People v. Arteaga CA4/1

CourtListener 10851792Calctapp1 mai 2026

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Filed 5/1/26 P. v. Arteaga CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D087441

Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CR60998)
v.

MICHAEL LEE ARTEAGA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Joshlyn R. Pulliam, Judge. Affirmed.
Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Randall D.
Einhorn and Jon S. Tangonan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

Defendant Michael Lee Arteaga filed a motion to initiate a proceeding
under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) to preserve youth-
related mitigation evidence to use at a future youth offender parole hearing.
The trial court denied the motion finding Arteaga was statutorily ineligible
for relief under Franklin based on his sentences of life without the possibility
of parole (LWOP) and his age at the time of the crimes. Arteaga appeals,
contending he was deprived of due process. We affirm the denial of the
motion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At age 18, Arteaga committed, and later pled guilty to, two first degree

murders with special circumstances (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, 190.2, subd. (a)(3))
and premeditated attempted murder. (§§ 664, 187.) For the murders, he was
sentenced to concurrent terms of LWOP. Over two decades after his
conviction, Arteaga filed a motion to initiate an evidence preservation
proceeding for a potential future parole hearing under Franklin and
section 1203.01. He also requested appointment of counsel. Arteaga
acknowledged existing precedent held LWOP defendants ages 18 to 25 were
excluded from youth offender parole consideration under section 3051, but he
wished to “preserve [his] claim for further review” and argued the exclusion
violated his constitutional rights. The trial court granted Arteaga’s request
for a Franklin proceeding and appointed counsel. Arteaga later filed a letter
with the court, alleging a lack of communication from appointed counsel and
stating he was unaware his case had been continued. On the day of the
hearing, Arteaga’s attorney filed a written request to be relieved as counsel
and moved to have the Franklin motion taken off calendar, stating that
Arteaga was not eligible for a Franklin hearing pursuant to section 3051,
subdivision (b)(4) and People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin).

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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Arteaga was not present at the hearing. The court determined Arteaga was
statutorily ineligible for relief and denied his motion.
DISCUSSION
Arteaga contends he was deprived of due process when the court
conducted a hearing in his absence and denied his motion for a Franklin
proceeding. He also argues counsel was ineffective by failing to communicate
and moving to dismiss his Franklin motion. He claims Hardin did not
conclusively foreclose his ability to obtain future youth offender relief, and
the court had discretion to hold an evidence preservation hearing under
section 1203.01. We review the trial court’s order denying a defendant’s
Franklin motion under the abuse of discretion standard. (See In re Cook
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 459 (Cook).) We independently review due process
claims. (Roth v. Jelley (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 655, 666 (Roth).)
A. Youthful Offender Parole Hearing
Section 3051 affords a youthful offender parole hearing to an offender
who was either a juvenile or a young adult between the ages of 18 and 25 at
the time he or she committed a controlling offense. (§ 3051; County of San
Diego v. Commission on State Mandates (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 625, 634.)
The statute requires a parole hearing during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of
incarceration. (§ 3051, subd. (b); County of San Diego, supra, at p. 635.)
Relevant here, section 3051 specifically excludes relief for offenders serving
sentences of LWOP for crimes committed after reaching age 18. (§ 3051,
subd. (h); Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 843.) But those who are eligible for
a future youth offender parole hearing under section 3051 are entitled to
make a record of mitigating evidence tied to their youth to preserve it for use
at such a future parole hearing. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 283-284,
286.) To do so, offenders with final convictions may request a Franklin

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proceeding by filing a motion in superior court under the authority of section
1203.01. (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 451.) A Franklin proceeding gives “an
opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of the juvenile
offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so that
the Board [of Parole Hearings], years later, may properly discharge its
obligation to ‘give great weight to’ youth-related factors (§ 4801, subd. (c)) in
determining whether the offender is ‘fit to rejoin society’ . . . .” (Franklin,
supra, at p. 284.)
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Arteaga’s
motion for a Franklin hearing. While the court had authority to hold such a
hearing under section 1203.01, there was no reason for it to do so. A
Franklin hearing exists solely to preserve evidence for a future youth
offender parole hearing. (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 451-455.) Arteaga,
having committed his crime at age 18 and sentenced to LWOP, is
unambiguously excluded from section 3051 relief and thus ineligible for a
youth offender parole hearing. (§ 3051, subd. (h).) Indeed, in a motion for a
Franklin hearing, an inmate is required to establish entitlement to a
youthful parole hearing, however, Arteaga was unable to do so because he is
ineligible as a matter of law. (See Cook, supra, at p. 458.) Absent eligibility
for a future youthful parole hearing, preserving the record for one would be
futile. The trial court properly denied Arteaga’s motion.
We are unpersuaded by Arteaga’s argument that he was entitled to a
hearing under section 1203.01 to preserve evidence for a future equal
protection challenge. In Hardin, the Supreme Court considered whether
section 3051’s exclusion of young adult offenders sentenced to life without
parole violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.
(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 838-839.) Defendant Hardin specifically

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challenged the life without parole exclusion as it applied to young adult
offenders convicted of first degree special circumstance murder. (Id. at
p. 847.) The court’s analysis was therefore largely concerned with whether
the Legislature had a rational basis to distinguish between young adults
convicted of first degree murder with and without special circumstances.
(See id. at pp. 859-863.) The court found there was a rational basis for the
exclusion. (Id. at p. 840.) Similarly, like defendant Hardin, Arteaga was over
18 years old at the time he committed first degree murder with special
circumstances and received an LWOP sentence and, thus, was ineligible for a
future youth parole hearing. While Hardin does not preclude future as-
applied equal protection challenges to section 3051, Arteaga does not
meaningfully distinguish his case from the facts and circumstances in
Hardin. Thus, he has not demonstrated a viable equal protection challenge
that would justify an evidence preservation hearing under section 1203.01
We also reject Arteaga’s claim that he was entitled to an evidence
preservation hearing under section 1203.01 in anticipation of potential future
challenges to the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment. Speculation that Arteaga may someday have an age-based cruel
and unusual punishment claim based on a future change in law is insufficient
to justify a Franklin proceeding. (See People v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
116.) Due process does not require courts to conduct evidentiary hearings
based on hypothetical future legal changes. (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976)
424 U.S. 319, 335.) The likelihood that Arteaga will ever need to present
mitigating evidence at a parole hearing is “insufficient to justify forcing the
court, counsel, and witnesses to expend scarce resources to preserve evidence
for a hearing that probably will never happen.” (People v. Ngo, supra, at
p. 129.)

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B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Arteaga argues appointed counsel was ineffective by moving to dismiss
his motion for a Franklin hearing. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, a defendant must establish (1) that his counsel’s performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, i.e., that counsel’s
performance did not meet the standard to be expected of a reasonably
competent attorney, and (2) that, but for counsel’s error, a different result
would have been reasonably probable, thus resulting in prejudice.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694 (Strickland);
People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218.) To be effective, counsel is
not required to make futile motions or to leave an exhaustive paper trail.
(See People v. Montoya (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th. 1139, 1147-1148 (Montoya);
People v. Torrez (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1091-1092.) Rather, competent
counsel must exercise his or her best professional judgment and pursue an
avenue of defense that seems appropriate after having examined the case, its
evidence, and its issues. (Montoya, supra, at pp. 1147-1148.)
Further, “ ‘ “[i]f the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel
acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,] . . . unless counsel was
asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply
could be no satisfactory explanation,” the claim on appeal must be rejected.’ ”
(People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266; People v. Cash (2002)
28 Cal.4th 703, 734 [“ ‘ “ ‘record must affirmatively disclose the lack of a
rational tactical purpose for challenged act or omission’ ” ’ ”].) “A claim of
ineffective assistance in such a case is more appropriately decided in a
habeas corpus proceeding.” (Mendoza Tello, supra, at pp. 266-267.)
Here, Arteaga cannot demonstrate deficient performance because
counsel’s concession that Arteaga was ineligible for a Franklin proceeding

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reflected accurate law under Hardin and section 3051, subdivision (h). Nor
was counsel deficient by not presenting the same constitutional arguments
already addressed and rejected in Hardin. An attorney does not provide
deficient performance by refusing to make futile arguments. (See Montoya,
supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at pp.1147-1148.) Without deficient performance,
Arteaga cannot establish prejudice under Strickland.
Further, we discern no deficient performance resulting from any
alleged failure of Arteaga’s counsel to communicate with him. Even if
Arteaga were able to show little communication occurred with his attorney,
he has not identified any deficiency in representation resulting from any lack
of communication. To secure a reversal, Arteaga must establish that the lack
of communication caused representation to be wrongfully incomplete.
(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697.) Arteaga has not demonstrated
constitutionally inadequate communication or prejudice.
Finally, we conclude Arteaga’s absence from proceedings did not
deprive him of due process. The due process right to be present arises at
“critical stages” in the proceedings. (People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263,
1299.) A defendant, however, has no constitutional or statutory right to be
present to address a purely legal question–even if it is critical to the outcome
of the case–because his presence would not contribute to the fairness of
proceeding. (People v. Fedalizo (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 98, 109; People v.
Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 855-856.) Here, the court did not litigate facts,
take testimony, or assess credibility. Rather, the court addressed a purely
legal issue to determine whether an individual who committed a crime after
turning 18 and sentenced to LWOP was eligible for a Franklin hearing.
Thus, Arteaga’s presence was not required to make a legal conclusion based

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on these undisputed facts. Under independent review, we conclude Arteaga
was not deprived of due process. (See Roth, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 666.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, J.*

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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