CourtListener 10851335•People v. Beard CA5
Texte intégral
Filed 4/30/26 P. v. Beard CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F089505
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F22907976)
v.
JERRY BEARD, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Francine
Zepeda, Judge.
Alex Green, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Charlotte Woodfork and
Darren K. Indermill, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Detjen, Acting P. J., Franson, J. and Peña, J.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Jerry Beard (defendant) entered a no contest plea to pandering by
procuring (Pen. Code, § 266i, subd. (b)(1))1 and admitted that he suffered a prior strike
conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i),
1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) pursuant to a plea agreement. At sentencing, the court declined
to strike defendant’s prior strike conviction. Defendant contends on this appeal that the
trial court abused its discretion in declining to dismiss his prior strike conviction. The
People disagree, contending the court did not abuse its discretion. We conclude the court
did not abuse its discretion and affirm the court’s ruling.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On November 2, 2022, the Fresno County District Attorney filed an indictment
charging defendant with human trafficking of a minor for a sex act (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1);
count one) and pandering (§ 266i, subd. (b)(1); count two). It was alleged defendant had
suffered a prior strike conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)). Defendant entered not guilty pleas and denied
the allegation. Prior to going to trial, the court granted the People’s motion to dismiss
count two. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on count one and a mistrial was
declared.
On November 7, 2024, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the trial court
granted the parties’ motion to reinstate the dismissed pandering charge in count two,
defendant pled no contest to count two and admitted the prior strike conviction in
exchange for a “mitigated lid of 3 years doubled for a total of 6 years.” At the
January 15, 2025 sentencing hearing, the court denied defendant’s Romero2 motion to
strike his prior conviction. The court sentenced defendant to six years (the low term of
1 Hereinafter, undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
2.
three years, doubled) in state prison consistent with the plea agreement. Defendant filed
a notice of appeal; his request for certificate of probable cause was denied.3
FACTUAL SUMMARY4
On August 15, 2022, an undercover agent with the California Department of
Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Investigation, Human Trafficking and Sexual Predator
Apprehension Team utilized a social media account, posing as a 16-year-old female. On
the same day, the agent received a private message from a social media user later
identified as defendant.
Defendant asked the agent how old she was. The agent said she was 16 years old
and defendant responded that he was 26 years old. The agent insinuated to defendant that
she worked as a prostitute. Defendant asked her questions about her work as a prostitute
but noted she was young. The agent sent defendant a picture of another undercover
officer, claiming it was a picture of herself, and defendant told her she looked like she
could be 18 years old. The agent responded she will be 18 in two years.
The agent told defendant she was working as a prostitute over weekends, and
defendant asked her when she was going to come with him. The agent asked defendant if
he had a fee. Defendant asked how much she made in one day and they discussed what
defendant’s cut would be.
On August 18, 2022, DOJ agents detained defendant and read him his Miranda5
rights. Defendant admitted he had talked to a female but that she had contacted him first.
3 Although defendant’s certificate for probable cause was denied by the trial court,
he limited his appeal to challenging his sentence. “ ‘[I]ssues regarding proceedings held
subsequent to the plea’ ” “ ‘may be raised on appeal following a guilty or nolo plea
without the need for a certificate.’ ” (People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 766.)
4 Relevant facts are taken from defendant’s probation report.
5 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
3.
Defendant admitted he was aware she was a minor but said he was unaware she was a
prostitute and denied that he asked her for any money or wanted to traffic her.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends on appeal that the court abused its discretion when it denied
his Romero motion to dismiss his prior strike conviction. Defendant argues that his case
represents “one of those extraordinary set of circumstances where no reasonable judge
would find that [he] should not be ‘deemed outside the scheme’s spirit … [at least] in
part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one
… serious and/or violent felon[y].’ ” The People counter that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion given defendant’s criminal history and that he committed the instant offense
just three months after his release from completing a 10-year prison sentence on his prior
strike conviction. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm the
court’s ruling.
A. Relevant Factual and Procedural Background
The probation report set forth defendant’s delinquent and criminal history. In
January 2010, defendant committed battery and theft of personal property. Defendant
was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation. Over the next 18 months,
defendant violated his probation three times. In December 2011, defendant was
convicted of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and sentenced to state prison for
10 years. Defendant served about 16 months of that sentence in the juvenile system
before being transferred to state prison. In January 2019, defendant was convicted of
obstructing or resisting an executive officer (§ 69) while incarcerated. He was sentenced
to two years in state prison, to run concurrent with the sentence he was currently serving
for his voluntary manslaughter conviction. Defendant was released on parole in May
2022. The instant offense occurred in August 2022.
At the sentencing hearing on January 15, 2025, defendant’s counsel argued that
defendant and his family worked hard for him to stay out of a situation that would send
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him back to prison. Defendant acknowledged the court indicated a lid to resolve the
matter and contended that defendant did not believe a state prison sentence would
improve his future.
The prosecutor recognized the court could consider a Romero motion, but she
argued that even though the strike conviction was over 10 years old, it was not in the
interests of justice to grant Romero relief. The prosecutor noted that while defendant was
in custody on his 2011 manslaughter conviction, defendant committed a violent offense
of resisting a law enforcement officer in violation of section 69. Shortly after serving his
prison term, defendant was picked up for the current case. Although the instant offense
involved an undercover officer, which was “somewhat mitigating,” it was “quite
disturbing and unfortunate” that defendant “believed he was communicating with a minor
and continued to do so.” The prosecutor believed defendant lacked growth while
incarcerated. Defendant was subsequently arrested in 2023 for being a felon in
possession of a firearm while out on bail in this present case. As such, defendant had not
managed to live crime free while out of custody for more than a few months. The
mitigating circumstances, including that the jury did not reach a verdict on count 1, had
been considered when offering the mitigated term as part of the plea bargain, and the
prosecutor therefore opposed any Romero relief.
Defendant’s counsel pointed out the mitigating factors related to the prior
voluntary manslaughter conviction: that defendant was 15 years old when he committed
the voluntary manslaughter, that he committed the crime with his older brother who was
the “heavy,” and that his older brother had provided defendant with the firearm used in
the crime. Due to defendant’s age and unique circumstances of that crime, counsel
requested that the court dismiss the prior strike.
The prosecutor argued that the only factor in favor of granting relief under Romero
was the age of the prior strike conviction. However, the age of the conviction was
canceled out by his continuous criminality, both while in custody picking up the
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section 69 conviction and then getting out of custody and shortly incurring two offenses.
She believed it was “abundantly clear” that defendant fell outside the scope of Romero
relief.
Defendant spoke on his own behalf and stated that he “tried out here,” got a job,
and thought he did “pretty good.” He did not feel he had committed crimes since his
release. Defendant referred to his firearm possession case as “bullshit,” arguing he had a
legally registered firearm.
The court explained that it had reviewed the probation report and all the letters
submitted on defendant’s behalf. The court acknowledged, based on the letters and what
the court had personally observed, that defendant “has now reached a point where he is
on a better path,” likely due to the birth of his son. The court noted that defendant had
suffered convictions in 2011 and 2019 and was not eligible for probation because of his
prior strike conviction. The strike conviction was in 2011 but that “not very much time
has passed” from when he came out of prison and was back in front of the court.
Defendant had served a 10-year sentence on the voluntary manslaughter conviction, was
released in May 2022, and committed the instant offense in August 2022. The court felt
the instant offense was “definitely serious” and because it was committed so soon after
defendant’s release, the court declined to exercise its discretion to dismiss the prior strike
conviction and denied the Romero motion. The court explained that even though the
strike “makes the sentence quite a bit higher than I think is necessary under the
circumstances,” it does not meet the factors for dismissing a strike under Romero. As
such, the court did not follow probation’s recommendation for the midterm and instead
imposed the lower term.
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
The trial court’s decision to decline to exercise its discretion to strike a prior
conviction under section 1385 is subject to review for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375 (Carmony); see also Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th
6.
at pp. 529–530.) The party challenging the court’s ruling bears the burden to show the
sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. (Carmony, at pp. 376–377.) Absent such
a showing, “ ‘ “the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing
objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be
set aside on review.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 377.) “ ‘ “[A] decision will not be reversed merely
because reasonable people might disagree.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Accordingly, “a trial court does
not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable
person could agree with it.” (Ibid.)
The Three Strikes law does not offer discretionary sentencing choices like other
sentencing laws. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) Rather, it restricts the court’s
discretion in sentencing repeat offenders by establishing a sentencing requirement to be
applied in every case where the defendant has at least one qualifying strike, unless the
court finds the defendant falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes scheme. (Ibid.) The
relevant question in ruling on whether to strike or vacate a prior strike conviction is
“whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious
and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and
prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part,
and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or
more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
The circumstances must be “ ‘extraordinary … by which a career criminal can be deemed
to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within which he squarely falls once he
commits a strike as part of a long and continuous criminal record, the continuation of
which the law was meant to attack.’ ” (Carmony, at p. 378.)
“Thus, the three strikes law not only establishes a sentencing norm, it carefully
circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart from this norm and requires the court to
explicitly justify its decision to do so. In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption
that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.”
7.
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) As such, a trial court will only abuse its
discretion in failing to dismiss a prior strike conviction allegation in limited
circumstances such as where the trial court was not aware of its discretion to dismiss,
where the court considered impermissible factors in declining to dismiss, or where the
sentencing produces an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd result. (Ibid.) Where the
record is silent or where the record demonstrates the court balanced the relevant facts and
reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, the court’s ruling
will be affirmed. (Ibid.)
C. Analysis
Our review of the record shows the trial court considered the proper circumstances
when it declined to exercise its discretion to strike defendant’s prior strike conviction.
The court expressed it had reviewed letters submitted on behalf of defendant, thereby
considering defendant’s background, character and prospects. (See Williams, supra,
17 Cal.4th at p. 161.) The court analyzed the nature and circumstances of defendant’s
present and prior offenses, noting the age of the prior strike, the very serious nature of the
present offense, and the fact that defendant committed the instant offense within three
months of his release after completing his 10-year prison sentence for his voluntary
manslaughter strike conviction. On this basis, the court found defendant did not meet the
factors that would place him outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. The record
demonstrates the court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in
conformity with the spirit of the law. (See Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)
Therefore, the court’s decision not to strike defendant’s prior strike conviction was
neither irrational nor arbitrary and does not constitute an abuse of discretion. (See id.
at p. 377.)
Defendant’s disagreement with the trial court’s conclusion does not change our
mind. “ ‘ “[A] decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might
disagree.” ’ ” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) Defendant argues that his two
8.
arrests after being released from prison do not make him the type of career criminal the
Three Strikes law is designed to punish. However, defendant’s present offense occurred
almost immediately after his release from prison, and his second offense occurred shortly
after being released on bail. As a juvenile, defendant suffered an adjudication for battery
and theft, violated his probation three times, and was convicted of three felonies as an
adult. Defendant committed a felony while in prison for his strike offense, committed
this present offense within three months after being released from prison, and while out
on bail, was arrested on another felony. Based on defendant’s criminal history, and lack
of ability to remain crime free, it was not unreasonable for the court to conclude
defendant fell within the spirit of the Three Strikes law.
We disagree with defendant’s attempt to minimize the seriousness of his current
offense. Even though defendant was unaware he was talking to an undercover agent,
defendant believed he was talking to a minor and continued to engage in discussions with
her for prostitution for his financial benefit. The court considered defendant’s conduct to
be “definitely serious.” Additionally, defendant’s arguments regarding the mitigating
circumstances of his prior strike offense, including his age at the time of the offense,
were already litigated before the court. Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume the
court considered these mitigating factors in reaching its decision. (Carmony, supra,
33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) Further, as discussed, the court expressly stated it considered the
letters in support of defendant, the parties argued the mitigating circumstances before the
court and were considered by the prosecution in negotiating the plea agreement.
Defendant’s disagreement with the weight given to his mitigating circumstances does not
amount to an abuse of discretion, especially here where he fails to show the court’s
decision was irrational or arbitrary. (See id. at p. 377 [decision will not be reversed
where reasonable people might disagree].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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