Brown v. Mansueto CA4/3

CourtListener 10856178Calctapp8 mai 2026

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Filed 5/7/26 Brown v. Mansueto CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

SUSAN J. BROWN, as Trustee, etc.,

Respondent, G066603

v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2008-00152252)

ROBERT F. MANSUETO, OPINION

Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Olga Alvarez, Judge. Affirmed. Motion for sanctions. Denied. Requests for
judicial notice. Denied.
Robert F. Mansueto, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Buchalter, Robert M. Dato; Greenberg Traurig, LLP and
Catherine Swafford for Respondent.
Appellant Robert F. Mansueto (Brother) appeals from an order
granting the petition of respondent Susan J. Brown (Sister) and removing
him as cotrustee of their parents’ trust. We conclude the trial court
permissibly found Brother waived any objection to the petition by failing to
file an objection and instead merely opposing an ex parte application.
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
The parties to this case are siblings whose parents died in 2006
and 2008. The parties settled previous litigation over their parents’ trust by
agreeing to serve as cotrustees of the trust and permitting Brother to live in
their parents’ former home with his family so long as he complied with the
agreement. Brother further agreed to pay $400,000 to Sister by January
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2014, secured by the parents’ former home.
Over the years, Brother made various payments but as the due
date approached, more than half the total remained outstanding. The parties
agreed to extend the time for payment to January 2019. Brother made more

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Brother requests we take judicial notice of the 2010 settlement
agreement, the order granting entry of stipulated judgment against him and
in Sister’s favor, Brother’s opposition to Sister’s ex parte application, a notice
of hearing, an April 9, 2024 minute order authorizing Sister to evict Brother
and sell the property, and the order challenged by this appeal. That request
is denied, as these documents are either already a part of the record on
appeal or are irrelevant to the appeal. Brother also separately requests we
take judicial notice of excerpts from the underlying trust and 2010 settlement
agreement. That request is also denied for the same reasons we denied the
first request. Brother also requests we take judicial notice of certain orders
entered by the trial court after the order that is the subject of this appeal.
That request is also denied, as those orders have no relevance to the dispute
in this appeal. Shortly before oral argument, Brother also filed a Notice of
Subsequent Developments Relevant to Pending Appeal. This document does
not include a request for any sort of relief; we take no action in response to it.

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payments but did not pay the full amount by the due date, at which time
$66,778.23 remained due. At that point, interest and late fees began accruing
according to the terms of the agreement. By February 2024, Brother owed
Sister $111,297.04.
Sister filed a new petition seeking orders removing Brother as
cotrustee of the parents’ trust, authorizing Sister to evict any occupants of
their parents’ former home, and awarding attorney fees.
Sister filed an ex parte application seeking suspension of
Brother’s trustee powers in February 2024, though the application itself is
not in the record. Brother opposed the ex parte, arguing his parents did not
want the house to be sold, that he needed to live in the home to care for the
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parties’ disabled sister (not a party to this case), that the underlying
settlement should be set aside, that Sister violated the settlement agreement,
and that there was no emergency justifying ex parte relief. The trial court
granted the application and suspended Brother’s cotrustee powers.
At a May 2024 initial hearing on the petition, the trial court
noted no written objections to the petition had yet been filed and warned
Brother that “if he fail[ed] to serve and file a timely objection or response by
08/01/2024, the Court may deem such objection or response waived.” The
court continued the hearing for nearly three months.
At the August 2024 hearing, the trial court found Brother failed
to file a written objection. The court told the parties it had previously set a
deadline for written objections and had not received a written objection.
Brother asked for a continuance, explaining he believed he had filed

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The record shows the parties’ disabled sister presently lives in a
managed care facility, but Brother also contended she should be moved to live
in the home with him.

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objections in the body of a separate petition he had previously filed against
Sister, describing it as “excusable neglect” on his part. He denied
understanding that there was a deadline for the filing of written objections.
The trial court then placed Brother under oath and asked him why he did not
file timely written objections. Brother responded that he was overwhelmed by
his various responsibilities relating to the trust and the parties’ disabled
sister. The trial court found there was no mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect, and deemed the objections waived.
Accordingly, the trial court granted Sister’s petition, removed
Brother as cotrustee of the trust, permitted Sister to evict any remaining
occupants of the parents’ former home, and awarded attorney fees to Sister in
an amount to be determined.
DISCUSSION
Orders removing a trustee are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
(Trolan v. Trolan (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 939, 957.) Regardless of the standard
of review, we presume the trial court’s decision is correct; it is the appellant’s
burden to demonstrate via an adequate record that the trial court erred.
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 (Jameson).) If the record on
appeal is inadequate to evaluate the merits of an issue raised by the
appellant, “‘“the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should
be affirmed.”’” (Id. at p. 609.)
Objections to petitions in probate court are governed by Probate
Code section 1043. Subdivision (b) of that section allows objections to be
raised orally at the initial hearing and allows the trial court to grant a
continuance for the purpose of allowing an objection to be made in writing. “If
the court continues a matter to allow a written objection or response to be
made, and the responding or objecting party fails to serve and file a timely

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objection or response, the court may deem the objections or responses
waived.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.801.) That is what happened here.
We disagree with Brother’s claim that he effectively objected to
the petition by opposing the ex parte application. He cites no authority for
this proposition and we find none. An opposition to an ex parte application in
probate court is not the same as an opposition to the underlying petition, in
the same way that an opposition to a request for a temporary restraining
order is not a substitute for an answer to the underlying complaint. Brother’s
opposition is unambiguously and expressly directed to Sister’s ex parte
application, not to the petition.
Moreover, the timeline does not support appellant’s version of
events. Brother filed his opposition to the ex parte application in March 2024.
The trial court informed Brother that he had not filed an objection to the
petition on May 21, 2024, and set a deadline for him to do so, warning him of
the consequences of failing to meet it: “the Court may deem such objection or
response waived.” Had Brother believed his opposition adequately objected to
the petition, he could have said so at that time. The court even continued the
hearing on the petition from May to August. Yet at the final hearing, Brother
still did not assert his opposition was a sufficient objection, instead
suggesting that his objection was contained in a separate petition he filed
against Sister (a contention he has not raised before this court) and
requesting a further continuance to fix this “defect,” which he argued was the
result of his being “overwhelmed” by responsibilities relating to the trust and

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his disabled sister. The trial court acted well within its authority by
“deem[ing] the objections or responses waived.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
7.801.)
Briefly in the “Introduction” section of his opening brief, Brother
asserts the parties’ disabled sister will be adversely affected by the trial
court’s ruling, potentially in violation of one or more trust provisions. He
neither raised this below nor supports it with a meaningful legal basis and
citations to the record. (See Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.)
The only remaining issue is Sister’s motion for sanctions.
Sanctions for a frivolous appeal are appropriate where either “it is prosecuted
for an improper motive—to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an
adverse judgment—or when it indisputably has no merit—when any
reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely
without merit.” (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650.) These
two standards buttress each other: for example, “the total lack of merit of an
appeal is viewed as evidence that [the] appellant must have intended it only
for delay.” (Id. at p. 649.)
Sister argues this appeal meets either standard for a frivolous
appeal. She points out that Brother was expressly directed to file a proper
opposition by a date certain, was warned that failure to do so might lead to
the trial court granting her petition, and yet now appeals anyway. Sister also
points to Brother’s repeated petitions for supersedeas, all of which were

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For the same reasons, we disagree with Brother’s contention
that the trial court violated either his due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
section 7 of the California Constitution, or Probate Code sections 15642 and
17200.

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denied, as evidence of appellant’s subjective intent to utilize the appellate
process for the illegitimate purpose of delay.
This is a close call, but we decline to impose sanctions. We see a
genuine effort by Brother to overturn the trial court’s decision that confuses
procedural devices but is not wholly unreasonable. Similarly, any inference of
delay from Brother’s repeated supersedeas petitions is rebutted by his motion
for calendar preference—a request to speed up this proceeding.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
Respondent shall recover her costs on appeal.

SCOTT, J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

GOODING, J.

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