People v. Pinedo CA2/6

CourtListener 10852741Calctapp4 mai 2026

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Filed 5/4/26 P. v. Pinedo CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B340552
(Super. Ct. No. 24BFCF00230)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

FERNANDO PINEDO, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Fernando Pinedo, Jr., appeals from the judgment after a
jury convicted him of elder abuse and assault by means of force
likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code,1 §§ 368, subd.
(b)(1), 245, subd. (a)(4); counts 1 and 3). He was sentenced to
four years in state prison. Pinedo contends the evidence was
insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In April 2024, Whittier police officers were dispatched to a
location in Santa Fe Springs. While in her vehicle responding to
the call, Officer Lidia Corona observed Pinedo in the street and
76-year-old E.V. walking across the same street. Pinedo walked
“aggressively” towards E.V. holding a belt in his hand. E.V.
moved away from Pinedo as he approached her. When Pinedo
and E.V. were a few feet apart, Pinedo swung the belt at E.V.’s
head. E.V. ducked to avoid the belt, stepped into the road to get
away from Pinedo, and continued walking away from him.
Pinedo then fell in the street and was detained and arrested by
officers. Pinedo appeared to be drunk at the time of the incident.
Video of the incident was captured on a surveillance camera and
on Officer Kaitlyn Lara’s body camera.
Pinedo was charged with (1) elder abuse under section 368,
subdivision (b)(1), and (2) assault by means of force likely to
produce great bodily injury under section 245, subdivision (a)(4).2
At trial, Cecilia Espinoza (E.V.’s daughter), Officer Corona,
and Officer Lara testified. The jury also viewed the two videos
depicting the incident. The jury convicted Pinedo of both charges.
The trial court sentenced Pinedo to the high term of four years in
prison for elder abuse, and imposed and stayed a four-year prison
sentence on the assault conviction pursuant to section 654.
DISCUSSION
Pinedo contends the evidence was insufficient to support
his convictions. We disagree.
“In evaluating whether the judgment is supported by
substantial evidence, we review the entire record in the light

2 The district attorney dismissed an assault with a deadly
weapon charge prior to trial.

2
most favorable to the judgment, presume in support of the
judgment every fact that can reasonably be deduced from the
evidence in the record and determine whether any reasonable
finder of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We do not
reweigh conflicting evidence or reevaluate the credibility of
witnesses. [Citation.]” (People v. Skiff (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th
571, 579.) When reviewing the record for sufficiency of the
evidence, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the
judgment. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.)
Substantial evidence must be “reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.]’
[Citations.] ‘Substantial evidence includes circumstantial
evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that
evidence.’ ” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 942–943.)
“ ‘ “ ‘[T]he judgment may not be reversed simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 945.)
The assault charge
Section 245, subdivision (a)(4) prohibits an assault upon
another person “by any means of force likely to produce great
bodily injury.” Assault under section 245 is “directed at the force
used, and it is immaterial whether the force actually results in
any injury. The focus is on force likely to produce great bodily
injury.” (People v. Parrish (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 336, 343; see
also People v. Armstrong (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1065 [while
death or great bodily injury must be likely, it need not actually
occur].) Assault focuses on the “nature of the act and not on the
perpetrator’s specific intent.” (People v. Williams (2001) 26

3
Cal.4th 779, 786.) It is not necessary that the perpetrator have a
specific intent to injure the victim, or even a substantial certainty
that application of physical force will result. (Id. at p. 788.)
“Whether the injury is inflicted under circumstances or
conditions likely to produce great bodily injury is a question for
the trier of fact.” (People v. Clark (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 235,
245.)
Here, the prosecutor pursued two theories of assault by
means of force likely to produce great bodily injury: the act of
Pinedo swinging his belt toward E.V.’s head, and E.V.’s
subsequent retreat toward the road, where she could have been
injured by a vehicle. While substantial evidence supports
Pinedo’s conviction on both theories, his conviction will be upheld
if there is substantial evidence supporting either theory. (People
v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 972.)
As to Pinedo’s act of swinging his belt, the jury viewed a
picture of the belt, the actual belt with a hollow metal buckle,
and the surveillance video depicting Pinedo swinging the belt
toward E.V.’s head. The jury was able to examine the belt and
assess what kind of injuries it could have potentially inflicted on
E.V. The jury heard audio from Officer Lara’s body camera,
where another officer stated, “He’s attacking the female. He’s
attacking the female. Let’s go.” On these facts, the jury could
reasonably determine that the belt, had it made contact with
E.V., was likely to produce great bodily harm. (See People v.
Lopez (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 754, 758–759 [conviction of assault
upheld where defendant swung a metal coin changer at police
officers, but made no physical contact].) “We cannot say that the
inference drawn by the jury was an unreasonable one.” (Id. at p.
759.)

4
Moreover, the incident occurred on a busy street; Officer
Corona testified she was concerned for E.V.’s safety because a
vehicle had already come to a complete stop near the incident.
E.V., holding two bags in her hands, had to walk quickly to get
away from Pinedo. E.V. could have been seriously injured or
killed by a vehicle while trying to get away from Pinedo. (Cf.
People v. Russell (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 776, 778 [“a defendant
who intentionally pushes another person into the path of an
oncoming vehicle has used that vehicle as a ‘deadly weapon’ ”
under § 245, subd. (a)(1)]; see People v. Drayton (2019) 42
Cal.App.5th 612, 618, fn. 2 [analysis for assault with a deadly
weapon under § 245, subd. (a)(1) is the same as assault under
subd. (a)(4): “i.e., whether the defendant used force likely to cause
great bodily injury”]; see also People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th
1055, 1065 [collecting cases recognizing a vehicle can be used as a
deadly weapon].) The jury could reasonably conclude that, given
the location of the incident—on a street in heavy traffic—Pinedo
created a situation likely to produce great bodily injury.
(Drayton, at p. 617 [“A person can be guilty of an aggravated
assault despite causing no injury so long as his actions made a
serious injury likely”].)
Pinedo contends the evidence was insufficient to support
his assault conviction because his belt never made contact with
E.V. But it is not necessary for Pinedo to have made physical
contact with E.V. “One may commit an assault without making
actual physical contact with the person of the victim; because
[section 245] focuses on use of a deadly weapon or instrument or,
alternatively, on force likely to produce great bodily injury,
whether the victim in fact suffers any harm is immaterial.
[Citation.]” (People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1036, fn.

5
9.) And Pinedo does not dispute that his belt could inflict serious
injury on E.V.
Pinedo also contends the evidence was insufficient to
support that E.V. could have been struck by a vehicle, because
the videos of the incident do not show a vehicle in her immediate
vicinity. Because no vehicle “came close to hitting or injuring
[E.V.]” and because she was not injured, Pinedo contends there
can be no conviction for assault. “[S]ince the statute focuses on
force likely to produce harm, [however,] it is immaterial that the
force actually resulted in no harm whatever.” (People v. Wingo
(1975) 14 Cal.3d 169, 176.) It matters not that no vehicle was
directly next to E.V. when she moved away from Pinedo; if a
vehicle had been closer to her, she could have been seriously
injured or killed. Officer Corona testified there were vehicles in
the road, and the jury viewed surveillance video showing a
vehicle in the road as E.V. walked away from Pinedo. Officer
Corona activated her lights and sirens to signal to other
motorists to avoid the area. That a police officer observed and
alerted other motorists to avoid the area does not lessen the
danger posed by Pinedo’s conduct.
Finally, Pinedo contends there was no evidence he was
aware of the vehicle that stopped near E.V. But the test is not
what Pinedo personally knew or didn’t know; it is whether a
reasonable person would reasonably believe that frightening
someone to such an extent that they are forced to move toward
the road, where other cars regularly travel, would “directly and
probably” injure them. (People v. White (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th
881, 885.) Pinedo “did not have to specifically intend to inflict a
particular injury to be guilty of assault.” (Ibid.) A jury could

6
reasonably find that Pinedo’s actions created the risk of great
bodily injury to E.V.
The elder abuse charge
Pinedo contends his conviction must be reversed because
the evidence was insufficient to show that he (1) acted under
circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm
or death; (2) caused E.V. to suffer physical pain or mental
suffering, and (3) knew or had reason to know that E.V. was at
least 65 years old. (§ 368, subd. (b)(1).) We disagree.
Elder abuse liability applies to a person “who knows or
reasonably should know that a person is an elder” and “who,
under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily
harm or death, willfully causes or permits any elder . . . to suffer,
or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental
suffering.” (§ 368, subd. (b)(1).) An “elder” is someone who is 65
years or older. (Id., subd. (g).) Section 368 applies to a “wide
range of abusive situations, including . . . active, assaultive
conduct,” by which a defendant causes an elder to suffer
“unjustifiable pain or mental suffering.” (People v. Heitzman
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 197.)
Under the elder abuse statute, the phrase “under
circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm
or death” has the same meaning as used in the assault statute.
(People v. Caparrotta (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 874, 899.) As with
the assault charge, the prosecutor offered two theories of elder
abuse: Pinedo swinging his belt at E.V. and her retreat to the
road to avoid being hit. Substantial evidence supports both
theories. And we conclude that Pinedo’s actions were likely to
produce great bodily harm or death.

7
We also reject Pinedo’s claim of insufficient evidence
regarding E.V.’s mental suffering because she did not testify at
trial.3 Because Pinedo swung his belt toward E.V.’s head, E.V.
was forced to duck and retreat away from Pinedo toward the
road. The jury viewed surveillance video of the incident, and
could reasonably conclude that E.V. suffered mental suffering
due to Pinedo’s actions, evidenced by her ducking to avoid injury
and walking faster to avoid Pinedo’s belt. This evidence is
sufficient to support the jury’s reasonable inference that Pinedo
caused E.V. to suffer fear, which amounts to mental suffering
under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act.
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.53; see People v. Racy (2007) 148
Cal.App.4th 1327, 1335.)
We also conclude substantial evidence supports the jury’s
finding that Pinedo should have known that E.V. was an “elder,”
because she is over 65 years old. E.V.’s daughter testified to her
mother’s age, 76 years old at the time of the incident. The jury
viewed a picture of E.V. and surveillance video footage of the
incident, and heard Officer Lara describe E.V. as “elderly.” The
jury therefore had in evidence E.V.’s physical appearance.
(People v. Smith (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1190.) Viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment, the jury could
have reasonably concluded that Pinedo should have known E.V.
was over 65 years old at the time of the incident.

3 Pinedo also contends the evidence was insufficient to
support that E.V. suffered physical pain. The district attorney,
however, did not argue that E.V. suffered any physical pain or
injuries.

8
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

CODY, J.

9
Maria A. Davalos, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Dan E. Chambers, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and Lauren Sanchez, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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