CourtListener 10855944•People v. Foster CA2/8
Texte intégral
Filed 5/7/26 P. v. Foster CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B337548
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA159188)
v.
EMMANUEL MIRRIEN FOSTER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Connie R. Quinones, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded with directions.
Judith Kahn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer and Michael C. Keller, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
**********
A jury found defendant and appellant Emmanuel Mirrien
Foster guilty of one count of first degree murder, and found true the
allegation he personally used a firearm in the commission of the
murder. The jury also found defendant guilty of one count of
shooting at an inhabited dwelling. Defendant received a sentence of
35 years to life plus 1 year 8 months.
Defendant challenges his conviction, arguing the trial court
committed prejudicial error in admitting his pretrial statements to
an undercover informant during what is commonly referred to as a
Perkins operation. (Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292
(Perkins).) Defendant contends the court also erred in admitting
pretrial statements made by codefendant Willie Jones in a separate
Perkins operation. Finally, defendant says that if we do not reverse
his convictions due to the admission of the pretrial statements, then
we should remand for resentencing due to several sentencing
errors.
As we explain below, we conclude remand for a full
resentencing hearing is warranted. We otherwise affirm the
judgment of conviction in its entirety.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On October 30, 2022, Robert Walton was fatally shot on South
Clymar Avenue in Compton. Defendant and codefendant Jones
were arrested and charged with one count of murder (Pen. Code,
§ 187, subd. (a);1 count 1). Defendant was also charged with
one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246; count 2).
As to count 1, defendant was alleged to have personally used a
firearm in the commission of the murder within the meaning of
section 12022.5, subdivision (a). The People also alleged multiple
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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aggravating factors. (Cal. Rules of Court, 4.421(a)(1)–(a)(3) &
(b)(1).) Jones is not a party to this appeal. Evidence at the joint
jury trial established the following facts material to our discussion.
1. Testimony of the victim’s girlfriend I.H.
In October 2022, I.H. had been dating Walton for about three
years. Walton’s nickname was Nuskii, and he drove a white
Mercedes-Benz. I.H. also knew defendant and codefendant Jones.
Defendant, who went by the moniker Active, had once lived in the
same apartment complex as I.H. As for Jones, I.H. had known him
and most of his family since she was a child. Jones was often called
Nu-Nu or Tiny Hands. Jones’s brother Lorenzo had been killed
sometime in 2020. I.H. knew Jones had a motorcycle and had seen
him riding it numerous times in the neighborhood, including on the
afternoon of October 30, 2022.
I.H. knew the Fruit Town gang was active in her
neighborhood. She said some of her family members were involved
with the gang, but she denied any gang affiliation.
On October 30, 2022, Halloween festivities were held at
Gonzales Park in Compton. Around 1:00 that afternoon, I.H. went
to Gonzales Park with her friend S.T. (who was dating defendant),
Yolanda K. (I.H’s half sister), and Nikendra C. (a friend of
Yolanda’s). Nikendra drove them. Over the course of the afternoon,
they left briefly to go to a nearby marijuana shop and to pick up
some takeout food. I.H. admitted to smoking weed that afternoon.
She said defendant and Jones were also at the park. I.H. recalled
that defendant was wearing a red jacket, and Jones a black hoodie.
I.H. had been texting with Walton throughout the day, mostly
arguing. Sometime around 6:00 p.m., the four women left the park
and returned to the marijuana shop in Nikendra’s car. Walton
drove up in his Mercedes. I.H. got out of the car to go see Walton,
but he yelled at her from his window and threw a drink at her. I.H.
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threw her phone at his car as he drove off. The other women urged
I.H. to get back in the car with them. She did briefly, but then
asked to be let out of the car. She walked to Walton’s house to see if
he had gone home, but his car was not there. As she was walking
along Clymar Avenue, she called Walton, and he drove up. They
continued to argue. Their argument escalated to a point where
Walton drove towards I.H. as if to hit her, and I.H. threw rocks at
the car.
While they were still arguing, Yolanda, Nikendra and S.T.
arrived. Yolanda told I.H. to get back in the car with them, but I.H.
told them to leave. I.H. tried to get into Walton’s car, but he pulled
away before she could close the door and she fell to the ground.
Shortly thereafter, I.H. heard six to seven gunshots, “spaced out.”
She ran to Nikendra’s car and got in. After they drove a short
distance, I.H. said she was worried about Walton and wanted to go
back. Nikendra refused, and I.H. demanded to be let out. S.T. got
out with her, and I.H. ran back to Clymar Avenue.
I.H. saw a black motorcycle with a big front headlight and two
people on it, driving down Clymar Avenue. She recognized the
motorcycle as Jones’s bike. She could not see the faces of the people
on the motorcycle. But I.H. believed the back passenger was
defendant based on his size and the thick hair sticking out of his
hoodie. The driver was wearing a black jacket and black beanie.
When I.H. finally got to the end of Clymar Avenue, she saw
Walton’s car had crashed into a light pole. Walton was not inside
the car. Shortly thereafter, S.T. arrived. She called 911 and stayed
with I.H. until the police arrived.
I.H. spoke with the police several times about what happened.
She said she was scared and did not want someone to “do
something” to her for talking, so she initially did not say much.
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But she later told the detectives what she saw that day, including
that Jones had been at the park on his motorcycle.
2. Other evidence
S.T. testified that she knew Jones rode a motorcycle and even
had a video on her cell phone of Jones on the bike. She admitted
hearing gunshots ring out on Clymar Avenue and she heard a
motorcycle, but she did not see any motorcycle and could not
identify the shooter. S.T. said she felt pressured by the detectives
to “say[ ] something” and that is why she told them that defendant
had killed Walton, even though that was wrong and she had not
seen what happened. She denied being in a dating relationship
with defendant.
Two residents on South Clymer Avenue also testified. D.B.
had lived on South Clymer Avenue for many years, and was at
home with her sister on October 30, 2022. She recalled hearing a
lot of screaming, a loud crash, and “some popping” noises which she
and her sister believed to be gunshots or firecrackers. They got
down and stayed away from the windows. Afterward, a bullet hole
was found in the wall of her front porch near the garage.
S.A. testified he was with his children in his car outside his
home, getting ready to leave when he saw a young woman on the
street yelling and arguing with a man in a white car. They got
fairly loud and animated, so S.A. was waiting for them to leave
before he drove off. He then heard gunshots and initially thought
the man in the white car had shot at the woman because she
started running. At that point, he saw the headlight of a motorcycle
heading in the same direction as the car. The car eventually
crashed and S.A. heard some additional gunshots. S.A. gave the
video footage from the security cameras on his house to the police.
When officers arrived on the scene, they found a white
Mercedes-Benz crashed into a light pole near the intersection of
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South Clymar Avenue and 145th Street. There was no one inside
the car. Walton’s body was eventually located near a residence
farther up the street. It was later determined that Walton died
from multiple gunshot wounds, including to the right neck, right
chest, and left arm.
Several expended shell casings and live rounds were
recovered at the scene and tested for DNA. Defendant was
determined to be a contributor to the DNA found on one of the
casings, along with two other unknown contributors. All of the
fired shell casings and live rounds were the same caliber: 5.7 by
28 millimeters. The most common manufacturers of firearms that
used that size ammunition were FN and Ruger. All of the live
rounds recovered at the scene had blue tips.
Video footage from several security cameras recovered during
the investigation captured some of the events on Clymar Avenue
that evening, including the argument between I.H. and Walton.
Another video showed the arrival of a dark motorcycle with two
riders. The footage recovered did not show the shooting or the car
crash, but some footage captured an individual running across the
front yard of a home and eventually jumping onto the back of the
motorcycle, which then sped from the scene. One video that also
contained audio captured Walton leaning out of the window of his
car and yelling toward I.H. and the other women, “Fuck y’all dead
homies.” That video also captured a motorcycle with two
passengers accelerating at a high rate of speed down Clymar
Avenue, the sound of screeching tires followed by gunshots and the
sound of a car crashing.
Mapping of cell phone data showed that both defendant’s and
Jones’s cell phones were using cell towers in the vicinity of the
murder scene during the timeframe when the shooting occurred.
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Detective Robert McGaughey of the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department, one of the lead detectives in the case, testified
that during her second interview, I.H. identified Jones as the driver
of the motorcycle and defendant as the passenger. Additional
testimony confirmed that Jones’s brother Lorenzo was fatally shot
in December 2020.
3. Perkins statements by defendant and Jones
Detective McGaughey testified about the pretrial statements
obtained from defendant and Jones.
Detective McGaughey explained that after defendant was
detained in December 2022, he was placed in a cell with an
informant “posing as an inmate” during the Perkins operation.
The informant was instructed to converse with defendant about the
shooting. The cell in which the operation took place had a recording
device, and the informant was also equipped with an undercover
recording device to capture any conversations with defendant. The
recordings of those conversations were played for the jury.
A month later, a similar operation was conducted with Jones
and his statements were also introduced into evidence.
We reserve a more detailed discussion of the statements and
admissions made by defendant and Jones to parts 1 and 2 of the
Discussion below.
4. Verdict and sentencing
The jury found defendant guilty as charged. Defendant
waived his right to a jury trial on the aggravating factors. The
court found all aggravating factors true, except for the allegation
the victim was particularly vulnerable.
The court sentenced defendant to 35 years to life plus 1 year
8 months, calculated as follows: a term of 25 years to life on
count 1; plus a consecutive 10-year upper term for the firearm
enhancement; plus a consecutive term of one year eight months
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(one-third the midterm) on count 2. The court awarded defendant
547 total days of presentence custody credits (476 actual & 71
conduct).
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
1. Admission of defendant’s Perkins statements
Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial
error in admitting his statements to the undercover informant
during the Perkins operation. We are not persuaded.
1.1 Background
After his detention, defendant was placed in a holding cell
with an undercover informant posing as an inmate and a member of
the Brim gang. We will refer to the informant as the Perkins agent.
Defendant casually spoke with the Perkins agent for a period
of time and then Detective McGaughey stopped by to tell defendant
that his partner was running late, but that once he arrived they
would be talking to him about the murder of Nuskii that had taken
place before Halloween. The detective told defendant he had
already spoken to I.H., S.T., Yolanda, Nikendra and Jones.
Once Detective McGaughey left, the Perkins agent and
defendant resumed talking. There were periods of silence and lots
of unintelligible comments not clearly picked up by the recording
device.
The Perkins agent told defendant, “It sounds like somebody
telling.” Defendant said he felt like he was going to be sick.
Defendant said, “He’s gonna ask where was I at that night, all that
type of shit.” The Perkins agent asked defendant if he had any “shit
at your house that puts you there” like a “Strap and all that?”
Defendant responded, “Nothing. None of that.” When asked if any
license plates could place him at the scene, defendant said, “I wasn’t
driving.”
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The Perkins agent repeated at several different points in the
conversation that it sounded like someone must be snitching or
talking. At one point, defendant told the Perkins agent, “[T]hat’s
what I’m telling you. I shut that nigga up.” The comments directly
preceding that statement are largely unintelligible.
Defendant was then removed from the cell for an interview
with the detectives. When he returned, defendant told the Perkins
agent the detectives were saying his girlfriend was talking, they
had surveillance video, and he would not be seeing the light of day
again. Defendant then added that the detectives “got nothing.”
The Perkins agent told defendant he hoped defendant got rid
of the “whip.” Defendant responded by saying the other guy got rid
of it, that it was not even his “shit,” and referenced being on a
motorcycle. When asked if the motorcycle had been dealt with,
defendant said the detectives told him the motorcycle was at Jones’s
“baby mama’s house.” At some point, defendant asked the Perkins
agent if he knew of a firearm called an “FN,” and ammunition
called “five seven” with blue tips.
Defendant said the detectives were talking like they had a
bunch of evidence, but they “didn’t show me nothing.” He said he
told the detectives he smoked a lot of weed that day and did not
remember anything.
There is another section of largely unintelligible comments,
followed by defendant telling the Perkins agent that “this nigga, he
said ‘fuck the dead homies.’ … [H]e go and say, ‘Fuck the dead
homies’ … because he got into it with his bitch … I’m tired of that
shit, bro.”
The Perkins agent asked if the victim died at the scene and
defendant said, “hell yeah.” A detective returned to the cell and
showed defendant a photograph. After the detective left, the
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Perkins agent asked defendant about the photograph and defendant
said “that’s the nigga that was driving when we hit Nuski[i].”
1.2 Forfeiture
The People urge us to find defendant forfeited his argument
by failing to specifically raise an objection based on Miranda v.
Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 or Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S.
477 (Edwards) in the trial court. We decline to do so.
The parties presented and argued pretrial motions on the
admissibility of the pretrial statements made by both defendant
and Jones. In explaining its ruling on the motions, the trial court
referenced the relevance of Perkins and California law following
Perkins. Among other things, the court noted both men believed
they were talking to fellow inmates and concluded the statements
did not violate Miranda. Moreover, at the time of defendant’s trial
in December 2023 and January 2024, our Supreme Court had
declined to review the issue of if and how an undercover Perkins
operation is affected by a suspect’s prior invocation of Miranda
rights. (See, e.g., People v. Valencia, review den. Dec. 11, 2019,
S25803).) After defendant’s trial and while this appeal was
pending, the Supreme Court granted review in People v. Allen,
review granted November 20, 2024, S286520. The issue remains
under consideration.
We therefore decline to find forfeiture and will resolve the
merits of defendant’s claim. (People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 14
[“Asking attorneys at the trial level to predict that our court might
in the future overrule its prior precedent—or risk forfeiting
constitutional claims of their clients—simply requires too much”];
People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908, fn. 6 [“Because the
question whether defendants have preserved their right to raise
this issue on appeal is close and difficult, we assume [they] have
preserved their right, and proceed to the merits”].)
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1.3 Analysis
Perkins explains that “Miranda forbids coercion, not mere
strategic deception by taking advantage of a suspect’s misplaced
trust in one he supposes to be a fellow prisoner. As we recognized
in Miranda, ‘confessions remain a proper element in law
enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without
any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.’
[Citation.] Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense
of security that do not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to
speak are not within Miranda’s concerns.” (Perkins, supra,
496 U.S. at p. 297.)
Defendant acknowledges the holding in Perkins, as well as
California law that has followed Perkins, including this court’s
decision in People v. Felix (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 439, 451 (Felix).
(See also People v. Orozco (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 802, 813–815.) But
defendant nonetheless urges us to reconsider Felix and, instead, to
follow the dissent in Felix.
The dissent in Felix, which hinged its analysis on Edwards, is
of no assistance to defendant. Edwards held that “when an accused
has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial
interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by
showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial
interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.” (Edwards,
supra, 451 U.S. at p. 484, italics added.) Because there was no
dispute in Felix that the defendant invoked his right to counsel
during his initial police interrogation, the dissent in Felix concluded
that Edwards controlled, and a valid waiver of that asserted right
was required before any further questioning could occur, even
under the guise of a Perkins operation. (Felix, supra,
100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 453–454 (dis. opn. of Stratton, P. J.).)
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Here, the record contains no evidence that defendant invoked
his right to counsel during his interview with the detectives or at
any other time. The detective testified to reading defendant his
Miranda rights, getting his background information, and talking
generally about the night of the shooting and then returning
defendant to the holding cell. But there is no testimony or other
evidence demonstrating that defendant invoked his right to counsel
before returning to the cell and resuming his conversation with the
Perkins agent.
Defendant’s own statements to the Perkins agent once he
returned to the cell appear to indicate he did not decline to talk
with the detectives or assert any right to counsel, but rather, that
he did not say much to the detectives, telling them that he did not
remember anything because he had smoked a lot of weed that day.
Recently, People v. Zapata (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 529, like
the dissent in Felix, concluded that Edwards controlled the
analysis. But there, like Felix, the defendant also clearly invoked
his right to counsel. (Zapata, at p. 534.) Zapata therefore does not
provide any basis for finding the trial court erred in admitting
defendant’s statements to the Perkins agent. Defendant states no
other bases for disregarding Perkins and its progeny on our facts.
Accordingly, we conclude defendant’s uncoerced statements to
the Perkins agent were properly admitted.
2. Admission of codefendant Jones’s statements
Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in
admitting pretrial statements made by Jones, over defense
objection, because they were not statements against his penal
interest and therefore inadmissible hearsay. We conclude any error
in admitting Jones’s statement was harmless.
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2.1 Background
The detectives conducted a separate Perkins operation with
Jones using an undercover informant posing as an inmate and
wearing a recording device. As we did above, we will refer to the
undercover informant as the Perkins agent.
When he first started talking to the Perkins agent, Jones
identified himself as a member of the Fruit Town gang.
Throughout his conversation with the Perkins agent, Jones
repeatedly denied any involvement in any shooting, and asserted
that others must be snitching and lying. Jones said he did not
know Nuskii from the Bounty Hunters. He said the night Nuskii
was killed, he was at a nightclub in downtown.
Later in the conversation, Jones told the Perkins agent that
the detective had been “just throwing some shit.” He said the
detective asked him, “ ‘What’s up with Active? … You all know
what’s up … He in jail.’ ” The Perkins agent then asked Jones
whether he thought defendant “might be saying something?” Jones
said he did not know, but that defendant “can’t say nothing unless
he just rat his self out with this to try to get me to do time with
him.” Jones continued, saying “And he’s the one that did it. I ain’t
did shit.” Jones insisted he did not drive defendant anywhere and
did not pull the trigger. “I was no driver.”
Jones was subsequently interviewed by detectives and read
his Miranda rights. Jones talked with the detectives without
requesting counsel. Jones acknowledged that his brother Lorenzo
had been killed by members of the Bounty Hunter gang a few years
earlier, and that I.H. was dating someone from that gang. Jones
otherwise continued to deny any involvement. When the detectives
said they knew he was not the shooter, he said he also was not the
driver. One of the detectives said maybe Active shot Walton for
“disrespecting a homey.” Jones said, “[t]hat’s on him.” Jones said
13
his bike may have been used, but he was not there and did not do
anything.
2.2 Analysis
Statements against penal interest are a well-settled exception
to the hearsay rule and may be properly admitted under Evidence
Code section 1230. But the exception “does not apply ‘ “to evidence
of any statement or portion of a statement not itself specifically
disserving to the interests of the declarant.” ’ ” (People v. Jasso
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 669.) The statements by Jones at issue here
are overwhelmingly self-serving.
Assuming it was error to admit his statements, we
nevertheless conclude that error was harmless. Error in this
context is assessed under the state law standard set forth in People
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836–837. (People v. Duarte (2000)
24 Cal.4th 603, 618–619.) The error is harmless unless we conclude
it is reasonably probable the error affected the verdict. (Watson, at
pp. 836–837.)
Defendant’s statements to the Perkins agent were powerful
admissions of guilt. Defendant made many statements that were
corroborated by other evidence, including the type of firearm and
ammunition used. Perhaps most damningly, he told the Perkins
agent, who asked about the photograph the detective brought to the
cell, that the photo was a picture of Jones who “was driving when
we hit Nuski[i].” I.H., who knew both defendant and Jones, told the
detectives they were the two on the motorcycle that night.
Combined with the eyewitness testimony as to how the shooting
occurred, aspects of which were corroborated by video footage, the
DNA evidence linking defendant to one of the shell casings, and the
cell phone data evidence, we are convinced the admission of Jones’s
statements was harmless. Jones’s statements, oftentimes difficult
to follow, and focused almost exclusively on denials of his own
14
involvement and making very little understandable references to
defendant, would not reasonably have carried significant weight in
comparison to the balance of the evidence received at trial, and
defendant’s own admissions of complicity. It is not reasonably
probable defendant would have obtained a more favorable verdict
had Jones’s statements been excluded.
3. Sentencing issues
Defendant contends the trial court committed sentencing
error by failing to stay the sentence imposed on either count 1 or
count 2. He argues that both counts were committed during one
indivisible course of conduct, and therefore section 654 required the
court to impose a stay on one of the counts. We disagree.
It is well-settled “there is a ‘multiple victim’ exception to
section 654. Under this exception, ‘even though a defendant
entertains but a single principal objective during an indivisible
course of conduct, he may be convicted and punished for each crime
of violence committed against a different victim.’ ” (People v. Garcia
(1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1756, 1781; accord, People v. Andrews (1989)
49 Cal. 3d 200, 225.) There was substantial evidence in the record
that counts 1 and 2 pertained to two separate victims. Count 2 was
premised on shooting at an occupied dwelling. Walton, the murder
victim, was not the focus of count 2. The evidence established that
in firing multiple shots, at least one struck the home of D.B. while
she was inside with her sister. They heard the gunshots, the sound
of Walton’s car crashing, and got away from the front windows to
avoid being struck.
The People argue the court did err however in imposing a one-
third the midterm sentence on count 2, improperly treating count 2
as a subordinate term to count 1. The People argue remand for
resentencing is warranted. In his reply brief, defendant agrees that
15
remand for resentencing is appropriate in the event we do not
reverse his convictions.
We agree with the parties that remand for resentencing is
warranted. Indeterminate and determinate sentences are governed
by different statutes. (See, e.g., §§ 669, 1170.) The trial court here
imposed an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life on count 1.
The court had the discretion to impose a consecutive determinate
term on count 2, but count 2 was not a subordinate consecutive
term subject to reduction under section 1170.1.
Section 1170.1 requires reduction of consecutive terms to one-
third “ ‘only when all terms of imprisonment are “determinate,” i.e.,
of specified duration. A life sentence is “indeterminate,” i.e., not for
a fixed period. When a defendant is sentenced to both a
determinate and an indeterminate sentence, the determinate
sentence is served first. Nonetheless, neither term is “principal”
[n]or “subordinate.” They are to be considered and calculated
independently of one another.’ ” (People v. Garza (2003)
107 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1094.)
Accordingly, this case must be remanded for resentencing to
allow the trial court the opportunity to exercise its discretion in
choosing an appropriate sentence for defendant’s conviction on
count 2. (§ 246 [specifying penalty for shooting at an occupied
dwelling as “imprisonment in the state prison for three, five, or
seven years, or by imprisonment in the county jail for a term of not
less than six months and not exceeding one year”].) In so doing, the
court shall conduct a full resentencing hearing at which it may
reconsider all of its sentencing choices anew.
Because we conclude it is appropriate to remand for a full
resentencing, we do not reach defendant’s other claims of
sentencing error.
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DISPOSITION
The sentence on count 2 is reversed and the case remanded to
the superior court for a full resentencing hearing. We affirm the
judgment of conviction in all other respects.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
SCHERB, J.
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