Myers v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles

CourtListener 10854304Calctapp6 mai 2026

Texte intégral

Filed 4/20/26; Certified for Publication 5/6/26 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

JAMES WILLIAM MYERS,
F089241
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BCV-24-100651)
v.

DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES et al., OPINION
Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Thomas S.
Clark, Judge.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Chris A. Knudsen, Assistant Attorney General,
Gary S. Balekjian and Narek Shahmoradian, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants
and Appellants.
Middlebrook & Associates, Richard O. Middlebrook, and Gabrielle Burnett, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended James William Myers’s
driver’s license for a period of four months for driving with a blood-alcohol
concentration (BAC) of 0.08 percent or more. (Veh. Code, § 13353.2.)1 Myers appealed
the suspension and an administrative per se (APS) hearing was held. An administrative
hearing officer (AHO) upheld the suspension, concluding that the arresting officer
complied with all laws and regulations, requiring a 15-minute period of continuous
observation before administering a chemical breath test (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 17,
§ 1221.1 (title 17)).2, 3
The trial court overturned the suspension and granted Myers’s petition for writ of
mandate on the ground that the observation criterion under title 17 was not satisfied based
on video evidence from an arresting officer’s body worn camera. On appeal, the DMV
contends (1) the court erred in concluding the video evidence rebutted the presumption
that the arresting officer complied with the 15-minute observation period before
administering the first chemical breath test; and (2) even assuming the officer did not
comply with title 17, Myers did not establish the violation resulted in an inaccurate test
result because other evidence of intoxication corroborated the chemical breath test. We
affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 5, 2023, Myers was arrested for driving under the influence of
alcohol. The arresting officer issued Myers a Suspension Order and Temporary Driver
License, suspending his driver’s license effective 30 days after October 5, 2023.

1 All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise noted.
2 All further references to regulations are to title 17 of the California Code of
Regulations, unless otherwise noted, and are denoted by the section number of the
regulation.
3 Title 17, section 1221.1, subdivision (b)(1) provides: “The breath sample shall be
collected only after [15] continuous minutes during which time the subject must not have
ingested alcoholic beverages or other fluids, regurgitated, vomited, eaten, or smoked.”

2.
On October 18, 2023, the DMV issued a stay in suspension of Myers’s driver’s
license pending the outcome of the APS hearing.
On February 7, 2024, an APS hearing took place.
On February 14, 2024, the AHO upheld suspension of Myers’s driver’s license
from February 23 through June 22, 2024.
On February 26, 2024, Myers filed a petition for writ of mandate and requested an
immediate stay in the suspension of Myers’s driver’s license.
On March 8, 2024, the trial court issued an order granting a stay in the suspension
of Myers’s driver’s license pending determination of his petition for writ of mandate.
On April 29, 2024, the DMV filed an answer to Myers’s petition for writ of
mandate.
On August 26, 2024, Myers filed an opening brief in support of his petition for
writ of mandate.
On September 23, 2024, the DMV filed a brief in opposition.
On October 7, 2024, Myers filed a reply in response to the DMV’s opposition.
On October 25, 2024, a hearing on Myers’s petition for writ of mandate was held.
On October 31, 2024, the trial court ruled in Myers’s favor, granted the petition,
and issued a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the DMV to set aside and revoke their
order suspending Myers’s driving privilege.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On October 5, 2023, at 11:22 p.m., Officer Kyle Goodrich was on foot patrol in
Pismo Beach. Goodrich observed a car driving the wrong way on a one-way street in
violation of section 21657. Goodrich shined his light at the driver, Myers, and advised
him to pull over to the side of the road.
Goodrich observed Myers had a nightclub wristband on his right wrist. Goodrich
also noticed Myers had slurred speech and that there was an odor of alcohol coming from
his breath. Myers admitted he consumed alcohol that night. After completing the

3.
horizontal gaze nystagmus test, Goodrich believed Myers was impaired and asked him to
step out of the car. Myers performed poorly on field sobriety tests (the one-legged stand
and the walk and turn). Myers also completed another horizonal gaze nystagmus test and
did not pass. Preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) tests indicated that Myers had a BAC
of 0.160 percent at 11:39 p.m. and 0.162 percent at 11:42 p.m.4 Goodrich arrested Myers
at approximately 11:43 p.m. for driving while under the influence of alcohol.
Goodrich walked across the street to move his patrol car. Myers gave Officer
Bradley Pullen, another officer on the scene, permission to move his car. Myers was
searched and placed in the back of Goodrich’s patrol car. Myers’s car was parked
nearby. Pullen ensured Myers’s car was locked.
Goodrich informed Myers about implied consent at 11:45 p.m. Myers chose to
have a breath test at approximately 11:49 p.m. Myers agreed to have Pullen park his car
for him. Goodrich instructed Myers to place his feet inside the patrol car, told him he
needed to “do a couple things,” and closed the door at about 11:50 p.m. Myers was alone
in Goodrich’s patrol car with the door closed.
On October 6, 2023, at approximately 12:04 a.m., Myers was again alone in the
back of Goodrich’s patrol car with the door shut. Goodrich then opened the back
passenger side door and explained how to provide a chemical breath sample.
Two chemical breath tests were administered at the police station. Myers’s
first chemical breath test resulted in a 0.15 percent BAC at approximately 12:04 a.m.
The second chemical breath test resulted in a 0.16 percent BAC at 12:08 a.m.

4 A PAS is an investigative tool used to determine whether there is reasonable cause
to believe a person was driving while under the influence. (§ 23612, subd. (h).) A PAS
test is distinguishable from a chemical breath test which is administered after establishing
cause for an arrest, which can be referred to as “ ‘ “evidentiary” ’ ” testing. (People v.
Vangelder (2013) 58 Cal.4th 1, 5, fn. 1.)

4.
Goodrich stated that he had continuously observed Myers for 15 minutes and
certified he complied with title 17, section 1221.1, subdivision (b)(1) and did not observe
Myers ingest any fluids, eat, smoke, or vomit prior to administering the test.
APS Hearing and Decision
On February 7, 2024, an APS hearing was held. The AHO explained that there
were three issues for the hearing: (1) did Goodrich have reasonable cause to believe that
Myers was driving under the influence in violation of sections 23152 or 23153; (2) was
Myers lawfully arrested; and (3) was Myers driving with a BAC of 0.08 percent or more.
The exhibits included Goodrich’s sworn driving under the influence arrest investigation
report (form DS 367), Myers’s chemical breath test results, Goodrich’s arrest report and
supplemental report, and Myers’s driving record.
The AHO asked if there were any objections. Myers’s counsel objected on the
grounds that it was a due process violation under both the California and United States
Constitutions to have a single hearing officer act as both the presenter of evidence and as
the trier of fact. He further objected on the basis that the hearing officer could not act as
an advocate for the DMV, and the exhibits themselves should be the only evidence relied
upon. Counsel made several objections based on the accuracy and reliability of the
exhibits. He also made hearsay and lack of foundation objections to the exhibits. The
AHO overruled all objections and admitted the exhibits into evidence.
Myers’s counsel introduced video footage from Goodrich and Pullen’s body-worn
cameras on the night of the arrest without objection. He argued the video evidence
showed a violation of the 15-minute continuous observation period. Myers’s counsel
sought review of the video evidence from the time of Myers’s arrest on October 5, 2023
at 11:43 p.m., as indicated on the DS 367, and the first chemical breath test at 12:04 a.m.
the following day.
The AHO issued a written decision upholding the suspension of Myers’s driver’s
license. The AHO determined that Myers was lawfully stopped, that reasonable cause

5.
existed for Myers’s arrest, and that Myers drove with a BAC of 0.08 percent or more.
The AHO found “counsel did not provide any evidence to indicate there was a [t]itle 17
violation.” The AHO decided the chemical breath test results were admissible “based on
the lack of sufficient evidence to rebut the [breath] test results .…” The AHO noted that
the DMV’s evidence contained a signed certification (DS 367) indicating the chemical
breath test was administered in compliance with the 15-minute observation rule and
title 17. (Evid. Code, § 664 [“It is presumed that official duty has been regularly
performed”].)
Petition for Writ of Mandate and the Trial Court’s Ruling
On February 26, 2024, Myers filed a petition for writ of mandate through which he
sought to set aside the suspension of his license. (Veh. Code, § 13559, subd. (a); Code
Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) He also requested an immediate stay of the suspension of his
driving privilege pending the outcome of the petition. The trial court stayed the
suspension of Myers’s license pending the outcome of his petition for writ of mandate.
Myers argued in pertinent part that Goodrich did not comply with title 17. He
maintained the presumption was rebutted by the video evidence from Goodrich and
Pullen’s body-worn cameras, which showed that Goodrich did not observe Myers for a
continuous 15-minute period before administering the first chemical breath test. Myers
argued that because the DMV did not meet its burden to establish the reliability of the
chemical breath tests, the court should issue the writ of mandate setting aside the
suspension of his driver’s license.
The DMV argued Myers’s argument was speculative and that title 17 does not
require the officer to have his eyes on the motorist for the entire 15-minute period.
Rather, the purpose is to ensure reliability of breath test results by requiring the motorist
to “ ‘not have ingested alcoholic beverages or other fluids, regurgitated, vomited, eaten,
or smoked.’ ”

6.
At the hearing on Myers’s petition for writ of mandate, the matter was argued by
counsel and submitted.5 The DMV offered no additional evidence other than the sworn
statement to prove compliance with title 17.
The trial court found, in relevant part, that Myers successfully rebutted the
presumption of duty regularly performed under Evidence Code section 664 through video
evidence, which showed Goodrich did not continuously observe Myers for the 15-minute
observation period required under title 17. The court relied on Evans v. Gordon (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 1094 (Evans) and noted that while the DMV was “not required to prove
continuous eyeball observation, the video does establish that, at times, [Goodrich] was
not even in the vicinity and could not have been providing the [t]itle 17 mandated
observation.” The court further reasoned that unlike Evans, Goodrich did not testify, and
no other evidence was presented to counter the video. Thus, the court ruled that the
chemical breath tests should not have been admitted. The DMV failed to meet its burden
of proving Myers was driving with a BAC of 0.08 percent or above. The court granted
the writ of mandate overturning the administrative decision to suspend Myers’s driving
privilege.

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Rebut the Presumption that Goodrich
Complied with Title 17
A. Parties’ Arguments
The DMV argues the trial court erred when it concluded Myers successfully
rebutted the Evidence Code section 664 presumption that Goodrich complied with the
requirements of title 17 because no affirmative evidence undermined the reliability of the
breath test results. The DMV disputes that the video evidence demonstrates

5 We are not privy to the exact arguments made by counsel. A transcript of the
hearing is not a part of the appellate record.

7.
noncompliance with the 15-minute observation period. Instead the DMV contends no
other evidence raised a reasonable inference that Myers’s breath tests were unreliable,
particularly nothing showing that he ingested alcoholic beverages or other fluids,
regurgitated, vomited, ate, or smoked from the time of his arrest to the time his breath
samples were taken. Even assuming a title 17 violation, the DMV contends that
circumstantial evidence showed Myers drove with a BAC of above 0.08 percent.
Myers responds the burden was on the DMV to prove the reliability of the tests,
and substantial evidence supports the trial court findings that Goodrich did not
continuously observe Myers for 15 minutes prior to administering the first chemical
breath test. Myers further argues the DMV waived its argument regarding the timing of
the first chemical breath test and its contention regarding the use of circumstantial
evidence to show Myers’s BAC was above 0.08 percent by not raising these claims
below. Nonetheless, Myers maintains this court may not rely on circumstantial evidence
in conjunction with the chemical breath tests to support the theory that Myers’s BAC was
above 0.08 percent because the argument is speculative and asks this court to reinterpret
the evidence.
B. The Law
1. APS Hearing Procedure
License suspensions are governed by an administrative procedure called the
“administrative per se” law. (Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 455 (Lake).) It
follows that the DMV must immediately suspend the driver’s license of a motorist who is
driving with a BAC of 0.08 percent or more. (§ 13353.2, subd. (a)(1); Coffey v. Shiomoto
(2015) 60 Cal.4th 1198, 1207 (Coffey).) Motorists have a right to request an APS hearing
before the suspension of their driving privilege occurs, which is separate from the DMV’s
automatic internal review, and the hearing is usually held before an AHO. (Lake, at
pp. 455–456; §§ 13353.2, subd. (c), 13353.3, subd. (a), 13558, subd. (a).) At the APS
hearing, an AHO determines whether an arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe

8.
the driver was driving, whether the driver was lawfully arrested, and whether the driver
was driving with a BAC of 0.08 percent or more. (Evans, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1101; § 13558, subd. (c)(2).) If the AHO finds that the issues were proven by a
preponderance of the evidence, the driver’s license of the motorist will be suspended for
a period of four months if the motorist’s driving record is clean. (Evans, at p. 1101;
§ 13353.3, subd. (b)(1)).
At an APS hearing, the AHO “shall consider its official records and may receive
sworn testimony” as evidence. (§ 14104.7.) The “technical rules relating to evidence”
do not apply at an APS hearing, and the AHO “shall admit any relevant evidence that ‘is
the sort of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct
of serious affairs.’ ” (Gov. Code, § 11513, subd. (c); Evans, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1102.)
2. Breath Test Results
Breath test results on official forms may be admitted during an APS hearing and
may be considered as proof by a preponderance of the evidence that a motorist was
driving with a BAC of 0.08 percent or more. (Lake, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 451;
Manriquez v. Gourley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1227, 1232 (Manriquez).) This is because
the provisions of title 17 regulate the collection and testing of breath samples for
determination of alcohol concentration. (Tit. 17, § 1215 et seq.) Evidence Code
section 664 creates a rebuttable presumption that an “official duty has been regularly
performed.” Evidence Code section 1280 establishes a hearsay exception for records
made by public employees. (Shannon v. Gourley (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 60, 65.) Thus,
the recorded chemical blood-alcohol test results on official forms are presumptively
valid, obtained following the regulations and guidelines of title 17, and the DMV is not
required to present additional evidence. (Manriquez, at p. 1232; Evans, supra, 41
Cal.App.5th at p. 1103.) Under the presumption, “the officer’s sworn statement that the
breath-testing device recorded a certain blood-alcohol level is sufficient to establish the

9.
foundation, even without testimony at the hearing establishing the reliability of the test.”
(Manriquez, at p. 1233.)
Once the DMV presents evidence to establish a prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the motorist to produce affirmative evidence of improper performance. (Petricka v.
Department of Motor Vehicles (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1348.) Such a showing must
demonstrate a reasonable basis for an interference that the procedures were not properly
followed and cannot rest on mere speculation. (Ibid.) If such an affirmative showing is
made by the motorist that one or more of the requirements of title 17 were not observed,
the burden then shifts back to the DMV to prove the reliability of the test despite the
deviation. (Manriquez, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 1233; Evans, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1103; Baker v. Gourley (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1173.)
Under title 17, there is a requirement that “[t]he breath sample shall be collected
only after [15] continuous minutes during which time the subject must not have ingested
alcoholic beverages or other fluids, regurgitated, vomited, eaten, or smoked.” (Tit. 17,
§ 1221.1(b)(1); Evans, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1102–1103.) The purpose of the
15-minute observation period is to ensure that the breath sample is not contaminated by
mouth alcohol or regurgitation, which may skew the results of the breath test.
(Manriquez, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 1236, fn. 3.) Noncompliance with title 17
“goes only to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.” (People v. Williams
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 408, 414.)
3. Review of Petition for Writ of Mandate
In ruling on a petition for a writ of mandate following an order of license
suspension by the DMV at an APS hearing, trial courts are required to exercise their
independent judgment and determine “ ‘ “whether the weight of the evidence supported
the administrative decision.” ’ ” (Lake, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 456–457.) The appellate
court reviews the record on appeal to determine whether the trial court’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 457.) In deciding whether there is

10.
substantial evidence, the reviewing court resolves all evidentiary conflicts and draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of the trial court’s decision. (Ibid.; see Freitas v. Shiomoto
(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 294, 300 (Freitas).) To the extent the appeal involves a question of
law or interpretation of a regulation, the appellate court reviews those questions de novo.
(Freitas, at p. 300; Manriquez, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 1233.)
The trial court made a factual finding after viewing video evidence that Goodrich
failed to observe Myers for 15 continuous minutes before administering the first chemical
breath test as required by title 17. We review the court’s finding for substantial evidence
and the exclusion of the chemical breath test results for abuse of discretion.
C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Conclusion
The first issue we must resolve is whether the video evidence from the officer’s
body-worn camera provided substantial evidence to rebut the presumption that the
reported chemical breath test results were reliable in compliance with title 17. The record
contains a sworn DS 367 form signed by Goodrich, which attested the chemical breath
test results of 0.160 and 0.162 percent were administered pursuant to the requirements of
title 17. The sworn DS 367 form is sufficient to trigger the presumption of reliability
under Evidence Code section 664. (Evans, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 1103; Manriquez,
supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1232–1233.) The burden then shifted to Myers to
affirmatively demonstrate noncompliance. (Evans, at p. 1103.)
The video evidence from Goodrich’s body-worn camera shows that Myers was not
continuously observed for 15 minutes prior to administering the first chemical breath test.
Goodrich arrested Myers at approximately 11:43 p.m., on October 5, 2023. Myers agreed
to provide a chemical breath test at approximately 11:49 p.m. At about 11:50 p.m.,
Goodrich closed the door to his patrol car leaving Myers alone inside. On October 6,
2023, at about 12:04 a.m., Myers was again alone inside Goodrich’s patrol car with the
doors shut. No one else was present. At approximately 12:04 a.m., Myers provided his
first chemical breath test. During the period of about 14 minutes that lapsed, the video

11.
evidence showed Myers alone in the back of Goodrich’s patrol car with the doors shut on
two occasions.6
The DMV argues the trial court got the facts wrong. Specifically, the DMV
argues that the court misconstrued the video evidence in the record, confused the officers
and times, and therefore came to an erroneous conclusion that Goodrich was not
continuously in Myers’s vicinity during the 15-minute observation period. The record
does not support this view.
The trial court stated the video evidence provided an affirmative showing Myers
“was not observed for the required 15 minute period” and “at times, the officer was not
even in the vicinity and could not have been providing the [t]itle 17 mandated
observation.” The court’s conclusion does not reflect an incorrect identification of
officers and times. The court rightly found that the video evidence showed Goodrich was
not in Myers’s vicinity on two occasions during the approximate 15-minute observation
period.
While we agree with the DMV that it appears Pullen retrieved Myers’s belongings
and parked his car, this argument fails to persuade us that there was compliance with
title 17. Two videos showed Goodrich shutting the door to his patrol car, leaving Myers
alone inside during the observation period. This footage offered substantial evidence to
rebut the presumption that the BAC reported in the documents presented by the DMV
could be relied upon.

6 We note that the DMV argues for the first time on appeal that the initial chemical
breath test took place on October 6, 2023, at 12:05 a.m. Even if we were to accept that
the first chemical breath test took place at 12:05 a.m., we would still find sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption that Goodrich complied with title 17 because the video
evidence shows Goodrich did not continuously observe Myers for the approximate
15 minutes prior to administration of the first test. Thus, we need not address Myers’s
argument regarding waiver and the exact time of the first chemical breath test because we
find the video evidence shows lack of compliance with title 17.

12.
The DMV argues that an officer is not required to keep his eyes directly on the
motorist but may rely on his senses to ensure that the motorist did not eat, drink, smoke,
regurgitate, or vomit. (Manriquez, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 1236 [observation period
satisfied where an officer may perceive a subject has eaten, drank, smoked, vomited or
regurgitated by sound or smell and the perception by senses other than sight, even if
officer did not maintain direct visual contact the entire time].) While an officer is not
required to have “direct and unbroken eye contact for the 15-minute period,” the officer
must be in the vicinity and use “other means of uninterrupted observation” to determine
whether the motorist ate, drank, smoked, regurgitated, or vomited. (Id. at p. 1238.) This
was not done here.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the video evidence
rebutted the presumption by showing Myers was not continuously observed for
15 minutes before obtaining the first chemical breath test.
D. Reliability of the Test Results
The DMV argues there is no evidence showing the chemical breath test results
were unreliable. The DMV therefore maintains that even if there was technical
noncompliance with a regulatory standard, the test results should be admitted because
there is nothing to rebut the presumption of reliability. The DMV cites Gerwig v.
Gordon (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 59, 71 (Gerwig) for the proposition that the reliability of
the test is the paramount concern when rebutting the Evidence Code presumption.
In Gerwig, the motorist argued the phlebotomist dispatched to draw his blood was
not in compliance with certain state regulations that govern blood test procedures, for
example, the phlebotomist was functionally unsupervised and the manual that had been
provided to the phlebotomist had not been approved by a physician and surgeon.
(Gerwig, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 63.) The motorist argued that any evidence of
noncompliance with the regulations, even a technical violation, was enough to rebut the

13.
presumption and require the DMV to prove the reliability of the test results. (Id. at
pp. 64–65.)
The Gerwig court disagreed. It held there must be a nexus between the affirmative
showing of a regulatory violation and the reliability of the test results. (Gerwig, supra,
61 Cal.App.5th at p. 72.) The court found the title 17 violations did not show any errors
of practice or procedure by the phlebotomist with respect to the collection or testing of
the motorist’s blood sample. (Id. at p. 70.) The violations only implicated the
appropriate supervision and the proper conduct of a blood draw, which the court found
“too tenuous” to cast doubt on the reliability of the blood test results. (Id. at pp. 68–69.)
Thus, the Gerwig court found that any violation is not sufficient in and of itself to cast
doubt on the reliability of the test results and thereby rebut the presumption under
Evidence Code section 664. (Gerwig, at p. 72; see Baker, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1174 [speculation is insufficient to support a reasonable inference that the integrity of
the sample was compromised].)
Unlike Gerwig, the failure to continuously observe Myers for 15 minutes prior to
the administration of the first chemical breath test goes directly to the reliability of the
results. This is not a mere technical noncompliance. A violation of the observation
period is directly related to its purpose: to ensure that the breath sample is not
contaminated with mouth alcohol or other foreign substances that could potentially
influence the test results. (See, e.g., Manriquez, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 1236,
fn. 3.) The fact that Goodrich did not continuously observe Myers for 15 minutes before
testing cast doubt on the integrity of the test.
The DMV argues that without evidence of foreign matter in Myers’s mouth, the
chemical breath tests should be deemed reliable. However, this argument illustrates a
misunderstanding of the shifting burden of proof in APS hearing challenges. In this
regard, “[t]he burden imposed upon the licensee of rebutting the presumption favoring
the reliability of blood-alcohol tests does not entail the marshalling of complex scientific

14.
evidence.… [W]hat is actually presumed under Evidence Code 664 is compliance with
statutory and regulatory standards, which in turn gives rise to an inference of reliability.
If the licensee shows, through cross-examination of the officer or by the introduction of
affirmative evidence, that official standards were in any respect not observed, the burden
shifts to the [DMV] to prove that the test was reliable despite the violation.” (Davenport
v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 133, 144.)
In Najera v. Shiomoto (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 173, this court concluded the
presumption that the motorist’s blood test results were reliable was rebutted by expert
testimony that the blood test data collected from only one column of a gas chromatograph
did not establish the presence or the concentration of alcohol without confirmation by
data from the second column. (Id. at pp. 181–182.) While the DMV made several
arguments on appeal that the motorist’s blood test results could be confirmed without
data from the second column, this court held that once the burden shifted, it was up to the
DMV, not the motorist, to present evidence of the second-column data. (Id. at pp. 183–
184.) Because the DMV presented no additional evidence, this court held that substantial
evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that the equipment and methods were used
incorrectly to conduct the motorist’s blood test. (Id. at p. 184; accord, Freitas, supra, 3
Cal.App.5th at pp. 301–302 [the motorist rebutted the presumption by showing that the
testing apparatus was improperly employed when his sample was tested, thus shifting the
burden back to the DMV to prove compliance with the regulations].)
Myers presented video evidence from body worn camera footage of his arrest that
showed Goodrich left him alone in his patrol car on two occasions during the
approximate 15-minute period of continuous observation. The burden then shifted to the
DMV to prove the test was reliable despite this violation. (Manriquez, supra, 105
Cal.App.4th at p. 1233.) The DMV failed to meet their burden. (C.f. Evans, supra, 41
Cal.App.5th at p. 1104 [substantial evidence showed compliance with title 17 by way of

15.
evidence in the form of the arresting officer’s testimony, dispatch log, and the sworn
statement in the DS 367 form].)
The DMV asserts the video evidence in and of itself is insufficient to demonstrate
a violation that gives rise to a reasonable inference that the test results are unreliable. We
disagree. The video objectively captures the sequence of events. A video can be worth
“a thousand” words and does not suffer from bias or a fading memory. (See, e.g., Taylor
v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 205, 213 [a “camera’s video can be
unbiased, unblinking, unchanging, and clear” and is “far superior” to a witness’s
testimony].) Because the evidence shows official testing standards were not followed,
the trial court could reasonably question the accuracy of Myers’s test results when
weighing the evidence presented.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the chemical breath test
results. The court could reasonably conclude the chemical breath test results may have
been skewed by Myers’s activity during the time he sat alone in the back of the patrol car.
Absent the chemical breath test results, the court properly found insufficient evidence to
support a finding that Myers was driving a motor vehicle with a BAC above
0.08 percent.7
E. Circumstantial Evidence
Finally, the DMV argues that even assuming a title 17 violation occurred, the
circumstantial evidence established the reliability of the test results, and that Myers was
driving with a prohibited BAC. The DMV points to Myers’s PAS test results, the fact
that he drove the wrong way on the road, and his poor performance on field sobriety tests.

7 Our conclusion is in line with Gerwig’s holding that a motorist may rebut the
presumption only when the integrity of the test is called into question. (Gerwig, supra,
61 Cal.App.5th at p. 62.) It does not dispense with the requirement that the regulatory
violation have a reasonable connection to the reliability of the test. (Id. at p. 72.)

16.
1. Forfeiture
“ ‘The traditional rule is that “a party must raise an issue in the trial court if they
would like appellate review.” ’ ” (Kazelka v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2025) 109
Cal.App.5th 1239, 1254.) However, a new theory raising a pure question of law on
undisputed facts can be raised for the first time on appeal. (Ramirez v. Department of
Motor Vehicles (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1313, 1335.)
The DMV asks us for the first time to consider circumstantial evidence to support
the chemical breath test results despite noncompliance with title 17. The DMV did not
argue below that circumstantial evidence in conjunction with the chemical breath test
results provided sufficient evidence that Myers was driving with a BAC above
0.08 percent. Additionally, while the AHO made a finding that Myers’s poor
performance on field sobriety tests and “objective symptoms of intoxication” supported
the conclusion that his BAC was above 0.08 percent, the AHO’s conclusion was in the
context of determining whether the PAS test results should be admitted, not the chemical
breath test results.
Because we must look to the facts and the record to resolve the DMV’s challenge
raised for the first time on appeal, its claim is forfeited. We nonetheless choose to reach
the merits of its contention.
2. Merits
The DMV cites Coffey, supra, 60 Cal.4th 1198 to support its view that the
chemical breath test results should be considered in conjunction with the PAS test results
and behavioral evidence notwithstanding a title 17 violation. In Coffey, the plaintiff was
pulled over for swerving erratically on the road. (Id. at p. 1203.) She performed poorly
on field sobriety tests and was placed under arrest. (Id. at p. 1205.) Fifty-six minutes
after the plaintiff was stopped, she took a breath test which showed a BAC of
0.08 percent. A second breath test showed a BAC of 0.09 percent three minutes later.
Her blood sample taken about 20 minutes later tested at 0.095 or 0.096 percent. (Ibid.)

17.
At the administrative hearing, the plaintiff obtained an expert who testified that her
results suggested the alcohol level in her body was rising at the time of the tests and,
given the totality of the circumstances, were consistent with the plaintiff’s BAC being
below 0.08 percent at the time she was first pulled over. (Ibid.)
Our Supreme Court held the plaintiff’s expert testimony rebutted the presumption
that the test results showed she was driving with a BAC of 0.08 percent or more. (Coffey,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1211.) This shifted the burden back to the DMV. The DMV
hearing officer was still able to consider the chemical test results, and in conjunction with
other evidence, concluded that her BAC was above 0.08 percent while she was driving.
(Id. at pp. 1211–1217.)
The Supreme Court considered whether the DMV hearing officer properly
admitted and considered the nonchemical test evidence, i.e., other circumstantial
evidence such as the plaintiff’s poor performance on field sobriety tests, to reach its
conclusion that the plaintiff was driving with at least a 0.08 percent or more BAC. (Id. at
p. 1211.) The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s ruling
in favor of the DMV, holding that the court acted well within its discretion in rejecting
the expert’s testimony and placing primary emphasis on the four chemical tests that
showed the plaintiff’s BAC met or exceeded the statutory threshold at the time she was
driving. (Id. at pp. 1217–1218.) Significantly, the plaintiff’s expert in Coffey did not
testify the chemical tests inaccurately measured her BAC at the time the tests were run.
(Id. at p. 1217.)
Our case is distinguishable in two ways. In Coffey, the expert only stated that the
results were consistent with plaintiff’s BAC being lower than 0.08 percent while she was
driving. There was no evidence presented that the testing itself was invalid or raised a
question of inaccuracy by not following official standards. (Coffey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at
p. 1205.) Here, there is uncontroverted evidence that Myers was left alone in the patrol
car during the 15-minute period of continuous observation in violation of title 17.

18.
Moreover, the DMV failed to offer any evidence—by way of officer testimony or
otherwise—showing that the tests were reliable despite the videos. The record reflects
the only evidence the DMV presented was the signed DS 367 form. The DMV was
required to prove Myers’s BAC at the time he was driving was above 0.08 percent
without resort to the statutory presumption, after Myers rebutted it. (See Coffey, supra,
60 Cal.4th at p. 1211.) The DMV failed to do so.
Finally, the DMV argues that the circumstantial evidence established that Myers’s
evidentiary breath test results were reliable, and we should reverse on this basis. The
DMV’s argument again fails in two respects. Under a deferential standard of review, we
resolve all evidentiary conflicts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the trial
court’s decision. (Freitas, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 300.) While circumstantial
evidence may have been relevant in showing the tests were reliable, the record shows the
court considered all relevant factors and found the weight of the evidence favored Myers.
The DMV called no witnesses, introduced no additional evidence, and made no
arguments regarding the reliability of the chemical breath test despite the deviation. With
nothing to fill the evidentiary gap, the DMV failed to meet its burden to show the
procedures were properly followed. The court did not act in “an arbitrary, capricious or
patently absurd manner” in finding the chemical breath test results inadmissible. (People
v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 947.)
We also point out that the concurring opinion by Justice Liu in Coffey found
circumstantial evidence alone “do[es] not generally establish that it is more likely a
driver’s BAC is 0.08 percent .… [S]igns of impairment do not generally have a tendency
in reason to prove a BAC of 0.08 percent or greater.” (Coffey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at
p. 1218.) Similarly, in Komizu v. Gourley (2002) 103 Cal. App. 4th 1001, while the trial
court found the DMV did not err when it relied on an alcohol analysis report in
conjunction with other circumstantial evidence in finding the motorist’s BAC above
0.08 percent, the circumstantial evidence was in addition to, not instead of, a valid

19.
chemical test. (Komizu, at pp. 1007–1008, fn. 7.) Without a reliable chemical breath test,
there was nothing in this case for the circumstantial evidence to support.
We note the DMV correctly points out that the evidence relating to the PAS test
shows the test was properly administered for purposes of establishing its admissibility
into evidence. But admissibility into evidence is a different issue than the reliability of
the chemical breath test results under title 17. (People v. Williams (2002) 28 Cal.4th 408,
417.)
F. Conclusion
In sum, the trial court’s finding was supported by substantial evidence showing
Myers rebutted the presumption that the chemical breath test results were reliable.
Because the video evidence showed Goodrich failed to continuously observe Myers for
15 continuous minutes to ensure he had not ingested food or drink, smoked, or
regurgitated before administering the first chemical breath test, and the DMV offered no
further evidence indicating that the results were reliable despite noncompliance with
title 17, the trial court properly granted Myers’s petition for a writ of mandate.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to Myers.

HARRELL, J.
WE CONCUR:

HILL, P. J.

MEEHAN, J.

20.
Filed 5/6/26

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

JAMES WILLIAM MYERS,
F089241
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Kern Super. Ct. No. BCV-24-100651)
v.
ORDER GRANTING REQUEST
DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES FOR PUBLICATION
et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

As the nonpublished opinion filed on April 20, 2026, in the above entitled matter
hereby meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court,
rule 8.1105(c), it is ordered that the opinion be certified for publication in the Official
Reports.

HARRELL, J.
WE CONCUR:

HILL, P. J.

MEEHAN, J.

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