Fox Hills Canterbury Co. v. City of Culver City CA2/4

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Filed 4/23/26 Fox Hills Canterbury Co. v. City of Culver City CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

FOX HILLS CANTERBURY B342302
COMPANY,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 24STCP00451)

v.

CITY OF CULVER CITY,

Defendant and Respondent;

MEADOWS FORWARD ACTION
COMMITTEE,

Intervener and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, James C. Chalfant, Judge. Affirmed.
Hill, Farrer & Burrill, Kevin H. Brogan and Dean E.
Dennis, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Heather Baker, City Attorney, Christina Burrows,
Assistant City Attorney, Michael Cobden, Deputy City Attorney,
for Defendant and Respondent.
Munger, Tolles & Olson and Michael E. Soloff for
Intervener and Respondent.

______________________________________________

Appellant Fox Hills Canterbury Company (Fox Hills)
obtained building permits allowing it to renovate aging
apartment buildings in Culver City (the City). Before it
completed all of the renovations, the City enacted a tenant
protection ordinance requiring Fox Hills to return displaced
tenants to the rental units, after renovation, with the same rights
they had when displaced. A rent control ordinance would
regulate permissible increases in the tenants’ rent. Fox Hills
filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory
relief seeking an exemption from the tenant protection ordinance.
It also asserted that application of the ordinance constituted a
regulatory taking as it completely altered its investment backed
expectations. The trial court sustained demurrers by the City
and intervener Meadows Forward Action Committee (the
Committee) (collectively with the City, “respondents”) to Fox
Hills’s operative pleading. The court found that Fox Hills had no
vested right that would exempt it from the ordinance and that
the takings claim was not ripe because Fox Hills had not availed
itself of available City procedures for relief. We affirm.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The City’s Tenant Protection and Rent Control Laws
In September 2020, the City adopted its Tenant Protection
Ordinance (TPO) and Rent Control Ordinance (RCO).
As relevant to this case, the TPO states that a landlord
may not terminate a tenancy unless the landlord can
demonstrate the termination qualifies as a for-cause or no-fault
termination as defined in the TPO. (Culver City Municipal Code
(CCMC) § 15.09.310(B)(2).) Temporary “untenantable
conditions”1 resulting from “[s]ubstantial rehabilitation” work
that requires a permit from a government agency are not a valid
basis for a no-fault termination. (Id. at § 15.09.330(C)(1).) If the
substantial rehabilitation makes the rental unit untenantable,
the landlord must provide the tenant with relocation benefits
during the displacement period. The tenant remains responsible
for paying rent and has the right to reoccupy his or her unit upon
completion of the work with the same rights “that existed prior to
the displacement.” (Id. at § 15.09.330(E).) The TPO does not
have any provisions permitting landlords to apply for and receive
exemptions.
The RCO applies to apartment buildings that obtained a
certificate of occupancy prior to February 1995. (CCMC
§ 15.09.210(A).) The ordinance allows landlords of covered rental
units to increase rent annually in an amount not to exceed the
percentage change in the Consumer Price Index, with a cap of
five percent and a floor of two percent. (Id. at § 15.09.215(B).)

1 “Untenantable conditions include the conditions described in
Cal. Civil Code § 1941.1 and any other condition that makes the rental
unit incapable of being safely occupied.” (CCMC § 15.09.330(B).)

3
If a landlord contends that the limitations on rent increases
will prevent the landlord from receiving “a fair and reasonable
return with respect to the operation of the property,” and the
landlord desires to increase rent in an amount greater than
allowed under the RCO, the landlord may file a rent adjustment
application with the Housing Division of the Culver City
Community Development Department. (CCMC § 15.09.220(A).)
Rent adjustment applications are considered in accordance with
Housing Division guidelines. (Id. at § 15.09.220(E).) The
Housing Division’s “Guideline/Rule No. 2021-RC02” for rent
adjustment applications, which has “the force and effect of law”
(id. at § 15.09.265), states that “[l]andlords may submit as part of
their Application capital improvement expenses that have not
been or are not eligible to be passed-through to tenants through
the City’s Capital Improvement Cost Recovery Pass-Through
program.”
The RCO capital improvement cost recovery pass-through
provision allows a landlord to pass-through 50 percent of eligible
capital improvements to a tenant, with no pass-through cost
allowed that exceeds three percent of the rent. (CCMC
§ 15.09.225.) Section 15.09.225(B) of the CCMC defines eligible
capital improvements.

B. Fox Hills’s First Amended Petition
Fox Hills’s operative first amended petition for writ of
mandate and complaint for declaratory relief and inverse
condemnation made the following allegations.
Fox Hills owns the Meadows Apartments located in the
City. The property consists of 24 separate multi-family
apartment buildings, each containing a number of separate

4
rental units. The property is divided into two areas known as
Meadows North and Meadows South. Fox Hills constructed the
apartments in 1974.
Due to the age of the buildings, the property has had
various plumbing leaks and sewer line issues. Costs associated
with the repairs have increased dramatically over the years. In
light of the expenses, in 2016, Fox Hills undertook a renovation
project to, among other things, remove and replace pipes, lines,
and infrastructure in the exterior and interior of the buildings.
To implement the project, Fox Hills obtained more than 100
building permits from the City from 2016 to 2019. Fox Hills
completed all exterior work for the Meadows Apartments by
August 2019. The next phase involved work inside the
apartment buildings and each unit. Fox Hills completed all work
for Meadows South in 2021. Fox Hills alleged it has expended
more than $19.7 million in reliance on the building permits.
The remaining work to be completed is for the interior of
the Meadows North buildings, which is authorized by the existing
building permits. The work will require substantial removal of
concrete slabs, sewer lines, drywall, fixtures, cabinets, flooring,
and appliances. The tenants in Meadows North will need to
vacate their units. All tenants will be under month-to-month
leases when the work commences.
After the TPO was enacted in September 2020, and
beginning in the fall of 2021, Fox Hills reached out to the mayor
and city council members about proceeding with the work for
Meadows North without having to comply with the ordinance. In
January 2023, the City advised Fox Hills that the city council
voted to have Fox Hills’s concern agendized for a future meeting.

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The City did not, however, ultimately notice or conduct a hearing
on Fox Hills’s request.
In September 2023, Fox Hills sent the City a letter seeking
an exemption from application of the TPO “based upon the vested
rights obtained through the issuance of building permits, work
completed[,] and the $19.7 million spent in reliance thereon.”
The City declined to formally respond to Fox Hills’s request.
Fox Hills’s first amended petition alleged three causes of
action. The first sought a writ of mandate requiring the City to
exempt Fox Hills from the TPO based on its alleged vested rights.
The second sought a declaration that the TPO was inapplicable to
Fox Hills’s property. The third cause of action for inverse
condemnation alleged the TPO, if enforced against Fox Hills,
constituted a taking of private property without payment of just
compensation for “the lost rent on the to-be-renovated
apartments, and additional expenditures.”

C. Respondents’ Demurrers and the Trial Court’s
Ruling
The City and Committee each demurred to the first
amended petition arguing it failed to state a claim. They argued
the only right granted by the building permits was to perform the
specified renovation work. The permits, they argued, did not give
Fox Hills any right to be exempt from the TPO. The City
additionally argued that Fox Hills’s takings claim was not ripe
for adjudication because Fox Hills had not presented any rent
adjustment application to the City, which was the proper
mechanism to account for any alleged losses arising from the
TPO and RCO. Fox Hills opposed the demurrers. It argued it
had a right to complete the project based on its economic

6
expectations when the permits were issued and that application
of the TPO constituted a regulatory taking because it altered Fox
Hills’s “investment backed expectations.”
The trial court took judicial notice of various documents
submitted by respondents, including the TPO, RCO, and several
permits issued to Fox Hills. The permits generally contain short,
specific descriptions of the work the City approved. For example,
they authorize plumbing work on “24 clothes washer standpipes,”
mechanical work on “24 single duct exhaust/fans,” and electrical
work on “48 branch circuits, 48 electrical devices, [and]
24 service/sub panel[s].”
The trial court, in relevant part, determined the mandamus
claim was not ripe because the City had taken no action to
enforce the TPO against Fox Hills. In any event, the court also
determined the permits did not confer a vested right to be free of
the subsequently enacted TPO. The court found the declaratory
relief claim was “subsumed” within the mandamus claim. As to
the regulatory takings claim, the court found it was not ripe
because Fox Hills had not availed itself of any of the procedures
contained in the RCO to account for any alleged rental losses
caused by the TPO and RCO. The court sustained the demurrers
as to all claims without leave to amend. Fox Hills timely
appealed from the order of dismissal.

DISCUSSION
A. Demurrer Standard of Review
We review an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to
amend de novo. (United Talent Agency v. Vigilant Ins. Co. (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 821, 829.) “‘We treat the demurrer as admitting
all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions,

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deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also
consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.]
Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation,
reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Blank v.
Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank).) When a demurrer is
sustained without leave to amend, “we decide whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by
amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion
and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and
we affirm.” (Ibid.)

B. Fox Hills Did Not have a Vested Right to be Exempt
from the TPO
Fox Hills’s primary contention on appeal is that, because it
expended substantial sums in reliance on the building permits
issued by the City, it had a vested right to operate the Meadows
Apartments, and complete the renovation project, free from any
obligations imposed by the TPO. It also contends that the trial
court erred in finding its vested rights challenge was not ripe.
Assuming that Fox Hills’s vested rights challenge was ripe, we
conclude Fox Hills did not establish a vested right to be exempt
from the TPO.
Under the vested rights doctrine, if a property owner
performs substantial work and incurs substantial liabilities in
good faith reliance on a building permit, the owner acquires
vested rights to complete the project in accordance with the terms
of the permit and to use the premises as the permit allows.
(South Lake Tahoe Property Owners Group v. City of South Lake
Tahoe (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 735, 747 (South Lake Tahoe); Blue
Chip Properties v. Permanent Rent Control Bd. (1985) 170

8
Cal.App.3d 648, 658–659 (Blue Chip).) “‘[T]he rights which may
“vest” through reliance on a government permit are no greater
than those specifically granted by the permit itself.’” (South Lake
Tahoe, at p. 749; Blue Chip, at p. 660.)
The vested rights doctrine is “‘“predicated upon estoppel of
the governing body.”’” (Russ Bldg. Partnership v. City and
County of San Francisco (1988) 44 Cal.3d 839, 853–854 (Russ).)
“‘[A]n equitable estoppel requiring the government to exempt a
land use from a subsequently imposed regulation must include
(1) a promise such as that implied by a building permit that the
proposed use will not be prohibited by a class of restrictions that
includes the regulation in question and (2) reasonable reliance on
the promise by the promisee to the promisee’s detriment.’” (Id. at
p. 854.) “[E]stoppel can be invoked in the land use context in only
‘the most extraordinary case where the injustice is great and the
precedent set by the estoppel is narrow.’” (Toigo v. Town of Ross
(1998) 70 Cal.App.4th 309, 321 (Toigo).)
Fox Hills’s first amended petition alleged that before the
TPO was enacted, Fox Hills obtained numerous building permits
for its renovation project at Meadows North and expended
substantial sums in reliance thereon. However, the rights that
vest through reliance on government permits are only those
rights specifically granted by the permits themselves. (South
Lake Tahoe, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 749; Blue Chip, supra,
170 Cal.App.3d at p. 660.) Fox Hills neither alleged nor
identified any permit under which it obtained the right to
complete the project without having to comply with subsequent
tenant protection laws. Indeed, Fox Hills remains free to
complete the renovation project as specified in the permits. The
permits thus did not give Fox Hills a vested right to be exempt

9
from the TPO. (See Blue Chip, at p. 662 [“approval of a tentative
tract map for condominium conversion does not lead to a vested
rights exemption from subsequent rent control laws”]; see also
Briarwood Properties, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles (1985) 171
Cal.App.3d 1020, 1030 (Briarwood) [while tentative map
approval assured right to complete condominium conversion
process, developer did not obtain vested right to do so free from
application of independent tenant relocation assistance law].)2
Fox Hills’s estoppel argument also fails. It does not point
to anything in the record that could be interpreted as a promise
from the City that it would be exempt from any future tenant
protection laws. Further, “the rental industry is routinely
regulated; ‘Rent control, like the imposition of a new tax, is
simply one of the usual hazards of the business enterprise.’”
(Danekas v. San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization &
Arbitration Bd. (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 638, 651.) Thus, to the
extent Fox Hills relied on its beliefs and “own self-serving
interpretation” of the permits, “such reliance must be considered
unreasonable.” (Russ, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 853–854 [“A vested
right requires more than a good faith subjective belief that one
has it”].) Further, Fox Hills does not demonstrate the estoppel in
this case would be narrow. (Toigo, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at
p. 321.) If we accepted Fox Hills’s contention that it had a vested
right to be exempt from the TPO, “there could be serious
impairment of the government’s right to control land use policy.”

2 Fox Hills asserts that Blue Chip and Briarwood are
distinguishable because they concerned the Subdivision Map Act and
condominium conversions. Regardless, these cases stand for the
proposition that a permit authorizes only the work specified in the
permit.

10
(Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Com.
(1976) 17 Cal.3d 785, 797, superseded by statute on another
ground as stated in Cotta v. City and County of San Francisco
(2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1559, fn. 5.)
Fox Hills contends that our Supreme Court in Russ, supra,
44 Cal.3d 839, “broaden[ed] the inquiry” for determining vested
rights “well beyond the specific language of the permit.” Fox
Hills mischaracterizes Russ’s holding. In that case, the plaintiffs
obtained building permits expressly conditioned on their
participation “‘in a downtown assessment district, or similar fair
and appropriate mechanism, to provide funds for maintaining
and augmenting transportation service . . . .’” (Id. at p. 843.)
Russ addressed whether that condition encompassed San
Francisco’s subsequently enacted Transit Impact Development
Fee (TIDF), which required developers of downtown buildings
containing office space to pay a TIDF as a condition of issuance of
a certificate of completion and occupancy. (Id. at pp. 843–844.)
Because the TIDF fell among the “funding mechanisms
contemplated by the resolutions,” application of the ordinance to
the plaintiffs was proper as the transit mitigation condition
“included the eventuality of the TIDF.” (Id. at p. 846.) Russ did
not hold that a court was required to look beyond the terms of a
permit and consider a property owner’s economic expectations in
determining what rights the permits conferred. Rather, it
recognized that the plaintiffs’ vested rights were “‘no greater than
those specifically granted by the permit[s themselves].’”3 (Id. at
p. 854.)

3 Citing Russ, Fox Hills argues for the first time in its reply brief
that it was entitled to notice that the TPO would be applied to its
property when the permits were issued. It has forfeited this claim.

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Furthermore, contrary to Fox Hills’s argument, the TPO is
not within a “‘class of restrictions’” that would prohibit it from
conducting the renovations identified in its building permits. The
completion of the renovation project is not conditioned on
compliance with the TPO. (Cf. Russ, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 843–
844 [issuance of certificate of occupancy conditioned on
developers paying TIDF would impair vested rights if permits
had not contained transit mitigation condition].) The TPO is
independent from the rights granted to Fox Hills under the
permits and has no direct effect on the right to complete the
work. The ordinance instead requires landlords like Fox Hills to
comply with certain requirements when evicting or relocating
tenants.
In sum, the trial court properly sustained respondents’
demurrers to Fox Hills’s writ of mandate cause of action, which
was based solely on Fox Hills’s vested rights claim. To the extent
the declaratory relief and inverse condemnation causes of action
were based on Fox Hills’s vested rights allegations, the claims
also fail to state a cause of action.

C. Fox Hills’s Takings Claim is Not Ripe
Fox Hills argues the trial court erred in finding its “stand-
alone” claim asserting application of the ordinance constituted a
regulatory taking was not ripe. It contends that because there
was “no question that the City’s TPO applied to [its] property” as

(High Sierra Rural Alliance v. County of Plumas (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th
102, 111, fn. 2 [“New arguments may not be raised for the first time in
an appellant’s reply brief”].) Further, Russ did not state that notice
was always required for a project or property to be subject to
subsequently enacted legislation.

12
it had requested an exemption and the City refused, the claim
was ripe. We disagree.
A takings claim that challenges the application of
regulations to a particular property “‘“‘is not ripe until the
government entity charged with implementing the regulations
has reached a final decision regarding the application of the
regulations to the property at issue,’” i.e., when “there has been a
‘final, definitive position regarding’ how the regulations will be
applied to the land.”’” (Lafayette Bollinger Development LLC v.
Town of Moraga (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 752, 778.) This
“requirement ensures that a court can make ‘“the constitutional
determination whether a regulation has deprived a landowner of
‘all economically beneficial use’ of the property, [citation], or
defeated the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the
landowner to the extent that a taking has occurred.” [Citation.]
Simply put, a court cannot say whether a regulation goes too far
in restricting the use of property unless it knows how far the
regulation goes.’” (Ibid.; see also Howard v. County of San Diego
(2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1430 (Howard) [“until there has
been a ‘final, definitive position’ as to how the regulations will be
applied to the land, a court cannot determine the extent of the
economic impact, a factor that bears on the question whether a
compensable taking has occurred”].)
While the United States Supreme Court has described the
finality requirement as “relatively modest,” the plaintiff must
still show “that ‘there [is] no question . . . about how the
“regulations at issue apply to the particular land in question.”’”
(Pakdel v. City and Cty. of San Francisco (2021) 594 U.S. 474,
478.) Failure to exploit available procedures “may render a claim
unripe if avenues still remain for the government to clarify or

13
change its decision.” (Id. at p. 480; see also Felkay v. City of
Santa Barbara (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 30, 39 [landowner must
follow “‘reasonable and necessary steps to allow regulatory
agencies to exercise their full discretion . . . including the
opportunity to grant any variances or waivers allowed by law’”].)
“Closely related to the ‘final decision’ rule is the ‘futility’
exception . . . In order to invoke the futility exception, a plaintiff
must show ‘“that the [agency] has declared what its ruling will be
on a particular case.”’” (Howard, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p.
1430.) The exception is “‘extremely narrow.’” (Calprop Corp. v.
City of San Diego (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 582, 594.) “‘To come
within the exception, a sort of inevitability is required: the
prospect of refusal must be certain (or nearly so).’” (Toigo, supra,
70 Cal.App.4th at p. 327.)
The first amended petition alleged that the TPO
constituted a taking of Fox Hills’s property for which it was
entitled to compensation, including for the “lost rent on the to-be-
renovated apartments.” Fox Hills’s claim is necessarily based not
only on the requirement to return displaced tenants to the same
units after the renovation work is completed, but also on its
inability to raise the rents of its tenants beyond the amounts
allowed by the RCO. Therefore, the question is whether the
combined impact of the TPO and RCO is sufficiently great to
support a regulatory takings claim.
Fox Hills acknowledges there are at least two procedures
for seeking a rent increase above the RCO’s limits: (1) pass-
through recovery applications for capital improvements (CCMC
§ 15.09.225) and (2) rent adjustment applications (id. at
§ 15.09.220). The first amended petition alleged that most, if not
all, of Fox Hills’s expenses do not qualify for a pass-through

14
recovery application because “pass-through is limited to
additions, but not replacement, of capital improvements.” In
addition, Fox Hills alleged that the rent adjustment application
“contains a rebuttable presumption that the landlord is obtaining
a reasonable return with respect to operation of the property” and
excludes capital improvements. Fox Hills alleged this made the
application process futile.
Even if Fox Hills’s expenses are not recoverable through a
pass-through recovery application, the Housing Division’s
“Guideline/Rule No. 2021-RC02” concerning rent adjustment
applications clearly states that “[l]andlords may submit as part of
their Application capital improvement expenses that have not
been or are not eligible” for pass-through recovery applications.
Thus, a rent adjustment application remains an available
procedure for Fox Hills to obtain relief.
It is undisputed that Fox Hills did not submit a rent
adjustment application. Whether the application of the TPO and
RCO results in a regulatory taking depends on their economic
impact and the extent to which they “‘interfere[ ] with reasonable
investment-backed expectations.’” (Sandpiper Mobile Village v.
City of Carpinteria (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 542, 548–549,
disapproved on other grounds by Travis v. County of Santa Cruz
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 757, 775, fn. 11.) Those factors cannot be
evaluated until the City has arrived at a final position regarding
how it will apply the rent adjustment provisions to Fox Hills’s
property. (Sandpiper Mobile Village, at pp. 548–549; see also
Amberhill Properties v. City of Berkeley (9th Cir. 1987) 814 F.2d
1340, 1341 [where landlord did not seek rent adjustment from
city, court could not decide whether application of regulations
effected unconstitutional taking].) Until Fox Hills submits a rent

15
adjustment application, and the City determines whether to
exercise its discretion to grant a rent adjustment, it is not
possible to determine whether Fox Hills will receive a sufficient
return on its investment. The trial court therefore properly
sustained the demurrer to the inverse condemnation claim on the
basis that it was not ripe.

D. Fox Hills Does Not Demonstrate the Trial Court
Abused its Discretion in Denying Leave to Amend
The burden of proving a reasonable possibility the defects
of a pleading can be cured by amendment “is squarely on the
plaintiff.” (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) “[A] plaintiff ‘must
show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that
amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading.’
[Citation.] The assertion of an abstract right to amend does not
satisfy this burden.” (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service
(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43 (Rakestraw).) The proffered
“[a]llegations must be factual and specific, not vague or
conclusionary.” (Id. at p. 44.) “Where the appellant offers no
allegations to support the possibility of amendment . . . there is
no basis for finding the trial court abused its discretion when it
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.” (Ibid.)
Fox Hills makes no argument as to how it could amend the
petition to state a cause of action. It fails to identify “factual and
specific” allegations it could add if given leave to amend its
claims. (Rakestraw, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 44.) Speculating
that it “may” be able to allege that it “may not be able to recoup
its investment” is insufficient. Fox Hills’s assertion that it should
have been allowed to conduct discovery and develop a factual

16
record also falls short of meeting its burden. Accordingly, we find
no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of leave to amend.

DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. The City and Committee are
awarded costs on appeal.

MORI, J.
We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

COGLIATI, J. **

** Judge of the Santa Cruz County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California
Constitution.

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