Getz v. Serrano El Dorado Owner's Assn. CA3

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Filed 4/30/26 Getz v. Serrano El Dorado Owner’s Assn. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(El Dorado)

DEAN GETZ, Individually and C101412
as Personal Representative, etc.
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. PC20170113)

v.

SERRANO EL DORADO OWNER’S
ASSOCIATION et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

This is an appeal by plaintiff Dean Getz (Getz) following a grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants Serrano El Dorado Owner’s Association (the HOA) and
Serrano Associates, LLC (Serrano Associates) (collectively, defendants).
The underlying litigation concerns the interpretation of recorded covenants,
conditions, and restrictions (CC&R’s) governing the Serrano El Dorado master-planned
community. Getz, a former homeowner and HOA board member, filed a complaint
alleging that the HOA was not complying with its duty to charge assessments to owners
of undeveloped property, to the detriment of owners of developed property. In particular,
Getz alleged that the HOA was violating its duty under the CC&R’s to cap assessments
on developed property owners, and make up any resulting budgetary shortfall through
assessments on owners of undeveloped property, for “so long as” some property is

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“subject to assessment” as undeveloped property, which he construes to mean “so long as
[u]ndeveloped [p]roperty exists within the HOA.” Defendants moved for summary
adjudication, arguing that the intent of the CC&R’s was to permanently halt assessments
on undeveloped property if the assessments on developed property were sufficient to
meet the HOA’s budgetary needs in a given fiscal year.
Agreeing with the defendants, the trial court granted summary adjudication on
Getz’s first cause of action for declaratory relief. Defendants then moved for summary
judgment, asserting that Getz’s remaining claims were barred by the statute of
limitations. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the remaining claims
were time-barred because the HOA disclosed its interpretation of the CC&R’s to affected
property owners more than 10 years before the filing of Getz’s complaint.
On appeal, Getz argues that the grant of summary judgment should be reversed
because the trial court (1) misconstrued the language in the CC&R’s related to
assessments on undeveloped property, and (2) erred in failing to apply the continuous
accrual doctrine to breaches alleged to have occurred within the applicable limitations
period. We agree with Getz on both points and therefore reverse the grant of summary
judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Overview of the CC&R’s
The Serrano El Dorado development (the Development) is a master-planned
community formed under the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act of 1985
(Civ. Code, § 4000 et seq.). The Development is governed by a Master Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions and Reservation of Easements (CC&R’s),
recorded in August 1995. Serrano Associates is “the Declarant” under the CC&R’s, as
successor in interest to the El Dorado Hills Development Company, the initial developer
of the project.

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The Development is administered and maintained by the Serrano El Dorado HOA,
which is responsible for maintaining common areas, enforcing the CC&R’s, setting
budgets, and collecting assessments. The HOA’s authority includes the “power and duty
to levy assessments on the Owners of Lots or Parcels in Phases [of the Development] in
which assessments have commenced and to collect and enforce payment of such
assessments in accordance with the provisions of [the CC&R’s].”
The CC&R’s define an “Owner” as “the [p]erson or [p]ersons, including Declarant
and Merchant Builders,[1] holding a fee simple or long-term ground leasehold interest of
[r]ecord to a Lot or Parcel within the Property….” The terms “Lot” and “Parcel” refer to
units within the Property, as shown on a recorded subdivision map, parcel map, or
condominium plan. The “Property” is defined as “that portion of the Overall Property
which at any particular time is subject to this Master Declaration [of CC&R’s].”
The Overall Property refers to the land owned by the Declarant, which was the
subject of a “[s]pecific [p]lan” adopted by El Dorado County, as described in Exhibit A-1
to the CC&R’s. The CC&R’s contemplate that the Overall Property will be developed in
two or more phases.2 The portion of the Overall Property to which the CC&R’s initially
applied, described in Exhibit A-2 to the CC&R’s, is referred to as the “Initial Property.”
The CC&R’s state that other portions of the Overall Property, not included in the Initial
Property, “may be made subject to [the CC&R’s] by annexation….”
According to the CC&R’s, each Owner of a Lot or Parcel within the Property is a
member of the HOA and subject to the CC&R’s. Every member of the HOA has voting
rights, including the right to vote for the HOA board of directors. The voting rights “vest

1 The term “Merchant Builder” generally refers to a commercial homebuilder.
2 A “Phase of Development” is defined as “(i) any portion of the Overall Property
designated by Declarant to be a Phase of Development, or (ii) all the real property for
which a Final Subdivision Public Report is issued by the [California Department of Real
Estate].” The initial phase, also known as “Phase 1,” consisted of 160 lots.

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as of the date when the Lots and Parcels to which membership is appurtenant become
subject to assessment.”3
Each Owner of a Lot or Parcel within the HOA covenants and agrees to pay
annual assessments to fund the actual and estimated expenses of the common areas
(“Common Assessments”). To ensure that the expenses related to particular common
areas and improvements are paid only by the Owners who benefit from them, the
CC&R’s establish separate budgetary components or “Cost Centers” within the HOA.
The all-encompassing Cost Center is referred to as the “Master/Basic” budget; it funds
the costs of maintaining the master common areas that provide a general benefit to every
property. All portions of the Property are obligated to pay assessments to satisfy the
Master/Basic cost component.
The CC&R’s also establish smaller, enumerated cost centers (e.g., Cost Center 1)
to cover the costs of maintaining common areas or improvements that only benefit
specific properties within the Development. A Lot or Parcel may reside within multiple
cost centers, making it susceptible to assessments under several cost centers. For
example, the CC&R’s describe the “Phase 1” portion of the Initial Property—i.e., the
initial 160 Lots being developed—as subject to assessment for three cost centers:
Master/Basic, Cost Center 1, and Cost Center 2. The CC&R’s provide that “[o]nly
[those] portions of the Property lying within a particular Cost Center shall pay
assessments to satisfy that Cost Center Component.”

3 Membership in the HOA originally was set up with three different classes: Class
A, Class B, and Class C. Class A members consisted of all Owners, except that the
Declarant and Merchant Builders shall be members of Class B, not Class A, so long as
Class B continues to exist. Regardless of ownership, the Declarant also is a “Class C”
(non-voting) member of the HOA for so long as Class C continues to exist. Section 4.03
of the CC&R’s describes how and when the Class B and Class C memberships terminate.
The CC&R’s provide that Class C membership terminates on the earliest to occur of (i)
conveyance of 4,533 lots to Class A members, or (ii) the ninth anniversary of the first
close of escrow to a Class A member.

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1. Annexation
Article 14 of the CC&R’s governs annexation. It provides that “[a]ny or all of the
Overall Property may be annexed to and made subject to this Master Declaration,”
thereby making the annexed property subject to the [CC&R’s] and the jurisdiction of the
HOA. Those portions of the Overall Property which are annexed and “become subject to
[the CC&R’s]” subsequent to the Initial Property are referred to in the CC&R’s as
“Subsequent Phase Property.”
Sections 14.02 and 14.03 of the CC&R’s describe the authorized methods of
annexation. Section 14.02 gives the Declarant and Merchant Builders a unilateral right to
annex any portion of the Overall Property without the approval of the HOA, its board, or
the members, provided such right is exercised within a specified number of years—five
for the Declarant or three for a Merchant Builder—after the “immediately preceding
Phase” of Development. In contrast, section 14.03 allows the Declarant to annex real
property at any time with the approval of at least two-thirds of each class of membership.
Annexations are accomplished by filing a “Declaration of Annexation,” which
“adds Subsequent Phase Property ... to the Property” and “extend[s] [the CC&R’s] to
such real property.” Section 14.05 of the CC&R’s provides that “[t]he filing of record of
said [Declaration of Annexation] shall constitute and effectuate the annexation of the
additional real property described therein, and thereupon said real property shall become
and constitute a part of [the] Property, become subject to [the CC&R’s]..., and become
subject to assessment by the [HOA], and the Owners of Lots and Parcels in said real
property shall automatically become Members of the [HOA].”
Section 14.11 of the CC&R’s describes the effects of annexation. Similar to
section 14.05, it provides: “The [r]ecordation of a Declaration of Annexation shall
constitute and effectuate the annexation of the annexable property described therein, and
thereupon the annexable property shall become and constitute a part of the Properties,
and be subject to, and encompassed within, the general plan and scheme of [the CC&R’s]

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….. Lots and Parcels within the annexed property shall thereupon become subject to
[a]ssessment by the [HOA]…, and the Owners of Lots and Parcels within the annexed
real property shall automatically become Members of the [HOA].”
2. Assessments
Article 6 of the CC&R’s governs assessments. The first section of that article
(§ 6.01) describes the covenant and agreement of Owners to pay assessments to the HOA.
It provides: “Declarant and any Merchant Builder, for each Lot or Parcel owned by
Declarant or such Merchant Builder which is subject to assessment, hereby covenants and
agrees, and every other Owner of any Lot or Parcel, by acceptance of a deed or other
conveyance therefor,….is deemed to covenant and agree to pay [assessments] to the
[HOA]” for, among other things, “annual Common Assessments.”
Section 6.05 of the CC&R’s specifically addresses Common Assessments, i.e., the
charges against Owners to defray the expenses of the common areas. It provides that
“[s]ums sufficient to pay [c]ommon [e]xpenses shall be assessed as Common
Assessments against the Owners of Lots or Parcels.” It further provides that the common
expenses “shall be allocated among the Owners and their respective Lots or Parcels for
which Common Assessments have commenced based upon the number of Assessment
Units chargeable to each such Lot or Parcel” within a particular cost center, as described
in section 6.05, subdivisions (A) through (D).
For developed Property, section 6.05, subdivisions (A) through (D), of the
CC&R’s generally require the HOA to determine the amount of Common Assessments
by dividing the common expenses by the number of Assessment Units within a given cost
center. Thus, the common expenses attributable to the master common areas—referred to
as the “General Assessment Component”—“shall be allocated among all the Owners of
developed Property based upon the number of Assessment Units chargeable to such

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Owner.”4 The common expenses attributable to other cost centers—referred to as the
“Cost Center Assessment Component”—shall be allocated among the Owners of
developed Lots and Parcels within the respective cost centers.
For undeveloped Property, section 6.05, subdivisions (B), (C), and (D), of the
CC&R’s provide that the common expenses shall be allocated among Owners of
undeveloped Property as “provided in Exhibit D.” In addition, section 6.05, subdivision
(B) provides: “As all or any portion of a Parcel which is included within the Property is
subdivided into a Residential Subdivision, such Parcel, or subdivided portion thereof, will
cease to be assessed as undeveloped and commence to be assessed [as developed
Property], on the first day of the first month following the month in which the first Close
of Escrow occurs for the sale of a Lot or Residential Unit in such Residential
Subdivision…. As a Parcel which is included within the Property is improved with one
or more buildings, such Parcel will cease to be assessed as undeveloped and commence
to be assessed [as developed Property], on the first day of the first month following the
month in which the first such building is completed. For purposes of determining Class
A and Class B voting rights for undeveloped Property, the undeveloped Property shall be
deemed to have the number of Assessment Units the undeveloped Property would have
…if developed to maximum density under the zoning laws in effect as of the date this
Declaration is recorded.”
Section 6.05, subdivision (E), of the CC&R’s governs the amount of Common
Assessments. It provides that Common Assessments against Owners shall be levied and

4 Assessment Units for developed Property are allocated as follows: One “unit” for
each single-family Lot, a fraction of a unit for each dwelling in a multi-family residential
building, and pursuant to a formula for commercial and office buildings.

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adjusted in accordance with the annual HOA budget, “subject to the provisions of Exhibit
D and Section 6.07.”5
Section 6.06 of the CC&R’s states that “Common Assessments shall commence as
to each Lot or Parcel in the Property on the first day of the first month following the
month in which the first Close of Escrow occurs for the sale of a Lot in a Residential
Subdivision.”
3. Exhibit D to the CC&R’s
Exhibit D to the CC&R’s is entitled “Common Assessments so Long as Some
Property Is Subject to Assessment as Undeveloped Property.” (Underline and some
capitalization omitted.) As the title implies, Exhibit D delineates how Common
Assessments are charged while a portion of the Property is “subject to assessment” as
undeveloped Property.
Paragraph 2 of Exhibit D to the CC&R’s explains its purpose: “The purpose and
intent of the assessments provided for in this Exhibit are to allocate to undeveloped
portions of the Property sufficient portions of the various [cost components], so that so
long as portions of the Property are assessed as undeveloped Lots or Parcels, Common
Assessments for developed Lots and Parcels shall remain constant in real purchasing
power. To accomplish that objective, the Declarant is willing to accept levels of
Common Assessments on undeveloped portions of the Property which, at least during the
early phases of development of the Property, may be disproportionately high, taking into
account the fact that undeveloped portions of the Property derive little benefit from most
of the costs to be defrayed by Common Assessments.”

5 Subject to specified exceptions, section 6.07 limits increases on Common
Assessments to 120 percent of the level of Common Assessments levied in the
immediately preceding fiscal year.

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Exhibit D to the CC&R’s achieves this purpose by (i) setting the initial levels of
Common Assessments to be levied on the developed portions of the Property when a cost
center is created, and then (ii) capping increases in such assessments using a formula tied
to the consumer price index (hereafter, the CPI Rate). To address any resulting shortfall
between a cost component’s budgeted amount and the assessments levied on developed
Property at the CPI Rate, Exhibit D requires Owners of undeveloped Lots and Parcels to
pay assessments to make up the shortfall. Specifically, Exhibit D provides that the level
of Common Assessments “for undeveloped Property within [a cost center] for any fiscal
year shall be an amount sufficient to keep [the assessments] for developed Property from
exceeding [the CPI Rate] for that fiscal year.”
Exhibit D to the CC&R’s contains several provisions designed to minimize the
level of undeveloped Property assessments. First, Exhibit D provides that the CPI Rate
may only increase, not decrease, “so long as any undeveloped Property is being assessed
with respect thereto.” This prevents developed properties’ share of Common
Assessments from being unfairly shifted to undeveloped properties. Second, Exhibit D
prohibits the HOA from reducing developed Property assessments in a cost center that
has a surplus if such property also resides within another cost center that has a deficit.
Third, Exhibit D provides that if the assessments levied on undeveloped Property result in
surplus funds, Owners of undeveloped Property will be entitled to a reduction and/or
refund.
4. Annual Budget Disclosures
The HOA has statutory and contractual obligations to prepare and distribute
annual budgetary documents to Owners within the Development. (Civ. Code, § 5300.)
The required budgetary documents include: a year-to-date report on actual performance;
a pro forma budget for the upcoming fiscal year; and notice of any change in regular
assessments. (Civ. Code, §§ 5300, 5615.) To satisfy these obligations, the HOA

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prepared annual “[b]udget [p]ackets” and distributed them to Owners in the latter part of
each year.
Beginning in 2001, the HOA determined that the cap and subsidy provisions of
Exhibit D to the CC&R’s—capping assessments on developed property at the CPI Rate
and imposing assessments on undeveloped property to make up any shortfall—no longer
applied to certain cost centers and notified the affected Owners through the annual budget
packets. Thus, between 2001 and 2005, the HOA gave written notice to Owners that
assessments in Cost Center 2, Cost Center 3, Cost Center 7, and the Master/Basic cost
center were no longer subject to Exhibit D’s cap and subsidy arrangement.6 In other
words, the HOA gave notice that Exhibit D no longer applied to the calculation of
assessments for those cost centers. The HOA also reflected these changes in the year-end
financial statements that were distributed to Owners.
B. Getz’s Complaint
Plaintiff Getz is a former homeowner and HOA board member. He acquired a
residence in the Development in 2011 and served as an HOA board member from May
2014 to June 2016. Getz alleges that during his tenure on the board, he discovered that
since at least 2006, the HOA had not been complying with its duty to charge assessments
to Owners of undeveloped Property, including Serrano Associates. Getz alleges that,
because of this breach of duty, the Owners of developed Property were charged
assessments in excess of the CPI Rate, violating the CC&R’s.

6 As an example, the HOA’s budget packet for 2002 stated: “During the early
stages of development, the [HOA’s] operation is subsidized by the Declarant[,] Serrano
Associates, and merchant builders, through monthly contributions allocated against
undeveloped properties. These subsidies continue until all properties within a cost center
are subject to common assessments or until the subsidy is no longer required to keep the
assessments at or below predefined levels.... [¶] Several cost centers are no longer
subsidized through undeveloped lot assessments as all lots are subject to common
assessments or the cost center is fully funded at the predefined level without a subsidy.”

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In March 2017, Getz filed a lawsuit against defendants HOA and Serrano
Associates. The operative (third amended) complaint alleges three causes of action: for
declaratory relief, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the CC&R’s. Each cause of
action is premised on the HOA’s alleged failure to collect assessments from Serrano
Associates and/or other Owners of undeveloped Property to the detriment of the
remaining HOA members. Specifically, the complaint is premised on defendants’ failure
to (1) cap assessments to Owners of developed Property at the CPI Rate, and (2) impose
assessments on undeveloped Property Owners to make up any budgetary shortfall. The
claims pertain to four cost centers: Master/Basic, Cost Center 2, Cost Center 3, and Cost
Center 7.
The first cause of action, against all defendants, seeks a declaratory judgment that,
until the Property is fully developed, the HOA must calculate developed Property
assessments by applying the CPI Rate and assessing undeveloped Property for any
shortfall in the HOA’s annual budget. The second cause of action, against the HOA,
seeks to recover damages based on the HOA’s breach of fiduciary duty in failing to
adequately assess Owners of undeveloped Property, at the expense of developed Property
Owners who were charged more than the CPI Rate. The third cause of action, against all
defendants, seeks damages based on breach of the CC&R’s assessment obligations.
After filing the lawsuit, Getz filed a motion for class certification on his claims
against the HOA. The trial court granted the motion, certifying a class consisting of all
Owners of developed Property subject to Master/Basic, Cost Center 2, Cost Center 3, and
Cost Center 7 assessments for the period of March 16, 2013, to the present.
C. Motions for Summary Judgment/Adjudication
As noted, Getz’s first cause of action sought a judicial declaration that, as long as
undeveloped Property exists, the HOA has a duty to calculate developed Property
assessments using the CPI Rate and make up any resulting budgetary shortfall through

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assessments on undeveloped Property Owners. Each party moved for summary
adjudication on the declaratory relief cause of action.
Getz’s motion was denied, and the defendants’ motions were granted. The trial
court held that the CC&R’s unambiguously provide that Common Assessments against
Owners of undeveloped Property are permanently extinguished if either one of the
following two events occurs: (1) there is no longer any undeveloped Property in the cost
center, or (2) the cost center’s annual expenses are fully funded by assessments on
Owners of developed Property. The court found Getz’s interpretation of the CC&Rs
untenable, stating: “Plaintiff’s interpretation of the CC&R’s largely consists of parsing
sentences outside of their context and imprecisely paraphrasing provisions. Moreover,
his interpretation would result in an absurdity since [it] would require that undeveloped
property always be subject to assessment, even if the various Components were
financially self-sufficient without funding from undeveloped property, which money then
would need to be refunded to the owners of undeveloped property due to there being
surplus funds paid to or accumulated by the HOA.”
After prevailing on the declaratory relief claim, the defendants moved for
summary judgment on the remaining claims, asserting the claims were barred by the
statute of limitations because the undisputed facts showed that between 2002 and 2005,
the HOA disclosed to Owners its determination that Exhibit D to the CC&R’s cap and
subsidy no longer applied.
The motions for summary judgment were heard alongside a separate motion for
summary adjudication filed by Getz directed to the question of whether the HOA had a
duty to demand that Serrano Associates pay its “fair share of the costs for maintaining
improvements to public property.”
The trial court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, finding
that Getz’s remaining claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court did

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not reach Getz’s separate motion for summary adjudication, finding it “mooted” by the
resolution of the defendants’ motions.
Judgment was entered on April 9, 2024, and Getz timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
Standard of Review
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted “if all the papers submitted
show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc.,7 § 437c, subd. (c).)
“Summary adjudication works the same way, except it acts on specific causes of action or
affirmative defenses, rather than on the entire complaint. [Citation.] A summary
adjudication is properly granted only if a motion therefor completely disposes of a cause
of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Hartline v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 458, 464.)
The moving party, whether plaintiff or defendant, initially bears the burden of
making a “prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any genuine issue of material
fact.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “A prima facie
showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” (Id. at
p. 851.) A plaintiff moving for summary judgment/adjudication meets its burden by
“prov[ing] each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on that
cause of action.” (§ 437c, subd. (p)(1).) A defendant moving for summary judgment can
meet its burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit by showing that one or
more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete
defense to the cause of action. (Id., subd. (p)(2).) Once a moving party has met its

7 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

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burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show the existence of a triable issue of
material fact. (Id., subd. (p).)
We review rulings on motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication
de novo and decide independently whether the undisputed facts warrant judgment for the
moving party as a matter of law. (DiCarlo v. County of Monterey (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th
468, 489; Hartline v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 464.) In
so doing, we liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing the motion
and resolve any doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion in favor of that party.
(Quidel Corporation v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 155, 164.)
II
Summary Adjudication of Declaratory Relief Cause of Action
Getz argues that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motions for summary
adjudication of the first cause of action for declaratory relief because the trial court
misconstrued the language in the CC&R’s related to Common Assessments. We agree.
A. Additional Legal Background
An action for declaratory relief is governed by section 1060, which provides in
part: “Any person interested under a written instrument,... or under a contract, or who
desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another,... may, in cases
of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring
an original action…for a declaration of his or her rights and duties…, including a
determination of any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or
contract.”
“ ‘Declaratory relief operates prospectively, serving to set controversies at rest
before obligations are repudiated, rights are invaded[,] or wrongs are committed.’ ”
(California Public Records Research, Inc. v. County of Yolo (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 150,
185; County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 607.)
“[T]he remedy is to be used in the interests of preventive justice, to declare rights rather

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than execute them.” (Travers v. Louden (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 926, 931.) In this way,
declaratory relief “serves a practical purpose in stabilizing an uncertain or disputed legal
relation, thereby defusing doubts which might otherwise lead to ...litigation.” (Kirkwood
v. California State Automobile Assn. Inter-Insurance Bureau (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 49,
59; cf. Cordoba Corporation v. City of Industry (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 145, 157 [there is
no basis for declaratory relief where only past wrongs are involved]; Baldwin v. Marina
City Properties, Inc. (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 393, 407 [same].)
Summary judgment or adjudication “is appropriate in a declaratory relief action
when only legal issues are presented for the court’s determination.” (California Public
Records Research, Inc., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 185.) The defendant’s burden in a
declaratory relief action “ ‘is to establish the plaintiff is not entitled to a declaration in its
favor. It may do this by establishing (1) the sought-after declaration is legally incorrect;
(2) undisputed facts do not support the premise for the sought-after declaration; or (3) the
issue is otherwise not one that is appropriate for declaratory relief.’ ” (Ibid.)
B. Analysis
The issue presented in this appeal is one of contract interpretation: Whether,
under the CC&R’s, assessments against Owners of undeveloped Property are
permanently extinguished when a cost center’s annual budgetary expenses are fully
funded by assessments on Owners of developed Property at the CPI Rate.
The parties agree that the key disputed language is contained in Exhibit D to the
CC&R’s, which is entitled “Common Assessments So Long as Some Property is Subject
to Assessment as Undeveloped Property.” (Underline and some capitalization omitted.)
Paragraph 2 of Exhibit D provides: “The purpose and intent of the assessments provided
for in this Exhibit are to allocate to undeveloped portions of the Property sufficient
portions of the various [Cost] Components, so that so long as portions of the Property are
assessed as undeveloped Lots or Parcels, Common Assessments for developed Lots and
Parcels shall remain constant in real purchasing power.” (Italics added.)

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Defendants argue that Exhibit D to the CC&R’s title and language establishes “a
condition subsequent that, when satisfied, renders the CPI Rate obsolete and eliminates
any future assessment obligation on Undeveloped Property.” Defendants contend that the
condition subsequent is the point at which undeveloped Property is no longer “ ‘subject to
assessment’ ” for a given cost center. Defendants contend that this condition can be met
in either of two ways: (1) if the cost center is fully developed such that there is no longer
any undeveloped Property, or (2) if the cost center’s annual expenses are fully funded by
developed Property assessments without any contribution from undeveloped Property.
As to the first point, the parties agree that undeveloped Property is not subject to
assessment if the applicable cost center is comprised entirely of developed Property. The
second point is the source of the dispute.
Defendants contend that the phrase “so long as” portions of the Property are
“subject to assessment as undeveloped Property” means Exhibit D to the CC&R’s cap
and subsidy arrangement ceases to apply—permanently—once a cost center’s annual
expenses are “fully funded” without contribution from undeveloped Property in a given
fiscal year. In other words, “[w]hen undeveloped property is not charged an assessment
with respect to a cost center, Exhibit D ceases to apply to that cost center.”
In contrast, Getz argues that undeveloped Property becomes “subject to
assessment” upon annexation and continues to be subject to assessment as undeveloped
Property until it is developed, at which point it is assessed as developed Property. Thus,
according to Getz, the plain meaning of the CC&R’s is that the HOA is bound by the CPI
Rate when fixing assessments for Owners of developed Property “so long as undeveloped
Property exists within the HOA.” It follows that, so long as undeveloped Property exists,
the HOA must assess Owners of undeveloped Property whenever the CPI Rate is not
sufficient to meet a given cost center’s budgeted expenses.
The trial court agreed with the defendants’ interpretation. The court reasoned that
the intent of Exhibit D to the CC&R’s was to subsidize Owners of developed Property “at

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the early stages of development” and gradually “phase out” the assessments on
undeveloped Property as the revenue generated from developed Property assessments
increased. As support for this conclusion, the court relied on (1) the meaning of the
phrase “so long as,” as signaling a future end date depending upon a stated condition; (2)
Exhibit D’s mandate that the CPI Rate cannot be decreased “so long as any undeveloped
Property is being assessed with respect thereto”; and (3) Exhibit D’s requirement that
when assessments against undeveloped Property result in a surplus, Owners of
undeveloped Property shall be entitled to a refund.
As we explain, we are not persuaded by the trial court’s reasoning. Instead, we
agree with Getz that the plain language of the CC&R’s establishes that the HOA is
required to apply Exhibit D’s cap and subsidy arrangement for so long as there are
undeveloped Lots and Parcels within the HOA.
We begin with the guiding principle that CC&R’s are construed using the same
rules that apply to the interpretation of contracts. (Fourth La Costa Condominium
Owners Assn. v. Seith (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 563, 575.) The fundamental goal is to
give effect to the mutual intent of the parties at the time of contract formation, so far as
the same is ascertainable and lawful. (Ibid.; Civ. Code, § 1636.)
To ascertain that intent, we look first to the language of the contract, construing
the words in the context of the instrument as a whole and the circumstances under which
it was made. (PV Little Italy, LLC v. MetroWork Condominium Assn. (2012)
210 Cal.App.4th 132, 145-146; Civ. Code, § 1639.) We interpret words in the contract in
accordance with their ordinary and popular sense, unless the words are used in a technical
sense or a special meaning is given to them by usage. (Starlight Ridge South
Homeowners Assn. v. Hunter-Bloor (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 440, 447; Civ. Code,
§ 1644.) If the language is clear and explicit and does not involve an absurdity, it will be
followed. (Starlight Ridge South Homeowners Assn., at p. 447.)

17
Where, as here, the interpretation of a written instrument depends solely on the
terms of the instrument itself, the question is one of law, requiring us to independently
interpret its meaning. (PV Little Italy LLC, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at pp. 144-145;
Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865-866.)
We next turn to the relevant language of the CC&R’s, which (all parties agree)
requires the HOA to apply Exhibit D “so long as” some portion of the Property is
“subject to assessment” as undeveloped Property. Like the trial court, we interpret the
phrase “so long as” to be conditional language, signaling that Exhibit D remains in effect
only while a stated condition is met. (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2026)
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/so%20long%20as [as of Apr. 30, 2026],
archived at <https://perma.cc/D6VL-8K2>; Cambridge Dictionary Online (2026)
<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/grammar/british-grammar/as-long-as-and-so-long-as>
[as of Apr. 30, 2026], archived at <https://perma.cc/WQ94-N5W3>.) In this case, the
stated condition is that some portion of the Property is “subject to” assessment as
undeveloped Property.
However, we part ways with the trial court (and Defendants) in construing the
meaning of the phrase “subject to assessment.” The trial court construed this phrase as
referring to the act or occurrence of assessment. Under this view, property is “subject to
assessment” only for the time that it is being assessed and ceases to be “subject to”
assessment if it is not assessed. Consistent with this view, the trial court concluded that
undeveloped Property stops being “subject to assessment” if, in a given fiscal year, the
cost center’s annual expenses are fully funded by developed Property assessments
without a contribution from undeveloped Property.
In our view, the phrase “subject to assessment” refers to the property’s eligibility
for assessment, not the assessment itself. It refers to the HOA’s right to assess the
property, regardless of whether that right is being exercised in a given fiscal year. In

18
other words, property is “subject to assessment” if it is “assessable” under the CC&R’s.
We reach this conclusion for several reasons.
First, nothing in Exhibit D to the CC&R’s establishes that undeveloped Property
assessments were intended to be permanently extinguished upon a single instance of
financial self-sufficiency (i.e., a cost center being fully funded without contribution from
undeveloped Property Owners). Exhibit D does not even discuss financial self-
sufficiency, except in the context of refunds, which apply only when “Common
Assessments levied against undeveloped Property result in surplus funds being paid to or
accumulated by the [HOA].” (Italics added.) There is certainly nothing in Exhibit D
stating that undeveloped Property assessments shall end if a cost center is determined to
be “fully funded” at some “predefined level,” as the HOA asserted in its 2001-2005
budget packet disclosures.8
Nor are we persuaded that the reference to “early phases of development” in
paragraph 2 of Exhibit D to the CC&R’s has any bearing on this question. The language
merely states that “the Declarant is willing to accept levels of Common Assessments on
undeveloped portions of the Property which, at least during the early phases of
development of the Property, may be disproportionately high….” (Italics added.) It does
not state that Common Assessments will be limited to the early phases of development.
To the contrary, it clearly contemplates that Common Assessments on undeveloped
Property will extend beyond “the early phases of development.”
Second, the definitions in the CC&R’s establish that each Owner of a Lot or
Parcel within the Property is liable for Common Assessments, distinguishing only
between the portion of the Overall Property that is subject to the CC&R’s and the portion

8 We also do not ignore that an earlier 1998 budget disclosure told Owners that
Exhibit D to the CC&R’s subsidy would continue “until all properties within a cost center
are developed.”

19
that is not. For example, the CC&R’s define the term “Common Assessment” to mean
“the annual…charge against each Owner and his Lot or Parcel.” (Italics added.) As
discussed, the term Owner includes the “Declarant and Merchant Builders” and any other
person “holding a fee simple or long-term ground leasehold interest of [r]ecord to a Lot
or Parcel within the Property.” (Italics added.) The CC&R’s, in turn, define the term
Property to mean “that portion of the Overall Property which at any particular time is
subject to [the CC&R’s].”
Other provisions of the CC&R’s reinforce this view. Section 6.05 of the CC&R’s,
which governs the collection of Common Assessments, provides: “Sums sufficient to
pay [c]ommon [e]xpenses shall be assessed as Common Assessments against the Owners
of Lots or Parcels.” It then goes on to explain that such assessments “shall be allocated”
among the Owners of developed and undeveloped Property as specified in section 6.05
and Exhibit D to the CC&R’s.
To the same effect, paragraph 1 of Exhibit D to the CC&R’s expressly states that
“[a]ll [portions] of the Property shall pay assessments to satisfy the General Assessment
Component” of the Common Assessments, and that the “portions of the Property lying
within a particular Cost Center shall pay assessments to satisfy that Cost Center
Component.” Further, paragraphs 2, 5, and 6 of Exhibit D suggest that assessments on
undeveloped Property will continue until the entire Lot or Parcel is assessed as developed
Property pursuant to section 6.05. Collectively, these provisions support our conclusion
that each Lot or Parcel within the Property was intended to be “subject to assessment.”
Finally, and most importantly, article 14 of the CC&R’s directly addresses the
question of how Lots and Parcels become “subject to assessment” under the CC&R’s.
The answer is that Lots and Parcels become subject to assessment upon annexation into
the Property. Section 14.01 provides that “[a]ny or all of the Overall Property may be
annexed to and made subject to [the CC&R’s]” by any of its authorized methods. Section
14.11 describes the effect of annexation. It provides that the filing of a Declaration of

20
Annexation “shall constitute and effectuate the annexation of the annexable property
described therein, and thereupon the annexable property shall become and constitute a
part of the Propert[y], and be subject to, and encompassed within, [the CC&R’s].” It then
states: “Lots and Parcels within the annexed property shall thereupon become subject to
Assessment by the [HOA] ...and the Owners of Lots and Parcels within the annexed real
property shall automatically become [m]embers of the [HOA].” (Italics added.) Section
14.05, which governs the Declaration of Annexation, is nearly identical. It states that
upon the filing of a Declaration of Annexation, the annexed real property “shall become
and constitute part of [the] Property,” become subject to and encompassed within the
CC&R’s, and “become subject to assessment” by the HOA. (Italics added.)
In sum, it is clear from the structure of the CC&R’s that whether a particular Lot
or Parcel was “subject to assessment” depended on whether that Lot or Parcel was part of
the Property to which the CC&R’s apply. At the time of the recordation of the CC&R’s,
only the Phase 1 portion of the Property was “being developed.” Thus, the Phase 1
property was the only portion of the Initial Property initially assessed as developed
Property. The rest of the Initial Property was assessed as undeveloped Property, “as
provided in Exhibit D,” until “all or any portion of a Parcel” is subdivided into a
residential subdivision (with at least one Lot or Residential Unit closing escrow) or
improved with buildings, at which point it would “cease to be assessed as undeveloped
and commence to be assessed [as developed Property].” The remaining Overall Property,
not included in the Initial Property, was not subject to assessment because it was not yet
part of the Property subject to the CC&R’s, but it could be made subject to the CC&R’s
and become “subject to assessment” by annexation. Thus, by implementing the
Development in phases, the developer could control when the undeveloped portions of
the Overall Property would become subject to assessment, even if the developer had to be
mindful of the time limitations on “unilateral” annexations.

21
We are not persuaded by the defendants’ argument that Getz’s interpretation
cannot be squared with sections 4.01, 4.02, and 6.01 of the CC&R’s, which recognize
that Property might be owned by the Declarant or Merchant Builders and yet not be
subject to assessment. There is no inconsistency. As discussed, the CC&R’s expressly
allow the developer to own Property that is not subject to assessment. This would occur
any time the developer recorded a subdivision map for a parcel before annexing it and
making it part of the Property.
We likewise reject the suggestion that Getz’s interpretation is contrary to the
stated purpose and intent of Exhibit D because it would expose the developer to
disproportionately high assessments in the late stages of development. To begin, the
argument is premised on a hypothetical state of events that seems divorced from reality,
namely, that in the late stages of development the HOA would “ramp up spending” so far
beyond the CPI Rate that the last remaining undeveloped Parcels would be forced to bear
disproportionately high assessments. Nothing in the present record suggests this scenario
is likely. But even if the possibility exists, it is a risk that the developer has assumed
under the terms of the CC&R’s. We find no evidence that Exhibit D to the CC&R’s was
intended to preclude disproportionately high assessments in the late stages of
development.
Thus, for all these reasons, we conclude the trial court erred in granting
defendants’ motions for summary adjudication of the declaratory relief cause of action.
III
Motions for Summary Judgment
After granting summary adjudication of the first cause of action, the trial court
granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the ground that the remaining
claims were time-barred. The trial court ruled that because Getz was challenging the
HOA’s determination that Exhibit D to the CC&R’s cap and subsidy arrangement had
been extinguished, the trigger for the statute of limitations was the date in the early

22
2000’s when the HOA disclosed that determination to the affected Property Owners. As
a result, the court held that Getz’s lawsuit was untimely, having been filed more than ten
years after the HOA gave notice to the affected Owners.
On appeal, Getz challenges the grant of summary judgment. He argues that the
trial court erred in determining that a single limitations period should apply, running from
the date that the HOA gave notice of its determination. Relying on the continuous
accrual doctrine, Getz argues that each wrongful assessment constitutes its own separate
breach of the CC&R’s. Thus, he contends his complaint is timely as to those breaches
occurring within the applicable four-year limitations period (under § 337). Again, we
agree with Getz.
“ ‘Critical to applying a statute of limitations is determining the point when the
limitations period begins to run,’ ” i.e., when the cause of action accrues. (Nguyen v.
Western Digital Corp. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1538.) Generally, “ ‘[a] cause of
action accrues “when [it] is complete with all of its elements’—those elements being
wrongdoing, harm, and causation.’ ” (Ibid.) In other words, a cause of action accrues
upon the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action. (Howard Jarvis
Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra (2001) 25 Cal.4th 809, 815.)
However, there are several recognized exceptions to the general rule regarding
accrual of a cause of action, among them, the continuous accrual doctrine. (Gilkyson v.
Disney Enterprises, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1341.) Under the continuous
accrual doctrine, when an obligation or liability arises on a recurring basis, a cause of
action accrues each time the wrongful act occurs, triggering a new limitations period.
(Ibid.) Because each breach of the recurring obligation provides all the elements of a
claim—wrongdoing, harm, and causation—each may be treated as independently
actionable. (Ibid.) The effect of applying the doctrine is that “ ‘a suit for relief may be
partially time-barred as to older events but timely as to those [acts of wrongdoing
occurring] within the applicable limitations period.’ ” (Ibid.; see § 1047.) To determine

23
whether the continuous accrual doctrine applies, we look not to the claim’s label but to
the nature of the obligation allegedly breached. (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc.
(2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1200.)
The obligation at issue here concerns the Common Assessments levied against
Owners of Lots and Parcels within the Property. Such assessments are levied annually,
based in part on the projected budget for the upcoming fiscal year, subject to the
requirements of the CC&R’s. The operative complaint alleges that defendants breached
the CC&R’s (and that the HOA violated its fiduciary duties) by charging Owners of
developed Property annual assessments in excess of the CPI Rate and failing to
adequately charge assessments to Owners of undeveloped Property. The complaint also
alleges that the breaches are “continuing and ongoing,” which served as the foundation
for Getz’s cause of action for declaratory relief. (See Cordoba Corporation v. City of
Industry, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 157; Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2019)
39 Cal.App.5th 280, 295.)
We are persuaded that the continuous accrual doctrine applies to such allegations.
The continuing nature of the obligation to levy “annual Common Assessments” in
accordance with the CC&R’s renders each breach of that obligation separately actionable.
(Baxter v. State Teachers’ Retirement System (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 340, 378-382;
Gilkyson v. Disney Enterprises, Inc., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1346; Aryeh v. Canon
Business Solutions, Inc., supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 1200-1201; Howard Jarvis Taxpayers
Assn. v. City of La Habra, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 819-825.)
The cases on which defendants rely are distinguishable because they involve one-
time violations—denial of the right to reinstatement, to receive a pension, to
reclassification, or to reimbursement—whereas this action alleges recurring violations of
annual assessment obligations. (See Dillon v. Board of Pension Comrs. (1941) 18 Cal.2d
427 [right to pension]; Carrick v. San Francisco (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 402 [right to
reclassification for pension]; County of San Diego v. Myers (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 417

24
[right to Medi-Cal reimbursement]; Mezey v. State of California et al., (1984)
161 Cal.App.3d 1060 [right to reinstatement of employment]; see also Howard Jarvis
Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 822-823 [distinguishing
Dillon and Myers]; Baxter v. State Teachers’ Retirement System, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th
at p. 381 [distinguishing Dillon, Myers, and Carrick].)
The result is that we agree that the trial court erred in refusing to apply the
continuous accrual doctrine. While portions of Getz’s action may be time-barred, his
action is timely as to those breaches occurring within the four-year limitations period
preceding the filing of his lawsuit.
Because we determine the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the
ground that the claims were time-barred, we need not address the parties’ arguments
concerning the discovery rule, equitable tolling, or equitable estoppel.

25
DISPOSITION
The summary judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to
(1) deny defendants’ motions for summary adjudication of the first cause of action for
declaratory relief; (2) rule on the merits of Getz’s motion for summary adjudication on
the issue of whether the HOA had a duty to demand that Serrano Associates pay its “fair
share of the costs for maintaining improvements to public property,” and (3) conduct
further proceedings as are appropriate and not inconsistent with this opinion. Plaintiff
Getz shall recover his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)

\s\
Krause, J.

We concur:

\s\
Mauro, Acting P. J.

\s\
Feinberg, J.

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