CourtListener 10852742•People v. Gonzales CA3
Texte intégral
Filed 5/4/26 P. v. Gonzales CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
THE PEOPLE, C101626
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 22FE003665)
v.
RICKY RANDY GONZALES,
Defendant and Appellant.
That defendant Ricky Randy Gonzales shot Jimmy C. several times was never in
doubt; the question was whether Gonzales’s actions were legally justified. A jury
rejected Gonzales’s claim of self-defense and found him guilty of attempted murder,
assault with a firearm, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Gonzales now claims
several trial court errors require that we award him a new trial. We disagree and affirm.
LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Gonzales had a son with Loretta S. Subsequently, Jimmy C. married Loretta and
helped raise her son. In addition to the son and two other children, Loretta and Jimmy
also were raising Jimmy’s 13-year-old daughter and Jimmy’s 8-year-old sister.
On the day of the shooting, Loretta was planning a birthday party for her son. She
and Jimmy argued about money before she left the house on foot with three children.
While walking, Loretta called Gonzales. Despite the fact that she had hardly spoken to
Gonzales for over a decade, she asked him to meet them at a store called Citi Trends.
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She told him she needed help with the party. She never told Gonzales she was afraid of
anything.
When Gonzales arrived at the store, Loretta asked him to take the children to the
car. Meanwhile, Jimmy had followed Loretta and was waiting in the Citi Trends parking
lot in his SUV. He pulled up to Gonzales’s parked sedan and started talking to him.
Loretta came out of the store and told Jimmy that she and the children were
leaving with Gonzales. Jimmy told Gonzales that he was not taking his family. An
argument ensued, and Jimmy indicated that his own sister should stay with him.
Gonzales agreed that the sister could stay with Jimmy. Jimmy took his sister to his SUV
and unsuccessfully tried to unlock the doors.
Jimmy then walked in front of his SUV, and he and Loretta were “getting loud
with each other,” but he never threatened anybody. Gonzales then shot Jimmy five times.
Fortunately, Gonzales was a poor shot. Bullets struck Jimmy’s elbow and upper chest,
but he survived.
Gonzales, Loretta, and all of the children then quickly got into Gonzales’s car and
drove away. Loretta testified that she did not know that Jimmy had been shot, and
Gonzales told her he fired his gun in an attempt to scare Jimmy. Gonzales drove to a
family member’s house in Stockton. Loretta testified that when she learned that Jimmy
was in the hospital, she called the police and eventually cooperated.
Jimmy testified at trial that after he was shot, he walked quickly back to his SUV,
opened the driver’s side door, and leaned into the SUV, dripping blood on the front seat
and cup holder. He then went to Citi Trends to get help and collapsed inside the store.
Gonzales admitted at trial that he fired his five-shot .38 Smith & Wesson revolver
at Jimmy. Law enforcement found no casings at the scene; if the shooter used a revolver,
no casings would be ejected. When Gonzales was arrested nearly three weeks later, he
was in possession of a .40-caliber Beretta semiautomatic firearm. The parties appear to
agree this Beretta was “a second gun” not involved in the shooting.
2
Jimmy testified at trial. Consistent with his testimony, Jimmy narrated a
surveillance video that captured the shooting. He explained that once he was shot, he ran
away. He then thought about driving himself to the hospital, and even went to his car to
try and get inside to leave. He realized he was having trouble breathing and went to get
help instead.
Jimmy repeatedly testified that he never had a gun or threatened anyone that day.
Loretta also testified she never saw Jimmy with a gun and she had never seen Jimmy put
a gun in the car or hide things in different places in the car.
Gonzales testified on his own behalf. According to him, Loretta called and said
that she and the children were at Citi Trends in Sacramento and that someone was outside
with a gun. Gonzales took a five-shot .38 Smith & Wesson revolver and drove from
Stockton to Sacramento to help her.
Gonzales was by his car in the store parking lot when Jimmy pulled up in his
SUV. Gonzales soon realized it was a domestic dispute and felt that Loretta had set him
up. Gonzales had no ill will toward Jimmy.
The adults argued. Jimmy twice told Gonzales, “You’re not leaving with my
family.” The two men started walking toward each other, and Gonzales saw Jimmy
trying to draw a firearm from his waistline. It was a small-framed handgun; a
semiautomatic, not a revolver. Gonzales pulled his own firearm and shot Jimmy before
Jimmy could shoot him.
Gonzales discarded his Smith & Wesson on the drive back to Stockton, throwing it
out the car window.
When officers first arrived at the scene of the shooting, they investigated the
possibility of two shooters, and that Jimmy may have been one of them. Deputy
Matthew Tam spoke to Jimmy briefly, who indicated he was shot by his wife’s former
partner. Jimmy denied he had a firearm and gave Deputy Tam permission to search his
SUV. Deputy Tam looked around and inside Jimmy’s car and found no clear signs of
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hidden compartments where a firearm could be stashed. Deputies Jonathan Nelson and
Renny Rojo also searched Jimmy’s SUV but did not find a weapon.
Deputy Tam also testified that he followed a blood trail indicating Jimmy’s path
after he was shot. Although there were few areas where a gun could be hidden, he had
other deputies canvass the area for additional guns; none were found. After viewing the
surveillance video that captured the shooting, however, officers jettisoned the working
assumption of more than one shooter and focused on the theory that Jimmy was an
unarmed victim.
The jury found Gonzales guilty of attempted murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 664/187,
subd. (a); count one), assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count two), and felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count three). The jury also found true
firearm enhancement allegations: that during the commission of count one, Gonzales
discharged and used a handgun pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), and
(d) and that during the commission of counts one and two Gonzales used a handgun
pursuant to section 12022.5, subdivision (a).
In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true a prior strike and prior serious
felony allegation. The trial court also found true several factors in aggravation.
Defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial and requested that the court unseal
jury information, alleging that the jurors may have received extrajudicial evidence. The
trial court held a hearing on whether to disclose juror identifying information but
ultimately denied the request.
The trial court sentenced Gonzales to an aggregate term of 24 years four months,
plus 25 years to life.
Gonzales timely filed a notice of appeal.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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DISCUSSION
I.
Deputy Tam’s Testimony
At trial, Gonzales’s defense was one of self-defense. He contended that Jimmy
had a gun that day and that Jimmy hid the fact that he was armed by either hiding or
abandoning his weapon after he was shot, likely inside his own vehicle.2 Whether Jimmy
“had a firearm was the heart of the defense’s self-defense argument and the lynchpin of
the jury’s decision.” Gonzales contends that the court erred in allowing Deputy Tam to
testify that the surveillance video showed Jimmy did not have anything in his hand after
the shooting, thereby implying the shooting was not in self-defense. He specifically
argues that if Deputy Tam’s testimony was offered as lay opinion testimony, it was
speculative and if his testimony was offered as an expert opinion, it was improper
because it was not about a matter outside the scope of the jury’s common experience.
We need not resolve the issue however, as we conclude any error was harmless.
A. Additional Background
Deputy Tam testified he responded to a report of the shooting at Citi Trends.
Deputy Tam narrated the surveillance video played for the jury and pointed out the
moments where the shooter fired at Jimmy. Deputy Tam scrutinized the video to see if
there were any signs that Jimmy was armed with a firearm. At one point, after Jimmy
had been shot, he appeared “to grab something out of the vehicle,” which Deputy Tam
assumed was a cell phone. After the trial court sustained the defense’s objection to
Deputy Tam’s assumption, the following exchange took place.
2 To that end, a defense expert testified that the type of SUV Jimmy was driving has
a large space under the cup holders in the console where items can be stored. Deputy
Tam testified he looked around the front driver’s seat and center console area for hidden
compartments and found none but admitted there could have been a hidden compartment.
Deputy Rojo testified that when he searched the SUV, he did not find anything in the cup
holders. Deputy Nelson said he did not search the SUV for hidden compartments.
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“[PROSECUTOR:] Based on your training and your experience why did you
think something was coming out of the car and not something was going into the car?
“[DEPUTY TAM:] The motion in which he reached inside.
“[DEFENSE:] Objection, Your Honor. It’s speculation.
“THE COURT: Overruled. [¶] … It’s based on his training and experience.
“He can answer that.
“[DEPUTY TAM:] So based on my training — There’s certain motions that
people make.
“If they’re dumping a firearm in — inside of a vehicle, they would have reached
further in and probably stuffed it somewhere.
“I’ve found firearms — multiple firearms inside glove boxes. I’ve found them in
between the driver’s seat and center console. I’ve found them behind panels of
dashboards.
“They’re usually hidden. They don’t just drop firearms on a seat and run.
“This case, his motion on the seat appeared to him — appeared to be the victim
reaching into the vehicle and grabbing something from the vehicle and then shutting the
door behind him.
“Um, the other thing I noticed in this vehicle is —if you rewind it just a bit, his
hands are empty prior to approaching the vehicle.” (Italics added.)
Deputy Tam then narrated a portion of the video pointing out “where [Jimmy]
approaches the vehicle with empty hands and appears to grab something out of the
vehicle.” (Italics added.)
B. Analysis
Under Evidence Code section 720, subdivision (a), “[a] person is qualified to
testify as an expert if he has special knowledge, skill, experience, [or] training” on the
subject to which his or her testimony relates. The general test for the admissibility of
expert testimony is whether it concerns “a subject that is sufficiently beyond common
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experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.” (Evid. Code,
§ 801, subd. (a); see also People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 639.) In addition, a
lay witness may express an opinion based on his or her perception where it is helpful to a
clear understanding of the witness’s testimony. (Evid. Code, § 800; People v. DeHoyos
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 130.)
We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, and even if there was an
abuse of discretion we do not reverse unless there is a reasonable probability the
defendant would have achieved a more favorable verdict had the court ruled differently.
(People v. DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 131; see also People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 837.)
We begin by noting two things. First, neither party commits to a position on
whether Deputy Tam’s testimony was admitted as lay or expert opinion testimony.
Indeed, the trial court did not expressly state whether Deputy Tam’s testimony was
admissible as an opinion from a lay or expert witness or both. And, while the jury was
instructed with CALCRIM Nos. 332 (Expert Witness Testimony) and 333 (Opinion
Testimony of Lay Witness) neither instruction expressly informed the jury to consider
Deputy Tam’s testimony as either expert or lay opinion. In general, it is not improper for
an officer to testify about observations made when reviewing a surveillance tape.
(People v. Son (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 689, 696-698.) But, as evident from the law cited
ante, the analysis is different depending on how the evidence was admitted. We are of
the view that some aspects of Deputy Tam’s testimony could have been appropriately
admitted as lay opinion and other aspects as appropriate expert opinion. But where, as
here, there is no clear ruling on the foundation of the admissibility of the evidence, our
review would necessarily be speculative.
Second, the People contend Gonzales forfeited his challenge to Deputy Tam’s
testimony on the basis that it was improper opinion or that it lacked relevance because his
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trial objection was only based on speculation. We need not resolve either issue, however,
because in addressing prejudice we find that any error was harmless for several reasons.
To the extent the jury relied on CALCRIM Nos. 332 and/or 333 in assessing
Deputy Tam’s testimony, both instructions informed it that evidence of expert and lay
opinions must be considered but need not be accepted as true or correct. And regardless
of whether the jury relied upon those jury instructions, the jury saw the video and was
always free to compare the video to the deputy’s opinion and determine for itself whether
his opinion was correct. (See People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 601 [“because the
surveillance video was played for the jury, jurors could make up their own minds” as to
whether the video matched the testimony of the officer].)
The video clearly shows Jimmy was not holding a firearm when he returned to the
SUV and thus Deputy Tam’s testimony did not inform the jury of anything it could not
see for itself. Nor did allowing Deputy Tam to opine that Jimmy was removing rather
than depositing something inside the SUV usurp the jury’s function as a fact finder.
Because the video clearly shows Jimmy’s hands were empty when he reached inside the
car, there was nothing for Jimmy to deposit inside the vehicle and Deputy Tam’s opinion
on this point was wholly unnecessary to the jury’s determination of whether Jimmy was
armed.
Lastly, the evidence at trial supporting guilt was strong. While Gonzales testified
that Jimmy had a firearm, other witnesses denied seeing Jimmy with a gun or a weapon.
No other firearms were found on Jimmy or at the scene of the shooting. Furthermore, we
are unpersuaded by Gonzales’s contention that it was not apparent from the video
whether Jimmy had a gun in his hand at the time of the shooting. As we have mentioned,
in our viewing of the video it clearly shows Jimmy did not have anything in either hand
when he returned to his car following the shooting. The video shows Jimmy return to his
car after he was shot. His hands are visible and empty of any item, much less a firearm.
Jimmy used one single hand to open the car door and reach inside. His other hand
8
remained at his side and did not enter the car. This action dispels any notion that he was
placing a firearm inside the car, as it would have been difficult if not impossible to hold a
firearm and open the car door with the same hand. The video depicts no such
encumbered maneuver or item in his hand. The video of the shooting thus corroborated
the evidence that there was only one shooter — Gonzales. There is no reasonable
probability the result at trial would have been different absent Deputy Tam’s narration of
the video. In view of all the evidence presented at trial, any assumed error was harmless.
II.
Evidence of Other Firearm Possessions
Gonzales contends the trial court erred in admitting three facts about Gonzales’s
firearm possession: (1) when he was arrested three weeks after the shooting, he was in
possession of a second firearm not used in shooting Jimmy; (2) that he “walk[ed] around
armed all the time”; and (3) that he acquired both firearms illegally. According to
Gonzales, this evidence constituted irrelevant character evidence, inadmissible under
Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101. We agree the evidence was admitted in error but
find the error harmless.
A. Additional Background
Prior to trial, defense counsel requested that the court exclude any mention that
Gonzales was typically armed with a firearm and asserted that he planned to stipulate to
the fact that he was armed the day of the shooting. The court said, “I see this as you can’t
put on character evidence to say ‘Yeah, I know this guy and he carries all the time.’ ”
The prosecutor stated that she had no objection. The court excluded evidence that
Gonzales was typically armed with a firearm.
Defense counsel also requested exclusion of evidence as to how Gonzales
acquired the firearm used in the shooting. He admitted it was relevant that the firearm
was possessed illegally but asserted how he obtained it was not. The court said, “Yeah. I
tend to agree. He’s admitting to the prior and so — Okay. I’ll grant that.”
9
Defense counsel later stated that he wanted to make sure “there was no [Evidence
Code section] 1101[, subdivision ](b) evidence” in light of a notation regarding an illegal
firearm possession. The prosecutor stated she had no “1101(b)” evidence at that point.
After the People rested but before Gonzales took the stand in his own defense, a
new prosecutor3 indicated he intended to raise the fact that Gonzales had a firearm in his
possession when found by police three weeks after the shooting. The prosecutor never
suggested this firearm was used in the shooting. Rather, the parties below and on appeal
appear to agree this Beretta was “a second gun” and not involved in the shooting.
Defense counsel objected, stating that he previously requested the exclusion of any
evidence that Gonzales was armed at any time other than the shooting, as it was not
relevant to the instant offense. The trial court found the fact that Gonzales was armed
with a gun when he was arrested was relevant and admissible. The court stated that if it
ruled differently in limine, then “I’m just reversing myself I guess.” The trial court
reiterated that the prosecution could not elicit testimony that Gonzales was someone who
generally walks around carrying firearms.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Gonzales where he obtained the gun
used in the shooting. Gonzales admitted he bought it a week or two before the shooting
from an illegal source. He explained, “I still got people out there that want to do me
harm, too.” The prosecutor also asked Gonzales, “So the day this shooting happened, did
you — were you already armed? [¶] Did you just walk around armed all the time?”
(Italics added.) Gonzales answered “Yes, I did.”
Toward the end of cross examination, the following exchange took place between
the prosecutor and Gonzales.
3 On the sixth day of trial, the original prosecutor was called away on an emergency
basis and a new prosecutor was assigned.
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“[PROSECUTOR:] After all this happened, they catch — when — when they
find you — By the way, this was March 17th.
“Does that sound about right?
“[GONZALES:] Yes.
“[PROSECUTOR:] And in this period of time — Between when the shooting
happened and March 17th, it sounds to me like you’re saying — First of all, you got
another illegal gun?
“[GONZALES:] Yes, sir.
“[PROSECUTOR:] Where did you get that one?
“[GONZALES:] Probably the same place.”
Defense counsel did not immediately object to the question of whether Gonzales
walked around armed all the time or how he acquired the firearms. After the testimony
and outside the jury’s presence, defense counsel objected and explained that he did not
make a contemporaneous objection because he did not want to highlight the issue to the
jury. The trial court faulted defense counsel for waiting to object and found that any
issue as to how Gonzales came to possess the firearms was waived by counsel’s failure to
object.
After the close of evidence, the court denied defense counsel’s motion for a
mistrial on this claim of error. However, the court agreed that allowing the introduction
of evidence as to how Gonzales obtained firearms violated its ruling made in limine.
With the parties’ agreement, the trial court instructed the jury that “[a]ny questions and
any resulting testimony about how the defendant obtained any weapons in this case are
stricken from the record and you may not consider such questions or testimony in any
way during your deliberations.”
B. Analysis
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any
disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code,
11
§ 210.) “Evidence that a defendant has committed crimes other than those currently
charged is not admissible to prove that the defendant is a person of bad character or has a
criminal disposition; but evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove, among
other things, the identity of the perpetrator of the charged crimes, the existence of a
common design or plan, or the intent with which the perpetrator acted in the commission
of the charged crimes. (Evid. Code, § 1101.)” (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301,
1328; accord, Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).)
Trial judges have discretion to exclude relevant evidence where its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the probability that admitting the evidence will unduly
prolong the proceeding, prejudice the opposing party, confuse the issues, or mislead the
jury. (Evid. Code, § 352; People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1181.) However,
evidence is prejudicial not because it is damaging to a defendant’s case, but because it
“ ‘ “uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias” ’ ” without regard to its relevance.
(People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1121.) We review the trial court’s rulings on the
admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. (Linton, at p. 1181.)
The People contend that Gonzales forfeited his challenge to the firearm evidence
by failing to make a timely objection in the trial court on the ground raised on appeal.
Anticipating the People’s forfeiture argument, Gonzales makes a preemptive ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. We conclude Gonzales did not forfeit the claimed error. He
filed motions in limine regarding the propriety of the evidence and discussed the
applicability of both subdivision (a) and (b) of Evidence Code section 1101 to the case.
Counsel also objected to the relevant testimony. Although the objection took place
outside the presence of the jury, this is a recognized tactic to “ ‘efficiently dispose of
matters outside the hearing of jurors or testifying witnesses.’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2022)
13 Cal.5th 997, 1123.)
We agree with Gonzales that the highlighted evidence was improperly admitted.
By asking whether he always walked around armed, the prosecutor violated the court’s
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pretrial exclusion order. And it was irrelevant. Notably, Gonzales did not deny he had a
gun or used it to shoot Jimmy, nor does he claim such on appeal. His position was and is
that he used the gun lawfully in self-defense. Similarly, his possession of an unrelated
firearm three weeks after the shooting was therefore not relevant to whether he shot
Jimmy or acted in self-defense.
Similarly, the fact that Gonzales obtained both firearms illegally was irrelevant to
the contested issues as well. As Gonzales notes, the potential value in this evidence for
the prosecution was to portray him as having a predisposition to engage in armed
criminality, in flagrant disregard of the law, regardless of the relevant circumstances.
Admission of this evidence was erroneous. (Cf. People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th
1038, 1056 [“[w]hen the prosecution relies on evidence regarding a specific type of
weapon, it is error to admit evidence that other weapons were found in the defendant’s
possession, for such evidence tends to show not that he committed the crime, but only
that he is the sort of person who carries deadly weapons” and cannot be relied upon to
prove propensity or disposition]; see also People v. Henderson (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d
349, 360 [“Evidence of possession of a weapon not used in the crime charged against a
defendant leads logically only to an inference that defendant is the kind of person who
surrounds himself with deadly weapons — a fact of no relevant consequence to
determination of the guilt or innocence of the defendant”].)
The People alternatively contend that the evidence “ ‘had very little effect on the
issues’ ” and thus any error was harmless. Disagreeing, Gonzales claims the evidence
was so inflammatory and prejudicial that its admission violated due process such that it
cannot be said to be “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” — as set forth in Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. But the admission of evidence only results in a due
process violation when “ ‘there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the
evidence,’ ” such that its admission rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. (People v.
Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 229; see People v. Hunt (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th
13
811, 817.) Here, the trial court expressly instructed the jury to disregard “[a]ny questions
and any resulting testimony about how the defendant obtained any weapons in this case”
as they were stricken from the record and could not be considered. We presume the jury
followed the instruction. (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 30.) And the evidence
that Gonzales was frequently armed, including weeks after the shooting, could allow the
jury to permissibly infer that Gonzales had a need for self-defense, as explained by his
testimony. Thus, the evidence did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. We
conclude no due process violation occurred and Chapman does not apply.
Instead, “state law error in admitting evidence is subject to the traditional Watson
test: The reviewing court must ask whether it is reasonably probable the verdict would
have been more favorable to the defendant absent the error.” (People v. Partida (2005)
37 Cal.4th 428, 439; see People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) Under this test,
Gonzales has not demonstrated prejudice. The objectionable evidence was far from a
bombshell. As part of his own defense Gonzales essentially told the jury he was well-
prepared to illegally arm himself at a moment’s notice in anticipation of trouble. As
noted, Gonzales admitted he illegally owned and carried his Smith & Wesson to Citi
Trends after Loretta called him and that he used it to shoot Jimmy multiple times. We
also note that the prosecutor did not mention the second firearm possession at all during
closing arguments.
Even if the objectionable evidence led the jury to infer Gonzales was predisposed
to commit armed violence, this does not necessarily mean the verdict was based on this
inference. Indeed, it is hard to conceive how the evidence regarding how often Gonzales
was armed could influence the verdicts of guilt on the attempted murder or assault
charges when the jury actually saw the shooting unfold on the video. The video speaks
for itself. The jury could see Gonzales shoot Jimmy multiple times and could judge for
itself Gonzales’s claim that he only shot Jimmy in self-defense. The video corroborated
the eyewitness testimony that pointed to Gonzales as the sole shooter. Thus, the strength
14
of the evidence of Gonzales’s guilt makes it exceedingly unlikely he would have received
a more favorable verdict had the trial judge excluded the evidence of how often he was
armed, the fact that he was armed three weeks after the shooting, and/or how he obtained
the illegal firearms. Especially compared to the video, the objectionable evidence was
not of such a nature that “ ‘ “uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias” ’ ” without
regard to its relevance. (People v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1121.)
III.
Late Discovery of Body Camera Footage
After trial began, the prosecutor discovered footage from an officer-worn body
camera that recorded officers searching Jimmy’s SUV after the shooting. This evidence
tendered as late discovery was labeled People’s exhibit 3. On appeal, Gonzales claims
that the late discovery of the footage, which he identifies as defense exhibit G, was
prejudicial to his case and should have prompted the trial court to instruct the jury with
CALCRIM No. 306 (Untimely Disclosure of Evidence). He contends that the court erred
in refusing to do so and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to renew the instructional
request. We disagree with his claims.
A. Additional Background
The state of the record as to what evidence was “late discovered” is confusing. On
February 7, 2024, after the prosecution presented its first witness, the prosecutor noted
that she just received notice that body-worn camera footage was discovered. Defense
counsel accepted the prosecutor’s representation that the footage would be forthcoming.
The next day, on February 8, defense counsel premarked three video exhibits:
defense exhibits G, H, I, along with their respective transcripts, and described all of them
as footage from Deputy Tam’s body-worn camera. Gonzales’s final exhibit list contained
those same exhibits and descriptions.
On February 13, the prosecutor informed the court that he tendered the previously
missing footage (the “late discovered” evidence) to defense counsel a few days prior. As
15
described by the parties, the footage showed an officer searching the front passenger
compartment area of Jimmy’s SUV.4 Once defense counsel received the evidence, he
requested the court instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 306 on the untimely disclosure
of evidence. The court denied the request. Notably, defense counsel did not ask to
exclude the evidence.
The prosecutor noted that he planned to play a clip of People’s exhibit 3 but that
he would do so without sound because he did not have an accompanying transcript. The
prosecutor then stated, “there is a portion after that, where they are chatting amongst
themselves about were there two guns, the guys were shooting at each other.” Defense
counsel did not object or indicate that he had a transcript for this exhibit, which had only
been discovered a few days prior.
During Deputy Nelson’s testimony, the prosecutor and defense counsel both
played the same clip from People’s exhibit 3, without sound.5 Deputy Nelson confirmed
it was video footage from his body camera. The next day, during Deputy Rojo’s
testimony, defense counsel played defense exhibit G for Deputy Rojo, which is body
camera footage from an officer sitting in a car, speaking to another officer who is off
screen. The two officers discuss the possibility of multiple shooters. The transcript of
this video attributes the conversation to be between Deputy Tam and Deputy Rojo. But
Deputy Rojo testified he was not involved in that conversation. He stated that the voices
sounded like Deputy Tam speaking with Deputy Ken Lloyd.
4 Although People’s exhibit 3 was footage initially attributed to Deputy Rojo’s body
camera, Deputy Nelson testified the footage was from his body camera and recorded his
search of Jimmy’s SUV with Deputy Rojo.
5 Because the prosecution only introduced a four-minute clip, the clipped portion
was copied and admitted as People’s exhibit 4.
16
In briefing on appeal, Gonzales argues that the prosecution untimely provided a
body camera video of the search of Jimmy’s SUV, wherein the officer indicated that a
witness said the victim shot first. In doing so, he refers to defense exhibit G-1, the
transcript of the video footage contained in defense exhibit G. From our review of the
record, the “late discovered” evidence was People’s exhibit 3, not defense exhibit G. If
defense exhibit G is part of People’s exhibit 3, there is no record of such.
B. Analysis
Discovery in criminal cases is strictly governed by sections 1054 to 1054.10.
These provisions are “the only means by which the defendant may compel the disclosure
or production of information from prosecuting attorneys … .” (§ 1054.5, subd. (a); see
People v. Tillis (1998) 18 Cal.4th 284, 294 [courts may not broaden scope of discovery
mandated by these provisions].)
In criminal cases, the prosecutor must disclose “[r]elevant written or recorded
statements of witnesses or reports of the statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor
intends to call at the trial, including any reports or statements of experts made in
conjunction with the case … which the prosecutor intends to offer in evidence at the
trial.” (§ 1054.1, subd. (f).) These disclosures must be made at least 30 days before trial.
(§ 1054.7.)
If a party fails to comply with these disclosure requirements, “a court may make
any order necessary to enforce the provisions of this chapter.” (§ 1054.5, subd. (b).) The
court has broad discretion to fashion a remedy in the event of a discovery violation.
(People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 951.) As one choice of remedy, a trial court
may give the jury a special instruction regarding late disclosure of evidence. (People v.
Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 306.) A trial court’s ruling on matters concerning discovery
is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Lamb (2006)
136 Cal.App.4th 575, 581.)
17
Because Gonzales’s claim of prejudice rests on his contention that defense
exhibit G was part of the late discovery, his inability to connect defense exhibit G to
People’s exhibit 3 is fatal to his claim.
In addition, Gonzales cannot prevail without affirmatively showing error in the
trial court’s decision to not instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 306. (People v. Riggs,
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 306; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564). Even
were we to assume the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on CALCRIM
No. 306, we find no prejudice resulted. Contrary to Gonzales’s claim, the instruction
would not have been helpful here. CALCRIM No. 306 instructs the jury that both sides
“must disclose their evidence to the other side before trial, within the time limits set by
law. Failure to follow this rule may deny the other side the chance to produce all relevant
evidence, to counter opposing evidence, or to receive a fair trial.” The instruction also
provides an opportunity to identify the evidence and party at fault before further
instructing, “In evaluating the weight and significance of that evidence, you may consider
the effect, if any, of that late disclosure.” (CALCRIM No. 306) While the instruction
would have informed the jury that an untimely disclosure was made, it would not have
made a significant difference in this case.
Given the nature of the trial evidence, it is difficult to see that the late disclosure of
People’s exhibit 3 (which showed Deputies Nelson and Rojo searching the SUV) had any
effect on the trial or in the jury’s assessment of Gonzales’s guilt. The fact that officers
discussed reports that Jimmy fired the first shot or that there may have been two shooters
was not new information. Deputy Tam testified that he initially investigated the shooting
as involving more than one shooter and that the shooting was possibly instigated by
Jimmy. The jury also heard defense exhibits H and I, Deputy Tam’s body camera
footage, in which that same possibility was discussed.
Gonzales additionally argues that the body camera footage of the officers
searching Jimmy’s car would have added support to his argument that the officers
18
committed missteps in the course of investigating this case. He goes on to contend that
“it is reasonably probable that the jury could have decided that untimely discovery had
impacted the defendant’s ability to investigate and that this raised a reasonable doubt as
to appellant’s guilt.” Yet Gonzales does not tell us how the late discovery of this specific
evidence deprived him of the ability to investigate or of putting forth a claim of self
defense. “ ‘[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on
the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as
waived, and pass it without consideration.’ ” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764,
793.)
As a result, it is unclear how Gonzales was demonstrably prejudiced by the court’s
failure to instruct the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 306. (See People v. McKinnon
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 679 [“In determining whether the failure to instruct requires
reversal, ‘[w]e apply the normal standard of review for state law error: whether it is
reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to defendant
had the instruction been given’ ”].)
Nevertheless, Gonzales argues that discovering that defense exhibit G recorded a
conversation between Deputies Tam and Lloyd (rather than Rojo) was “precisely the type
of setback to the opposing party which may transpire through the late disclosure of
evidence.” We are not persuaded. Defense counsel premarked defense exhibit G on the
second day of evidence and, as we have concluded, there is no indication this was
tendered as part of the late discovery of People’s exhibit 3. Accordingly, Gonzales
cannot show that the prosecution bears any responsibility for counsel’s surprise that it
was not Deputy Rojo who was conversing with Deputy Tam on defense exhibit G.
Gonzales’s final claim is that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he
failed to renew his request for the instruction or request other remedies for the People’s
delayed production of discovery. A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel
must show both deficient performance under an objective standard of professional
19
reasonableness, and prejudice under a test of reasonable probability of a different
outcome. (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 309.) A reasonable probability is “a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694.) If the record on appeal sheds no light on why
counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, unless counsel was asked for an
explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation, the claim on appeal must be rejected. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997)
15 Cal.4th 264, 266.)
Gonzales contends that the late discovery resulted in counsel’s failure to
investigate Deputy Lloyd, the person who purportedly told Deputy Tam that a witness
said Jimmy fired first. But the record sheds no light on whether defense counsel did or
did not investigate Deputy Lloyd or whether he pursued other avenues to discover the
identity of the witness. Such a claim raises matters outside the record on appeal and
should therefore be resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding where evidence can be
submitted in support of the claim. (People v. Barella (1999) 20 Cal.4th 261, 272.) And,
because we have already rejected Gonzales’s claim that he was prejudiced by the court’s
failure to instruct the jury on CALCRIM No. 306, we conclude he has not established
that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to renew his request for the instruction.
IV.
Cumulative Error
Gonzales contends that the cumulative effect of the errors he alleges prejudiced
him, mandating reversal. We reject this contention. The premise behind the cumulative
error doctrine is that, while a number of errors may be harmless when taken individually,
their cumulative effect requires reversal. (People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189,
1236-1237, disapproved on another ground in People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176.) A
defendant is “entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one.” (People v. Cunningham (2001)
25 Cal.4th 926, 1009.) Gonzales was not deprived of a fair trial. Although we have
20
found the trial court erred by admitting extraneous evidence regarding Gonzales’s
possession of firearms, Gonzales was able to argue his defense. In light of the substantial
evidence of his guilt, there is no reasonable probability that with the correct rulings the
outcome of Gonzales’s case would have been more favorable to him.
V.
Juror Information
Gonzales contends the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to release juror
information when Gonzales presented evidence that officers had spoken about the merits
of the case in front of jurors. We disagree.
A. Additional Background
Defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial based on allegations from
Gonzales’s friend, Richard VanBoeyen, that the jurors in Gonzales’s case had “received
prejudicial extrajudicial evidence from law enforcement officers in the hallway while the
jury was present during a break within the court’s proceedings.”
Defense counsel noted that his investigator had been able to locate two of the 12
jurors, neither of whom were aware of any statements being made by the officers.6
Counsel requested that the court either release the contact information of the remaining
jurors or send letters to the jurors to inquire if they had been “privy to extra judicial
statements in the hallway by law enforcement officers.”
The court held a hearing on the motion to release juror information. VanBoeyen,
who had several felony convictions, testified he has known Gonzales since grade school
and was friends with and affiliated with the same gang as Gonzales. He also testified that
on February 13, 2024, during a break in proceedings, he heard “three to four officers
6 The court previously continued the hearing to provide the defense an opportunity
to attempt to contact jurors without the release of any information. The defense
investigator spoke with jurors Nos. 1 and 7.
21
talking about [Gonzales], his prior history and his case in front of the jury.” He claimed
that the officers referred to Gonzales as “a criminal,” “a thug” and commented “that there
was no other firearm involved in the case.” He acknowledged that he was only able to
hear bits and pieces of what the officers were discussing in the hallway.
VanBoeyen admitted that he had previously spoken with defense counsel and not
raised any concern. He claimed that he did not know that it was wrong for law
enforcement officers to talk about the case outside of the courtroom. However, on cross-
examination, VanBoeyen admitted he did not tell defense counsel about what he heard on
the day that he overheard the officers talking. He later clarified that he had told Gonzales
about what he overheard that same day, but that he did not say anything to defense
counsel until the following day. VanBoeyen subsequently changed his testimony again
and noted that he had not told defense counsel what he overheard until after the trial was
over.
The trial court initially refrained from making any credibility determinations but
said it would set the matter for another hearing and start the process of reaching out to
jurors. The court noted that “[a]ny juror who says they are okay sharing their
information, that information will be passed to Counsel.” The court further noted: “Any
juror who’s not willing to do that, we’ll take that up when we come back for the New
Trial Motion, if either side thinks there’s good cause to compel the disclosure of juror
information, over their objection.”
At the next hearing, the court noted that all the jurors had been contacted by mail.
Two of the jurors responded that they were willing to release their information, and five
responded that they objected to the release. The court clerk then reached out to the
remaining jurors by phone. Over the course of two weeks the clerk placed three phone
calls to the remaining jurors. Two additional jurors responded by phone opposing the
release of their information. Three jurors never responded by phone or by mail. The
22
court noted that it would not be disclosing information related to the jurors who had said
“ ‘No.’ ”
At the time of the hearing, two jurors (jurors Nos. 1 & 4) were present in court.
Defense counsel noted that his investigator had already spoken with juror No. 1 and that
she was unable to corroborate any of VanBoeyen’s allegations. He did, however, ask that
the court inquire from juror No. 4.
Juror No. 4 stated that she “was in the hallway most of the time with the
witness[es],” but that the only thing that she overheard was “one officer asked another
one … about getting the day off to come here or something logistical like that” and the
officer’s conversation “certainly wasn’t case-related.” Juror No. 4 acknowledged,
however, that she was not necessarily there “all the time that the officers were in the
hallway.”
Defense counsel argued that he should have the opportunity to inquire from the
other jurors. The court disagreed, finding, “I had one witness who I found not very
credible. I have now … two jurors … saying they didn’t hear anything. [¶] I had
another juror saying she didn’t hear anything.” The court ordered the jurors’ information
sealed.
At a subsequent court date, the court explained that the prior motion for new trial
was “recharacterized as motions for release of juror information.” The court then found
that to the extent that a motion for a new trial was made “based on juror misconduct,” the
court would deny such a motion.
B. Analysis
“ ‘A defendant accused of a crime has a constitutional right to a trial by unbiased,
impartial jurors.’ [Citation.] ‘Juror misconduct, such as the receipt of information about
a party or the case that was not part of the evidence received at trial, leads to a
presumption that the defendant was prejudiced thereby and may establish juror bias.’
[Citation.] Even a juror’s ‘inadvertent receipt of information that had not been presented
23
in court falls within the general category of “juror misconduct.” ’ ” (People v. Miles
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 601.) A verdict reached by prejudicial juror misconduct must not
be permitted to stand. (Pen. Code, § 1181, subds. 2, 3 & 4; Code Civ. Proc., § 657,
subds. 1 & 2.) Trial courts have the inherent power to manage inquiries into juror
misconduct. (People v. Tuggles (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 339, 385.)
Conducting these inquiries requires balancing a juror’s right to privacy against a
criminal defendant’s right to a verdict uninfluenced by prejudicial juror misconduct and
“a strong public interest in the ascertainment of truth in judicial proceedings.” (People v.
Granish (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1126.) Code of Civil Procedure section 237
provides guidelines as to how inquiries may be made into juror misconduct while
protecting juror information. (People v. Tuggles, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 386.)
“Under Code of Civil Procedure section 237, in a criminal case, the trial jurors’
‘personal juror identifying information’ — defined as their names, addresses, and
telephone numbers — must be sealed after their verdict is recorded. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 237, subd. (a).) However, ‘[a]ny person may petition the court for access to these
records. The petition shall be supported by a declaration that includes facts sufficient to
establish good cause for the release of the juror’s personal identifying information.’
(Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (b); see Code Civ. Proc., § 206, subd. (g).)” (People v.
Johnson (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 486, 492; see People v. Munoz (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th
143, 165.) There is good cause to unseal the jurors’ information when the petitioner
establishes “ ‘a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred.’ ” (People v. Cook
(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 341, 345.)
If the trial court finds that the moving party made a prima facie showing of good
cause, and if it finds no compelling interest against disclosure, it shall set the matter for
hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (b).) The trial jurors are entitled to notice of the
hearing, an opportunity to “protest the granting of the petition,” and an opportunity to
appear. (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (c).)
24
After the hearing on a petition, “the records shall be made available as requested
in the petition, unless a former juror’s protest to the granting of the petition is sustained.
The court shall sustain the protest of the former juror if, in the discretion of the court, the
petitioner fails to show good cause, the record establishes the presence of a compelling
interest against disclosure as defined in subdivision (b), or the juror is unwilling to be
contacted by the petitioner. The court shall set forth reasons and make express findings
to support the granting or denying of the petition to disclose.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 237,
subd. (d).)
We review a trial court’s denial of a petition to disclose juror information for an
abuse of discretion. (People v. Johnson, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 492.)
We do not find an abuse of discretion here. VanBoeyen was the only person to
purportedly hear the officers say Gonzales was a criminal, a thug, and that there was no
other weapon involved in the shooting. However, the trial court found VanBoeyen was
not credible and Gonzales has given us no reason to question that finding. (See, e.g.,
Tom Thumb Glove Co. v. Han (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 1, 5 [“it is for the trial court to
evaluate the credibility of witnesses [citation] and the judge may ‘disregard the testimony
of any witness, or the effect of any prima facie showing based thereon, when he is
satisfied that the witness is not telling the truth or his testimony is inherently improbable
due to its inaccuracy, due to uncertainty, lapse of time, or interest or bias of the
witness’ ”].)
Even if we take VanBoeyen’s testimony at face value, it fails to establish
misconduct. Although he testified that he heard those statements, at no point did he
indicate anything that suggests a juror heard any of the officers’ comments. Indeed,
three jurors indicated that they did not hear the officers speak about case related facts at
all. While juror No. 4 heard some discussion as to whether an officer needed to take the
day off to testify, this had nothing to do with the facts of the case or VanBoeyen’s
allegations. There is simply no basis to conclude there is a reasonable belief that jury
25
misconduct occurred. A failure to make the required showing justified denying the
request for disclosure. In light of our conclusion, we need not address Gonzales’s
remaining arguments.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
EARL, P. J.
We concur:
/s/
MAURO, J.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
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