CourtListener 10851341•In re Arturo A. CA2/1
Texte intégral
Filed 4/30/26 In re Arturo A. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re ARTURO A. et al., Persons B346922
Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP00586)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
SAUL A.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Eden Gharapet, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it
“raise[s] no substantial issues of law or fact.” (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.)
Saul A. (Father) filed a timely notice of appeal from the
juvenile court’s May 29, 2025 disposition order. He does not
challenge the court’s jurisdictional findings or the decision to
remove his children from his custody and release them to the
home of their mother. He challenges the court’s decision denying
visitation between him and his children, after he made a request
at the disposition hearing for monitored visitation. The court
found by clear and convincing evidence that it would be
detrimental to the children’s safety, protection, and wellbeing to
have visits with Father at that time. Father contends this
detriment finding is not supported by substantial evidence in the
record.
On March 2, 2026, while this appeal was pending, the
juvenile court ordered monitored visitation for Father and his
children. We grant the request of respondent Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family and Services (DCFS)
that we take judicial notice of the court’s March 2, 2026 minute
orders reflecting the new visitation disposition.
Based on this subsequent event, DCFS argues we should
dismiss this appeal as moot. We agree.
“A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[] it impossible
for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of [the
appellant], to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ [Citation.] For
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relief to be ‘effective,’ . . . the [appellant] must complain of an
ongoing harm [that is] . . . redressable or capable of being
rectified by the outcome the [appellant] seeks.” (In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).) To establish the appeal is not moot,
the appellant must “demonstrate[] a specific legal or practical
consequence that would be avoided upon reversal” of the finding
he challenges. (Id. at p. 273.) “A reviewing court must ‘ “decide
on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile
dependency matter make a case moot and whether [its] decision
would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding.” ’ ” (Id. at
p. 276.)
Absent a specific legal or practical consequence, we may
still exercise our discretion to decide the merits of a moot appeal
in a dependency case. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 282-283,
286 [setting forth a non-exhaustive list of factors for assessing
“whether a court should exercise discretionary review of a moot
appeal,” and noting that “no single factor is necessarily
dispositive”].) We may do so, for example, where the challenged
finding “ ‘could be prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially
impact the current or future dependency proceedings.’ ” (Id. at
pp. 283, 285.)
In this appeal, Father challenges (1) the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding that it would be
detrimental to the children to have visitation with Father, and (2)
the resulting decision denying visitation for Father and his
children. The no-visitation order is no longer in effect. The court
has since made a new order granting Father monitored visitation
with his children, based on a finding that such visitation would
not be detrimental to the children. Reversing the prior detriment
finding and the no-visitation order would provide no effective
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relief to Father, as he has already obtained the relief he sought in
this appeal: an order granting visitation. Thus, this appeal is
moot.
In opposition to DCFS’s request for judicial notice of the
March 2, 2026 minute orders granting Father monitored
visitation, Father asserted that as of March 24, 2026, he had not
yet had any visits with his children. Based on this assertion, he
argues the appeal is not moot. We disagree. This appeal is from
the prior no-visitation order in the May 29, 2025 disposition
order. DCFS’s compliance with the operative March 2, 2026
monitored visitation order is not before us.
In the alternative, Father argues we should exercise our
discretion to reach the merits of his moot appeal because
“dismissing Father’s appeal will unfairly prejudice him by
delaying justice and postponing his long-deserved and long-
awaited opportunity to spend time with his children.” Reaching
the merits of this appeal would do nothing to facilitate visitation
between Father and his children. Even if we were to reverse the
detriment finding and the no-visitation order, the remedy would
be to remand the matter to the juvenile court to make a visitation
order, something that court has already done. Reaching the
merits of the present appeal would not allow us to review the
adequacy of the operative visitation order or DCFS’s compliance
therewith because these matters are outside the scope of the
present appeal.
1
For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
1
We deny DCFS’s motion to augment the record with
exhibits filed in the juvenile court in advance of the adjudication
and disposition hearing by counsel for the children’s mother.
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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
M. KIM, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
WEINGART, J.
Because we are not reaching the merits, the exhibits are not
pertinent to our decision.
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