People v. Anderson CA3

CourtListener 10852743Calctapp4 mai 2026

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Filed 5/4/26 P. v. Anderson CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)

THE PEOPLE, C101712
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 19CF05564)
v.

ROBERT ANTHONY ANDERSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

On the morning of August 27, 2019, in Forest Ranch, Butte County, defendant
Robert Anthony Anderson beat Gunther Klaus Rupprecht (the decedent) to death. A jury
found defendant not guilty of first degree murder but found him guilty of the lesser
included offense of second degree murder, and also found him guilty of two drug-related
offenses. The trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life for murder and an
additional five years determinate on the drug-related convictions. Defendant argues on
appeal that the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct the jury, on its own
motion, (1) with CALCRIM No. 3425 on unconsciousness, that unconsciousness may be
caused by a blackout, and that he was not guilty of murder if he acted while unconscious,
and (2) with CALCRIM No. 626 that he was not guilty of murder, and was only guilty of
involuntary manslaughter, if he killed while unconscious due to voluntary intoxication.
We will affirm the judgment.

1
BACKGROUND
An information charged defendant with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count
1),1 possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351; count 2),
and sale, transportation, or offer to sell a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11352, subd. (a); count 3).
Trial—The Prosecution Case
Events Prior to the Killing—August 26-27, 2019
On August 26, 2019, at 7:00 or 8:00 p.m., Brandon H.2 hosted several friends at
his house in Chico, including the decedent, defendant, E. F., and Rebecca M. They were
all drinking and doing cocaine, which was supplied by defendant. E.F. testified that
defendant was agitated, angry, and out of control throughout the evening, which made her
uncomfortable. She testified that he was “not himself” and that something was different.
Defendant told E.F. he had been up for some time, which E.F. assumed was because of
the cocaine, although defendant did not tell her that.
At some point, the group ran out of cocaine, so Brandon and defendant left so
defendant could acquire more. E.F. and Rebecca also left because they felt scared and
uncomfortable, and thus they were not there when Brandon and defendant returned.
Upon returning, defendant had a bright yellow box which contained cocaine and money.
Defendant, the decedent, and Brandon continued to do cocaine and drink.
At approximately 5:00 a.m., defendant and the decedent left Brandon’s house.
According to Brandon, they intended to go to the decedent’s house in Forest Ranch to
continue drinking.

1 Further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
2 To protect privacy, we will refer to some individuals by their first name and last
initials or by first and last initials and, thereafter, by their first names or initials. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10).)

2
Defendant After the Homicide—August 27, 2019
S.A. and her son, W.A., lived on the same road in Forest Ranch as the decedent.
On August 27, 2019, at perhaps 10:00 a.m. or noon, defendant approached their house,
barefoot, with his hands up, saying he needed help. He said he had no weapons, and that
he had been attacked. “He was bleeding from his foot. And he had marks on him.
And...his eyes were dilated.” He had blood on him. Defendant said that “ ‘they were
trying to kill him,’ ” and that “ ‘he wasn’t going to let no 18-year-old kid kill him.’ ”
Defendant claimed he was “ ‘fighting for his life,’ ” and said someone had tried to rob
him. Referring to the other man, defendant said, “ ‘he wasn’t breathing. And he was
pretty sure that he was dead.’ ” He told W.A. that once he started swinging, he could not
stop, and he did not know “ ‘if the guy was breathing.’ ”
Blood was squirting from defendant’s foot, so S.A. retrieved bandages. W.A.
hosed defendant off. Defendant said he thought he had been stabbed, but S.A. did not
observe any stab wounds. Defendant had “a lot of little nicks and stuff, but they weren’t
really noticeable….”
Defendant asked to be taken to his mother’s home in Chico and offered to pay, but
he had no money. S.A. decided they should call 911. Because there was no cell phone
signal at the house, S.A. took defendant to a nearby market, where someone called the
police.
CalFIRE firefighter Matthew Aldrich responded to the market in Forest Ranch.
There, he saw defendant sitting against a wall. He had a one-inch laceration to his right
foot and a cut on his left bicep, but no other apparent injuries. Defendant complained
only of right foot pain. Defendant had the appearance of someone who was in shock.
When CalFIRE firefighter Aldrich asked what happened, defendant responded that
“he went out to use his phone that…morning. And the other gentleman at that property
had come out with a machete, acting crazy, and swiped his phone away with the

3
machete.” Defendant then said that he had “punched the other gentleman in the face,
knocking him to the ground. And then kicked him in the face over a hundred times….”
CalFIRE Captain James Derington testified that, when he saw defendant at the
market, he was “pretty much covered head to toe” in dried blood.
The Scene of the Homicide
Sergeant Jason Miller of the Butte County Sheriff’s Office arrived at the
decedent’s property in Forest Ranch and saw the decedent on the ground near the
driveway. CalFIRE’s Derington and Aldrich confirmed he was dead. Derington testified
that there was blood “[a]ll over the place,” and that the amount of dried blood he had seen
on defendant was consistent with the injuries inflicted on the decedent.
On a picnic table outside the residence, there was a mirror with a line of a white
powder substance on it, a $20 bill rolled up like a straw, alcohol, and a yellow box
containing $1,100 in cash, cocaine, and plastic baggies consistent with drug
paraphernalia.
There was a car parked at the residence, and there was blood on the car. Near the
car, there was a PVC pipe covered in blood. Next to the car’s wheel, there was a plastic
snow shovel, broken on one side, which was covered in blood. The broken-off portion of
the shovel was found some distance away. Law enforcement also found a large rock
covered in blood and a kitchen knife covered in blood and dirt.
Jennifer Celentano, a coroner’s investigator for the Butte County Sheriff’s Office,
testified as a certified medical death investigator. At the scene, Celentano saw “blood
everywhere.” The decedent was lying in the driveway, riddled with injuries and covered
in dirt and blood. He had multiple sharp force injuries on his arm and hands, suggesting
they were defensive wounds, that were consistent with being inflicted either by the sharp
side of a snow shovel or a knife. The decedent also had a sharp force injury to his leg
consistent with being struck by a snow shovel or a knife. He had sharp force injuries to
the top of his head or forehead, consistent with being inflicted by a knife or shovel, and a

4
blunt force injury to the head, consistent with being inflicted by a pipe or a rock or with
being stomped on. He had at least 20 sharp force injuries and approximately five blunt
force injuries. Celentano concluded decedent had been beaten to death.
Inside the house, investigator Celentano observed blood everywhere. She
observed shoe prints and footprints in blood. There was also a large pool of blood in the
house. Outside, Celentano observed three paths leading from the house onto the
driveway, with blood along all three. Celentano testified that the “decedent only had
socks on. There was no blood on the bottom of his feet.” The bloody footprints were
significant because they indicated that someone “was running to and from the house
through the pools of blood.”
No machete was found at the crime scene.
Autopsy
Dr. Katherine Raven performed the autopsy on the decedent, who had multiple
contusions, abrasions, and cuts to the head. He had at least eight large open wounds to
the back of the head, most of which were sharp force injuries, but some of which were
blunt force injuries. He had three large, open sharp force wounds on his forehead. He
had a laceration and fracture of the nose. He had sharp and blunt injuries to both sides of
his face and an impact injury to his mouth. He sustained a significant fracture to his skull
near his right eyebrow.
The decedent sustained defensive injuries to his arms and hands. He had at least
three such injuries to the right forearm, injuries to the left hand and wrist, and at least six
sharp force injuries across the back of his hand. He also had large bruises on both
shoulders. He also had approximately 16 superficial linear wounds on his body. He had
abrasions on his knees and three sharp force injuries to his right leg. Dr. Raven
determined that the cause of death was multiple blunt and sharp force injuries, and the
mechanism of death was injuries to the decedent’s head, severe skull fractures, and injury
to his brain.

5
Trial—The Defense Case
On August 27, 2019, defendant and the decedent went to the decedent’s house in
Forest Ranch. There, they hung out at the picnic table listening to music, drinking,
smoking marijuana, and doing cocaine. The decedent was doing lines of cocaine while
defendant was just doing “bumps,” meaning that “[y]ou stick it into…a key and just do a
little bit.” Defendant did not like to do full lines of cocaine because he did not “like to
get that high.”
After a while, defendant stepped away to make a call. Suddenly, he heard a
footstep, and then he was hit in the back of the head. He turned around and backpedaled.
He saw the decedent coming at him with a shovel. Defendant assumed he had been hit
with the shovel. He backpedaled at least 10 feet. He said, “Hey, what’s up? What’s
going on? Let’s talk about it.” The decedent continued coming at defendant and attacked
him with the shovel.
Asked what he did next, defendant testified that he could “only speculate because
at that point I blacked out.” He remembered the initial attack to the back of his head. He
remembered seeing the decedent coming at him. And he remembered seeing the
decedent swinging at him. Defendant thought, “this guy is going to kill me.” He
remembered backpedaling and saying, “let’s talk about this.” However, after that, the
next thing defendant remembered was being on the property with blood spurting out of
his foot. He was losing a lot of blood and “was pretty sure [he] was going to die.” He
tried to find keys to the decedent’s car, but eventually left on foot.
Defendant hobbled down the driveway to the road. He continued down the road
about a quarter of a mile until he came upon S.A.’s house. W.A. was in the driveway.
Defendant put his hands up, said he was unarmed, and asked for help. S.A. and W.A.
hosed defendant off to “figure out what was what.”
Defendant testified that he “was pretty out of it that whole day” after the incident.
He was “in and out of…consciousness.” He testified, again, that, “after he’s coming at

6
me with the shovel in hand, and he continued to hit me after I tried to get him to stop, I
blacked out. And that whole day, looking back on it, I don’t remember a lot of it.”
During her cross-examination of defendant, the prosecutor played a video of
defendant’s interview with Detective Hugh Hooks. Defendant told Hooks that the
decedent unexpectedly hit him with something multiple times. Hooks asked if defendant
knew what the decedent hit him with, and defendant responded, “[a]t this point it’s all a
blur,” and then said, “it was turning into mostly a blur.” He then told Hooks that the
decedent hit him six to 10 times. Defendant told Hooks, “I shocked his ass,” and that he
threw punches at the decedent, and maybe an elbow, and the decedent “went down.” He
stated that he weighed 110 pounds, and that he “was fightin’ for my life.” Hooks asked
defendant how many times he hit the decedent, and defendant responded that he hit the
decedent 10 to 20 times. Defendant then told Hooks that, after he got the decedent down,
“I hit him a few times and he was–when he was down, that’s for sure.” Defendant then
went through the decedent’s pockets looking for keys. When he could not find keys, he
left on foot. He also mentioned that his foot had been “sliced wide open” “with a glass.”
Defendant testified at trial that he had no recollection of telling anyone that he cut
his foot on glass or that he had been attacked by someone wielding a machete. Defendant
reiterated that “that whole day is pretty much a blur to me.” Defendant again testified
that, after the altercation began, he “blacked out.” He had no recollection of telling
Detective Hooks that he threw punches and an elbow. Asked if he told Hooks that he
punched the decedent 10 to 20 times, defendant eventually acknowledged that statement.
Asked if he hit the decedent a few times when he was down, defendant acknowledged
telling Hooks that he had.
The prosecution played a second clip from the interview. Detective Hooks asked
defendant why there had been mention of a machete, and defendant responded that he
believed he had been hit in the foot with a machete. He also said he may have kicked the
decedent once or twice. He did not remember saying he had kicked the decedent around

7
100 times. In his trial testimony, defendant acknowledged that he told law enforcement
his foot was cut with a machete.
The prosecution played a recording of another interview between Detective Hooks
and defendant. In that interview, defendant stated that the decedent struck him with a
shovel. According to defendant, the decedent hit him a few times, including on his head,
his arm, and, he supposed, his foot. Defendant stated that the decedent “kept trying to hit
me.” Defendant “was scared. I was scared for my life. So what do I do? I fight….”
The decedent hit him “at least three times” that he could recall. He continued, “[a]fter
that…I black–I blanked out.” Hooks asked defendant how he fought back, and defendant
responded, “[t]hat’s the thing, once I started fighting, I was–I went and blacked out.” He
stated that he still did not remember the fight. It was a “complete blur.” Hooks asked
defendant the next thing he remembered after blacking out. Defendant replied that he
“start[ed] having memory” when he was walking down the driveway, and his foot was
squirting blood. Defendant also told Hooks that, “I believe I was hit with a shovel, the
more and more I think about it. Then that’ll–that was screwin’ my head up bad, too.”
Defendant testified that he had been fully blacked out and he did not remember
how the decedent was killed. When asked about the fact that, the day before his
testimony, he told a friend on a phone call from jail that he had killed the decedent with a
shovel, defendant responded, “Yeah, that’s not a puzzle,” and, “it’s pretty clear I killed
him with a shovel.”
Stipulations
Defendant’s blood was drawn on August 28, 2019, and his blood alcohol content
was 0.06 percent. He tested positive for benzoylecgonine and cocaine. The cocaine was
below the 0.01 mg/L level of quantification. He had 0.03 mg/L of Lidocaine. He also
tested positive for marijuana. At the time of his death, the decedent’s blood alcohol
content was 0.15 percent. He had 0.22 mg/L of cocaine, 1.14 mg/L of benzoylecgonine,
and he tested positive for marijuana. The substance in the yellow box found on the picnic

8
table tested positive for cocaine and weighed 47.67 grams. All blood at the crime scene
belonged to either defendant or the decedent.
Verdicts and Sentencing
The jury found defendant not guilty of first degree murder, but found him guilty of
the lesser included offense of second degree murder. The jury also found defendant
guilty of possession for sale of a controlled substance, and sale, transportation, or offer to
sell a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of
20 years to life in state prison, consisting of an indeterminate term of 15 years to life for
murder, the determinate middle term of four years for sale, transportation, or offer to sell
a controlled substance, and one year determinate, one-third the middle term, for
possession for sale of a controlled substance.
DISCUSSION
I
CALCRIM No. 3425
Defendant argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, on its own
motion, with CALCRIM No. 3425 on unconsciousness, that unconsciousness may be
caused by a blackout, and that he was not guilty of murder if he acted while unconscious.
Defendant emphasizes his extrajudicial statements and his trial testimony that he blacked
out after the decedent hit him in the head with a shovel and continued to attack him. We
conclude the trial court did not err in not instructing the jury on its own motion with
CALCRIM No. 3425.
“Among those persons deemed incapable of committing a crime are individuals
who ‘committed the act charged without being conscious thereof.’ ” (People v. Rogers
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 887 (Rogers), quoting § 26, class four.) “ ‘Unconsciousness does
not mean that the actor lies still and unresponsive. Instead, a person is deemed
“unconscious” if he or she committed the act without being conscious thereof.’ ”
(Rogers, at p. 887.) As defendant correctly notes, CALCRIM No. 3425 specifies that

9
unconsciousness may be caused by, among other things, a blackout. “Unconsciousness,
when not voluntarily induced, is a complete defense to a charged crime.” (Rogers, at
p. 887.)
“ ‘ “It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial
court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the
evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154, disapproved on another
ground in People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260, fn. 7.) “A trial court must
instruct on unconsciousness on its own motion if it appears the defendant is relying on
the defense, or if there is substantial evidence supporting the defense and the defense is
not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at
p. 887.) Substantial evidence is “evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in favor
of the defendant….” (People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982.) “In determining
whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a jury instruction, the trial court does not
determine the credibility of the defense evidence, but only whether ‘there was evidence
which, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt….” (Ibid.) “If
the defense presents substantial evidence of unconsciousness, the trial court errs in
refusing to instruct on its effect as a complete defense.” (People v. Halvorsen (2007)
42 Cal.4th 379, 417.) An appellate court reviews a trial court’s failure to instruct on a
defense theory de novo, and, in doing so, views the evidence in the light most favorable
to the defendant. (People v. Ibarra (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1081.)
Defendant in the trial court did not expressly rely on a defense of unconsciousness.
In his opening statement, defense counsel stated that this “is going to be a case about self-
defense.” He stated that the jury would hear testimony that the decedent attacked
defendant, and defendant “defend[ed] himself and unfortunately kill[ed]” the decedent.
In closing, defense counsel stated that defendant “is not a murderer. He acted in self
defense.” Defense counsel did note that defendant testified that “he doesn’t recall all the
facts and circumstances of what happened….” Counsel argued that it was “not

10
unreasonable for [defendant] not to recall something….” He noted that defendant had
testified that, after the decedent’s “initial attack he blacked out. He can’t recall what
happened. He told that to law enforcement too on multiple times. He told law
enforcement that he was scared. But he can’t recall the immediate actions right after [the
decedent’s] attack.” In concluding, defense counsel stated that the “[p]rosecution failed
to prove that [defendant] acted with the intent to kill, with the malice aforethought, that
he planned to kill, this happened to kill. [sic] None of that’s there. This was heat of
passion. This was self defense. [Defendant] believed he was acting to protect himself.”
Defense counsel did not refer to unconsciousness or argue that defendant committed any
act while unconscious. Thus, while defense counsel did note that defendant could not
recall events and that he blacked out, contrary to defendant’s contention, he did not rely
on unconsciousness as a defense. Therefore, we turn to whether there is substantial
evidence supporting that defense. (See Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 887.)
Defendant testified that, as the decedent advanced on him after hitting him with
what he assumed to be the shovel the decedent was holding, he could only speculate what
happened next because he blacked out. He testified that, after backpedaling and saying,
“let’s talk about this,” he blacked out, and the next thing he remembered was being on the
property with blood spurting out of his foot. Defendant testified that he “was pretty out
of it that whole day” after the incident, and that he was “in and out of…consciousness.”
He testified that, “that whole day, looking back on it, I don’t remember a lot of it.” He
later reiterated that “that whole day is pretty much a blur to me.” He again testified that,
after the altercation began, he “blacked out.” Defendant also testified that he had been
fully blacked out and he did not remember how the decedent was killed.
In his initial interview, Detective Hooks asked if defendant knew what the
decedent hit him with, and defendant responded, “[a]t this point it’s all a blur,” and “it
was turning into mostly a blur.” In a subsequent interview, defendant stated that, after
the decedent hit him at least three times, he “black–I blanked out.” After making a

11
representation that he fought back, and after Hooks asked him how he fought back,
defendant stated, “[t]hat’s the thing, once I started fighting…I went and blacked out.” He
stated that he did not remember the fight, and that it was a “complete blur.” Defendant
said more than once that the first thing he remembered after blacking out was coming to
on the property with blood squirting out of his foot. Thus, in extrajudicial statements and
in his trial testimony, defendant reported that he blacked out and could not recall killing
the decedent.
But defendant also, and repeatedly, described the altercation and detailed his
assault on the decedent. In his first interaction with others after killing the decedent,
defendant told S.A. and W.A. that he had been “fighting for his life.” He told W.A. that
once he started swinging, he could not stop, and he did not know “if the guy was
breathing.” Defendant told S.A. that he thought he had been stabbed, although S.A. did
not see any stab wounds. That defendant thought he might have been stabbed suggests
that he recalled aspects of the altercation.
At the market in Forest Ranch, defendant told CalFIRE firefighter Aldrich that he
had “punched the other gentleman in the face, knocking him to the ground. And then
kicked him in the face over a hundred times….” And in his first interview with Detective
Hooks, defendant recalled that the decedent hit him with something six to ten times.
Defendant then told Hooks, “I shocked his ass,” and that he threw punches at the
decedent, and maybe an elbow. He specified that he did not have any weapons.
Defendant remarked that he weighed 110 pounds, and stated that he “was fightin’ for my
life.” The decedent “went down.” Hooks asked defendant how many times he hit the
decedent, and defendant responded that he hit the decedent 10 to 20 times. Defendant
then told Hooks that, after he got the decedent down, “I hit him a few times and he was–
when he was down, that’s for sure.” Defendant then told Hooks that, after decedent went
down, defendant “was so scared that he was gonna get back up and I didn’t know what

12
was gonna happen.” Defendant went through the decedent’s pockets looking for keys,
but could not find them and eventually left on foot.
In a later interview with Detective Hooks, defendant stated that the decedent “kept
trying to hit” him and he “was scared. I was scared for my life. So what do I do? I
fight....” Defendant at trial acknowledged that he told Hooks that he punched the
decedent 10 to 20 times. He also acknowledged that he told Hooks that he hit the
decedent after the decedent went down. And in a jail call the day before his trial
testimony, defendant told someone that he killed the decedent with a shovel.
Defendant’s extrajudicial statements and his trial testimony, that he blacked out
and did not recall beating the decedent to death, are belied by the foregoing statements
offering details of the beating and his flight. The only support for defendant’s argument
is his own statements representing that he blacked out and could not recall killing the
decedent. However, a “[d]efendant’s professed inability to recall the event, without
more, [i]s insufficient to warrant an unconsciousness instruction.” (Rogers, supra,
39 Cal.4th at p. 888; see ibid. [“there is no ‘ineluctable rule’ that a defendant’s inability
to remember supplies an evidentiary foundation for an unconsciousness instruction”],
quoting parenthetically People v. Heffington (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 10.) We note that
S.A. testified that defendant’s eyes were dilated, and CalFIRE firefighter Aldrich testified
defendant had the appearance of someone in shock. However, there could be several
explanations for these conditions and defendant does not cite them as evidence of
unconsciousness. Moreover, there was no evidence to support the premise that an
individual who has blacked out or lost consciousness would have such symptoms. This
testimony thus does not support defendant’s argument. We also note, as emphasized by
the People, that there is no indication in the record that defendant sustained or
complained of a head injury. There is nothing to support defendant’s argument other
than his professed inability to recall killing the decedent.

13
Defendant emphasizes that the Supreme Court in Rogers observed: “nor did
defendant himself testify he was unconscious, but only that he could not later recall the
killings.” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 887.) Defendant therefore seeks to distinguish
this case from Rogers because here, defendant not only stated that he did not recall the
killing, but also that he blacked out, which, defendant states, “is synonymous with
unconsciousness under the law.” We conclude, however, that defendant’s mere
invocation of the phrase “blacked out” does not establish an entitlement to an instruction
on unconsciousness, particularly where he has also described numerous details of the
beating he inflicted on the decedent, causing his death.
Defendant relies on People v. Wilson (1967) 66 Cal.2d 749 for the proposition that
a trial court errs in failing to instruct on unconsciousness even where “the only evidence
of unconsciousness came from the defendant.” (Id. at p. 762.) However, unlike the
circumstances here, the defendant in Wilson, while claiming that he could not recall
shooting the two murder victims, did not offer detailed descriptions of the actions he took
while purportedly unconscious that contradicted his claimed inability to recall events.
We find unpersuasive defendant’s argument that the jury reasonably could have
viewed his numerous statements in which he described his assault of the decedent, such
as that he was fighting for his life and that he repeatedly punched and kicked the
decedent, “as a candid acknowledgment...that he realized before he left the scene…that
he must have fiercely resisted [the decedent’s] attack in some manner because he could
see that [the decedent] ‘wasn’t breathing’ and he was ‘pretty sure that he was dead,’ …”
In his statements, defendant did not describe observing the decedent’s body and, based on
its condition, deducing what he must have done while unconscious. Rather, he described
in detail, among other things, “fighting for his life,” punching the decedent in the face,
knocking him to the ground, kicking him in the face over 100 times, throwing punches
and maybe an elbow, and hitting the decedent 10 to 20 times, including while he was
down. We do not credit defendant’s argument that these statements were merely

14
“evidence that [defendant] realized afterward that he had used some form of deadly force
against” the decedent.
Defendant alternatively argues that, “even if [his] statements about punching and
kicking [the decedent] could reasonably be viewed as conflicting with his statements that
he blacked out, he was still entitled to the unconsciousness instruction.” He relies on
People v. Gana (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 598 for the premise that conflicting evidence as
to whether a defendant was unconscious does not negate the requirement that the court
instruct on the unconsciousness defense. In Gana, the defendant gave a detailed account
shortly after the shootings, but, at trial, she claimed to have a limited recollection of it.
(Id. at p. 609.) The appellate court stated: “ ‘[t]hat [s]he did not, by the time of trial,
accurately recall certain details of the shootings does not support an inference [s]he was
unconscious when [s]he committed them.’ ” (Ibid.) However, the Gana court continued:
“[b]ut here there was other evidence that justified giving unconsciousness instructions.
Tony Gana testified defendant’s eyes were wide open and her face lacked emotion when
she shot his father. A deputy sheriff also described her as having ‘a thousand mile stare’
and paramedics said she remained silent when asked a series of standard questions.”
(Ibid.) Additionally, “[t]he defense presented the testimony of medical experts who
identified the medications [the] defendant was taking to combat cancer and to overcome
the adverse effects of the chemotherapy, and explained how these medications could
affect her mental state.” (Id. at pp. 609-610.) Based on the conflict in the evidence, the
court concluded that the evidence supported instructions on unconsciousness. (Id. at
p. 610.)
Here, conversely, the only evidence relevant to unconsciousness is the defendant’s
bare claims that he blacked out and cannot remember. However, as stated, these claims
are belied by his detailed statements describing his assault and flight. Unlike Gana, there
was no other eyewitness testimony and no medical testimony to support defendant’s
claim of unconsciousness. While defendant argues that there is no legal requirement

15
“that the defense present expert testimony to explain the cause of the blackout, or that
eyewitness testimony corroborate the defendant’s account of his blackout,”; the fact
remains that a “[d]efendant’s professed inability to recall the event, without more, [i]s
insufficient to warrant an unconsciousness instruction.” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at
p. 888.)
We conclude that substantial evidence did not support the unconsciousness
defense and CALCRIM No. 3425. The trial court did not err by not instructing the jury
with CALCRIM No. 3425 on its own motion.
II
CALCRIM No. 626
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, on its
own motion, with CALCRIM No. 626 and the lesser included offense of involuntary
manslaughter. CALCRIM No. 626 would have informed the jury, in part: “When a
person voluntarily causes his or her own intoxication to the point of unconsciousness, the
person assumes the risk that while unconscious he or she will commit acts inherently
dangerous to human life. If someone dies as a result of the actions of a person who was
unconscious due to voluntary intoxication, then the killing is involuntary manslaughter.”
(CALCRIM No. 626.) Defendant argues that substantial evidence supported this
instruction, specifically evidence of his use of cocaine to the point of voluntary
intoxication and unconsciousness in the hours preceding the homicide. We disagree.
“Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or
not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with
murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice
aforethought.” (§ 29.4, subd. (b).) “ ‘Voluntary intoxication can prevent formation of
any specific intent requisite to the offense at issue, but it can never excuse homicide.’
[Citation.] Hence…, voluntary intoxication could reduce a criminal homicide to
involuntary manslaughter only if the defendant was rendered unconscious: ‘When a

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person renders himself or herself unconscious through voluntary intoxication and kills in
that state, the killing is attributed to his or her negligence in self-intoxicating to that point,
and is treated as involuntary manslaughter.’ ” (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192,
1227.) A person may be unconscious in this context when the person acts but is not
conscious of acting. (People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 981.)
Generally, involuntary manslaughter is treated as a lesser included offense to
murder. (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 422.) “ ‘ “[I]t is the ‘court’s duty to
instruct the jury not only on the crime with which the defendant is charged, but also on
any lesser offense that is both included in the offense charged and shown by the evidence
to have been committed.’ [Citation.]” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] … ‘ “[T]he existence of
‘any evidence, no matter how weak’ will not justify instructions on a lesser included
offense….” [Citation.] Rather, substantial evidence must exist to allow a reasonable jury
to find that the defendant is guilty of a lesser but not the greater offense. [Citation.]
“ ‘ “Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to ‘deserve consideration by the jury,’ that
is, evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Westerfield
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 718.) “A trial court must instruct the jury ‘sua sponte on
involuntary manslaughter based on unconsciousness’ whenever ‘there is evidence
deserving of consideration that the defendant was unconscious due to voluntary
intoxication.’ ” (People v. Turk (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1361, 1371, fn. omitted.) A trial
court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is reviewed de novo (People v.
Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 463), and we consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the defendant (People v. Millbrook (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1137).
Here, there was substantial evidence that defendant used cocaine. However, we
conclude there was not substantial evidence that defendant’s cocaine use rendered him
voluntarily intoxicated to the point of unconsciousness, preventing him from forming the
intent to kill.

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In the hours preceding the homicide, defendant and his four companions were
drinking and using cocaine. When the cocaine ran out, Brandon and defendant went to
get more. Upon their return, defendant, the decedent, and Brandon continued to drink
and use cocaine. At around 5:00 a.m., defendant and the decedent left to go to the
decedent’s house in Forest Ranch to continue drinking. There, defendant and the
decedent hung out drinking, smoking marijuana, and doing cocaine. The decedent was
doing lines of cocaine while defendant was just doing “bumps,” meaning that “[y]ou stick
it into...a key and just do a little bit.” Defendant did not like to do full lines of cocaine
because he did not “like to get that high.” Defendant “lost track of time.” After a while,
he stepped away to make a call, the decedent hit him on the back of his head, and
defendant blacked out. Later, at the scene of the homicide, law enforcement would find a
mirror with a line of white powder substance on it, a $20 bill rolled up like a straw, and a
yellow box containing 47.67 grams of cocaine. In his initial interview with Detective
Hooks, Hooks asked about drugs, and defendant responded, “No, I didn’t.” When
defendant’s blood was drawn on August 28, 2019, his blood alcohol content was 0.06
percent, he tested positive for benzoylecgonine and cocaine, the cocaine was below the
0.01 mg/L level of quantification, he had 0.03 mg/L of Lidocaine, and he tested positive
for marijuana.
Thus, the jury heard evidence that defendant used cocaine. The jury also heard
evidence in the form of defendant’s testimony and extrajudicial statements that he had
blacked out. However, we find no evidence in the trial record, let alone substantial
evidence, to establish, or even suggest, that when he killed the decedent, defendant was
voluntarily intoxicated to the point of unconsciousness as a result of using cocaine.
Defendant argues that he was “using and sharing so much cocaine that he ran out
and had to go pick up more, so he could continue using and sharing it.” However, despite
defendant’s framing, the record sheds no light on how much cocaine defendant himself
used. In fact, the record establishes that, later, while the decedent inhaled lines of

18
cocaine, defendant only did “bumps” because, in his own words, he did not “like to get
that high.” And defendant in his interview with Detective Hooks represented that he did
not do drugs. This is not substantial evidence that defendant’s cocaine use rendered him
voluntarily intoxicated and unconscious.
Defendant emphasizes E.F.’s testimony that he was agitated, angry, out of control,
and did not seem to be “himself.” Defendant told E.F. he had been up for some time,
which E.F. assumed was because of the cocaine, although defendant did not tell her that.
This, too, is not substantial evidence that defendant’s cocaine use rendered him
voluntarily intoxicated and unconscious.
Defendant refers to his “prodigious consumption of cocaine,” and the “copious
amount of cocaine he ingested….” But, again, the record does not contain substantial
evidence, or any evidence, of the extent of defendant’s personal cocaine use to support
these characterizations. Nor does the record contain substantial evidence that defendant’s
cocaine use rendered him voluntarily intoxicated and unconscious. We also note that
there was no medical testimony concerning the effects of cocaine on defendant and no
detailed testimony concerning how his cocaine use affected him.
Moreover, as discussed above, the record lacks substantial evidence that defendant
was unconscious when he beat the decedent to death. Defendant remembered in detail
the events leading up to, during, and after the confrontation. He remembered partying
with his friends. He remembered going to the decedent’s house. He remembered
hanging around at the picnic table, drinking, using cocaine, and listening to music. He
remembered going to speak with someone on the phone, at which time, he stated, he was
struck in the head, causing him to black out. According to defendant, his next
recollection after blacking out was when he came to and realized that there was blood
spurting from his foot. He was still on the decedent’s property.
However, notwithstanding his representations that he blacked out and could not
recall his fatal assault on the decedent, as discussed at length above, in his statements to

19
S.A. and W.A., to CalFIRE firefighter Aldrich, and to Detective Hooks, defendant
described details of that assault. And, as stated, a defendant’s “professed inability to
recall the event, without more, [i]s insufficient to warrant an unconsciousness
instruction.” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 888; see ibid.) That defendant volunteered
that he blacked out and could not remember assaulting the decedent alone is not
substantial evidence of unconsciousness.
Having considered the entire record in a light most favorable to defendant (see
People v. Millbrook, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1137), we conclude there is not
substantial evidence that, when he beat the decedent to death, defendant was voluntarily
intoxicated and unconscious as a result of his cocaine use. Accordingly, the trial court
did not err in failing to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 626 on its own motion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

\s\
KRAUSE, J.

We concur:

\s\
MAURO, Acting P. J.

\s\
FEINBERG, J.

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