People v. Schmitt CA1/5

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Filed 4/28/26 P. v. Schmitt CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for pur-
poses of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. A174711
BRIAN DOUGLAS SCHMITT, SR., (Sonoma County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. SCR7562591)

In 2024, Brian Douglas Schmitt, Sr., was convicted of
molesting an eight-year-old girl and sentenced to a prison term of
30 years to life. About 18 months after he was sentenced,
Schmitt was diagnosed with terminal cancer. He now appeals
from the trial court’s order denying the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation’s request for compassionate
release (Pen. Code, § 1172.2).1 Schmitt argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by finding that he posed an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety, which overcame the presumption
in favor of his release. (See id., subd. (b).) We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In March 2024, Schmitt was sentenced to 30 years to life in
prison for his convictions for sexual penetration of a child under
10 (counts one and three; § 288.7, subd. (b)) and committing a

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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lewd act on a child under 14 (counts two and four; § 288, subd.
(a)). We affirmed the judgment. (People v. Schmitt (June 23,
2025, A170547) [nonpub. opn.].)

In September 2025, the Department’s Health Care Services
Director sent a letter to the trial court recommending that it
recall and resentence Schmitt, under the compassionate release
provisions (§ 1172.2), based on Schmitt’s terminal cancer
diagnosis. In its recommendation, the Director explained that
Schmitt has advanced and incurable leiomyosarcoma—a rare and
aggressive cancer that develops within smooth muscle—and that
Schmitt had decided to forgo treatment. Schmitt’s oncologist
predicted he had a life expectancy of less than one year.

The Department’s letter also notes that Schmitt’s tumor is
growing in the vena cava of his heart, which interferes with blood
return. His cancer has also metastasized to his liver.
Accordingly, Schmitt “requires a walker to ambulate due to pain
and severe fatigue” but “is able to complete activities of daily
living . . . such as feeding, bathing, dressing and toileting;
however, this will change as this disease progresses.” The
Director noted that Schmitt was 79 years old and was then living
in the general population at California Medical Facility, but was
growing weaker every day.

The accompanying diagnostic study and evaluation report
indicated Schmitt was at “[c]lose [c]ustody” placement level—due
to his lengthy sentence—but that he had no disciplinary record
and his static risk assessment score was very low (one).
Schmitt’s adult son was willing and able to care for Schmitt and
provide independent housing for him, in Arizona, if Schmitt was
released. Schmitt’s son said that “[h]e and his family would . . .
support, care for and visit with . . . Schmitt as needed” and
provide necessary nursing or hospice care.

Additional documentation described Schmitt’s commitment
offenses. Schmitt’s former girlfriend, Janice, is the victim Jane
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Doe’s paternal grandmother. At the time of the crimes, Schmitt
lived with Janice. Doe regularly spent time with Schmitt at
Janice’s house. In July 2022, Doe told her maternal grandmother
that Schmitt had molested her. The following month, when she
was nine years old, Doe told a forensic interviewer that one day,
when she was in the middle of watching a movie with Schmitt at
Janice’s house, Schmitt digitally penetrated her vagina and anus
while she was sitting in Schmitt’s lap and wearing pajama shorts.
Police later obtained a laptop Schmitt left at Janice’s house,
where they found sexually explicit images of children engaged in
sexual conduct.

The trial court appointed counsel for Schmitt and
conducted a hearing to consider whether to recall Schmitt’s
sentence (§ 1172.2, subd. (c)). The People opposed the request on
the basis that Schmitt posed an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety (§ 1172.2, subd. (b)) due to the nature of his crimes
and his remaining physical capabilities. The same judge who
presided over Schmitt’s trial and originally sentenced him, in
2024, presided over the section 1172.2 hearing.

After hearing argument, the trial court denied the request
for recall, finding that Schmitt posed an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety. The court explicitly recognized that a
presumption in favor of recall and resentencing applied due to
Schmitt’s terminal cancer (§ 1172.2, subd. (b)(1)), but explained,
“I’m convinced based on the evidence that was presented in the
trial, the presentence report prior to sentencing, [that] . . . while
his end of life is near, this is the type of crime he can commit if he
can move and if his hands can move. It is not the type of crime
where there’s some type of extreme exertion.” The court
continued, “[H]is physical condition is still there to give him the
ability to commit a super strike.”

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DISCUSSION
Schmitt contends the trial court abused its discretion by
finding his release would present an unreasonable risk of danger
to public safety. (See People v. Lewis (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 401,
409 (Lewis) [standard of review].) We disagree.

1.

Section 1172.2 authorizes a trial court to recall the
sentence of an incarcerated person who has “a serious and
advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory” and has not been
sentenced to either death or life without parole. (§ 1172.2, subds.
(b)(1), (o); Lewis, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 403.) Section
1172.2, subdivision (b) further provides that—if the trial court
determines an incarcerated person has such a qualifying illness—
a presumption favoring recall and resentencing arises, which
may only be overcome if the trial court finds the individual is an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety based on the person’s
current physical and mental condition. An unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety is defined as an unreasonable risk that
the incarcerated person will commit a “super strike,” which
includes the offense of committing a lewd and lascivious act on a
child under age 14. (§§ 1172.2, subd. (b), 1170.18, subd. (c), 667,
subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(III); Lewis, at p. 403; Nijmeddin v. Superior
Court (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 77, 83 (Nijmeddin).)

One of the primary intents of section 1172.2’s
compassionate release provisions is “to save the prison system
money” by avoiding high healthcare costs for terminally ill or
elderly inmates. (People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1160.)
Thus, in making a finding that the presumption in favor of recall
is overcome, it is not enough for the court to express only “a
generalized concern” about an incarcerated person’s “ ‘ability to
continue to commit crimes.’ ” (Nijmeddin, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th
at p. 83.)

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“The abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential.”
(People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298.) “ ‘A trial
court abuses its discretion when the factual findings critical to its
decision find no support in the evidence’ ” (Lewis, supra, 101
Cal.App.5th at p. 409), or “when the trial court . . . is unaware of
its discretion, fails to consider a relevant factor that deserves
significant weight, gives significant weight to an irrelevant or
impermissible factor, or makes a decision so arbitrary or
irrational that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (In re
White (2020) 9 Cal.5th 455, 470 [bail decision].)

2.

There is no dispute that—because Schmitt has a qualifying
illness with an end-of-life trajectory—a presumption in favor of
recall and resentencing arose. (See § 1172.2, subd. (b)(1).)
However, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that presumption was overcome by the unreasonable danger
Schmitt’s release would pose to public safety.

True, an incarcerated person’s mere capacity or ability to
commit a super strike offense “has no tendency to prove” by
itself—untethered to an individual’s circumstances—an
unreasonable risk that the incarcerated person will commit such
an offense. (Lewis, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 409.) But, in
Lewis, an incarcerated person was denied compassionate release
because the trial court feared the person could solicit or direct
another person to commit a crime even though there was no
evidence that person had ever done so previously. (Id. at pp. 409-
411.)

Here, in contrast, the trial court relied on more than
Schmitt’s remaining physical capacity to commit crimes. The
trial court considered that Schmitt had very recently committed
super strikes (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(III)), which did not require
force or unusual physical strength due to his young victim’s
vulnerability and Schmitt’s abuse of the victim’s trust. The
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pornography found on Schmitt’s computer also demonstrated he
had more than a fleeting interest in sex with very young girls.
The trial court also considered Schmitt’s current physical and
mental condition. Schmitt was not incapacitated by his terminal
illness; he was still able to walk (with the assistance of a walker)
and able to feed, bathe, and dress himself. And unlike other aged
prisoners who committed their crimes decades before they
became ill, perhaps making it less probable they would reoffend,
Schmitt was convicted of child molestation just 18 months before
he became eligible for compassionate relief.

It was appropriate for the trial court to consider Schmitt’s
criminal conviction history and his current physical condition.
(See §§ 1170.18, subds. (b)(1)-(3) [in determining “unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety,” court may consider criminal
conviction history, disciplinary and rehabilitation record, and any
other relevant evidence], 1172.2, subd. (b); see Nijmeddin, supra,
90 Cal.App.5th at p. 83 [“presumption can be overcome only by
evidence that, based on [their] current physical and mental
condition, [the incarcerated person] poses an unreasonable risk of
committing a ‘super strike’ offense”]; People v. Jefferson (2016) 1
Cal.App.5th 235, 242.)

Schmitt effectively asks us to reweigh the evidence of his
dangerousness, which is impermissible. (See People v. JTH Tax,
Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1250, [“under an abuse of
discretion standard [citation] . . . ‘[w]e do not reweigh the
evidence or substitute our notions of fairness for the trial court’s’
”].) The trial court’s finding—that Schmitt posed an
unreasonable risk of committing a lewd act on a child under the
age of 14 were he to be granted compassionate release—is
supported by substantial evidence. The presumption in favor of
recall was thereby overcome and the trial court did not exceed the
bounds of reason in denying the request for compassionate
release.

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DISPOSITION
The October 21, 2025 order denying compassionate release,
under section 1172.2, is affirmed.

BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P.J.
CHOU, J.

People v. Schmitt (A174711)

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