CourtListener 10851344•Chelico v. Rolex Watch U.S.A. CA2/1
Texte intégral
Filed 4/30/26 Chelico v. Rolex Watch U.S.A. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
BASSAM SAMIH CHELICO, B345838
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STCV04771)
v.
ROLEX WATCH U.S.A., INC.,
et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Alison M. Mackenzie, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Nabil E. Chelico and Nabil E. Chelico for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Fisher & Phillips, Colin P. Calvert, Aalia Taufiq and
Danielle S. Zobel for Defendants and Respondents.
________________________________
Bassam Samih Chelico filed a lawsuit against Rolex Watch
U.S.A., Inc. (Rolex) and Tyler Meine, a Rolex officer, alleging they
violated Civil Code section 52.11 by destroying Rolex records, which
caused his claims in a separate action against a third party to fail.
The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer without leave to
amend. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
We assume the truth of all material facts properly pleaded
in the complaint but not the complaint’s contentions, deductions,
or conclusions of fact or law. (Association for Los Angeles Deputy
Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 802.)
JB Gearys, LLC (Gearys) employed Chelico as a sales
consultant at its luxury watch boutique in Century City. He was an
exemplary employee. Meine, a Rolex employee, oversaw a program
whereby individuals posing as customers would surreptitiously
evaluate Gearys employees’ sales performance and compliance
with Rolex protocols. Chelico consistently performed well in these
evaluations. Rolex retained records of the feedback.
After Gearys terminated Chelico’s employment “under a
pretext,” he sued Gearys for ethnicity and age-based discrimination.
The superior court ordered the matter to arbitration, which ended
in Gearys’s favor. The court confirmed the resulting award and
entered judgment accordingly, which our colleagues in Division
Seven affirmed. (Chelico v. TJB Gearys, LLC (Dec. 15, 2025,
B331570) [nonpub. opn.], opn. mod. Jan. 13, 2026.)
In the instant lawsuit, Chelico asserts causes of action
for violation of section 52.1 and “conspiracy.” After the trial court
sustained defendants’ demurrer to the first amended complaint, the
1 Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references are to
the Civil Code.
2
second amended complaint became the operative complaint. In
it, Chelico alleged that Meine conspired with Rolex, a New York
corporation, to destroy records of Rolex’s evaluation program,
including records relating to Chelico. Chelico alleged defendants
destroyed these records to “intimidate and coerce [his] efforts to
vindicate his . . . rights” against Gearys and “intimidate his ability
to pursue his” rights, which caused his claims against Gearys to
fail. He alleged “[d]efendants intended for their actions to hurdle
[his] ability [to pursue] his statutory rights.”
Concluding that spoliation of evidence does not constitute
coercion or intimidation for purposes of section 52.1, the trial court
sustained defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend.
Chelico appealed from the resulting judgment of dismissal.
DISCUSSION
Chelico contends he adequately alleged that defendants’
destruction of records relating to Rolex’s evaluations was a form of
intimidation and coercion for purposes of section 52.1. We disagree.
On review of a trial court’s order sustaining a demurrer,
we examine the complaint de novo. (McCall v. PacifiCare of
Cal., Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415.) “We give the complaint
a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts
in their context. [Citation.] Further, we treat the demurrer
as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but do not
assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.
[Citations.] When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether
the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
[Citation.] And when it is sustained without leave to amend, we
decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can
be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its
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discretion and we reverse.” (City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 859, 865.)
Section 52.1, known as the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act,
provides that a person may bring legal action against anyone,
whether or not acting under color of law, who by “threat,
intimidation, or coercion,” interferes with or attempts to interfere
with a plaintiff ’s exercise or enjoyment of rights that are enshrined
under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution
or laws of this state. (§ 52.1, subd. (b); Venegas v. County of
Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820, 841 [Tom Bane Civil Rights Act
prohibits interference or attempted interference with the plaintiff ’s
legal rights through threats, intimidation or coercion].)
Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute such as
section 52.1 is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent and effectuate
the law’s purpose. “The statutory language itself is the most
reliable indicator, so we start with the statute’s words, assigning
them their usual and ordinary meanings, and construing them
in context. If the words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume
the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute’s plain meaning
governs.” (Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39
Cal.4th 1164, 1190.)
Neither the Civil Code nor case law defines what the
Legislature intended “intimidation” or “coercion” to mean
in section 52.1. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “intimidation”
as “[u]nlawful coercion; extortion.” (Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed.
2024).) It defines “coercion” as the “[c]ompulsion of a free agent by
physical, moral, or economic force or threat of physical force” or “the
improper use of economic power to compel another to submit to the
wishes of one who wields it.” (Ibid.)
Coercion and intimidation are thus conduct designed to
compel a person to take or refrain from an action.
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Here, Chelico does not allege defendants deleted their records
to compel him to take or refrain from any action, for example to
drop his claims against Gearys. Instead, he alleges that defendants
intimidated and coerced his “efforts to vindicate his . . . rights” and
his “ability to pursue his . . . rights.”
At best, Chelico alleges defendants deleted records to
interfere with his claims against Gearys. But in their usual and
ordinary meanings, “coercion” and “intimidation” are not synonyms
for “interference.” We therefore conclude the Legislature did not
intend for section 52.1 to afford a remedy for interference with a
legal claim. Defendants’ demurrer to Chelico’s cause of action for
violation of section 52.1 was therefore properly sustained. Because
Chelico concedes that his cause of action for conspiracy relies on
his claim for violation of section 52.1, defendants’ demurrer to it
was properly sustained as well.
Relying on Hardeman v. Thomas (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 153,
Chelico argues that “intimidation is a question of fact to be decided
by the jury.” Although it is true that “whether or not a [person]
is subject to intimidation is a question of fact, left to the trier of
fact” (id. at p. 170), whether the Legislature intended the terms
“intimidation” and “coercion” to mean interference with legal claims
is a matter of statutory construction for the courts. No principle or,
to our knowledge, authority supports that the Legislature intended
the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act to provide remedies for spoliation of
evidence.
Chelico argues Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36
Cal.4th 1028 held that falsification of employment information
can be a form of intimidation. Yanowitz contained no such holding.
In any case, Chelico did not allege that defendants destroyed Rolex
records to intimidate him.
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Identifying no new facts he could allege to amend the
complaint successfully, Chelico argues for the first time on appeal
that he should be granted leave to amend to assert a cause of action
under Business and Professions Code section 17200 (the Unfair
Competition Law or UCL) premised on defendants’ violation of
Corporations Code section 28802 and their otherwise unfair and
fraudulent practices.
The UCL prohibits, and provides civil remedies for, unfair
competition. (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th
310, 320.) “[U]nfair competition” includes “any unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business act or practice.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.)
Consequently, there are three varieties of unfair competition.
(Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone
Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180.) By prescribing “ ‘any unlawful’ ”
business practice, the UCL borrows violations of other laws
and treats them as unlawful practices that the UCL makes
independently actionable. (Ibid.) Actions for relief pursuant to
the UCL may be prosecuted “by a person who has suffered injury
in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair
competition.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204.)
Corporations Code section 28802 is part of the Capital
Access Company Law, Corporations Code section 28000 et seq.,
which regulates California companies that provide financing
and managerial assistance to California small businesses. (Corp.
Code, § 28004, subd. (a).) Corporations Code section 28802 makes
it unlawful to destroy the records of a “licensee” with intent to
deceive specified individuals or agencies. (Corp. Code, § 28802.) A
“licensee” for the purposes of this section is a company organized
under the laws of the State of California and licensed under the
Capital Access Company Law. (Corp. Code, §§ 28034, 28039.)
Because, as Chelico acknowledges, Rolex is not organized under
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the laws of the State of California, destruction of its records
does not violate Corporations Code section 28802, and thus no
UCL claim could be predicated on that statute.
As Chelico failed both below and on appeal to identify facts
he could allege to amend the complaint successfully, the trial court’s
order denying leave to amend is affirmed.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
BENDIX, J.
M. KIM, J.
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