CourtListener 10851330•People v. Valdez CA2/1
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Filed 4/30/26 P. v. Valdez CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B336447
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA130335)
v.
NOE VALDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Jr., Judge. Affirmed with
directions.
Valerie G. Wass, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
A jury convicted defendant Noe Valdez of first degree
murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. At trial, the
People introduced evidence that Valdez is a gang member who
shot and killed a gang rival at a gas station. The trial court
sentenced Valdez to an aggregate term of 54 years to life in state
prison.
On appeal, Valdez argues the trial court violated his
constitutional rights by denying his motion for a mistrial, or in
the alternative, a continuance, after his trial counsel informed
the court that due to his conditions of confinement, Valdez had
only approximately one hour of sleep each night before trial.
Valdez asserts this sleep deprivation prevented him from
assisting in his own defense and from appearing in a dignified
manner before the jury. Valdez also claims the court erred in
denying his motion to exclude all references to the Mexican
Mafia. Additionally, Valdez argues the court erred in denying a
mistrial after the prosecution’s gang expert offered testimony
that violated the court’s prior ruling limiting the admission of
evidence concerning the Mexican Mafia.
First, assuming arguendo the trial court violated Valdez’s
federal constitutional rights by denying his motion for a mistrial
or a continuance based on his alleged sleep deprivation, we
conclude any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The People presented overwhelming circumstantial evidence that
Valdez perpetrated the murder, including evidence Valdez and
the shooter shown in the surveillance footage appeared to have
the same facial features and clothing, historical cell site data
indicating a telephone associated with Valdez activated a cell
tower less than three miles away from the crime scene within a
half hour of the shooting, a notebook recovered from Valdez’s
2
residence contained gang graffiti similar to new graffiti found by
the gas station the day after the shooting, and Instagram
messages Valdez sent to others several days after the crime that
indicated he feared apprehension by the police.
Second, Valdez fails to show the trial court abused its
discretion in concluding the probative value of evidence showing
the number 13 in the new graffiti near the gas station referred to
the Mexican Mafia was not substantially outweighed by the
danger of undue prejudice. Because Valdez’s gang had an
allegiance to the Mexican Mafia, the graffiti reinforced the
People’s theory that a member of Valdez’s gang perpetrated the
murder. Valdez’s assertion the jury would infer from this brief
reference to the Mexican Mafia that he was affiliated with a
criminal enterprise that was larger and more dangerous than his
own gang is speculative.
Third, we reject Valdez’s assertion the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial based on the gang
expert’s violations of the order limiting the admission of Mexican
Mafia evidence. The court did not transgress the bounds of
reason in finding the expert’s testimony that Valdez’s gang clique
had been greenlit by the Mexican Mafia and that the latter had a
rivalry with another prison gang did not deny Valdez a fair trial.
Lastly, the parties agree that the trial court’s minutes and
abstract of judgment should be corrected to reflect that the only
monetary obligation imposed on Valdez was $6,764.78 in victim
restitution. Given the parties’ concessions and our rejection of
Valdez’s other claims of error, we affirm the judgment and
instruct the trial court to prepare a corrected minute order and
an amended abstract of judgment imposing only victim
restitution in the amount of $6,764.78.
3
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
We summarize only those facts pertinent to our disposition
of this appeal. We describe in greater detail certain trial
evidence and aspects of the procedural history in our Discussion,
post.
1. The information
The People filed an information charging Valdez with
willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, in violation of
Penal Code2 section 187, subdivision (a) and section 189,
subdivision (a) (count 1), and possession of a firearm by a felon, in
violation of section 29800, subdivision (a)(1) (count 2). The
People further alleged Valdez suffered a prior conviction for a
serious or violent felony that constitutes a strike for the purposes
of section 667, subdivisions (b) to (j), and section 1170.12.
1 In describing the trial evidence and the procedural
history of this case, we rely in part on admissions from the
parties’ briefing and assertions made by the respondent that
Valdez does not dispute in his reply brief. (See Association for
Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 764, 772, fn. 2, 773–774 (Association for
Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs) [employing this approach]; see
also Reygoza v. Superior Court (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 514, 519 &
fn. 4 (Reygoza) [criminal case in which the Court of Appeal
assumed that an assertion made by the respondent was correct
because the “defendant did not dispute [the] respondent’s claim
in his reply”].)
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
4
2. The People’s trial evidence3
At around 9:40 p.m. on January 10, 2022, a group of four
males had a verbal altercation with a motorcyclist, Vincent
Maldonado, near the air inflation service area at a Mobil gas
station in Baldwin Park. The tallest of the group fired several
gunshots at Maldonado. Maldonado later died of his gunshot
wounds. John H., Davis P., Joshua M., and Brian F. witnessed
the incident.4
Valdez is a member of the East Side Bolen Parque (ESBP)
gang, which has a rivalry with Maldonado’s gang, the
Des Madres gang. The police recovered surveillance video from
the Mobil station and from the vehicle driven by Brian F. The
surveillance footage revealed that the shooter wore a shirt
similar to that Valdez had worn in a photograph on his
Instagram page, and that the shooter and Valdez had similar
facial characteristics. Three other ESBP gang members appear
in the footage as well. The day after the shooting, new graffiti
was discovered on a wall near the Mobil station that included the
3 We summarize here the evidence the People introduced
at trial to provide context for Valdez’s appellate challenges. We
note Valdez did not testify in his defense. We provide additional
background related to our analysis in the Discussion, post.
4 Because this case involves a gang-related homicide, we
refer to these witnesses by their first names and last initials.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10) [“To protect personal
privacy interests, in all opinions, the reviewing court should
consider referring to the following people by first name and last
initial[:] . . . [¶] . . . Persons in . . . circumstances in which
personal privacy interests support not using the person’s
name . . . .”].)
5
monikers of the three other ESBP members and had the letter
“D” crossed out to disrespect Maldonado’s gang.
The prosecution introduced other evidence tending to show
Valdez was the shooter, including a notebook from Valdez’s
residence that contained graffiti similar to that found near the
Mobil station, and historical cell site information showing that
approximately 30 minutes after the shooting, a telephone
associated with Valdez’s Instagram account had activated a cell
tower approximately 2.5 miles east of the Mobil station.
3. The bifurcation of the trial, the jury’s verdicts, the
trial court’s findings at the bench trial on Valdez’s
alleged prior strike conviction, Valdez’s sentence, and
his notice of appeal
The trial court bifurcated trial on the underlying charges
from trial on the prior conviction. For the purposes of count 2,
Valdez admitted he was previously convicted of a felony. Valdez
waived his right to a jury trial on the prior conviction allegation.
The jury convicted Valdez on both counts and found Valdez
had committed murder in the first degree. At the bench trial, the
trial court found true that Valdez was previously convicted of
assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury with a
great bodily injury enhancement, and that the prior conviction
qualified as a strike.
On December 8, 2023, the trial court sentenced Valdez to
an aggregate state prison term of 54 years to life, which consists
of a four-year prison sentence for count 2 (i.e., the midterm of
two years doubled as a second strike conviction) and an
indeterminate term of 50 years to life on count 1 (i.e., 25 years to
life doubled as a second strike conviction). On January 16, 2024,
Valdez appealed from the judgment.
6
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s orders
denying motions for mistrial or continuance (see People v.
Breceda (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 71, 89–91 (Breceda)), and its
admission of evidence (People v. Byers (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 447,
453). “[R]egardless of the applicable standard of review,” “[t]he
appellant bears th[e] burden of rebutting the presumption of
correctness accorded to the trial court’s decision . . . .”
(See Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at p. 777.) “[W]e evaluate the harmlessness of
violations of the federal Constitution under the standard set forth
in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87
S.Ct. 824], which requires reversal unless the error
is harmless ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 195–196 (Gonzalez).)
DISCUSSION
A. Even If Arguendo the Trial Court Erred in Denying
Valdez’s Motion for a Mistrial or a Continuance
Based on His Alleged Sleep Deprivation, That Error
Does Not Warrant Reversal of the Judgment
1. On the second day of trial, Valdez moved for a
mistrial or, in the alternative, a continuance
On Thursday, November 2, 2023, the second day of trial
testimony, Valdez’s trial counsel represented to the trial court
that Valdez had only approximately one hour of sleep each night
because of the distant location of Valdez’s incarceration at
Wayside and certain transportation issues with the sheriff’s
department. Defense counsel asserted that the previous day,
7
Valdez was falling asleep during the testimony of witnesses.
Valdez’s counsel claimed his client indicated he could not follow
the proceedings due to lack of sleep. Counsel moved for a
mistrial or, in the alternative, to continue the proceedings to
Monday to allow Valdez to attain sufficient sleep over the
weekend to participate in the remainder of the trial.
The trial court stated it was surprised Valdez was being
housed at Wayside during trial. The court indicated it hoped to
“get more answers as to [Valdez’s] housing situation,” and
expressed its intention to consider at a later time Valdez’s
counsel’s request for “some type of modification of [the] trial
schedule . . . .” The court apologized to Valdez for the
circumstances; advised Valdez to do his “best to stay attentive,
most certainly before the jury”; stated that Valdez could possibly
“get rest during the lunch break” that day and that the court
would “do what [it could] to remedy the situation”; and denied
Valdez’s request for a mistrial, apparently based on the court’s
belief the housing and transportation concerns identified by
defense counsel did not establish that Valdez was unable to assist
his attorney.
The trial continued that day with the testimony of
additional prosecution witnesses. The following day, additional
prosecution witnesses testified. The parties agree that the record
does not contain any further discussions regarding Valdez’s
housing and transportation situation, or on Valdez’s request for a
mistrial. Valdez does not dispute, and thus tacitly agrees with,
the Attorney General’s assertion that “[c]ounsel did not make any
further claim that [Valdez] was unable to stay awake.” (See
Reygoza, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 519 & fn. 4.) On Monday,
November 6, 2023, the prosecution rested, the jury was
8
instructed, the parties delivered their closing arguments, and the
jury commenced its deliberations at 3:25 p.m. The jury reached
its verdicts the following morning.
2. Assuming arguendo the trial court violated Valdez’s
constitutional rights in denying his motion for a
mistrial or a continuance, any such error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
Valdez maintains, “[T]he trial court abused its discretion by
denying the defense motion for a mistrial,” or, in the alternative,
to “continue the proceedings until [Valdez’s] housing and
transportation issues had been resolved to the point where
[Valdez] was provided with an opportunity to obtain a sufficient
amount of sleep.” Valdez asserts the court’s refusal to provide
him such relief violated his “federal and state constitutional
rights to due process, to assist in his own defense, to the effective
assistance of counsel,” “equal protection,”5 and “to appear before
the jury in a dignified manner.” As for the latter alleged
constitutional violation, Valdez contends the denial of his motion
was prejudicial because “[Valdez’s] sleeping and inattentiveness
at trial was likely interpreted by jurors as a disinterest or
disrespect for the court, jury, and trial, and jurors may have
interpreted it as a sign of guilt.”
5 Valdez’s equal protection claim appears to be premised
on his assertion that he would not have been subjected to
conditions of confinement that deprived him of sleep if he could
have afforded bail. For the reasons set forth above in Discussion,
part A.2, any purported denial of equal protection in not granting
Valdez a mistrial or a continuance was harmless.
9
As we noted in our Standards of Review, ante, federal
constitutional error is reviewed under the Chapman standard of
prejudice, that is, the error is subject to reversal unless it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.6
Preliminarily, we note there is no dispute that someone
shot and killed Maldonado on the evening of January 10, 2022.
In fact, Valdez acknowledges in his appellate briefing that “the
shooting was captured on surveillance video . . . .” The parties
instead quarrel over whether the factfinder still would have
found that Valdez shot Maldonado if the trial court had granted a
mistrial or a continuance to remedy Valdez’s alleged sleep
deprivation.
Valdez contends, “Not a single eyewitness identified
[Valdez] as the shooter or as one of the four males in the group at
the Mobil station.” In particular, he argues John H. “was shown
a lineup that included [Valdez’s] photograph and was unable to
make a definitive identification”; Brian F. “expressed only a
‘strong inclination’ toward [Valdez’s] photo because of his lean
face, but was not confident in his choice”; Joshua M. “explicitly
stated that the people in the photo array that included [Valdez]
were ‘way too old’ ”; and Davis P. “made no identification at all,
and during a prior hearing, [he] stated that none of the
individuals involved in the shooting were [sic] present in court.”
Valdez further argues the “surveillance video [introduced at trial]
did not clearly depict the shooter’s face.” Lastly, Valdez insists
6 Valdez does not assert the trial court committed
structural error that is reversible per se. (See Gonzalez, supra,
5 Cal.5th at p. 196 [noting that “structural error results in per se
reversal” regardless of “[w]hether [that error is a] violation of
state law or federal constitutional law”].)
10
“[t]he cell phone records [presented at trial] did not place [Valdez]
at the scene at the time of the shooting.” As we explain below,
other evidence presented at trial persuades us, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that Valdez would have been convicted of the
instant offenses even if the trial court had granted his motion for
a mistrial, and then conducted a new trial after Valdez attained
more sleep, or granted a continuance so that Valdez could get
more rest before the trial resumed.
First, Valdez admits in his appellate briefing that Detective
“Rodas testified that [Valdez] had similar facial features to the
shooter, as seen in the [surveillance] video, as reflected in a
photograph of [Valdez] from his Instagram account, and the shirt
worn by the shooter was similar to one [Valdez] was wearing in
the [Instagram] photo.” Indeed, Detective Rodas testified the
individual in the surveillance video, shown in the still image
marked as People’s exhibit 95B, and Valdez, shown in the
photograph marked as People’s exhibit 95A, both had a “similar
nose[, s]imilar eyebrows,” and similar facial hair. Detective
Rodas further testified that the shirt depicted in each image bore
the following similarities: “The cursive writing in the middle of
the sweater, what appears to be the Adidas logo on the chest
portion, and then an unknown circle on the other, opposite
direction.” Although we observe the image in People’s
exhibit 95B does not clearly depict the shooter’s face, our review
of People’s exhibits 95A and 95B substantiates Detective Rodas’s
testimony as to the similarities between Valdez and the
individual in the other image.
Next, in their briefing, the parties agree that the
prosecution introduced “historical cell site” evidence for the
telephone the police recovered from Valdez’s residence after the
11
shooting.7 They also acknowledge that although this evidence
did not disclose the telephone’s “location at the time of the
shooting at 9:40 p.m.,” those records did reveal that “[a]t
10:06 p.m., the [tele]phone activated a [cell] tower approximately
two and a half miles east of the crime scene.”
Further tying Valdez to the shooting is evidence of his
membership in a gang that had a rivalry with Maldonado’s gang.
Detective Rodas testified ESBP gang members Victor C., Joel L.,
and Samuel O. were depicted in the surveillance video obtained
from the Mobil station,8 and Valdez admits in his briefing that
Joshua M. identified Samuel O. and Joel L. as two of the males in
the group he saw at the station. Valdez also acknowledges the
prosecution presented evidence that Victor C.’s moniker
(“Gangster”), Joel L.’s moniker (“Bandit”), and Samuel O.’s
moniker (“Fighter”) appeared in new graffiti found on an
embankment wall near the Mobil station the day after the
shooting, as did the notations: “ESPRS,” “Bolen,” and “Dodger.”
The prosecution’s evidence showed that a notebook seized from
Valdez’s residence contained handwritten ESBP graffiti,
including a page that had Samuel O.’s moniker (“Fighter”). The
parties also acknowledge in their appellate briefing that the
People presented evidence that another page of the notebook had
7Although the subscriber listed for this telephone was
“Martin Valdez,” the telephone number was associated with
defendant Valdez’s Instagram account.
8 Because these three individuals were minors on the date
of the crime, we refer to them by their first names and last
initials. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10).)
Additionally, the surveillance video is not in the record
before us.
12
the notations “ESBPRS” and “DODGER” written in green ink,
which Detective Alvarado noted was similar to the new graffiti
found near the gas station.
The parties further represent on appeal that Detective
Rodas testified tattoos Valdez had on his chest, neck, and head
could only belong to a member of ESBP who was in good standing
and actively engaged in criminal conduct. Importantly, the
parties do not dispute the prosecution proffered evidence that:
Maldonado admitted to being a member of the Des Madres gang,
one of ESBP’s rivals is “Southside Des Madre,” and the graffiti
found near the Mobil station the day after the killing “had many
letters crossed out . . . as disrespect to ESBP rivals,” e.g., “[t]he
D’s in ‘Bandit’ and ‘Dodger’ were crossed out to disrespect Des
Madre.”9
Content from Valdez’s Instagram account further suggested
he was involved in Maldonado’s murder. The account included a
photograph of Valdez displaying an “R” hand sign, representing
Rascals, which Detective Rodas testified is a subset of ESBP.
Valdez’s Instagram account also had a screenshot from a rap
music video featuring Valdez, Samuel O., and other ESBP
members. Further, Valdez sent messages to other Instagram
users suggesting that within two weeks after Maldonado was
9 Although the People’s evidence showed Maldonado had
admitted to being a member of “Des Madres,” Valdez does not
argue this organization differs from the “Des Madre” gang that
had been disrespected in the graffiti found near the Mobil station
the day after the shooting. Instead, Valdez suggests in his reply
brief the prosecution did in fact offer evidence supporting its
theory that “[Valdez] and . . . Maldonado were members of rival
gangs . . . .”
13
shot, Valdez decided to no longer use the telephone police later
recovered from his residence. Approximately 12 days after the
shooting, Valdez sent an Instagram message to another user
indicating Valdez did not like the fact Valdez was unarmed;
Valdez also stated “the hood is hot right now” and “Detective are
[sic] everywhere.”
In sum, the People presented overwhelming circumstantial
evidence implicating Valdez in the shooting, including evidence
that Valdez shared the shooter’s attire and facial characteristics,
Valdez had associated with ESBP gang members who were at the
crime scene, Valdez had a notebook containing graffiti similar to
that found at the gas station the day after the killing, Valdez
belonged to a gang that had a rivalry with Maldonado’s gang,
Valdez possessed a telephone that had activated a cell tower near
the crime scene shortly after the shooting, and Valdez feared
apprehension by the police days after the murder. Based on the
evidence discussed above, we conclude, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Valdez would have been convicted of first degree
murder and possession of a firearm by a felon even if he had been
granted a mistrial or a continuance to remedy his purported sleep
deprivation. Accordingly, Valdez’s claim of constitutional error
does not warrant reversal under Chapman’s standard of
prejudice.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In
Denying Valdez’s Motion To Exclude Any Reference
to the Mexican Mafia
Evidence Code section 352 provides: “The court in its
discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
14
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) We review the trial
court’s admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. (Standards
of Review, ante.)
Valdez moved to exclude any reference to the Mexican
Mafia under Evidence Code section 352. Based on the
prosecution’s representation that “the wall graffiti contains the
number 13,” which is associated with the Mexican Mafia, the
trial court denied Valdez’s motion and authorized the People to
present evidence showing that the number “13 when written in
gang graffiti shows affiliation or allegiance to [the] Mexican
Mafia . . . .” The court barred the prosecution from
“expla[ining] . . . what the Mexican Mafia is or . . . what [it does]
in terms of controlling local street gang activity.”
On appeal, Valdez argues, “[T]he trial court abused its
discretion by failing to exclude all references to the Mexican
Mafia” “because such evidence lacked probative value while its
prejudicial impact was significant.” Although Valdez
acknowledges that “[t]he prosecutor’s theory of the case was that
Maldonado was shot by [Valdez] because they were members of
rival gangs,” Valdez maintains, “Any affiliation or association
that the ESPB [sic] gang or the Rascals clique had with the
Mexican Mafia . . . was completely irrelevant in establishing the
motive for the homicide and the identity of the shooter.” Valdez
further contends that “Mexican Mafia evidence is uniquely
inflammatory and creates a substantial danger that the jury will
improperly infer a criminal disposition.” Additionally, Valdez
argues the trial court’s alleged error in denying his motion to
exclude all references to the Mexican Mafia under Evidence Code
15
section 352 “ ‘had the additional legal consequence of violating
[his federal] due process [rights].’ ”
As an initial matter, we reject Valdez’s assertion that
evidence of “ESBP’s affiliation or allegiance to the Mexican Mafia
was [not] relevant in proving motive and/or identity.” (Italics
added.) Testimony that the graffiti was spray painted by
members of a gang that has an allegiance to the Mexican Mafia
has a tendency to show that a member of ESBP committed
Maldonado’s murder, given the People’s evidence that ESBP is
one such gang that has an allegiance to the Mexican Mafia.10
Although the prosecution introduced other evidence that
Maldonado was killed by a rival gang member (see Discussion,
part A.2, ante [describing that evidence]), the fact remains that
the evidence connecting the number 13 in the graffiti to the
Mexican Mafia provided further support for the People’s gang
rivalry theory. (See Evid. Code, § 210 [defining “[r]elevant
evidence” as that “having any tendency in reason to prove or
disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action,” italics added].) Further, when
considered with other evidence suggesting Valdez was the
perpetrator (see Discussion, part A.2, ante), this Mexican Mafia
evidence reinforces the conclusion that Valdez was the ESBP
member who shot Maldonado. For instance, the evidence that
police recovered a notebook from Valdez’s residence that
contained ESBP graffiti similar to that found by the gas station
the day after the murder further suggests Valdez was the ESBP
10 On appeal, Valdez acknowledges, “[T]he gang expert
testified that the 13 in the ESBP gang graffiti . . . showed the
gang’s allegiance to the Mexican Mafia . . . .”
16
member who committed the murder. (See Discussion, part A.2,
ante.)
Accordingly, Valdez may prevail on his claim of error only if
he shows the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the
probative value of this reference to the Mexican Mafia was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice
attendant with its admission. Valdez maintains that upon
hearing this evidence, “the jury likely . . . believed that [Valdez]
and his gang were part of a larger and more dangerous criminal
enterprise,” giving rise to “a danger that the jury would use it as
propensity evidence.” Because the trial court did not permit the
prosecution to present any evidence concerning the Mexican
Mafia other than a brief explanation that ESBP had an
allegiance to that organization, the jury had no basis to infer that
the Mexican Mafia was larger and more dangerous than ESBP.
Valdez cites Division Seven’s decision in People v. Albarran
(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214 for the proposition that “[t]he
Mexican Mafia evidence was extremely inflammatory, could have
only interfered with the jury’s resolution of the issues, and posed
a danger that the jury would use it as propensity evidence.”
Valdez’s reliance on Albarran is unavailing.
In Albarran, a jury convicted the defendant of attempted
murder, shooting at an inhabited dwelling, and attempted
kidnapping for carjacking, and found true enhancements under
section 186.22 that the defendant committed the offenses for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal
street gang with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist
in criminal conduct by gang members. (See Albarran, supra,
149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 217, 219.) Under the prosecution’s theory
of the case, the defendant perpetrated these crimes with “an
17
unidentified accomplice . . . .” (See id. at pp. 217–219, 227, fn. 9.)
Although there was evidence that the defendant was “a member
of the 13 Kings street gang” (see id. at p. 220), “[t]here [was]
nothing inherent in the facts of the [offenses] to suggest any
specific gang motive” (see id. at p. 227). Prior to trial, the trial
court denied the defendant’s motion under Evidence Code
section 352 to exclude any evidence of the defendant’s gang
affiliation and evidence concerning whether the crimes were gang
related. (Albarran, at pp. 219–220.) The court reasoned the
evidence was admissible to prove “motive and intent as to the
underlying charges.” (See id. at p. 220.)
During opening argument, “[t]he prosecutor . . . showed a
picture of [the defendant’s] gang tattoos, describing one of the
tattoos as a ‘reference to the Mexican Mafia, which is a violent
prison street gang that controls the Hispanic street gangs[,]’ ”
and stated that “when a person has such a tattoo it shows
allegiance to the Mexican Mafia.” (See Albarran, supra,
149 Cal.App.4th at p. 220.) Similarly, the prosecutor’s gang
expert “explained [at trial that the defendant] had a number of
tattoos, including one referencing the Mexican Mafia.” (See id. at
pp. 219–220.) The expert also “described one piece of graffiti he
attributed to [the defendant’s] gang which contained a specific
threat to murder police officers,”11 “told the jury the 13 Kings
11 There was no evidence that the defendant or his
unidentified accomplice created this graffiti to take credit for the
offenses at issue. (See Albarran, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 227
[“There was no evidence presented that any gang members had
‘bragged’ about their involvement [in the shooting] or created
graffiti and took credit for it.”].) Instead, it seems the gang
18
committed a number of criminal offenses, including robberies,
driveby shootings, carjackings, and felony vandalism[,] . . . [and]
explained how gang members gain respect by committing crimes
and intimidating people.” (Albarran, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 220–221.) During his closing argument, the prosecutor “told
the jury that the crime was gang motivated[,] . . . argued that
because [the defendant] was a gang member his alibi was
unbelievable[,] . . . [and] reminded the jury that [the defendant]
was an active member of the 13 Kings with gang tattoos.” (See
id. at p. 222, fn. omitted.)
After the jury returned its verdicts, the trial court granted
the defendant’s motion for a new trial as to the gang
enhancements on the ground they lacked sufficient evidentiary
support, but denied his motion for a new trial as to the
underlying charges, thereby rejecting the defendant’s argument
that “absent the gang allegations, the gang evidence was
irrelevant and overly prejudicial.” (See Albarran, supra,
149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 217, 222, 226–227.)
The Court of Appeal reversed, reasoning that, even if
“evidence of [the defendant’s] gang membership and some
evidence concerning gang behavior were relevant to the issue[s]
of motive and intent,” “a panoply” of “other extremely
inflammatory gang evidence was admitted” that was “irrelevant,
cumulative and presented a substantial risk of undue prejudice,”
“i.e., threats against police, reference to the Mexican Mafia, and
descriptions of other crimes committed by other gang
members . . . .” (See Albarran, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 217,
expert was simply referring to “13 Kings graffiti around [the
defendant’s] home.” (See id. at p. 220.)
19
227–228.) Further, the Albarran court agreed with the defendant
that “the erroneous admission of this evidence was so serious as
to violate his federal constitutional rights to due process,
rendering his trial fundamentally unfair” because “there was a
real danger that the jury would improperly infer that whether or
not [the defendant] was involved in these shootings, he had
committed other crimes, would commit crimes in the future, and
posed a danger to the police and society in general and thus he
should be punished.” (See id. at pp. 229–231.) “Given the nature
and amount of this gang evidence at issue, the number of
witnesses who testified to [the defendant’s] gang affiliations and
the role the gang evidence played in the prosecutor’s argument,”
the reviewing court reversed under Chapman’s standard of
prejudice. (See id. at pp. 229, 232.)
Albarran bears little resemblance to the instant case.
There, the prosecution’s references to the Mexican Mafia “had no
connection to the[ ] crimes” at issue because “the motive for the
underlying crimes . . . was not apparent from the circumstances,”
e.g., “[t]here was no evidence presented that any gang members
had ‘bragged’ about their involvement or created graffiti and took
credit for it”; the prosecutor told the jury that the defendant had
a tattoo showing allegiance to the Mexican Mafia, which the
prosecutor represented was “ ‘a violent prison street gang that
controls the Hispanic street gangs’ ”; and the Mexican Mafia
evidence was accompanied by “extremely inflammatory gang
evidence” that “raised the distinct potential to sway the jury to
convict regardless of [the defendant’s] actual guilt,” including
“threats to kill police officers” and “descriptions of the criminal
activities of other gang members . . . .” (See Albarran, supra,
149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 220, 227–228, italics added.)
20
Conversely, as explained above, the evidence connecting
the number 13 in the gang graffiti near the Mobil station to the
Mexican Mafia supported the People’s theory that an ESBP
member committed the murder to eliminate a rival gang member,
and the trial court limited the extent to which the Mexican Mafia
could be referenced, thereby preventing the prosecution from
introducing a “panoply of incriminating gang evidence . . . [that]
had no bearing on the underlying charges.” (See Albarran, supra,
149 Cal.App.4th at p. 227.) Because the probative value of the
Mexican Mafia evidence in the instant case was greater, and the
danger of undue prejudice considerably lower, than that of the
irrelevant gang evidence at issue in Albarran, that decision
does not demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion in
denying Valdez’s motion.
In sum, Valdez fails to demonstrate the trial court erred in
denying his motion to exclude any reference to the Mexican Mafia
at trial.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In
Denying Valdez’s Motion for a Mistrial Based on the
Introduction of Mexican Mafia Evidence Exceeding
the Scope of the Court’s Prior Ruling
1. The trial court denied Valdez’s motion for a mistrial
even though Detective Rodas provided testimony that
violated the court’s prior order
At trial, Detective Rodas testified that the three dots and
two lines next to “ESBPRS” in the ESBP graffiti found on the
wall outside the Mobil station the day after the murder refers to
the number 13, which shows the gang’s allegiance to the Mexican
Mafia. (Punctuation omitted from the quotation.) In response to
21
the prosecutor’s question concerning the significance of the color
green in the graffiti, Detective Rodas stated, “The color green is
used by specifically this click [sic] within the east side. Many
years ago — the history told to me by gang detectives and gang
members from the Rascals click [sic], many years ago they were
what is called green lit by the Mexican Mafia, meaning they were
in bad standings [sic] within the Mexican Mafia . . . .”12
The prosecutor also asked Detective Rodas why certain
letters in gang monikers found in the graffiti had been crossed
out. In his response, Detective Rodas testified, inter alia, “The
letter ‘N’ [in ‘Gangster’] is spelled backwards and also crossed off.
The ‘N’ is spelled backwards to disrespect Nuestra Familia which
is another prison gang that is north of Bakersfield that doesn’t
get along with the Mexican Mafia. It is also crossed off because
North Side Bolen Parque is the primary rival to East Side Bolen
Parque.”
Valdez moved for a mistrial, arguing that Detective Rodas’s
testimony exceeded the scope of the trial court’s prior ruling
limiting the admission of Mexican Mafia evidence. In denying
Valdez’s motion, the court acknowledged that two aspects of
Detective Rodas’s testimony violated the court’s prior order:
(1) “mentioning that, at one point in time, [the] . . . gang was
greenlighted by the Mexican Mafia, and they adopted a green
color when . . . graffitiing their gang affiliation”; and (2) noting
12 In ruling on the motion for a mistrial that we discuss in
this section, the trial court seems to have construed this portion
of Detective Rodas’s testimony to mean that the ESBP gang “may
be more in allegiance” with the Mexican Mafia “despite falling
out of favor [with the Mexican Mafia] at one point in time.”
Valdez does not contest that interpretation of this testimony.
22
that the letter “N” included in the gang graffiti had been written
in such a way as to show “disrespect to a different prison gang,
Nuestra Familia, which is a rival state prison gang to the
Mexican Mafia.” The court found Valdez had not been denied a
fair trial because the Mexican Mafia’s greenlighting of the
Rascals was mentioned but not explored, and the other testimony
had “somewhat tangentially” referred to “rivalry between prison
gangs . . . .” The court stated it would not issue a curative
instruction because doing so would simply “highlight” these
aspects of the expert’s testimony.
2. Valdez fails to demonstrate the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a mistrial
“ ‘ “A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of
prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or
instruction. [Citation.] Whether a particular incident is
incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and
the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on
mistrial motions. [Citation.]” [Citation.] A motion for a mistrial
should be granted when “ ‘ “a [defendant’s] chances of receiving a
fair trial have been irreparably damaged.” ’ ” [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” (Breceda, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 89.)
According to Valdez, even if we reject his contention the
trial court erred in “allowing the prosecution to introduce a
limited amount of Mexican Mafia evidence,” the court
nonetheless erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. He claims
the prosecution’s violations of the court’s order limiting the
Mexican Mafia evidence “rendered [Valdez’s] trial fundamentally
unfair in violation of [his] constitutional rights to due process”
because the testimony in question “had no relevance to the issues
and was extremely prejudicial.”
23
Valdez does not, however, challenge the trial court’s finding
that Detective Rodas did not expound upon his testimony that
the Mexican Mafia had “greenlit” the Rascals clique or his
testimony that there is a rivalry between the Mexican Mafia and
another prison gang named Nuestra Familia. In concluding that
these brief allusions to the Mexican Mafia’s status as a prison
gang and its relationship to other gangs did not deprive Valdez of
a fair trial, the court acted within “the bounds of reason . . . .”
(See Breceda, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 90; ibid. [utilizing the
quoted text as a formulation of the abuse of discretion standard
in reviewing the denial of a mistrial motion].)
D. The Parties Agree Certain Modifications Should Be
Made to the Trial Court’s Minutes and Abstract of
Judgment
The parties agree that we should “order the trial court to
correct its minutes and prepare an amended abstract of judgment
that accurately reflects that the trial court suspended and never
imposed [any] fines and fees other than victim restitution” in the
amount of $6,764.78. We thus instruct the trial court to issue a
corrected minute order and an amended abstract of judgment
indicating that the only monetary obligation imposed on Valdez is
$6,764.78 in victim restitution. (In re Lynex (2026)
118 Cal.App.5th 756, 769 [“ ‘ “An express concession or assertion
in a brief is frequently treated as an admission of a legal or
factual point, controlling in the disposition of the case[.]” ’ ”].)
24
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Upon issuance of our
remittitur, the trial court shall prepare a corrected minute order
and an amended abstract of judgment reflecting that the court
did not impose any fines or fees except for victim restitution in
the amount of $6,764.78. The trial court shall forward a copy of
the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
We concur:
WEINGART, J.
M. KIM, J.
25
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