People v. Moqaddem CA2/7

CourtListener 10857110Calctapp11 mai 2026

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Filed 5/11/26 P. v. Moqaddem CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B336791

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. No. XWESA098438)

MAHA MOQADDEM,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEALS from a judgment and an order of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, Joseph J. Burghardt, Judge.
Affirmed.
Law Offices of George E. Murphy and George E. Murphy
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles G. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

Maha Moqaddem attacked her husband, Albert Gregory
Pinto, hitting him several times in his eyes, knowing Pinto had a
history of medical problems with his eyes. She damaged one of
his eyes so badly he lost all vision in that eye.
A jury convicted Moqaddem of various crimes, including
aggravated mayhem, willfully inflicting corporal injury on a
spouse, and after she contacted Pinto in violation of a criminal
protective order and offered him $20,000 not to testify against
her, attempting to bribe a witness and dissuade him from
testifying. The trial court sentenced Moqaddem to a prison term
of two years, plus life with the possibility of parole. Moqaddem
appeals from the judgment, but through her retained appellate
counsel does not make any preserved, cogent, or supported
arguments. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

A. Moqaddem and Pinto Meet, Marry, and Argue
Pinto and Moqaddem met in July 2017, began dating the
next month, became engaged in March 2018, and married in
April 2018. They lived in Santa Monica.2 Before they were
married Pinto could see out of both eyes.

1 We summarize the facts, as we must, in the light most
favorable to the judgment. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th
981, 988.)
2 Moqaddem testified she never dated, became engaged to,
married, or lived with Pinto. She stated that Pinto, an attorney,

2
But, as Moqaddem learned, Pinto had a history of eye
problems. As a teenager he had a cornea condition called
keratoconus, where the fibers around the eye weaken and begin
to break, which creates pressure inside the eye, causes the cornea
to bulge, and distorts the image the eye sees. Pinto had surgery
to insert corneal transplants in both eyes. An ophthalmologic
surgeon replaced the central portion of Pinto’s corneas with donor
corneas, which gave Pinto smooth corneal surfaces that refracted
light properly.
Moqaddem knew Pinto’s history of eye issues. In May 2018
Pinto and Moqaddem visited Pinto’s mother in Las Vegas.
Pinto’s mother told Moqaddem about her son’s “history with his
eyes and the cornea transplants he had . . . as a teenager.”
Pinto’s mother wanted Moqaddem to know her son had sensitive
eyes because, several weeks before Pinto and Moqaddem went to
Las Vegas, Pinto’s mother had observed Pinto’s right eye was red
and swollen. Moqaddem said Pinto had already told her that he
had the cornea transplants and that his eyes were sensitive.
The morning after this conversation Moqaddem woke up
angry, got out of bed, and hit Pinto in the face and eyes. One of
her swings “connected” with Pinto’s right eye.3 Pinto’s right eye
became red and swollen, and he had scratches on his face and
arms. Moqaddem was screaming, cursing, and saying she was
going to blind Pinto. Pinto begged her not to hit him in the eye.
Moqaddem stopped hitting Pinto when his mother came into the

represented her in several legal matters and that he forced her to
have sex with him.

3 Moqaddem denied hitting Pinto that day. She testified
Pinto attacked her.

3
room and saw Pinto’s right eye was bloody and swollen. Pinto’s
mother told Moqaddem that Pinto would need a transplant and
called security. Security guards took Moqaddem away.4
Pinto sought medical attention for the injury to his eye
from the same doctor who had treated him as a teenager.
Moqaddem accompanied Pinto because she wanted to make sure
Pinto did not tell the doctor how he sustained the injury. With
Moqaddem present the doctor examined Pinto’s eye and found he
had a bruise on the outside of his eye and a vitreous detachment.5

B. Moqaddem Hits Pinto in the Eye Again and Blinds
Him
On July 11, 2018, a few months after they married, Pinto
and Moqaddem had lunch together at a Mexican restaurant in

4 This was not the first incident of domestic violence. On
April 17, 2018, just before Pinto and Moqaddem were married,
police responded to a domestic disturbance at their Santa Monica
residence. Moqaddem had hit Pinto while he was sleeping. Pinto
ran downstairs, and Moqaddem following him, screaming and
swinging at him. She hit him in the ears and scratched his face
and neck. Officers observed “fresh scratches” on Pinto’s forehead,
neck, and upper back, and they arrested Moqaddem. When
asked why he married Moqaddem a week after this incident,
Pinto said, “I loved her. I don’t know. Clearly it wasn’t the best
choice.” Moqaddem testified that Pinto attacked her that evening
and that he physically assaulted her “many times.”
5 Moqaddem admitted she was present at Pinto’s visit with
his eye doctor in May 2018 and said Pinto “made up something
about his right eye.” Moqaddem stated that Pinto had damage to
his left eye before they met and that his eye doctors deleted
medical records and later entered “new information.”

4
Los Angeles. Later that afternoon they went to meet some of
Moqaddem’s friends and family members at a hotel in Beverly
Hills. After a few hours Pinto left to meet a real estate agent at a
restaurant to discuss houses in Washington, DC Pinto and
Moqaddem were considering buying. Pinto drove to the
restaurant to meet the real estate agent; Moqaddem stayed at the
hotel with her family and friends.6 One of the members of the
group at the hotel called Pinto and said they would meet him at
the restaurant. Pinto waited at the restaurant until it closed, but
no one came. Pinto left the restaurant and went home. When he
arrived he found the house empty, went upstairs, and fell asleep
on a couch next to the bed.
Approximately 30 minutes later, Pinto heard loud knocking
at the door. He went downstairs, thinking it might be
Moqaddem, and opened the door. Moqaddem yelled and cursed
at him and said she did not have her keys. Moqaddem was
standing two feet from Pinto screaming obscenities when he
turned his head toward the stairs and indicated he was going to
bed. Moqaddem hit him four times in rapid succession, “full
extension,” twice in each eye, either in the eyelid, eye socket, or
the temple by his eye. Pinto put his hands up and said, “Stop.
You’re gonna blind me. You know I had surgeries. You know you
could blind me. We talked about this before. Stop. Stop.”
Moqaddem stopped, and Pinto put down his arm. Moqaddem hit
Pinto two more times: One strike was in his right eye and “hit
the bone”; the other was “an absolute bullseye connection with
[his] left eye.”

6 Moqaddem testified Pinto took her car from the hotel
without her permission.

5
Pinto “saw stars, just like a cartoon,” and “everything in
[his] head went to a hollow thud sound.” He felt his left eye
“bouncing back in [his] head.” Pinto fell to one knee, put his
hand to his face, and felt his eye “start to goo out” between his
fingers. He was unsure whether it was blood or pieces of his eye
coming out. Pinto testified: “It felt like if you were making
meatballs and you were trying to squeeze them and hold them in
while you’re trying to squeeze them hard, and the blood and the
bits are trying to squeeze through the areas of your fingers where
you’re trying to hold them together.” His eye felt “warm and
gooey, like you dinged the inside of your eye or brain.” Pinto did
not take his hand away from his eye because he did not want his
eye to “squirt out on the ground,” so he asked Moqaddem to bring
him a towel.
Pinto wrapped the towel around his hand and used it to
keep pressure on his eye. He could feel his eye “oozing out” and
wanted to make sure he caught any pieces of his eye to take with
him to the hospital. Pinto stated: “I didn’t want to lose pieces of
my eye. So if they could find it in the goo mess, they could
possibly repair it.” Pinto asked Moqaddem to take him to the
same hospital where he had received the corneal transplants.
After initially resisting and saying Pinto’s eye was fine,
Moqaddem drove him to the hospital and dropped him at the
emergency room.7

7 Moqaddem testified she walked into the residence and was
looking for her keys upstairs, when she heard Pinto say, “Oh, my
God.” She stated she came downstairs and saw him sitting on a
bench with a towel in his hand. She denied she hit Pinto in the
head or the eyes. She stated that Pinto’s dog may have scratched

6
Doctors and nurses treated Pinto in the emergency room.
When they asked Pinto what happened to his eye, he said his
wife hit him. The doctors and nurses put bandages on him,
placed him in a dark room, and later performed emergency
surgery on his eye.8 Pinto remained in the hospital for several
days.
Pinto lost all vision in his left eye. Pinto learned in follow-
up visits with doctors that he would not regain sight in his left
eye and that it was “essentially dead.” The blows from
Moqaddem had ruptured the incision site of the prior surgery,
and the contents of his eye had come out through the hole.
Pinto’s eye was “shrunken,” “deformed,” “depressed,” and had an
“opaque cornea.” His doctor used the term “phthisis bulbi,” which
means “ophthalmic death.” The doctor told Pinto nothing could
be done for his eye and discussed with Pinto the possibility of a
prosthetic.
Pinto eventually went to a “cosmetic optic” doctor to get an
ocular prothesis for his eye. He received a prosthetic cap that fits
over the remnants of his eye. The cap replaces the parts of the
eye that are missing and moves “a little more naturally than a
full prosthetic eye.”9

him or that “neurotic plants” got into Pinto’s eye and caused his
injury.

8 Moqaddem testified that Pinto’s eyes were “completely
normal” at the hospital and that “there was nothing wrong” with
them.
9 Pinto did not have the prosthetic cap in his eye at trial and
was able to show it to the jury.

7
C. The People Charge Moqaddem with Several Crimes
Police arrested Moqaddem in the hospital valet parking
area outside the emergency room. The People charged her with
mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203)10 and willfully inflicting corporal
injury on a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). The People alleged
Moqaddem personally inflicted great bodily injury under
circumstances involving domestic violence, within the meaning of
section 12022.7, subdivision (e).

D. Moqaddem Violates a Criminal Protective Order
On July 16, 2018 Moqaddem was served in court with a
criminal protective order requiring her, among other things, not
to have any contact with Pinto. The order also required her to
stay at least 100 yards away from Pinto and to stay away from
their Santa Monica residence.
Moqaddem did not comply with the criminal protective
order. In April and May 2021 she called Pinto from custody using
different phone numbers and sent him emails asking him to help
her with certain documents. Pinto also visited Moqaddem in jail
10 to 12 times, “pretty much every time she asked.”11 When at
one point the criminal case was about to go to trial, Moqaddem
suggested to Pinto that “she wanted to work something out with

10 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

11 Pinto explained: “I still cared about her. I still didn’t
understand what happened and why. I still missed her. I still
hoped that she would acknowledge what she did and apologize
and maybe we could do something to help her move on and make
things better. I really was at a loss. I didn’t know either what
I wanted or what to do.”

8
[him] regarding the trial.”12 Moqaddem said she could do
something for him, and he could do something for her. Pinto
thought Moqaddem was asking him to “change the facts for her”
or “refuse to testify in the coming trial.” He stated she wanted
him “to recant anything that was in the police report or the
hospital report or anything that was in any of the incident
reports that had anything to do with this case.” Moqaddem
ultimately offered Pinto $20,000 to say that she never hit him
and that he made it all up.13 She also threatened Pinto by saying
that she and others would hurt him and his family and that she
would post a sex video of him on social media.

E. The People Charge Moqaddem with Additional
Crimes
The People charged Moqaddem with four more crimes. The
People charged her in an amended information with attempting
to prevent or dissuade another person who has been the victim of
a crime or who is witness to a crime from assisting in the
prosecution of a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(2)); offering or promising
to give to any witness or person about to be called as a witness,
any bribe upon any understanding or agreement the person will
not attend upon any trial or other judicial proceeding (§ 138,
subd. (a)); and intentionally and knowingly violating a protective
order (§ 273.6, subd. (a)). The People also added a charge of
aggravated mayhem: unlawfully, under circumstances

12 Pinto began recording some of these calls, and the People
played them for the jury.

13 Moqaddem admitted she offered Pinto $20,000 not to
testify, but said she was being sarcastic.

9
manifesting extreme indifference to the physical or psychological
well-being of another person, and intentionally causing
permanent disability or disfigurement of another human being or
depriving a human being of a limb, organ, or member of his or
her body (§ 205).

F. The Jury Convicts Moqaddem on All Charges, and the
Trial Court Sentences Her
The jury convicted Moqaddem on all six counts and found
true the allegation she inflicted great bodily injury. On
Moqaddem’s aggravated mayhem conviction the court imposed a
prison term of life with the possibility of parole. The court also
imposed a prison term of two years on her conviction for bribing a
witness. The court imposed concurrent or stayed terms, or both,
on Moqaddem’s other convictions. The court also ordered
Moqaddem to pay victim restitution in an amount to be
determined.
After a restitution hearing at which Pinto testified, the
court ordered Moqaddem to pay $188,057.86 in victim restitution
and $70,000 to the California Victim Compensation Board.
Moqaddem timely appealed from the judgment of conviction, the
trial court’s oral restitution order, and the court’s written
restitution order. We consolidated the appeals.

DISCUSSION

Moqaddem’s briefs, filed by retained counsel George
Murphy (who represented Moqaddem in the trial court from
May 2022 to March 2023), are a little hard to follow. For
example, Moqaddem argues that the cases against her “involve

10
absolute false allegations, exaggerated charges, that . . . involve
the prior Divorce attorney Albert G Pinto, that he formed for
financial gain,” and that “[t]his case involves absolute Extrinsic
Fraud by depriving and blocking [Moqaddem] from her day in
court, who was totally blocked from presenting her overwhelming
evidence against Pinto . . . .” She argues: “On the face of this
court transcript from this Preliminary Hearing. That will be
demonstrated from various Exhibits to court of Appeal, with the
clear sole intent to set up [Moqaddem] right from the start in the
most horrific ways, from one plot to another, at every step, to find
illegal and unjust ways to keep [Moqaddem] hostage at detention
facilities from documented evidence.” She contends: “The total
mess in this case is unheard of before.” Moqaddem cites no
statutes, cases (with one exception), or other authority, nor does
she provide any citations to the large record in this case.
We have done our best to try to understand Moqaddem’s
arguments. As best as we can determine, she appears to be
making five arguments: (1) the People should not have added the
charge of aggravated mayhem; (2) one or more of the various
attorneys who represented her at trial (other than Murphy)
provided ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) there was an
irregularity in the jury selection process; (4) the trial court erred
in sentencing her; and (5) the restitution award was improper.
Moqaddem’s arguments are all forfeited and meritless.

A. Moqaddem Has Not Shown the Aggravated Mayhem
Charge Was Improperly Added
Moqaddem asserts the “core issue of this entire case is the
improper adding of PC 205 to [this] case . . ., just two weeks after
[she] was released from serving 4 years jail time because of this

11
case, at a hearing that took place on January 17, 2020 (See court
transcript in the records) . . . .” She argues her attorney at the
time, H. Russell Halpern, “failed to file proper motions and
appeals to vacate such order adding this charge that was added
without a Preliminary hearing independent Judge nor a Grand
Jury approving of this outrageous and totally unjustified high
charge.”
What Moqaddem and her attorney Murphy appear to be
challenging is the People’s decision to add a count in the
amended information for aggravated mayhem under section 205,
though that did not occur on January 17, 2020. The People filed
an amended information on December 4, 2019 that added a
charge of aggravated mayhem under section 205, in addition to
simple mayhem under section 203, and the court and counsel
discussed the amendment at a hearing on January 6, 2020. The
People eventually filed a second amended information on July 21,
2022 that included aggravated mayhem, as well as the new
counts for attempting to dissuade Pinto from testifying,
attempting to bribe him, and violating the protective order.
Moqaddem’s court-appointed attorney at the time, Jason
Feldman, waived reading of, and arraignment on, the new
charges, and pleaded not guilty for Moqaddem.
Moqaddem forfeited any contention it was improper for the
People to add the count of aggravated mayhem. She does not
present any cogent argument or citation to legal authority for her
contention. (See People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 206
[“Points ‘perfunctorily asserted without argument in support’ are
not properly raised.”]; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764,
793 [“‘[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation
of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a

12
particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it
without consideration.’”]; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 150
[defendant forfeited an argument by failing to “expand on the
issue with either argument or citation to relevant authority”];
People v. Lewis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1098 [“absence of
cogent legal argument” forfeits the issue on appeal]; People v.
Benson (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1078, fn. 2
[“‘“[T]o demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the
reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal
analysis and citation to the record.”’”]; People v. Ramirez (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 315, 329-330 [defendant forfeited an argument
by not citing “any relevant legal authority to support this claim”
or “develop[ing] a cogent legal argument”]; People v. Clayburg
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 86, 93 [failure to present “reasoned
argument and analysis” forfeits issue on appeal]; People v.
Roberto V. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1364, fn. 6 [failure “to
provide any substantial argument or citation to authority to
support [the defendant’s] contention” forfeited the argument];
People v. Beltran (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 693, 697, fn. 5 [assertion
“without discussion, citation to authority or citation to the record”
is forfeited].)
Moqaddem also forfeited any such contention by failing to
cite to the record. (See People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 939
[“by failing to support his appellate arguments with record
citations, defendant has forfeited any claim of error on appeal”];
People v. Weber (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1055 [defendant
forfeited an argument by failing to provide a record citation for a
statement he claimed occurred during the trial]; People v.
Johnigan (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1098 [“Absent citation to
the record, the alleged error is without foundation and

13
forfeited.”]; People v. Mendoza (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 390, 398
[“‘[A] point suggested on appeal cannot be considered where the
brief fails . . . to point out the page of the record where the alleged
error is supposed to have occurred.’”]; People v. Nobles (1941)
44 Cal.App.2d 422, 425 [defendant forfeited claim of error where
he cited “no page of the record where this asserted error
occurred”].) Murphy’s brief contains no citations to the record.
As the court stated in People ex rel. Reisig v. Acuna (2017)
9 Cal.App.5th 1, in words equally applicable to this case: “‘[T]he
trial court’s judgment is presumed to be correct, and the
appellant has the burden to prove otherwise by presenting legal
authority on each point made and factual analysis, supported by
appropriate citations to the material facts in the record;
otherwise, the argument may be deemed forfeited. [Citations.]
[¶] It is the appellant’s responsibility to support claims of error
with citation and authority; this court is not obligated to perform
that function on the appellant’s behalf. [Citation.] [¶] . . . And
the appellant must present each point separately in the opening
brief under an appropriate heading, showing the nature of the
question to be presented and the point to be made; otherwise, the
point will be forfeited. [Citations.] This rule is “designed to
lighten the labors of the appellate tribunals by requiring the
litigants to present their cause systematically and so arranged
that those upon whom the duty devolves of ascertaining the rule
of law to apply may be advised, as they read, of the exact
question under consideration, instead of being compelled to
extricate it from the mass.”’” (Id. at p. 25; see Jones v. Superior
Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99 [“[i]ssues do not have a life of
their own: if they are not raised or supported by argument or
citation to authority,” they are forfeited].)

14
But even if Moqaddem had not forfeited it, her contention
is meritless. There was no error in amending the information to
add a count of aggravated mayhem. “‘Under section 739, “the law
is settled that unless the magistrate makes factual findings to
the contrary, the prosecution may amend the information after
the preliminary hearing to charge any offense shown by the
evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing provided the new
crime is transactionally related to the crimes for which the
defendant has previously been held to answer.” [Citations.]
“Under the case law interpreting section 1009, the test applied is
whether or not the amendment changes the offense charged to
one not shown by the evidence taken at the preliminary
examination. [Citation.]” [Citation.] As long as the above
standards are met, there is no bar to adding to the information
enhancement allegations that were not charged in the
complaint.’” (People v. McCoy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1531;
accord, People v. Terry (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 750, 766; see
§ 1009 [“An indictment or accusation cannot be amended so as to
change the offense charged, nor an information so as to charge an
offense not shown by the evidence taken at the preliminary
examination.”]; People v. Fugit (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 981, 993
[“a trial court may permit amendment of the information ‘“at any
stage of the proceeding, up to and including the close of trial,”’ if
the defendant’s substantial rights are not violated (unless the
new offense is not supported by evidence at the preliminary
hearing)”]; People v. Winters (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 997, 1005
[“Section 1009 authorizes amendment of an information at any
stage of the proceedings provided the amendment does not
change the offense charged in the original information to one not
shown by the evidence taken at the preliminary examination.”].)

15
The defendant’s remedy is to challenge the amendment by filing
a motion under section 995 to dismiss the new count. (People v.
Rogers (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1361.)
The trial court (Judge Lauren Birnstein) explained this to
Murphy, who practices “predominantly administrative law with
the workers’ compensation appeals board” but at the time was
counsel of record for Moqaddem in her criminal case: “So let me
explain to you what any reasonable criminal defense attorney
would know. And that is that at the time the amendment was
filed there need be no motion. They just filed the amended
information, right? If you or any reasonably experienced criminal
attorney at the time or anytime thereafter before trial—if you
believe there was insufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing
underneath to show all the elements of aggravated mayhem, then
you have the right certainly to file a [motion under section] 995
on that very serious charge that they added. They can only add it
if there was enough evidence at the preliminary hearing to have
held your client to answer on the more serious charge. So you
can file a [motion under section] 995 on all those issues that
I have now delineated for you.” Murphy said he would file a
motion to dismiss the mayhem charge under section 995, but he
never did.
On August 5, 2022 the trial court addressed the issues the
court believed the People’s amendment to add aggravated
mayhem charge raised, even though Murphy had not filed a
motion. The court stated: “So, if you had been doing your job
appropriately, as you said you were going to be ready on a
[motion under section] 995 today, I am going to address the
issues for a 995. . . . If you still wish to write your own 995, you
can present it . . ., but right now I’m going to address the issues

16
that I see with the aggravated mayhem.” The court stated: “I
want to hear the People’s argument, because I think that the only
issue on the aggravated mayhem is whether there was enough
evidence at the preliminary hearing to show a specific intent to
maim.” The court read some of the testimony presented at the
preliminary hearing, cited several cases, and stated that, “if the
evidence shows no more than an indiscriminate attack, it’s
insufficient to prove the specific intent” required for aggravated
mayhem.
The prosecutor responded the evidence showed that
Moqaddem knew Pinto had eye conditions and prior surgeries
and that she had previously attacked his eyes. The court stated:
“So before I rule, Mr. Murphy, I will allow you to file a written
[motion under section] 995, now that I’ve given you all the case
law, now that you know what the issue is, on the aggravated
mayhem. I want to see the defense. You said you wanted to file
one and make the motion yourself. Go right ahead. And you can
file a 995 [motion] anytime up until trial.”14 Murphy still did not

14 The court (still Judge Birnstein) later stated: “I probably
am going further than I should to help the defense in this case.
I’m sure [the prosecutor] does not like the fact that I am giving
·you all the case law.” The prosecutor stated: “I do not.” The
court stated: “So you have told me several times that you were
going to file a 995 [motion]. You’ve made that statement on the
record in court. But I have seen no paperwork.” The court
added: “I’ve also kind of pushed you to associate in or seek advice
from an experienced criminal attorney. And again, I have said all
along that is because I want your client to have the best defense
possible, okay? So if you are associating with or seeking the
advice of a criminal attorney, that might help you, okay?”

17
file a motion under section 995 to dismiss the aggravated
mayhem charge. As stated, he never did.
It was not until after the court removed Murphy from
representing Moqaddem that her court-appointed lawyer, Louis
Sepe, made a motion under section 995 to the trial court (Judge
Joseph Burghardt) to dismiss the aggravated mayhem charge on
December 29, 2023.15 Sepe argued: “The exceptionally limited
evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing does not include any
evidence to support the necessary element that [Moqaddem]
acted with extreme indifference to the well being of the victim.
Instead, it contains only evidence of the opposite, because it is
undisputed that [Moqaddem] immediately drove the victim to the
hospital and remained there and cooperated with the police . . . .

15 In March 2023 the trial court (Judge Burghardt) removed
Murphy as Moqaddem’s attorney for refusing to be ready for trial
and “to prevent disruption of the orderly processes of justice”
under the “exceptional” circumstances of the case. The court
found Murphy was unprepared, “not competently representing
the defendant,” had not retained an expert, was “not experienced
in criminal law or in the rules of professional conduct,” “stated in
documents to the court that he won’t obey the court’s orders,”
“questioned the integrity of the court and questioned the
integrity of pretty much every judicial officer in the . . .
courthouse,” made “unsubstantiated and baseless complaints
against judicial assistants, against court reporters, pretty much
everyone involved in the court system,” and “sought many delays
to get an advantage.” The court removed Murphy as Moqaddem’s
attorney in the case and ordered a court-appointed lawyer to
represent Moqaddem.* The court appointed Sepe to represent
Moqaddem in September 2023, and Sepe filed a motion under
section 995 two months later.
* Moqaddem does not challenge this ruling.

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A person who drives a person to the hospital is not indifferent to
that person’s well-being, let alone extremely indifferent.”
The trial court (Judge Burghardt) denied the motion to
dismiss the aggravated mayhem count, citing evidence at the
preliminary hearing that Moqaddem knew Pinto had surgeries on
his eye and that she had previously attacked his eyes “knowing
that one was weak.” The court ruled: “The standard at a
preliminary hearing is probable cause, and the court is permitted
to make reasonable inferences from the evidence. I agree that
the evidence is pretty thin as to the aggravated part of the
aggravated mayhem. But in the end the court believes that one
reasonable inference from the evidence is that, since the
defendant knew that the complaining witness’s eye—of his eye
injury, since she had previously tried to attack his eyes knowing
that one was weak, when she hit him four to six times in the
attack towards his face, one reasonable inference is that she had
the requisite mental state for aggravated mayhem. There are
certainly other reasonable inferences that could be made from the
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. But the court can
make reasonable inferences from the evidence that this was not
an indiscriminate attack based on the following: that all four to
six blows were to a targeted area, the complaining witness’s face;
defendant knew that the complaining witness had a previous eye
injury; that she tried to attack his eyes previously knowing that
one was weak; and she did not stop until the complaining
witness’s eye was bleeding, that he needed a towel to soak up the
blood.”
Moqaddem does not mention or challenge this ruling.
Though she asserts “Judge Birnstein lacked jurisdiction to add
this charge,” Judge Birnstein did not add the aggravated

19
mayhem charge; the People did. And though Sepe, in a proper
motion under section 995, challenged whether the People were
entitled to add the aggravated mayhem charge based on the
evidence at the preliminary hearing, Judge Burghardt denied the
motion, and Moqaddem does not argue Judge Burghardt’s order
was erroneous. Moreover, any error in the failure by Halpern,
who represented Moqaddem from January 2020 to April 2022,
and whom Moqaddem blames for her conviction, to file a motion
under section 995 to dismiss the aggravated mayhem charge was
harmless because Sepe made the very motion Halpern (and
Murphy) did not make, and the court denied it on the merits.
(See People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 497 [to demonstrate
ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show
prejudice]; People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 624 [“prejudice
must be affirmatively proved”].) Moqaddem does not argue
Halpern, whom she accuses of creating a “chaos and total mess
. . . in this case,” or Murphy, who had the opportunity to file a
motion to dismiss under section 995 but never did before the
court removed him for incompetence, would have made a better
motion than Sepe.
Finally, even if Moqaddem had challenged the court’s order
denying her motion under section 995 to dismiss the aggravated
mayhem charge, the court did not err in denying it. The question
on a motion under section 995 “is whether ‘it appears from the
preliminary examination that a public offense has been
committed, “and there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant
guilty thereof . . . .” . . . “‘Sufficient cause’ . . . means such a state
of facts as would lead a man of ordinary caution or prudence to
believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the
guilt of the accused [citation] . . . .”’ [Citation.] ‘[E]vidence which

20
will justify prosecution under the above test need not be
sufficient to support a conviction.’” (People v. Superior Court
(Decker) (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1, 7.) At a preliminary hearing the
“magistrate is to decide if there is ‘“‘some rational ground for
assuming the possibility that an offense has been committed and
the accused is guilty of it.’”’” (People v. Superior Court
(Fernandez) (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 26, 31.) Where, as here, the
defendant moves to dismiss a count under section 995, “we ask
only ‘whether the evidence is such that “a reasonable person
could harbor a strong suspicion of the defendant’s guilt.”’”
(People v. Superior Court (Sahlolbei) (2017) 3 Cal.5th 230, 245.)
The evidence at the preliminary hearing met this
“‘exceedingly low’ standard.” (People v. Superior Court
(Sahlolbei), supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 245; see People v. Consiglio
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 615, 631.) Section 203, which defines the
crime of mayhem, provides: “Every person who unlawfully and
maliciously deprives a human being of a member of his body, or
disables, disfigures, or renders it useless, or cuts or disables the
tongue, or puts out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of
mayhem.” (See People v. Romero (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 381, 386
[“A member of the body is a general term describing any integral
part or vital organ of the body.”].) Mayhem is a general intent
crime. (People v. Quarles (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 631, 636; People
v. Rodarte (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1170.) Section 205,
which defines the crime of aggravated mayhem, provides in
relevant part: “A person is guilty of aggravated mayhem when he
or she unlawfully, under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the physical or psychological well-being of another
person, intentionally causes permanent disability or
disfigurement of another human being or deprives a human being

21
of a limb, organ, or member of his or her body.” (See People v.
Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 86.) For aggravated mayhem
the People must prove “‘the defendant acted with the specific
intent to cause a maiming injury.’” (Ibid.; see People v. James
(2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 794, 811.) The “difference between
simple mayhem and aggravated mayhem . . . is the requisite
criminal intent”; the “permanent disfiguring injury requirement
is the same under each statute.” (People v. Newby (2008)
167 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1347, 1348.)
Though Pinto refused to testify at the preliminary hearing,
he told one of the officers at the hospital (who did testify) that
Moqaddem hit him in the eye, that he was “worried about his eye
because he had had a past cornea transplant,” that Moqaddem
knew about his past eye surgeries, and that she had “previously
tried to attack knowing” his eyes were weak. From this evidence
a reasonable person could have a strong suspicion that
Moqaddem, knowing Pinto had vulnerable eyes and having hit
him in the eyes multiple times in the past, specifically intended
to blind Pinto or permanently disfigure his eyes. She hit Pinto,
not in his chest, chin, or ears, but where she knew would likely
cause him to lose his eye or his eyesight. The evidence at the
preliminary hearing was sufficient to hold Moqaddem to answer
to the charge of aggravated mayhem.

B. Moqaddem Has Not Shown Her Trial Counsel
Provided Ineffective Assistance
Moqaddem argues two of the attorneys who represented
her in the trial court, Halpern (“mainly”) and Sepe (whom she
describes as “unauthorized”), provided ineffective assistance of
counsel. She contends Halpern, among other things, “conducted

22
zero work” on the case, “engaged in intimidation of his own client
at his own residence to abuse and use her at his own home,” and
failed to review the recordings Pinto made of his phone
conversations with Moqaddem. As for Sepe, Moqaddem argues
he “rushed to Trial on such high charges without ever meeting
and discussing the case with” her and failed to object during the
prosecutor’s closing argument, which allowed “defamatory
statements and lies to be stated about [Moqaddem] right at the
closing statement before the verdict is decided that day . . . .” In
her appeal from the restitution order, Moqaddem argues: “The
records show clearly that Louis Sepe was planted by force by
Judge Burghardt to conduct Jury Trial that Sepe was ill prepared
for and sabotaged the entire case and life of [Moqaddem].”
Moqaddem forfeited all of these arguments. She does not
cite to the record where this purported conduct occurred. She
does not cite or analyze the law governing ineffective assistance
of counsel. And she does not apply that law to any evidence or
statements in the transcripts of the proceedings. (See People v.
Hoyt, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 939; People v. Williams, supra,
16 Cal.4th at p. 206; People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at
p. 793; People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 150; People v.
Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1098; People v. Benson,
supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1078, fn. 2; People v. Ramirez, supra,
104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 329-330; People v. Weber, supra,
217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1055; People v. Clayburg, supra,
211 Cal.App.4th at p. 93; People v. Johnigan, supra,
196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1098; People v. Roberto V., supra,
93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1364, fn. 6; People v. Beltran, supra,
82 Cal.App.4th at p. 697, fn. 5; People v. Mendoza, supra,
183 Cal.App.3d at p. 398.)

23
Moreover, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s
performance was deficient and that counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced the defendant. “‘A convicted defendant’s
claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require
reversal of a conviction . . . has two components. First, the
defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable.’ [Citation.] Regarding deficient performance, ‘“Unless a
defendant establishes the contrary, we shall presume that
‘counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professional
competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be
explained as a matter of sound trial strategy.’” [Citation.] When
the record on direct appeal sheds no light on why counsel failed to
act in the manner challenged, defendant must show that there
was “‘“no conceivable tactical purpose”’ for counsel’s act or
omission.”’” (People v. Aguirre (2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 679.)
Moqaddem has made neither of these showings. Halpern,
who represented Moqaddem from January 2020 (after Feldman)
to April 2022, filed a motion to disqualify the district attorney,
a motion under section 995 to dismiss the simple mayhem count,
appeared and represented Moqaddem at numerous court
hearings and bail reviews, requested discovery on the new
charges in the second amended information, expressed a doubt
under section 1368 regarding Moqaddem’s competence to stand

24
trial, explored mental health diversion for Moqaddem, obtained
and reviewed discovery, and tried to negotiate a plea agreement
that included probation. There is no evidence Halpern’s
performance was so deficient he was not functioning as
Moqaddem’s attorney.16 Moqaddem does not cite anything in the
record Halpern did wrong (she does not cite anything in the
record).
As for Sepe’s failure to object to statements by the
prosecutor during closing argument, Moqaddem does not state
what those statements were or what valid objections Sepe could
have made. Where, as here, “‘“‘the record on appeal sheds no
light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner
challenged[,] . . . unless counsel was asked for an explanation and
failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation,’ the claim on appeal must be rejected.”’”
(People v. Barrett (2025) 17 Cal.5th 897, 969.) “This rule ‘is
particularly apt’ where, as here, ‘the asserted deficiency arises
from defense counsel’s failure to object. “[D]eciding whether to
object is inherently tactical, and the failure to object will rarely
establish ineffective assistance.”’” (People v. Arredondo (2019)
8 Cal.5th 694, 711; see People v. Washington (2017)

16 Which is not to say Halpern did not make mistakes. In
April 2022 he moved to withdraw as Moqaddem’s counsel,
admitting he had sexual relations with Moqaddem in late 2020.
Moqaddem did not think there was a conflict and she did not
want Halpern to withdraw. She stated: “I’ve always spoken
highly of Mr. Halpern.” Halpern, however, said he felt he had to
withdraw because he had received threats from Murphy and
others that Moqaddem might sue him. Judge Birnstein relieved
Halpern, but stated, “This is not a Marsden hearing any longer.
This is very different,” and reported Halpern to the State Bar.

25
15 Cal.App.5th 19, 25 [“It is especially ‘difficult’ to prove
ineffective assistance ‘on direct appeal’ because courts ‘presum[e]
that counsel’s actions’ are reasonable and because the ‘record on
appeal may not explain why counsel chose to act as he or she
did.’”].)
We cannot evaluate whether the record sheds light on why
Sepe may have decided not to object to the prosecutor’s closing
argument or whether the prosecutor misstated the law or facts
because Moqaddem has not identified where in the record the
prosecutor made defamatory statements about her or misstated
the evidence, or even what those statements were. Sepe may well
have decided not to object because the prosecutor’s comments,
whatever they were, fell within the “wide latitude” prosecutors
have “during closing argument to comment on the evidence or
draw reasonable inferences from it.” (People v. Parker (2022)
13 Cal.5th 1, 79.) Therefore, her “ineffective assistance of counsel
claim predicated on the failure to object to [the prosecutor’s
alleged] misconduct fails.” (People v. Turner (2004) 34 Cal.4th
406, 431.)
Finally, Moqaddem had not shown anything Halpern or
Sepe did or failed to do prejudiced her case. She complains they
did not do enough work on the case and did not review Pinto’s
recordings of his conversations with Moqaddem. But Halpern
ceased representing Moqaddem in April 2022, leaving plenty of
time for Moqaddem’s subsequent lawyers (including Murphy,
from May 2022 to March 2023, and Sepe, from September 2023
through trial in February 2024) to do whatever they believed
needed to be done to prepare for trial, including reviewing Pinto’s

26
recordings of his telephone calls with Moqaddem.17 And though
there is no evidence when Sepe reviewed the recordings
(Moqaddem cites no evidence to support her claim he failed to
review them), he was sufficiently familiar with them at trial to
cross-examine Pinto about them extensively. For example, Sepe
got Pinto to admit that in one of the calls Moqaddem told him to
testify about anything he wanted to and to let the jury decide,
that some of the statements he made on the tapes were untrue,
that Pinto would be able to use the recordings in his civil action
against Moqaddem, and that Pinto deleted some of the
recordings. Moqaddem has not shown that, if Halpern or Sepe
had done any of the things she asserts they should have done, the
result of the trial would have been any different. (See People v.
Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198 [“To demonstrate prejudice,
defendant bears the burden of showing a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different.”].)

C. Moqaddem Has Not Shown Any Error in Jury
Selection
Moqaddem argues that the trial court deprived her of her
right to an impartial jury of her peers because the jurors “were
handpicked to be all linked to Law firms, police officers’ relatives
and District attorneys’ relatives.” Moqaddem also asserts “one of
the Jurors was eliminated by Sepe on Friday Afternoon final day

17 The People gave the defense a copy of the recordings no
later than April 2022.

27
of Jury selection, but somehow returned on Monday to serve as
one of the Jurors.”
Moqaddem forfeited these arguments. She does not cite to
information in the record about the prospective jurors, their
employment, or their relationships or experiences with law
enforcement or lawyers. She does not present any analysis or
citation to authority to support her claim of impropriety in jury
selection. She does not cite any statements by the prospective
jurors during voir dire that indicate any of them could not be fair
or impartial. And while empaneling a juror who been excused
would be irregular, Moqaddem does not cite anything in the
record suggesting that occurred.
Jury selection occurred on Wednesday, January 31, 2024
(hardship), Thursday, February 1, 2024, and the afternoon of
Friday, February 2, 2024. The court clerk swore in a panel of
12 jurors and four alternate jurors on that Friday. When trial
resumed Monday, February 5, 2024, the trial court denied a
defense motion to continue the trial, granted a motion by the
People to admit Pinto’s recordings of his telephone calls with
Moqaddem, held a hearing under Evidence Code section 402, and
ruled on the admissibility of evidence regarding the purchase of a
car Moqaddem claimed she bought and complaints to the State
Bar about Pinto. Then the jurors entered the courtroom, counsel
made opening statements, and the People called their first
witness, Pinto. Later the court held another hearing on the
admissibility of evidence Pinto solicited Moqaddem as a client at
a courthouse. There was no mention of or indication any of the
excused jurors were sitting on the panel or as alternate jurors.
At one point Sepe asked the court to inquire about an individual
in the audience who had been observing the proceedings. The

28
court asked the individual if he was a witness in the case, the
man stated he was not, and the court said he could sit and watch
the trial.

D. Moqaddem Has Not Shown Any Error in Her
Sentence
As stated, the trial court sentenced Moqaddem to a prison
term of two years, plus life with the possibility of parole. In
challenging her sentence Moqaddem argues (1) the trial judge
“signaled to his Deputy to move the notes from [her] hand who
was deprived from reading her notes for the records”; (2) the
sentencing hearing “took place without her presence”; (3) the
court relied on a “probation false report” that “had absolutely
nothing to do with this case, is not even signed by any probation
officer, is outdated to 2017, is false on its face and not stamped by
the court nor any Judge, and somehow ended up part of the
records in this case”; and (4) “there was no mention at all by
Sepe, nor the court and DA, that as a matter of evidence
[Moqaddem] was already pre punished because of this case . . .
for 4 years jail time that she already served in 2018, that
consisted of 3 years jail time, plus 1 year jail time of 54 weeks
Domestic Violence Classes . . . .” These arguments, to the extent
we can understand them, lack merit.
As a preliminary matter, Moqaddem does not cite to the
record where the trial court, the prosecutor, or defense counsel
did or failed to do any of the things she asserts occurred. She
does not present any legal argument, citations to authority, or
citations to the record that the court directed the courtroom
deputy to take any actions, that the sentencing hearing occurred
in her absence, that the court relied on a probation report from

29
another case (let alone a false one), or that she was
inappropriately punished for her convictions. Therefore, as with
her challenges to her convictions, Moqaddem’s challenges to her
sentence are all forfeited.
Moqaddem’s arguments also fail on the merits. At the
sentencing hearing (which began with a hearing on Moqaddem’s
motion for a new trial) Moqaddem, though represented by
counsel, interrupted the proceedings and made long speeches
about the merits of her convictions (as she had throughout the
trial). The trial court patiently allowed Moqaddem to make
statements and arguments that essentially sought to relitigate
the trial. At one point, after Moqaddem had been speaking for
some time, the trial court said to her, “If you don’t stop talking,
I’m going to exclude you from the courtroom. I’ll give you five
more minutes. But I’m telling you, you have to be done in five
minutes.” After allowing Moqaddem to speak for an additional
period of time, the court stated: “Ma’am, we need to proceed,
okay? I’ve given you ample time. You can put everything else in
your appeal. So we’re going to go forward with the [motion for
new trial] now.” Moqaddem stated that she did not authorize
Sepe to file a motion for a new trial and that “the deputy is
touching my paper.” The court stated: “Ma’am, if you don’t stop
talking, I’m going to have to exclude you from the courtroom and
sentence you without you being present. I don’t want to do that,
but you need to stop talking. I’ve given you an opportunity to
speak. Now you have to let everyone else speak.”
After the court denied the motion for new trial, while Pinto
was making his victim impact statement, and after the court
asked someone in the courtroom affiliated with Moqaddem to
stop recording the proceedings, Moqaddem interrupted again.

30
The court stated, “Alright, Ma’am. If you continue to speak, I’m
going to have to exclude you.” Moqaddem interrupted the court
again. The trial court then excluded Moqaddem from the
courtroom.
The record reflects (at most) the courtroom deputy touched
Moqaddem’s notes, not that the deputy took her notes from her.
And even if the deputy had taken her notes, she did not need
them for the rest of the hearing because the trial court was forced
to remove her from the courtroom for refusing to control her
behavior. And though removing a defendant from the courtroom
is an extreme measure, Moqaddem does not explain why the trial
court abused its discretion in removing her from the courtroom
under the circumstances. (See § 1043, subd. (b)(1) [trial court
may remove a defendant from the courtroom where “the
defendant, after being warned by the judge that they will be
removed if they continue their disruptive behavior, nevertheless
insists on acting in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and
disrespectful of the court that the trial cannot be carried on with
the defendant present in the courtroom”]; People v. Carson (2005)
35 Cal.4th 1, 9 [“a defendant represented by counsel may be
removed from the courtroom for disruptive behavior”]; People v.
Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 737 [“an unduly disruptive
defendant, after being warned, may be removed from the
courtroom until he ‘reclaims’ his right to be present by expressing
his willingness to conduct himself properly”].)
On whether the trial court relied on a false probation
report, the only mention of probation at the sentencing hearing
was when the court, in imposing (and staying under section 654
execution of) the middle term of two years (rather than the lower
term) on her conviction for attempting to bribe a witness, stated

31
Moqaddem was on probation at the time she committed the
crimes in this case and that her performance on probation was
unsatisfactory. Moqaddem was in fact on probation for a
2017 conviction for taking, keeping, or concealing a child and
maliciously depriving a lawful custodian of a right to custody or
visitation, in violation of section 278.5. The trial court did not err
in considering that factor in imposing the middle term on that
conviction. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(4) & (5).)
Finally, regarding whether Moqaddem had been
inappropriately punished or “pre-punished” for her convictions in
this case, the court stated, for each conviction, what term the
court was imposing, the reasons for its discretionary choices, and
whether each term was consecutive, concurrent, or stayed under
section 654. (See People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042
[“Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court
knew the law and followed it.”]; People v. Gutierrez (2014)
58 Cal.4th 1354, 1390 [“Absent evidence to the contrary, we
presume that the trial court knew and applied the governing
law.”].) For most of Moqaddem’s convictions (the court dismissed
her conviction for simple mayhem as a lesser included offense),
the court imposed a concurrent term or stayed execution of
sentence under section 654. The court awarded her 1,049 days
(more than two and a half years) of actual and conduct credit. It
is hard to discern what Moqaddem is claiming the court did
wrong. She states: “The time served prior sentencing is doubled
in time of 16 months total, plus four years and four months jail
time as of April 11, 2024, that is not what was stated by State
Court Judge, of only three years jail time falsely stated to have
been served, that is another fatal and gross error by State Court
to cheat [Moqaddem] of and [sic] entire additional 2 years and

32
4 months served in this case as of April 11, 2024.” But it’s not
clear what that means.

E. Moqaddem Has Not Shown Any Error in the
Restitution Award
Moqaddem challenges the court’s order requiring her to pay
Pinto $188,057.86 in victim restitution and $70,000 to the
California Victim Compensation Board. She contends: “This
Appeal is based in absolute ineffective counsel, violation of clear
conflict of interest between the entire LACBA with Louis Sepe
who are not authorized by matter of Law to pose by force or by
any other as counsels of [Moqaddem] from Lawsuits filed against
them by [Moqaddem] and serious complaints, that also causes a
clear conflict of interest.” And: “The conduct of Sepe was
outrageous, unheard of before in any court system that is
determined by the facts that no one can dispute. Any decent and
honest Attorney would have objected and refused to participate
at a hearing on restitution when he is not authorized by the
client to do so and when there a clear conflict of interest. Sepe
has done just the opposit [sic] to cause further harm and damage
to [Moqaddem]. His actions were willful, intentional, deliberate,
malicious and vindictive.”
Moqaddem again forfeited her contentions by failing to
present a coherent argument, cite to the record, or cite to relevant
authority. Though Moqaddem cites a case, Culpepper v. Pearl
Street Bldg., Inc. (Colo. 1994) 877 P.2d 877, it has no relevance to
the issues in this appeal.18 Her contentions are also meritless:

18 In Culpepper the Colorado Supreme Court held parents of
an adult son could not maintain an action for (Colorado’s

33
Sepe was appointed by the court to represent Moqaddem after
Murphy was removed for incompetence. Sepe represented
Moqaddem at the restitution hearing, cross-examined Pinto, and
successfully argued the court should not award some of the items
Pinto claimed as restitution.
Moqaddem also argues (more or less) the evidence at the
restitution hearing did not support the award. She contends:
“Without actual damages documented with medical records and
photos of injury at the date it was issued and the financial
hardship caused by Pinto to [Moqaddem] and the massive theft of
over $400,000 by Pinto of [Moqaddem’s] valuable jewelry and
property, his criminal trespassing should not have awarded this
substantial amount to Pinto, and this hearing should not have
taken place without the attorney of record in this case. Only
nominal damages could have been awarded.” Moqaddem
forfeited this argument, too, by failing to present it cogently and
with citations to authority and the record.
Moqaddem is also incorrect. Under section 1202.4,
subdivision (f), “[w]hen a crime victim has suffered an economic
loss because of the defendant’s conduct, the trial court must order
full restitution to the victim. [Citation.] Courts broadly construe
the right to restitution. [Citation.] We review a restitution order
for abuse of discretion, and we must uphold the amount of
restitution if there is a factual and rational basis for it.” (People
v. Anderson (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1256, 1260.) “‘“[W]here the
specific issue is whether the court’s factual findings support

equivalent of) intentional infliction of emotional distress against
a crematorium that had mistakenly cremated the wrong body.
(Culpepper v. Pearl Street Bldg., Inc., supra, 877 P.2d at pp. 878-
879.)

34
restitution, we review those findings for substantial evidence.”’”
(People v. Plains All American Pipeline, L.P. (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 872, 885-886.)
At the restitution hearing Pinto described the expenses he
incurred as a result of Moqaddem’s crimes. He testified his
claimed restitution amounts included $30,000 for the lost corneal
transplants, $28,268.29 in hospital expenses, $15,165 in
physician charges from his treatment in the hospital, $1,605.57
in follow-up medical appointments and procedures, $100,000 in
lost wages when he was unable to work after the incident, $5,700
for a prosthetic eye, and $1,296 in counseling (16 sessions), some
of which was paid by the California Victim’s Compensation Fund.
Pinto provided receipts and other documentation to support his
claim for restitution. Substantial evidence supported the trial
court’s findings, and the court did not abuse its discretion in
ordering Moqaddem to pay victim restitution.
Finally, Moqaddem states the restitution hearing “should
not have taken place without the attorney of record.” At the
restitution hearing, after filing another motion to disqualify
Judge Burghardt, Moqaddem stated she had filed a substitution
of attorney to substitute Murphy for Sepe, and Sepe said he had
received a substitution of attorney naming Murphy as
Moqaddem’s attorney. The court pointed out, however, that
Murphy had been removed from the case and that the court
would not permit Murphy to substitute back in as Moqaddem’s
attorney. The court also observed Murphy was not present in
court for the restitution hearing.19

19 Moqaddem suggests she was “deprived of her right to at a
minimum be able to represent herself at this hearing that she

35
DISPOSITION

The judgment and restitution orders are affirmed.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

STONE, J.

has every right to do, but was deprived from that too.”
Moqaddem, however, did not move to represent herself at the
restitution hearing, though during the trial the court had denied
such a motion. Moqaddem walked out of the courtroom and
voluntarily absented herself from the restitution proceedings
before Pinto testified.

36

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