CourtListener 10851388•People v. Rencher CA2/1
Texte intégral
Filed 4/30/26 P. v. Rencher CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B344779
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA012143)
v.
LAMONTE ERIC RENCHER,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Scott T. Millington, Judge. Reversed.
Morad Fakhimi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Seth P. McCutcheon and Stacy S. Schwartz,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
We decide this appeal by memorandum opinion. (See Cal.
Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.)
Lamonte Rencher appeals from an amended judgment
entered following a Penal Code1 section 1172.75 resentencing
hearing. He contends the trial court abused its discretion at the
hearing by declining to make certain reductions to his sentence
and by neglecting to provide “any substantial or meaningful
explanation” for its sentencing decision. We, however, conclude
that Rencher’s challenge fails because he was not entitled to
resentencing under section 1172.75.
In 1992, a jury convicted Rencher of assault with a firearm
(§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) and robbery (§ 211), among other offenses.
On March 19, 1993, the trial court sentenced Rencher to 17 years
4 months in prison in connection with the 1992 offenses. As
reflected in an October 31, 1996 amended abstract of judgment,
Rencher’s sentence later was reduced to 14 years 4 months in
prison. Both the original and amended sentences included a
one-year prior prison term enhancement under section 667.5,
former subdivision (b). In light of custody credits, as reflected
on the face of the October 31, 1996 abstract of judgment, Rencher
completed service of his prison term for the 1992 offenses no later
than 2006.
Rencher, however, committed several new offenses while
in custody. And he remained incarcerated serving terms on one
or more of those offenses through at least December 1, 2025 (the
date Rencher filed his opening brief in this appeal). (See People v.
Langston (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1237, 1242 [“new crimes committed
while in prison are treated as separate offenses and begin a new
aggregate term”].) The Attorney General asserts, and Rencher does
1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
not dispute, that the sentences for the offenses Rencher committed
while incarcerated did not include any section 667.5, former
subdivision (b) enhancements.2
In 2021, the Legislature enacted section 1172.75, which
invalidated certain prior prison term enhancements—including
the enhancement imposed in connection with Rencher’s 1992
offenses. (See § 1172.75, subd. (b).) In addition, section 1172.75
established a procedure for identifying and resentencing individuals
whose sentences include a qualifying enhancement. First, the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) “shall
identify those persons in [its] custody currently serving a term
for a judgment that includes an [invalid section 667.5, former
subdivision (b)] enhancement . . . and shall provide the name of
each person, along with the person’s date of birth and the relevant
case number or docket number, to the sentencing court that
imposed the enhancement.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) Second, upon
receiving the information from the CDCR, “the court shall review
the judgment and verify that the current judgment includes [an
invalid section 667.5, former subdivision (b)] enhancement. . . .
If the court determines that the current judgment includes [such]
an enhancement . . . , the court shall recall the sentence and
resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).)
In October 2023, Rencher filed a petition asserting that
the CDCR had identified him as a person potentially eligible
2 Our appellate record does not include the abstracts of
judgment or any other materials memorializing Rencher’s sentences
on the new offenses. And Rencher did not file a reply brief on
appeal.
3
for section 1172.75 relief.3 In the petition, he requested
that the trial court strike the invalidated prior prison term
enhancement from the 14 year 4 month sentence imposed in
connection with his 1992 offenses and conduct a full resentencing
under section 1172.75. In March 2025, the court held the
requested resentencing hearing and struck the prior prison term
enhancement. The court, however, declined to make any other
changes to Rencher’s sentence. It memorialized Rencher’s new
sentence in a March 19, 2025 amended abstract of judgment.
Rencher now asks us to reverse, arguing the court abused
its discretion at the resentencing hearing. But he does not
dispute that he was no longer serving a term on any judgment that
included an invalid enhancement when the CDCR identified him
as potentially eligible for resentencing or when the court conducted
the resentencing hearing. Rather, he was serving one or more
terms for in-custody offenses that did not include an invalid
section 667.5, former subdivision (b) enhancement. Rencher
thus was not entitled to any section 1172.75 resentencing hearing,
and his claim that the court abused its discretion at the hearing
therefore fails. (See People v. Washington (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th
1057, 1065 [“[s]ubdivision (b) of section 1172.75 requires two things
in addition to the judgment including an invalid section 667.5[,
former subdivision] (b) enhancement: (1) that the defendant be
in custody’ and (2) be ‘currently serving a term’ on the judgment
containing the invalid enhancement” (italics added)]; id. at p. 1066
[“[w]here a defendant remains in prison, ‘the current judgment’ is
3 Although our appellate record does not contain any
communication from the CDCR, the Attorney General does not
dispute Rencher’s representation on this point. We therefore accept
the representation for purposes of argument.
4
the operative judgment pursuant to which they are incarcerated”];
People v. Escobedo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 440, 447 [“[t]he People
correctly argued that [the] appellants were not eligible for relief
under section 1172.75 because they were not currently serving
the sentences imposed for the prior prison term enhancements.
The sentences for these enhancements had been completed.
When appellants filed their petitions, they were serving separate
sentences imposed for felonies committed while they were in prison
for the 2015 and 2016 convictions”].)
Accordingly, we reverse the March 19, 2025 judgment entered
following the section 1172.75 resentencing. (See People v. Amaya
(2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 379, 386–387 [the trial court’s “resentencing
was void on the face of the record” because the court “granted
relief that [it] had no power to grant”]; Young v. Tri-City Healthcare
Dist. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 35, 53 [“ ‘ “[w]hen, as here, there is an
appeal from a void judgment, the reviewing court’s jurisdiction is
limited to reversing the trial court’s void acts” ’ ”].)
5
DISPOSITION
The March 19, 2025 amended judgment is reversed. The
October 31, 1996 judgment is reinstated.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
WEINGART, J.
M. KIM, J.
6
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