Derakhshan
on October 1, 2021 and began moving in the next day. On
October 3, 2021 Derakhshan told Bonene that the patio outside
the guest house was a common area she would have to share with
him, that she could not use the pool table unless she invited him
to play with her, and that she would have to have her mail
delivered to his mailbox and he would deliver her mail to her.
This information disturbed Bonene; she immediately told
Derakhshan she wanted to terminate the lease. Bonene believed
that, when she signed the lease, the patio area adjacent to the

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guest house was a private area for her exclusive use, that she
would be able to use the pool table without any preconditions,
and that she would have a private mailbox. Derakhshan agreed
Bonene could terminate the lease and said he would refund her
money if she moved her items out of the guest house by
October 5, 2021.

C. Bonene Surrenders Possession of the Guest House, but
Derakhshan Refuses To Refund Her Money
Bonene moved out and returned the keys to Derakhshan on
October 5, 2021. At some point before she returned the keys
Derakhshan touched Bonene inappropriately, putting his finger
on the nape of her neck and stroking her down to the middle of
her back while saying, “You’re blocking me in.”
The situation took a dark(er) turn after that. Bonene was
frightened of Derakhshan and reported his unwanted touching to
the police. Derakhshan did not return any of Bonene’s money,
despite promising to do so. And Derakhshan sent a letter by
email to Bonene’s employer, Coldwell Banker, accusing Bonene of
engaging in a range of racist behavior, including being a member
of the Ku Klux Klan, and accusing Bonene’s boyfriend, Larry
Serraino, of breaking into Derakhshan’s house.
The letter created problems for Bonene at work, and she
had to go through the “humiliating process” of defending herself
against Derakhshan’s false accusations. Bonene was “‘beyond
embarrassed’” and feared her employer would terminate her
employment. The stress of the situation caused her to cry
frequently, have difficulty sleeping, and vomit.

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D. Bonene Files This Action Against Derakhshan
In March 2022 Bonene filed this action against
Derakhshan, alleging causes of action for breach of contract and
rescission, fraud, unjust enrichment, defamation, false
light/invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. She alleged Derakhshan breached the lease and
fraudulently induced her to enter the lease by misrepresenting
that the covered patio area was private, rather than common,
space. She alleged Derakhshan was unjustly enriched because,
though he agreed to terminate the lease and she returned the
keys to the guest house on October 5, 2021, Derakhshan did not
refund any of the $17,100 Bonene had paid him. Regarding
Derakhshan’s letter to Coldwell Banker, Bonene alleged
Derakhshan made knowingly false statements about her to her
employer that defamed her, showed her in a false light, and
caused her extreme emotional distress. Bonene sought to rescind
the lease and recover the $17,100 she paid to Derakhshan,
compensatory damages, and punitive damages.

E. Bonene Prevails at Trial
Bonene testified at trial about her discussions with
Derakhshan on September 5, 2021, when she first saw and
decided to rent the guest house. She also testified about her
interactions with Derakhshan after she returned the keys to the
guest house. She said Derakhshan accused her of breaking into
his house and threatened to have her arrested. Bonene was
scared of Derakhshan, and she reported her concerns to the police
and to her doctor. The doctor prepared a report describing
Bonene’s condition, which included nausea, sleeplessness, and
anxiety due to her interactions with Derakhshan. When

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Derakhshan learned of the report, he sent a letter to the doctor
accusing her of committing fraud and threatening to use the legal
system to harass her. Bonene also denied making racially
charged remarks about Derakhshan or anyone else.
Serraino testified about his impressions of the guest house
and his interactions with Derakhshan. He took pictures of the
guest house in late September showing that the awning covering
the patio area was attached to the guest house and that the pool
table was just a few feet from the guest house, nearly blocking
the path to the front door. Serraino also corroborated Bonene’s
statements about the extreme emotional distress Derakhshan’s
actions caused her.
Derakhshan, who represented himself at trial, testified he
told Bonene that the patio area was a common area and that she
would have to pay an additional $200 per month if she wanted to
use the pool table. He also stated that, as Bonene was moving
into the guest house, she “‘treated him like a slave’” and
“‘machine gunned him with demands,’” texting him more than
400 times with unreasonable and harassing requests. (The court
reviewed the text messages and rejected Derakhshan’s
characterization of them.) Derakhshan also claimed that Bonene
“demonstrated her ‘white supremacy’ attitudes by demanding he
surrender his entire property to her”; that she told him that she
wanted to break the lease because she wanted to throw wild
drug- and alcohol-fueled parties for clients using his pool and hot
tub; that she threatened to falsely accuse him of raping her; and
that she threatened to kill him, saying, “‘You will find yourself in
a bag in the desert with a gun to your head.’” (The court did not
find this testimony credible.) Derakhshan also gave inconsistent
testimony about the alleged break-in at his home.

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In its 22-page statement of decision the trial court made
credibility findings on each of the three witnesses. The court
stated Bonene was “easily confused as a witness,” but was
“apologetic when she had trouble answering questions or had
confused facts.” The court found that Bonene’s testimony was
“candid, unexaggerated, and credible” and that her denial of
Derakhshan’s accusations of racist behavior was credible. The
court also found Serraino’s testimony was credible. In contrast,
the court found Derakhshan was not “a credible witness on any
issue.” The court described Derakhshan as “belligerent in his
conduct” toward Bonene, her attorney, and the trial court: “He
was dismissive of the questions directed to him, contemptuous of
the court process and appeared to view the proceedings as a
game. His conduct in the courtroom, and as amply displayed in
his communications with [Bonene’s] employer and doctor, was
that of a bully, willing to threaten people (including witnesses) if
they did not agree with him. His testimony was self-serving,
internally contradictory, and highly suspect.” The court also said
Derakhshan’s testimony often appeared “delusional, paranoid, or
deliberately fabricated to gain an advantage in this case.”
The court ruled in favor of Bonene on all causes of action
except fraud. The court ruled there was no meeting of the minds
regarding a material term of the lease: whether the patio area
adjacent to the guest house was a private or a common area.
Therefore, the court ruled, both parties were entitled to rescind
the lease, and Derakhshan was unjustly enriched by retaining
the $17,100 in prepaid rent and deposits. On Bonene’s
defamation and false light causes of action, the court ruled the
letter Derakhshan sent to Coldwell Banker included false and
defamatory statements Derakhshan knew were untrue. The

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court also ruled Derakhshan’s statements in the letter to
Coldwell Banker caused Bonene extreme emotional distress.
The court awarded Bonene $205,044. The court ruled
Bonene was entitled to recover the $17,100 she paid Derakhshan,
less $383 (prorated rent for October 1, 2021 to October 5, 2021).
The court also awarded Bonene $8,327 in costs she incurred to
obtain funds to secure a new apartment, $100,000 in emotional
distress damages, and $80,000 in punitive damages.
The trial court filed a proposed statement of decision on
May 1, 2024. Derakhshan filed lengthy objections to the court’s
statement of decision that disputed the court’s summary of the
testimony at trial and criticized the court’s rulings. The court
overruled Derakhshan’s objections.

F. The Court Denies Derakhshan’s Motion for New Trial,
and Derakhshan Appeals
Derakhshan filed a motion for new trial on the grounds of
irregularity in the proceedings, excessive damages, and error in
law (Code Civ. Proc., § 657, parts 1, 5, & 7). Regarding
irregularity in the proceedings, Derakhshan argued that the
court erroneously denied his motion to “correct” the trial date
from March 15, 2024 to March 25, 2024; that the court unfairly
found Bonene was a credible witness, but “found [Derakhshan] to
be an absolute liar”; that the trial court’s statement of decision
“omitted . . . incriminating testimonies” by Bonene and Serraino,
which purportedly disclosed Bonene’s racist rants about her
housekeeper and Derakhshan, Serraino’s confession he broke into
Derakhshan’s house, and Bonene’s admission she and Serraino
spent several days waiting outside Derakhshan’s property with
the intent to attack him; that counsel for Bonene coached and

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gave signals to Bonene and Serraino during their testimony to
induce them to lie; and that the trial court prevented
Derakhshan from cross-examining witnesses. Regarding
damages, Derakhshan argued that Bonene owed him $11,024 in
rent and $3,950 for property damage and other costs, which the
court should have deducted from Bonene’s recovery; that the
damages the court awarded for defamation were excessive
because Bonene did not show she lost any income after
Derakhshan sent the letter to Coldwell Banker; and that the
awards of $100,000 in emotional distress damages and $80,000 in
punitive damages were “unfounded.” And regarding error in law,
Derakhshan generally criticized the court’s statement of decision
and the outcome of the trial.
The trial court denied Derakhshan’s motion for new trial.
The court ruled that it properly set and then reset the trial date,
that its assessment of the witnesses’ credibility was accurate,
that counsel for Bonene did not coach any witnesses, and that the
court allowed adequate time for both parties to cross-examine
witnesses. The court also ruled substantial evidence supported
its damages award and rejected Derakhshan’s contention the
statement of decision contained errors of law.
The trial court entered judgment in favor of Bonene on
July 12, 2024. Derakhshan timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review
On appeal from a judgment based on a statement of
decision following a court trial, we “review questions of law
de novo and we review the trial court’s findings of fact under the

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substantial evidence standard.” (Gajanan Inc. v. City and County
of San Francisco (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 780, 791-792; see Rojas v.
HSBC Card Services Inc. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 860, 872-873.)
“We construe findings of fact liberally to support the judgment;
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment;
draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings; and
infer that the trial court “‘impliedly made every factual finding
necessary to support its decision.’”” (Gajanan, at p. 792; see
Rojas, at p. 873.) We “give deference to the factual findings made
by the trial court, where there is substantial evidence supporting
them.” (Greif v. Sanin (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 412, 442; see
LA Investments, LLC v. Spix (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1061
[“When a finding of fact is attacked on the ground there is no
substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court
begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is
any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which
will support it.”].) “‘It is not our role to reweigh the evidence,
redetermine the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicts in
the testimony, and we will not disturb the judgment if there is
evidence to support it.’” (Slone v. El Centro Regional Medical
Center (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1173; see Harley-Davidson,
Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 193, 213.)
The trial court’s judgment is presumed correct, and the
burden is on the appellant to demonstrate reversible error.
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609; Denham v.
Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) The reviewing court
indulges all intendments and presumptions to support the
judgment, and the appellant must affirmatively establish error.
(Denham, at p. 564; Hanna v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 493, 512.) “‘“To prevail on appeal, an appellant

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must establish both error and prejudice from that error.”’”
(Audish v. Macias (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 740, 751.) “‘[W]e
cannot presume prejudice and will not reverse the judgment in
the absence of an affirmative showing there was a miscarriage of
justice. [Citation.] Nor will this court act as counsel for
appellant by furnishing a legal argument as to how the trial
court’s ruling was prejudicial.’” (Property Reserve, Inc. v.
Superior Court (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1020.)
Finally, in order to demonstrate error, “‘“an appellant must
supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported
by legal analysis and citation to the record.”’” (Audish v. Macias,
supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 751.) Indeed, “[t]he absence of
reasoned legal argument supported by citation to authority
allows this court to treat the contention as forfeited.” (Siskiyou
Hospital, Inc. v. County of Siskiyou (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 14,
39.)

B. The Claimed Pretrial Errors Derakhshan Identifies
Did Not Deprive Him of Due Process
Derakhshan identifies a series of pretrial rulings he
contends evidence a “broad[ ] pattern of procedural injustice.”
Derakhshan forfeited most of his arguments by failing to provide
any legal analysis, failing to explain how the alleged errors were
prejudicial, or both, and those arguments he has not forfeited are
meritless.
For example, Derakhshan argues the trial court erred in
refusing to hear his “properly filed motion to dismiss.”
Derakhshan did not file a motion to dismiss. The document he

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cites is his answer to the original complaint, and it does not
include a request to dismiss.
Derakhshan also argues that Bonene did not properly serve
him with the complaint and that the court erred in entering his
default. Any error, however, was harmless because the court
vacated Derakhshan’s default and allowed Derakhshan to file an
answer.
Derakhshan argues the court erred in allowing Bonene to
file a first amended complaint. By failing to provide any relevant
legal authority or analysis, however, Derakhshan forfeited his
challenge to the court’s order granting Bonene leave to file her
first amended complaint. (See Siskiyou Hospital, Inc. v. County
of Siskiyou, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 39.)
Derakhshan also asserts the court erred in denying him
“the right to obtain discovery relevant to the new claims” in
Bonene’s amended complaint. The record does not support
Derakhshan’s assertion. In granting in part Derakhshan’s
motion to compel further responses to discovery he served after
Bonene amended her complaint, the court stated: “While the
minute order on the hearing granting the trial continuance was
silent on the issue, the court intended to continue the deadlines
for discovery, at a minimum, based on the new trial date. To
have ruled otherwise, would have severely prejudiced
[Derakhshan’s] right to conduct discovery on the amended
complaint. Accordingly, the discovery here was served in a
timely manner.” Thus, Derakhshan had the opportunity to
conduct, and in fact conducted, discovery after Bonene filed her
first amended complaint.
Derakhshan also repeatedly argues the trial court failed to
provide him with adequate notice of rescheduled trial dates and,

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in particular, of the March 15, 2024 trial date. But Derakhshan
was in court on December 28, 2023 and stipulated to the
March 15, 2024 trial date; he cannot claim he lacked notice.

C. Substantial Evidence Supported the Judgment

1. Derakhshan Forfeited His Argument
Substantial Evidence Did Not Support the
Judgment
“On appeal challenging sufficiency of the evidence,
appellant’s opening brief must set forth all the material evidence
on point, not merely state facts favorable to appellant. [Citation.]
. . . [Citation.] When appellant’s opening brief states only
favorable facts, ignoring evidence favorable to respondent, the
appellate court may treat the substantial evidence issues as
[forfeited] and presume the record contains evidence to sustain
every finding of fact.” (LA Investments, LLC v. Spix, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1061.) “‘As with all substantial evidence
challenges, an appellant challenging [a finding of fact] must lay
out the evidence favorable to the other side and show why it is
lacking. Failure to do so is fatal.” (Slone v. El Centro Regional
Medical Center, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1173-1174.)
Derakhshan disregards the substantial evidence standard
of review. For example, he discusses his trial exhibits at length
(and does not mention Bonene’s trial exhibits) and complains the
trial court disregarded his exhibits and failed to discuss his
evidence in its statement of decision. When discussing Bonene’s
individual causes of action, Derakhshan focuses only on the
evidence favorable to his position, without discussing the
contrary evidence supporting the judgment. Derakhshan also

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repeatedly challenges the court’s rulings that Bonene and
Serraino testified credibly and truthfully and that Derakhshan
was not credible on any issue. And he constantly asserts the trial
court, counsel for Bonene, and Bonene committed various types of
misconduct during the trial—events the trial court said never
occurred. The appellant “cannot carry his burden on appeal by
merely rearguing the ‘facts’ as he would have them and/or
reasserting his position at trial. [Citations.] Such a ‘factual
presentation is but an attempt to reargue on appeal those factual
issues decided adversely to [the appellant] at the trial level,
contrary to established precepts of appellate review. As such, it
is doomed to fail.’” (Slone v. El Centro Regional Medical Center,
supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1175-1176.) Derakhshan forfeited
his substantial evidence challenge.
His arguments also fail on the merits.

2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial
Court’s Rescission Order
Under California law the basic requirements for an
enforceable contract are (1) parties capable of contracting, (2) the
consent of those parties, (3) a lawful object, and (4) adequate
consideration. (Civ. Code, § 1550; J.B.B. Investment Partners
Ltd. v. Fair (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1, 9.) The consent of the
parties to a contract must be free, mutual, and communicated by
each to the other. (Civ. Code, §§ 1565, 1581.) The absence of
mutual consent, i.e., the failure to reach a meeting of the minds
on all material points, prevents the formation of a contract.
(Cheema v. L.S. Trucking, Inc. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1149;
Bustamante v. Intuit, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 199, 215.)
Whether a term is material “‘depends on its relative importance

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to the parties and whether its absence would make enforcing the
remainder of the contract unfair to either party.’” (Eagle Fire &
Water Restoration, Inc. v. City of Dinuba (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
448, 468; see Copeland v. Baskin Robbins U.S.A. (2002)
96 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1256, fn. 3.)
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s ruling
there was no contract because Derakhshan and Bonene did not
agree on a material term of the contract, i.e., whether the patio
area adjacent to the guest house was a private or common area.
Both parties said the use of the patio area was an important term
of the agreement, but they did not have the same understanding
of that term when they signed the lease. Bonene understood,
based on information Derakhshan provided her, the patio and
pool table would be private and for her exclusive use. Only after
she began moving in did Derakhshan inform her that she would
have to share the patio area with him and that she could not use
the pool table unless she invited him to play. Bonene said she
would not have agreed to rent the guest house had she known she
would have to share the patio area with Derakhshan, and she
“assert[ed] strongly that she would never share a patio with a
man.” In contrast, Derakhshan understood and said he told
Bonene before she signed the lease that the covered patio area
was a common area and that she would have to pay an additional
$200 per month if she wanted to use the pool table. The lease did
not mention the patio or the pool table. The parties’ different
understandings about a material term of the tenancy supported
the trial court’s ruling rescinding the contract.
Citing Civil Code sections 1689 to 1693, Derakhshan
argues Bonene was not entitled to rescind the lease because she
did not demonstrate that the guest house was uninhabitable, that

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Derakhshan breached the lease, that she was a victim of
domestic violence or sexual assault, or that she signed the lease
under duress. Because Derakhshan did not raise these
arguments in the trial court, however, he forfeited them. (See
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506,
548 [“‘“theories not raised in the trial court cannot be asserted for
the first time on appeal”’”]; Sander v. Superior Court (2018)
26 Cal.App.5th 651, 670 [“‘It is axiomatic that arguments not
raised in the trial court are forfeited on appeal.’”].)

3. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial
Court’s Award of Restitution
“Generally, one who is unjustly enriched at the expense of
another is required to make restitution. [Citations.] The
elements of a cause of action for unjust enrichment are simply
stated as ‘receipt of a benefit and unjust retention of the benefit
at the expense of another.’” (Professional Tax Appeal v. Kennedy-
Wilson Holdings, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 230, 238; accord,
Tufeld Corporation v. Beverly Hills Gateway, L.P. (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 12, 31.) “The trial court has ‘inherent equitable
power’ to award restitution when it finds one party has been
unjustly enriched. [Citation.] We review the trial court’s order
awarding restitution for abuse of discretion.” (Tufeld
Corporation, at p. 31.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
Derakhshan’s failure to refund any of Bonene’s money resulted in
unjust enrichment or in awarding Bonene $16,717 in restitution.
Bonene had keys to the guest house for five days: October 1,
2021 to October 5, 2021. The court awarded Bonene the $17,100
she paid Derakhshan on September 5, 2021, less five days’

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prorated rent of $383.1 Because Derakhshan rented the guest
house to another tenant for three months beginning on October 6,
2021, Bonene’s termination of her tenancy did not cause him to
lose any rental income.
Derakhshan argues that “[a]ccording to California Civil
Code § 1950.5[, subdivision] (b) [he] had every right to hold
[Bonene’s] money to be used to reimburse for [Bonene’s] breach of
contract.” Civil Code section 1950.5 regulates the amount and
use of security deposits in rental agreements for residential
property. Assuming that section applies here, there was no
evidence Derakhshan sent an itemized list of deductions from the
security deposit and returned the balance of the deposit to
Bonene, as required under Civil Code section 1950.5,
subdivision (h).

4. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial
Court’s Judgment on Bonene’s Defamation and
False Light Causes of Action
The elements of a defamation cause of action are
“‘(a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and
(d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or
that causes special damage.’” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th
683, 720; accord, Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC v. Schneider (2025)
115 Cal.App.5th 980, 997; Sanchez v. Bezos (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
750, 763.) “To be defamatory, the statement must contain a
provable falsehood.” (Cocoa AJ Holdings, at p. 997.)
Derakhshan forfeited his substantial evidence challenge to
the trial court’s judgment on Bonene’s cause of action for

1 Bonene agreed to pay monthly rent of $2,300.
$2,300/30 days = $76.66 per day, and $76.66 x 5 days = $383.33.

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defamation. As discussed, the trial court found the letter
Derakhshan sent to Coldwell Banker was defamatory.
Derakhshan argues “the trial court based its decision on
non-existent evidence.” Derakhshan claims that, because the
letter to Coldwell Banker was not included in the clerk’s
transcript, it must not exist. The letter, however, exists, and the
court admitted it at trial as exhibit 9.2 The court’s statement of
decision quotes the letter at length, and Derakhshan does not
argue the court quoted the letter inaccurately. Derakhshan also
included the letter on the list of exhibits in the settled statement.
He described exhibit 9 as “[c]omplaint letter from [him] to
Coldwell Banker disclosing [Bonene’s] racist behavior” and
indicated the trial court admitted exhibit 9 over his objection.
But the reason exhibit 9 was not included in the clerk’s
transcript is that Derakhshan did not designate it (or any of
Bonene’s trial exhibits) in his designation of the record on appeal.
As the appellant, it was Derakhshan’s burden to provide an
adequate record to facilitate review of the judgment for
substantial evidence.3 (See LA Investments, LLC v. Spix, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1061-1062 [appellants forfeited their
substantial evidence argument by omitting “substantial portions

2 Derakhshan does not argue the court erred in admitting
the letter.

3 On our own motion, we augment the record to include the
exhibits admitted by the trial court. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rules 8.122(a)(3) [“all exhibits admitted in evidence, refused, or
lodged are deemed part of the record”] & 8.155(a) [court of appeal
may augment the record to include any document filed or lodged
in the superior court].)

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of the trial court record” containing “legally significant facts
necessary to [the] determination of the issue on appeal”].)
In any event, substantial evidence supported the trial
court’s ruling Derakhshan’s letter to Coldwell Banker was
defamatory on its face. (See Civ. Code, § 45a [“A libel which is
defamatory of the plaintiff without the necessity of explanatory
matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact,
is said to be a libel on its face.”].) The letter to Coldwell Banker
was a publication (see Sanchez v. Bezos, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at
p. 763 [“‘[p]ublication need not be to the “public” at large;
communication to a single individual is sufficient’”]) and is
plainly defamatory. Derakhshan stated, for example, that
Bonene “told [him] she couldn’t stand the ‘Jews’ despised ‘Israelis’
and hated the ‘Armenians,’ [e]specially her current landlord”;
that Bonene “realized that she could not enforce her white
supremacy and use me as her slave, because of my national
origin and color of my skin, [so] she quickly flipped and decided to
break our lease agreement,” which she did “for illegitimate racist
reasons”; that Bonene “follow[ed] her KKK (KU KLUX KLAN)
family rituals,” which included sending her boyfriend to break
into Derakhshan’s house; that “[w]hen a slave did not bow down
to white supremacy, [she] attack[ed] the unruly slave in the dead
of the night while the slave is most vulnerable sleeping”; that
Bonene’s boyfriend admitted he broke into Derakhshan’s house at
Bonene’s direction; and that Coldwell Banker was “harboring a
dangerous racist, . . . you are the broker to a mega racist, evil and
violent individual (Melinda Bonene).” And the statements in the
letter were false, as Bonene testified.
Derakhshan argues the statements in his letter “do not
contain any specific factual allegations that can be proven true or

19
false, but instead reflect [his] subjective views and
interpretations.” As Derakhshan suggests, opinions—as opposed
to statements of fact—are not defamatory. (See
J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Phillips & Cohen LLP (2016)
247 Cal.App.4th 87, 100 [“mere opinions are not actionable unless
the published statement declares or implies a provably false
assertion of fact”]; see also Issa v. Applegate (2019)
31 Cal.App.5th 689, 702 [“Though mere opinions are generally
not actionable [citation], a statement of opinion that implies a
false assertion of fact is actionable.”]; Ruiz v. Harbor View
Community Assn. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1471 [“An opinion
is actionable if it discloses all the statements of fact on which the
opinion is based and those statements are false.”].) But the
statements in Derakhshan’s letter to Bonene’s employer were
(false) statements of fact. Derakhshan did not merely offer his
opinion Bonene was a racist. He said Bonene made specific
statements and took specific actions consistent with her alleged
racist beliefs.
Derakhshan’s challenge to the trial court’s judgment on
Bonene’s false light cause of action is based on his challenge to
the judgment on her defamation cause of action. He argues:
“Trial court did not establish [Bonene] was defamed to cause
False light. Trial court committed reversible errors by
erroneously misapplying applicable California Law and
jurisprudence in reaching its conclusion in favor of [Bonene] as to
her claim of False Light in this matter.” The same evidence that
supported the court’s judgment in favor of Bonene on her
defamation cause of action supported the court’s judgment on her
false light cause of action. (See Mitchell v. Twin Galaxies, LLC
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 207, 218 [“‘To establish a false light claim

20
based on a defamatory publication, a plaintiff “must meet the
same requirements” as for a defamation claim.’”]; De Havilland v.
FX Networks, LLC (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 845, 865 [“‘“[a] ‘false
light’ cause of action is in substance equivalent to a libel claim”’”];
Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1264
[“‘[w]hen a false light claim is coupled with a defamation claim,
the false light claim is essentially superfluous, and stands or falls
on whether it meets the same requirements as the defamation
cause of action’”].)

5. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial
Court’s Judgment on Bonene’s Cause of Action
for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress exists when there is ‘“‘“(1) extreme and outrageous
conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or
reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional
distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional
distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional
distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.”’”’ [Citations.]
A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘“‘extreme as to
exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized
community.’”’ [Citation.] And the defendant’s conduct must be
‘“‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that
injury will result.’”’” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035,
1050-1051; accord, Safechuck v. MJJ Productions, Inc. (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 675, 697.)
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s ruling on
this cause of action. As the trial court found, Derakhshan’s “act
of sending [Bonene’s] employer a letter falsely accusing her of

21
being part of the KKK, of breaking into his home and making
racist statements about Israelis, Hispanics, and Armenians is an
example of outrageous conduct which is not tolerated by a
civilized society.” The evidence also supported the trial court’s
finding Derakhshan acted intentionally, hoping the letter would
ruin Bonene’s reputation, cause her to lose her job, and cause her
so much distress she would give up trying to recover the money
he owed her. Indeed, it is hard to imagine what other motive
Derakhshan could have had for sending an unsolicited and
extremely defamatory letter to Bonene’s employer.
Derakhshan argues that, because Bonene failed to show
she suffered any financial loss (such as loss of income), she could
not have suffered any harm to her reputation. According to
Derakhshan, a “real estate agent’s reputation is directly related
to her income. It is impossible for a real estate agent to lose her
reputation and not lose income or suffer no damages. No loss of
income means no loss of reputation therefore the trial court’s
ruling is flawed and reversible.” Neither financial loss nor loss of
reputation, however, is an element of a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See Safechuck v.
MJJ Productions, Inc., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 697.)

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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The notices, objections, and
requests filed by Derakhshan are denied as moot, on the merits,
or both. Bonene is to recover her costs on appeal.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

GIZA, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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