People v. Gallardo CA4/1

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Filed 4/28/26 P. v. Gallardo CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D087442

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF2101993)

WILFRED GALLARDO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Charles G. Rogers, Judge. (Retired Judge of the San Diego Super. Ct.
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
Affirmed.
Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Steve Oetting and Daniel J. Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Wilfred Gallardo appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of
multiple sex crimes committed against a minor. The sole issue he raises on
appeal is that the trial court erred by giving a modified version of the current
CALCRIM No. 1193 on the use of expert testimony concerning child sexual
abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). Finding no reversible error, we
affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Incidents Preceding May 2021
E.A. was born in January 2011. She was 13 years old at the time of
her trial testimony. E.A.’s mother started dating Gallardo when E.A. was
around eight years old. Within months, Gallardo moved into a one-bedroom
apartment with E.A. and her mother. E.A. slept in the bedroom and her
mother and Gallardo slept in the living room.
According to E.A., Gallardo began touching her lewdly shortly after
they all began living together and continued molesting her for over a year
thereafter. The molestations occurred when her mother was asleep or not at
home. Gallardo touched, grabbed, and rubbed E.A.’s vagina, anus, breasts,
back, and stomach. He touched her “any time he got a chance to.” Gallardo
touched E.A. over and under her clothes and sometimes after removing her
clothes. He touched her vagina more than 10 times. He put his fingers
inside her anus and caused her pain, usually while lying behind her. He also
touched E.A. with his penis, including rubbing his penis on her buttocks.
E.A. initially testified that Gallardo never tried to insert his penis into
her anus. She later testified that during a period when her mother was gone
for a week or two, Gallardo did put a small part of his penis inside her anus.

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Gallardo told E.A. he would hurt her and her mother if she said
anything. E.A. kept quiet and never told Gallardo to stop because she was
afraid of his threats.
In 2019, E.A.’s mother was arrested and pled guilty to assaulting
Gallardo by throwing nail polish at him. When interviewed by child
protective services after the 2019 assault, E.A. said Gallardo had never hurt
or abused her. E.A.’s mother and Gallardo reconciled and continued living
together after this incident.
B. Incident of May 2021
One night in May 2021, when E.A. was 10 years old, E.A. and Gallardo
were sleeping in E.A.’s bedroom because E.A.’s grandfather was spending
the night and sleeping in the living room. When E.A.’s mother awoke, she
noticed the bed was shaking. She saw Gallardo sitting on the side of the bed
touching E.A.’s vagina and masturbating. E.A. looked terrified. E.A. recalled
the incident differently. According to E.A., Gallardo was rubbing his penis on
her ankle when her mother awoke.
E.A.’s mother immediately removed her from the room and took her
outside. She began questioning E.A. E.A. told her Gallardo had been
touching her for a long time. She said it had started after they all moved in
together, and she had not said anything because she was worried, scared, and
felt threatened. E.A. did not initially disclose all the details to her mother.
When E.A.’s mother confronted Gallardo, he said, “You act like your daughter
has never had sex before.”
E.A.’s grandfather called 911. When law enforcement arrived, E.A. did
not want to talk about the abuse. She underwent a medical examination and
had her external genitalia swabbed for DNA. Gallardo’s DNA was present on
the swab. There was no way to determine how Gallardo’s DNA got there, and

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it could have been transferred through clothing, bedding, or some other
household item. No injuries were discovered in E.A.’s medical examination.
In a forensic interview, E.A. made some statements that were
inconsistent with her trial testimony, including that Gallardo had only
touched the outside of her anus. She also did not mention anything about
threats during the interview. She told the interviewer she had “a gut feeling”
that Gallardo would do something bad to her if she said anything.
E.A. became closed off and depressed after the abuse came to light.
C. CSAAS Evidence and Related Instructions and Argument
Before trial, the prosecution filed a motion in limine seeking to admit
“[e]xpert testimony about child molestation victims as a class to dispel myths
and misconceptions about child molestation victims and to restore the
victim’s credibility.” The moving papers identified the specific myths and
misconceptions the prosecution intended to dispel, which included the
following: (1) that a molestation did not occur if the victim did not disclose
immediately, (2) that a molestation did not occur if the victim did not
remember specifics regarding dates and times, and (3) that only some of the
acts of molestation occurred if the victim disclosed gradually over time. The
prosecution also noted that the expert would not be offering any “syndrome”
evidence, would not give an opinion that the alleged molestation in fact
occurred, and would not vouch for the credibility of the victim.
The defense opposed the admission of this evidence on the ground that
it risked confusing and prejudicing the jury.
The trial court granted the People’s motion to admit the CSAAS
testimony to dispel common misunderstandings and beliefs about how
victims of child molestation behave. The court stated it intended to give a
limiting instruction to the jury on this evidence and invited both sides to

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propose a limiting instruction or a modification of the standard CALCRIM
instruction on CSAAS evidence.
The prosecution called Dr. Martha Rogers as its CSAAS expert,
although neither she nor the prosecutor used the word “syndrome” or the
phrase “child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome” during her testimony.
Dr. Rogers testified that she did not know anything about the facts of this
case. She told the jury she was merely providing general information about
victims of child abuse as a class that “may” or “may not” be relevant to this
specific case, and she was “not here to taint or throw the case, if you will, for
either side.”
According to Dr. Rogers, the vast majority of abuse cases involve a
perpetrator whom the victim knows, such as a family member, neighbor,
babysitter, coach, or teacher. Younger children may not be aware that what
is happening to them is abuse, and they may consider it just part of their
home life. When they grow older and begin to understand, their emotional
reactions vary. Some children withdraw, others act out, and others avoid
thinking about what is happening.
Most children delay disclosing such abuse and many do not disclose
until they are adults. They may be fearful, confused, ashamed, or upset, and
they may worry about upsetting the family. They may also have experienced
overt or implicit threats that bad things will happen if they disclose.
When children do disclose, their initial disclosures may be incomplete
or limited in detail, especially if they are younger. If the abuse occurred
repeatedly over a period of time, the events can become blurred in the child’s
memory, making it difficult to recall specific details of a single incident.
Moreover, the trauma of the abuse itself can result in changes in the memory
process, particularly if the abuse occurred repeatedly. The child may adapt

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to the situation by trying not to think about it or talk about it, which could
affect their memory of the details.
On cross-examination, Dr. Rogers confirmed that her testimony could
“[a]bsolutely not” be used to determine whether abuse actually occurred in
this case. Defense counsel asked, “So, Doctor, your testimony today provides
very helpful context and understanding to these general behaviors, but just
for the jury, nothing you say can prove whether the prosecution’s allegations
are true or correct?” Dr. Rogers responded by telling the jury, “That’s your
job, and you’re perfectly capable of doing it.”
Dr. Rogers testified on cross-examination that delayed disclosure and
inconsistent statements also occur when children have not been abused.
Inconsistent statements can be caused by confusion or pressure, especially for
younger children. Children can also make mistaken or fabricated allegations
of abuse. Younger children can be susceptible to suggestibility or leading
questions or indoctrination. If the major details of a child’s story changes
over time, it could be a result of suggestive questioning by the parent.
Children can be influenced by the emotions and reactions of the adults
around them, such as their parents. If a parent is upset or angry, the child
might feel pressured to say something to please the parent. If a mother
repeatedly questions her daughter about being touched, it can influence the
child’s responses, especially if they are younger.
Immediately after Dr. Rogers testified, the court on its own initiative
instructed the jury as follows:
“Folks, you’ll get an instruction that helps you evaluate
this testimony, and [the] purpose of Dr. Rogers’ testimony
when we get into the jury instructions. For now, let me say
that her testimony is provided for you to help give you some
factors that may help you evaluate (Jane Doe E.A.)’s

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credibility, it is not evidence that Mr. Gallardo committed
any crimes charged in this case. Don’t consider it as some
kind of profiling evidence against him. Moreover, I should
add, Dr. Rogers is not directly vouching for (Jane Doe
E.A.)’s credibility. Instead she’s trying to identify factors
that may help you evaluate the weight to give (Jane Doe
E.A.)’s testimony.

“The law in regards to this kind of testimony, identifying
and dispelling common misconceptions or myths that we
might hold, for example, if it might be a case that we would
think a child would certainly remember details of bad acts
done to them or a child would not keep this to themselves
but disclose it or a child would never try to forget or
suppress that kind of evidence. Again, what she’s trying to
do is explain to you how those factors may or may not play
in so that you can evaluate (Jane Doe E.A.)’s testimony.
Please apply her testimony only to evaluate (Jane Doe
E.A.)’s credibility, not as direct evidence of Mr. Gallardo’s
guilt.”

During the conference on jury instructions, the trial court noted that
the prosecutor and defense counsel had collaborated on a modified version
of CALCRIM No. 1193 to give to the jury with respect to Dr. Rogers’s

testimony.1 Both counsel confirmed that this instruction was acceptable to

1 The unmodified current version of CALCRIM No. 1193 reads as follows:
“You have heard testimony from ____ <insert name of expert> regarding child
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. [¶] Child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome relates to a pattern of behavior that may be
present in child sexual abuse cases. Testimony as to the accommodation
syndrome is offered only to explain certain behavior of an alleged victim of
child sexual abuse. [¶] ____’s <insert name of expert> testimony about child
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is not evidence that the defendant
committed any of the crimes charged against (him/her) [or any conduct or
crime[s] with which (he/she) was not charged]. [¶] You may consider this
evidence only in deciding whether or not ____ ’s <insert name of alleged
victim of abuse> conduct was consistent with the conduct of someone who has
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the parties. As modified, this instruction eliminated from CALCRIM No.
1193 any reference to the word “syndrome” or the phrase “child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome.” The trial court instructed the jury with this
modified version of CALCRIM No. 1193 as follows:
“Testimony by Dr. Rogers is offered and may be considered
by you only for the purpose of understanding and
explaining the behavior of Jane Doe (E.A.) in this case and
not as proof that the molestation occurred as to Jane Doe
(E.A.) [¶] Dr. Rogers’s testimony about the behavior of
alleged victims of child molestation is not evidence that the
defendant committed any of the crimes charged against
him. [¶] You may consider this evidence only in deciding
whether or not Jane Doe (E.A.)’s conduct was consistent
with the conduct of someone who has been molested, and in
evaluating the believability of her testimony.”

In discussing Dr. Rogers’s testimony in closing argument, the
prosecutor told the jury: “She’s not diagnosing anybody in this case or making
an opinion on the case, that’s your job.” In defense counsel’s closing
argument, he relied on Dr. Rogers’s testimony that children are vulnerable to
suggestibility, influence, and false memories. Neither attorney referred to
CALCRIM No. 1193 in closing argument.
D. Verdict and Sentence
In a jury trial, the jury convicted Gallardo of one count of sodomy with

a child ten years of age or younger (Pen. Code,2 § 288.7, subd. (a)), seven
counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd.
(a)), and two counts of lewd and lascivious acts by force or fear on a child
under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (b)). The court sentenced Gallardo to a

been molested, and in evaluating the believability of the alleged victim.”

2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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determinate term of 34 years plus an indeterminate term of 25 years to life
in state prison.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Gallardo does not challenge the admissibility of Dr. Rogers’s
CSAAS testimony. However, he contends the court committed reversible
error by giving the last sentence of CALCRIM No. 1193 as follows: “You may
consider [Dr. Rogers’s testimony] only in deciding whether or not Jane Doe
(E.A.)’s conduct was consistent with the conduct of someone who has been
molested, and in evaluating the believability of her testimony.” (Italics
added.) Gallardo asserts that the phrase “consistent with” in the current
version of CALCRIM No. 1193—which replaced the phrase “not inconsistent
with” in the prior version—improperly allowed the jury to use the CSAAS
testimony as profile evidence to identify E.A. as a victim of child abuse. He
also claims that this error violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair

trial by creating an impermissible inference of guilt.3
A divided panel of this court recently rejected this same challenge to
the current version of CALCRIM No. 1193. (See People v. Page (2025) 114
Cal.App.5th 1022, 1030–1031 (Page) [finding no error in “consistent with”
language because it is synonymous with “not inconsistent with”]; but see id.
at pp. 1035–1036 (conc. opn. of Kelety, J.) [concluding that although the
distinction “may be subtle,” the “consistent with” language could be

3 As noted, Gallardo’s counsel agreed to the version of CALCRIM
No. 1193 given at trial, including the “consistent with” language. On appeal,
he argues that if his claim of error was forfeited, his counsel was ineffective
in failing to object to this language. We exercise our discretion to overlook
any forfeiture and decide the issue on the merits. Accordingly, we do not
address Gallardo’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

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misunderstood “to mean that . . . the abuse in fact occurred” but finding any
such error harmless when considered with “the other instructions given to
the jury”].) The People urge us to follow the majority opinion in Page.
Gallardo contends Page was wrongly decided and argues we should follow
the concurring opinion.
Although one member of this panel authored the concurring opinion
in Page, we need not weigh in on this debate as a panel because we conclude
there is no reasonable possibility the jury could have been misled when
considering the totality of the record before us, including the CSAAS
testimony given by Dr. Rogers, the other admonitions and instructions to
the jury, and the closing arguments. As we explain below, there was no
instructional error when considering the record as a whole, and even if there
were, it would be harmless under either the Watson standard of prejudice for
state-law errors (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836–837) or the
Chapman standard for federal constitutional errors (Chapman v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24).
“[I]t has long been held that in a judicial proceeding presenting the
question whether a child has been sexually molested, CSAAS is admissible
evidence for the limited purpose of disabusing the fact finder of common
misconceptions it might have about how child victims react to sexual abuse.”
(In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 418.) Expert testimony on the
common reactions of child molestation victims is not admissible to prove
that the complaining witness has in fact been sexually abused but may
be admitted in appropriate cases to disabuse jurors of commonly held
misconceptions about child abuse. (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289,
1300–1301.)

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As this court has emphasized, CSAAS evidence may not be used “as a
predictor of child abuse.” (People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 393
(Bowker).) “It is one thing to say that child abuse victims often exhibit a
certain characteristic or that a particular behavior is not inconsistent with a
child having been molested. It is quite another to conclude that where a child
meets certain criteria, we can predict with a reasonable degree of certainty
that he or she has been abused. The former may be appropriate in some
circumstances; the latter . . . clearly is not.” (Ibid., italics added.) “The
evidence is admissible solely for the purpose of showing that the victim’s
reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having
been molested.” (Id. at p. 394.)
When the prosecution presents CSAAS testimony at trial, the
defendant is entitled to a limiting instruction stating that “(1) such evidence
is admissible solely for the purpose of showing the victim’s reactions as
demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having been
molested; and (2) the expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be
used to determine whether the victim’s molestation claim is true.” (People v.
Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 959 (Housley), italics added.) Although
Housley held that such a limiting instruction must be given sua sponte,
another court has disagreed and ruled it need only be given upon request.
(People v. Mateo (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1071–1074.)
CALCRIM No. 1193 is the standard jury instruction used to inform the
jury of these principles. Before 2022, CALCRIM No. 1193 used the “not
inconsistent with” language of Bowker and Housley by stating that the jury
may consider CSAAS testimony “only in deciding whether or not [the alleged
victim]’s conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone who has
been molested, and in evaluating the believability of (his/her) testimony.”

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(Italics added.) In 2022, however, the Judicial Council modified this
instruction in response to two unpublished Court of Appeal cases which
“addressed a challenge that this instruction is potentially misleading because
it contains the instructional phrase ‘was not inconsistent with’ and does not
otherwise adequately state the permissible use of this type of expert
testimony.” (Judicial Council of Cal., Advisory Com. on Criminal Jury
Instructions Rep., Jury Instructions: Criminal Jury Instructions (Sept. 20,
2022) p. 4.) As modified in 2022, “[t]he double negative was removed and
replaced with the ‘consistent with’ phrasing that is in the current version,
and the second paragraph stating that CSAAS evidence ‘is offered only to
explain certain behavior of an alleged victim of child abuse’ was added ‘to
clarify the distinction between the proper and improper use of the evidence.’ ”
(Page, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 1031.)
We need not determine whether the “consistent with” language of
revised CALCRIM No. 1193 is erroneous or misleading when considered
in isolation. In assessing a claim of instructional error, we must look to
the instructions as a whole and the entire record of trial, including the
arguments of counsel. (People v. Mason (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 818, 825.)
We must also review the instructions as a whole and the entire record in
determining prejudice. (See, e.g., People v. Barrett (2025) 17 Cal.5th 897,
993.) Based on our review of the entire record, we conclude there is no
reasonable possibility the jury would have understood the instructions to
mean it was permitted to use the CSAAS testimony as profile evidence to
draw a conclusion that E.A. must have suffered abuse.
Dr. Rogers herself emphasized that she knew nothing about the facts
of this case and her testimony could not be used to determine whether the
alleged abuse occurred or the prosecution’s allegations were true. She also

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testified that the CSAAS characteristics she was testifying about, such as
delayed disclosure and inconsistent statements, occur when children have
not been abused as well. Thus, the jury was made aware that these
characteristics cannot be used as a diagnosis of abuse. (See Bowker, supra,
203 Cal.App.3d at p. 393 [noting that the danger of CSAAS testimony being
used to draw predictive conclusions is present when the jury is not aware
that this behavior “is also found in significant numbers of children who have
not been molested”].) Dr. Rogers also never used the word “syndrome” in
her testimony. (See id. at p. 392, fn. 8 [suggesting that use of the word
“syndrome” “assumes the child is a ‘legitimate victim’ of sexual abuse” and
is “neither relevant nor necessary” to rebut common misconceptions].) Nor
did she otherwise state or imply that she was describing symptoms for
diagnosing a victim of child sexual abuse. Nothing in her testimony
suggested that her opinions could be used to profile E.A. as a victim of
sexual abuse or determine that the charged abuse actually occurred.
More to the point, the trial court made clear to the jury that the
evidence could not be used for such a purpose. Immediately following
Dr. Rogers’s testimony, the court told the jurors it was “not evidence that
Mr. Gallardo committed any crimes charged in this case” and instructed
them: “Don’t consider it as some kind of profiling evidence against him.”
(Italics added.) We cannot imagine a more direct admonition not to use the
CSAAS testimony as profile evidence. Absent any contrary indication in the
record, we must presume the jury followed this limiting instruction. (People
v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 725.)
As part of the same admonition, the court also emphasized to the jury
that Dr. Rogers was merely identifying “common misconceptions or myths”
about how victims of child abuse behave. The court told the jury it could

13
consider this evidence in evaluating E.A.’s credibility but “not as direct
evidence of Mr. Gallardo’s guilt.” In several different ways, therefore, the
court’s admonition immediately following Dr. Rogers’s testimony informed
the jury it could not use this evidence to conclude that Gallardo was guilty
because E.A. fit the “profile” of a child abuse victim.
The first two sentences of CALCRIM No. 1193 as given to the jury at
the end of trial further reinforced this point. They stated: “Testimony by
Dr. Rogers is offered and may be considered by you only for the purpose of
understanding and explaining the behavior of Jane Doe (E.A.) in this case
and not as proof that the molestation occurred as to Jane Doe (E.A.) [¶]
Dr. Rogers’s testimony about the behavior of alleged victims of child
molestation is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes
charged against him.” (Italics added.) By telling the jury that Dr. Rogers’s
testimony could not be considered “as proof that the molestation occurred,”
the court once again precluded the jury from using it as profile evidence to
prove that the molestations occurred. Moreover, the modified version of
CALCRIM No. 1193 given by the court also eliminated the potentially
misleading use of the word “syndrome” and the phrase “child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome.”
The prosecutor also drove the point home in closing argument to
the jury. The prosecutor did not mention or rely on the “consistent with”
language of CALCRIM No. 1193 in his argument, nor did he suggest that
Dr. Rogers’s testimony could be used as evidence that E.A. fit the profile of a
child abuse victim. On the contrary, the prosecutor argued that “every kid
has different reactions.” He also reminded the jury that Dr. Rogers had
never met E.A. or read any of the reports in this case and was only providing
information about “victims of child molestation as a class.” (Italics added.)

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The prosecutor emphasized: “She’s not diagnosing anybody in this case or
making an opinion on the case, that’s your job.” These remarks further
underscored that Dr. Rogers was not profiling E.A. as a victim of child abuse
or expressing an opinion as to the truth of the charges or Gallardo’s guilt.
In sum, considering the totality of the record, including Dr. Rogers’s
testimony, the trial court’s lengthy admonition immediately following her
testimony, the prosecutor’s closing argument, and the rest of CALCRIM
No. 1193 as given to the jury, we conclude there is no reasonable possibility
the jury was misled into believing it could use the CSAAS testimony as
profile or diagnostic evidence to prove E.A. had in fact been molested. We
therefore reject Gallardo’s related argument that the jury instructions
created an impermissible inference of guilt in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Accordingly, we conclude there was no instructional error, or
alternatively, even assuming any error in the “consistent with” portion of the
instruction, it would be harmless under either the Watson standard or the
Chapman standard.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

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