Golshani v. Bd. of Trustees of the Cal. State U. CA2/3

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Filed 4/23/26 Golshani v. Bd. of Trustees of the Cal. State U. CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

FOROUZAN GOLSHANI, B337469

Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 20STCV40168

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
THE CALIFORNIA STATE
UNIVERSITY,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Douglas W. Stern, Judge. Reversed.

Gusdorff Law, Janet Gusdorff; Hennig Kramer, Kramer
Brown Hui, Robert A. Hennig, Jennifer R. Kramer, Dat Tommy
Phan, Sam M. Brown; The Law Office of Nicole Meyers, Principle
Employment Law, Nicole Meyers; Public Employees Legal and
Oshea V. Orchid for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Complex Appellate Litigation Group, Jens B. Koepke,
Greg Wolff; Burke, Williams & Sorensen, Daphne Anneet and
Vanessa M. Hooker for Defendant and Respondent.
_________________________

Plaintiff Forouzan Golshani appeals a summary judgment
in favor of the Board of Trustees of the California State
University (the Board) on his claim for unlawful retaliation
under the California Whistleblower Protection Act (CWPA or
Act, Gov. Code, § 8547 et seq.).1 Construing the evidence in the
light most favorable to Golshani as the party opposing summary
judgment, we conclude there are triable issues of material fact
as to whether Golshani made protected disclosures about threats
to employee health and safety under the CWPA, whether those
disclosures were a contributing factor in a sequence of adverse
employment actions that followed, and whether the same adverse
actions would have been taken absent the protected disclosures.
We reverse the summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
Consistent with our standard of review, we state the facts
in the light most favorable to Golshani as the nonmoving party,
liberally construing the evidence in his favor, except that to
which objections were made and sustained. (Lonicki v. Sutter
Health Central (2008) 43 Cal.4th 201, 206; Vatalaro v. County
of Sacramento (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 367, 377 (Vatalaro).) We
note the trial court sustained the Board’s objections to significant
parts of Golshani’s summary judgment declaration, based largely
on conflicts between the declaration and Golshani’s earlier

1 Statutory references are to the Government Code, unless
otherwise specified.

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deposition testimony. We therefore disregard statements
in Golshani’s declaration to which objections were sustained
and draw the relevant facts from his deposition. We likewise
disregard statements in the Board’s supporting declarations
to which Golshani’s evidentiary objections were sustained.
(See Archdale v. American Internat. Specialty Lines Ins. Co.
(2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 449, 473 [“Where a party’s self-serving
declarations contradict credible discovery admissions and
purport to impeach that party’s own prior sworn testimony,
they should be disregarded.”]; accord Vatalaro, at p. 381.)
1. Safety in the College of Engineering
Dr. Golshani was the Dean of the College of Engineering
at California State University, Long Beach (CSULB or
the University) from August 2007 until his non-retention in
January 2020. During his tenure, Golshani received excellent
performance reviews and was recognized for his success in
recruiting higher quality faculty and growing student enrollment.
Dr. Brian Jersky was the Provost at CSULB and
Golshani’s direct supervisor from July 2016 to January 2020. As
Provost, Jersky had hiring authority for management employees,
including the deans of the University’s various colleges. Golshani
met with Jersky on a monthly basis and during Council of Deans
meetings. He always tried to maintain a professional, cordial,
and supportive relationship with the Provost.
Under the University’s governing Injury and Illness
Prevention Program (IIPP), Dean Golshani was responsible for
ensuring the safety of the College’s classrooms, laboratories, and
workplaces. This included (among other things) establishing
“clearly outlined safety responsibilities” for employees under his
supervision; developing and implementing “a specific training

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program designed to instruct employees in general safe work
practices”; performing “all necessary corrective actions as
identified by safety inspections”; and conducting “preliminary
investigations of all reported industrial injuries and illnesses.”
From the beginning of Jersky’s tenure (and before then),
Golshani was always outspoken about safety issues with the
Provost. This included ongoing requests for funding, support,
and personnel to address safety issues in the College of
Engineering. The College’s lack of a full-time safety officer
was a special concern. Golshani had repeatedly raised the issue
with the serving Provost since 2007, including with Jersky after
he became Provost in 2016. Despite ongoing discussions about
the need to hire a safety officer, Golshani had always been denied
the necessary funding to fill this critical position.2 He alerted
Jersky about other safety hazards at the College as well,
including the need for funding for asbestos removal and the
installation of fume hoods, non-skid flooring, and biosafety
cabinets in certain labs.
Upon becoming Dean in 2007, Golshani had appointed
Dr. Hamid Kavianian as a part-time safety coordinator for the
College by reallocating a quarter of Kavianian’s teaching time
so he could serve in the position. Kavianian developed safety
policies and procedures, forms, trainings, and questionnaires to
ensure that those who entered and worked in the College’s labs

2 As Jersky explained in his deposition, neither he nor
Golshani could hire a permanent full-time safety officer without
a permanent funding source. For new positions that did not have
ongoing funding, Jersky testified he would be required to request
the funds from the University President, who would have “full
discretion” to grant or deny the money.

4
had appropriate knowledge about safety protocols. Until 2012
when Kavianian retired, he was responsible for tackling a host
of safety matters, including junk in labs and offices, cabinets
with unmarked chemicals, eroded containers, and other hazards
that the College had neglected for decades. This was an ongoing
process due to a lack of resources and funding—an issue that
Golshani frequently raised with the serving Provost in connection
with his efforts to call attention to safety concerns at the College.
Golshani supervised Dr. Hamid Rahai, who served as
Associate Dean during Golshani’s tenure. Golshani expected
his associate deans to be watchful of safety matters in the College
of Engineering. Although he made clear to College personnel
that safety was everyone’s responsibility, Golshani recognized
his associate deans generally worked more closely with the labs
and thus could provide better oversight of safety concerns. Rahai
had a good working relationship with Golshani and understood
that he was expected to work closely with the College’s safety
personnel.
In 2014, a hiring committee recommended Michael Hom
to serve as safety officer for the College. As before, budgetary
constraints meant that Golshani would need to reallocate Hom’s
teaching responsibilities to allow him to serve in the position.
Golshani did this by increasing the time assigned for the safety
officer position from 25 percent to 50 percent of Hom’s time.
Hom reported to Associate Dean Rahai. The two worked
together on several safety initiatives, including safety drives,
establishing safety quizzes, and conducting routine inspections.
Hom was in charge of and conducted safety trainings with
faculty and students. He also conducted annual inventories
and ensured the College used locked cabinets to store chemicals

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safely. He regularly emailed faculty regarding the proper
handling of chemicals stored in offices and labs. Rahai never
reported any issues with Hom’s performance to Golshani.
As safety officer, Hom also served as a liaison between
the College of Engineering and CSULB’s Environmental Health
and Safety Office (EHS). EHS is a campus-wide office within
the University’s facilities department—known as Beach Building
Services (BBS)—that is responsible for implementing and
managing the IIPP. BBS is headed by Scott Apel. Tony
Malagrino—an Associate Vice President in BBS—manages EHS.
In 2015, EHS audited the College of Engineering and
found multiple safety violations. It shared the audit report
and corrective recommendations with the College’s facilities
coordinator; however, a number of the issues were beyond the
coordinator’s power to fix. Despite this, EHS did not share
the audit report with Hom or Golshani.
In 2016, EHS performed follow-up safety audits and,
with few exceptions, found that issues reported in the 2015 audit
had not been corrected. In an email to the EHS director and
Malagrino summarizing the 2016 inspections, the inspector noted
that conditions “have reached a potential hazard threshold such
that the labs/rooms should be closed until corrective actions are
completed.” The inspector recommended that notices of violation
be sent to the College’s Dean (Golshani) and that a qualified,
full-time safety officer be appointed immediately. Despite
these recommendations, Golshani’s ongoing requests for funding
to hire a full-time safety officer remained unmet.3

3 According to the inspector, EHS requested a meeting
with Golshani to review the issues identified in the audit and
to develop an action plan to resolve the deficiencies. Golshani

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Notwithstanding the results of the EHS audits in 2015
and 2016, Golshani received positive performance evaluations
for those academic years, including an evaluation of “exceeds
expectations” from Jersky for 2016.
2. The 2018 Chemical Fire
On February 27, 2018, the College of Engineering had
a major safety incident when a chemical explosion ignited a fire
in one of the labs. An arson investigation by the Long Beach
Police Department (LBPD) determined Dr. Ted Yu (an Assistant
Professor of Chemical Engineering) had likely caused the
explosion while attempting to dissolve lithium waste in a bucket
of water. Over 50 fire department personnel and 25 vehicles
were required to put out the fire. Yu was hospitalized, and the
fire caused more than a million dollars of damage that took over
a year to repair. The City of Long Beach cited the University
for several safety violations in connection with the incident.
A week after the fire, on March 5, 2018, Golshani reported
to Jersky, Apel, and the President of CSULB that he had started
an audit of the College’s “safety procedures, procurement
processes, and faculty and students’ level of compliance with
the guidelines,” as authorized and directed under the IIPP.4
He explained the College had “sought the assistance of an

sent Rahai to attend the meeting in his place. The parties
have not directed us to any evidence in the record regarding
what Rahai communicated to Golshani about the meeting.
4 As noted, the IIPP directs that the dean of each college
is responsible for conducting “preliminary investigations of all
reported industrial injuries and illnesses” affecting facilities
under his or her purview.

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independent expert to conduct the audit” and he committed the
College to “implement[ing] meticulously every recommendation
that the various investigating teams will present to us.” The
President thanked Golshani for the update and agreed an
investigation should help everyone “learn something important
that will increase safety from this point on.” Apel forwarded
Golshani’s email to Malagrino. In a cryptic response, Malagrino
appeared to question the wisdom of consulting an independent
party, writing, “Independent expert?”
Two days later, Jersky emailed Golshani about the
plan to bring “in an independent consultant to investigate the
chemical incident.” Jersky asked Golshani to “provide me details
of this in writing,” concluding his email with the admonition,
“Just so you know, I advise you not to do this.” Golshani
responded, explaining that he had asked Kavianian to return
from retirement “to assist us in examining our published safety
procedures and identify any gaps in what we have in place.”
He explained that the “goal is to create a culture of safety in
the entire college,” and reminded Jersky that Kavianian was
“a national expert in health and safety” and that he had been
the College’s safety coordinator for many years.5 Golshani
advised Jersky that his staff had met with Kavianian that
morning and that Kavianian had “pointed out several important
updates to our processes.” Nevertheless, in apparent response
to Jersky’s admonition, Golshani asked Jersky to “let me know

5 In his deposition, Golshani elaborated on the intended
audit, explaining that he “was interested to know if there were
things that needed to be updated” and he “wanted to have a
checkpoint and document that indeed . . . the safety procedures
that we had were indeed enforced.”

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if we should stop this ‘self audit.’ ” Jersky responded, “I think
it is better if you do not proceed with this at this stage.” Golshani
wrote back, confirming he would “stop this immediately.”
Ultimately, EHS conducted its own investigation of the
incident. While it consulted frequently with Jersky, Golshani
was excluded from the process. In a report memorializing its
findings, EHS determined the “root causes” of the incident were
(1) lack of training, as Yu was not trained on critical hazardous
waste disposal procedures; and (2) lack of an adequate hazardous
material purchasing procedure, as many of the hazardous
chemicals in the lab were not on the room’s chemical inventory
list. The report cited inadequate leadership and supervision
as contributing factors, explaining the College of Engineering
had failed to ensure that Yu follow the requisite hazardous waste
disposal protocols or that he wear all required personal protective
equipment. Jersky received a copy of the report from EHS
but did not share it with Golshani, despite Golshani’s requests
to review all safety audits related to the fire in his meetings
with the Provost.
Although Golshani had growing concerns that Jersky and
EHS were excluding him from the investigation and decision-
making processes related to the fire, he continued to impress
upon Jersky the need to hire two full-time safety officers for
the College of Engineering. Jersky initially assured Golshani
that funds would be allocated to hire two safety officers, but the
Provost later reduced this to a single line of funds for only one
new hire.
After consulting with EHS, Jersky assigned a faculty
member from outside the College of Engineering to head a hiring
committee for the new full-time safety officer. Although it was

9
routine and customary for the Dean to be involved in this process,
Golshani was not given information on candidate qualifications
or permitted to interview any of the candidates. Instead, the
head of the hiring committee regularly reported to Jersky on the
progress of the search, and Jersky relayed those updates to EHS.
In January 2019, the committee hired Ricardo Magallanes
as the Chemical Hygiene Officer for the College. Golshani was
advised that Magallanes was not the committee’s top choice, but
Golshani was still asked to sign the hiring paperwork. Given the
urgency of bringing a safety officer onboard, Golshani promptly
did so. He then raised his concerns with Jersky, outlining the
negative impacts of the irregular procedures, which he warned
might have direct consequences for the safety of students and
staff.
3. The 2019 CSU Safety Audit
In 2019, the Division of Audit and Advisory Services
at the CSU’s Chancellor’s Office conducted an internal audit
of health and safety at CSULB. As memorialized in a July 2019
report, the audit concluded the University’s administrative
controls regarding safety were inadequate, with the College
of Engineering accounting for many of the violations.
After learning of the audit’s findings, Golshani told Jersky
the College would take immediate corrective measures to address
the safety issues. While an October 2019 report by EHS found
that little progress had been made, Magallanes testified that
the College managed to remedy all the issues raised in the safety
audit after he came on board.

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4. Golshani Recommends Yu for Tenure
In early 2019, Yu came up for tenure and promotion review.
Golshani recommended him for tenure, as did Yu’s department
and the College of Engineering tenure committee.
Jersky objected to Golshani’s recommendation, given that
Yu’s mishandling of chemicals had caused the 2018 fire. After
reviewing Yu’s application materials, Jersky discovered that
Yu had not included a copy of the LBPD arson investigation
report in his self-selected tenure review file, although his official
personnel file did contain a copy of the report. Jersky was
surprised to learn that Golshani had not reviewed Yu’s official
personnel file in making his tenure recommendation. Golshani
explained that he believed University policy prohibited him
from reviewing the official personnel file and he had therefore
reviewed only Yu’s application materials. This response alarmed
Jersky, as he believed the collective bargaining agreement that
governed the tenure review process mandated that tenure
decisions be based on the official personnel file.
Contrary to Jersky’s stated understanding, Mark Wiley—
a former Associate Vice President in the Office of Faculty Affairs
whom the Board designated as its person most qualified
regarding tenure decisions—testified that faculty members,
including college deans, typically do not look at an applicant’s
personnel file and, in fact, are trained to confine their evaluation
to the applicant’s self-selected tenure review file. As Wiley
explained, the official personnel file is a “security file” that can
only be accessed “at the provost level” or with permission from
the Office of Faculty Affairs.
Jersky ultimately denied Yu’s tenure application.

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5. Chemical Hygiene Officer Magallanes Resigns
In November 2019, Magallanes resigned his position as
the College’s chief safety officer. In an exit interview, he reported
that the College of Engineering had a culture of ignoring safety
protocols; that Rahai had advised him of a directive by Golshani
to stop electronically documenting safety violations and to record
them instead in a handwritten journal; and that, in his view,
Golshani showed favoritism to certain faculty members who
were not held to account for safety violations in their respective
classrooms and laboratories. Rahai refuted these claims and
maintained that the College administration, including Golshani,
made every effort to comply with safety protocols and were firmly
committed to safety. Apel notified Jersky that Magallanes’s
claims would need to be investigated; however, neither Jersky
nor anyone in EHS discussed the allegations with Golshani
or Rahai at the time.
Although Jersky had given Golshani relatively high marks
in his 2017 and 2018 performance reviews, his 2019 review
contained critical comments about Golshani’s oversight of safety
conditions at the College and his handling of the Yu tenure
review process.
6. Jersky Decides Not to Retain Golshani as Dean
In January 2020, Jersky informed Golshani of the decision
not to retain him as Dean of the College of Engineering.
Golshani sought reconsideration and met with Jersky as part of
that process. During the meeting, Jersky identified three reasons
for the non-retention decision: (1) ongoing safety concerns at
the College; (2) Golshani’s recommendation of Yu for a tenured
faculty position; and (3) Golshani’s lack of understanding of
academic hierarchy. The University denied reconsideration.

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7. Golshani Files an Administrative Complaint
with the University
After his non-retention, Golshani exercised his retreat
rights and became a tenured professor in the Computer
Engineering and Computer Science Department.
On October 1, 2020, Golshani filed an administrative
complaint with the University claiming Jersky had retaliated
against him by removing him as Dean in response to his
complaints about safety concerns and requests for funding
and personnel to remedy those concerns. As Golshani later
explained in his deposition, he filed the complaint because
he had been “shut out” from all matters related to safety after
the 2018 fire and “used as a scapegoat” for Apel’s and Jersky’s
failures after “all of [his] requests regarding safety had been
ignored up until the time of the accident.” In accordance with
CSULB policy, the University hired an outside law firm to
investigate the claim.
As set forth in the investigator’s report, Golshani explained
that “safety was a concern at the [College] ‘since day one,’ ”
and he had “made ‘many’ requests for funding” over the years
“to upgrade the College’s safety programs and facilities but was
never granted the requested funds.” Golshani also reported that,
following the 2018 fire, “he began a self-audit of the [College]
to determine if its safety policies and procedures were sufficient
in light of the accident, but Mr. Jersky advised him to cease
the audit.” Golshani alleged that Jersky “instructed him to stop
the self-audit because Mr. Jersky could find himself in trouble
for the accident and wanted to ‘cover his tracks and position
himself as the savior.’ ”

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The investigator found Golshani had made a protected
disclosure that “potentially involved safety conditions . . . that
could threaten the health and safety of employees, students
and/or the public.” However, based on his “review of all relevant
evidence,” he found “it is more likely than not that Dr. Golshani’s
complaints about safety were not a contributing factor in
the decision to remove [him] as the Dean.” The investigator
explained: “Mr. Jersky cited as one of his concerns Dr. Golshani’s
failure to appreciate how his department has failed to properly
train staff on safety-related concerns. It strains credibility
that he would therefore remove Dr. Golshani from his dean
position for sharing his exact concerns regarding safety.”
8. Golshani Sues the University
On October 20, 2020, Golshani filed his original complaint
against the Board. The operative third amended complaint
asserts a single cause of action for whistleblower retaliation
under section 8547.12. The pleading alleges Golshani made
three specific protected disclosures “regarding conditions
that significantly threaten the health or safety of employees
or the public”: (1) “informing his supervisors that he was
conducting a self-audit to ensure that the College was up to date
in policies and procedures relating to modern safety hazard[s]
after a chemical reaction resulted in a fire in the College’s lab”;
(2) “informing his supervisors about safety issues identified
by the CSU safety audit that [were] either addressed by the
College’s technician or [for] which purchase order[s] need[ed]
to be submitted to contract services”; and (3) “making requests
to his supervisor(s) for funding, support, and personnel to address
safety issues in the College.”

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9. The Board Moves for Summary Judgment
The Board moved for summary judgment, arguing the
undisputed evidence established Golshani could not prove either
that his three alleged disclosures were “protected” under the
whistleblower statute or that any of the alleged disclosures was
a contributing factor in the decision not to retain him as Dean.
The Board also argued it had a complete defense in that clear
and convincing evidence proved beyond dispute that Golshani
would have been dismissed from his position as Dean for
legitimate non-retaliatory reasons, regardless of whether
he engaged in protected conduct.
In support of the motion, the Board relied heavily upon
Golshani’s deposition, including testimony that (a) Golshani
consistently disclosed to his supervisors that the College did not
have “proper safety support and resources” even before Jersky
was appointed as Provost; (b) Golshani “was always outspoken
about safety issues” with Jersky throughout Jersky’s tenure
as Provost; and (c) Golshani requested funding from Jersky
every year for “safety issues,” including requests for funds to
hire a full-time safety officer. The Board argued Golshani’s
testimony conclusively proved that his alleged disclosures
were not a contributing factor in any adverse employment
action because (a) Golshani had always received positive
performance reviews (including from Jersky) notwithstanding
his consistent outspokenness about safety and requests for
funding, and (b) his negative performance review and subsequent
non-retention came only after the 2018 chemical explosion
and his recommendation of Yu for tenure.
In his opposition, Golshani asserted for the first time
that he had made five (not three) protected disclosures—only

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two of which appeared to align with those alleged in the third
amended complaint: (1) reporting his intention to conduct a
safety investigation into the chemical fire; (2) reporting the need
to hire two full-time safety officers after the recent chemical fire;
(3) complaining of inflated service prices as improper government
activity and prohibited government waste; (4) complaining that
Jersky violated CSULB’s policies and regulations for retention,
tenure, and promotion in connection with Yu’s tenure review; and
(5) complaining of unlawful retaliation for engaging in protected
disclosures. He argued the evidence, when viewed in the light
most favorable to him as the non-moving party, created disputes
of material fact on every issue raised in the Board’s summary
judgment motion.
10. The Trial Court Grants Summary Judgment
and Denies Leave to Amend
The day before the scheduled hearing, the trial court
issued a tentative ruling granting the summary judgment
motion. The tentative indicated that the court would not
consider the purported disclosures that had not been alleged
in Golshani’s operative pleading.
The morning of the hearing, Golshani filed a motion
to amend his third amended complaint to add allegations for
the additional disclosures that were not included in the operative
pleading. At the start of the hearing, he also moved orally for
leave to amend and asked the court to continue the summary
judgment hearing until his written motion could be heard.
The court denied the oral motion and request to continue.
Addressing the disclosures alleged in Golshani’s complaint,
the trial court concluded that “[n]one of [Golshani’s] alleged
disclosures would be protected disclosures.” And, even if

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Golshani’s alleged disclosures were protected, the court
determined Golshani had failed to raise a triable issue of fact
as to whether the disclosures were a contributing factor in his
non-retention. Finally, the court found that clear and convincing
evidence showed that CSULB would have non-retained, and did
non-retain, Golshani for legitimate reasons, independent of the
alleged disclosures. Thus, the court granted summary judgment
on all elements of Golshani’s whistleblower claim.
Three weeks later, the court heard Golshani’s motion for
leave to amend. The court denied the motion, concluding that
Golshani had unreasonably delayed in seeking leave to amend
and that granting leave would prejudice the Board by requiring
it to file another motion for summary judgment.
The court entered judgment for the Board. This timely
appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
A trial court may grant a motion for summary judgment
“if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
To meet its burden on summary judgment, a moving
defendant must show either that one or more elements of the
plaintiff’s causes of action fail or that there is a complete defense
to the plaintiff’s case. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
If the defendant meets this initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more
material facts exists. (Ibid.) A triable issue of a material fact
exists “if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier
of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing

17
the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”
(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 845.)
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo,
“ ‘liberally constru[ing] the evidence in support of the party
opposing summary judgment and resolv[ing] doubts concerning
the evidence in favor of that party.’ ” (Hartford Casualty Ins. Co.
v. Swift Distribution, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 277, 286; Yanowitz
v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037 (Yanowitz);
Vatalaro, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 377; Scheer v. Regents of
University of California (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 904, 913 (Scheer).)
2. The California Whistleblower Protection Act
The CWPA prohibits retaliation against state employees
who “report waste, fraud, abuse of authority, violation of law,
or threat[s] to public health.” (§ 8547.1; Miklosy v. Regents of
University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 882 (Miklosy).)
The Act is premised on the legislative finding that “public
servants best serve the citizenry when they can be candid and
honest without reservation in conducting the people’s business.”
(§ 8547.1.) Thus, the CWPA aims to “ ‘protect[ ] the right of state
employees’ ” to report matters of public concern “ ‘ “without fear
of retribution.” ’ ” (Runyon v. Board of Trustees of California
State University (2010) 48 Cal.4th 760, 774 (Runyon).)
Section 8547.12 authorizes an employee of the CSU system
to bring a civil action for damages to redress acts of retaliation.
(See Runyon, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 767, 769, 774.) Under the
statute, a CSU employee establishes a whistleblower retaliation
claim by proving (1) that he or she engaged in a “protected”
activity or made a “protected disclosure[ ]” under the Act; and
(2) that the protected activity was a “contributing factor” in the

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alleged retaliation against the employee. (§ 8547.12, subd. (e).)6
If the employee makes this showing, “the burden of proof” then
shifts to the employer “to demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that the alleged action would have occurred for
legitimate, independent reasons even if the employee had
not engaged in protected disclosures.” (Ibid.)
Because the burden rests with the employer to establish
its affirmative defense, the employee need not prove that the
employer’s asserted legitimate reason was pretextual to establish
a CWPA claim. (See Scheer, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 912–
913, 915–916, citing Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc.
(2022) 12 Cal.5th 703 (Lawson).) Rather, “plaintiffs may satisfy
their burden of proving unlawful retaliation even when other,
legitimate factors also contributed to the adverse action,” simply
by showing that “the employer also had at least one retaliatory
reason that was a contributing factor in the action.” (Lawson,
at pp. 713–714, 716, italics added; Scheer, at pp. 915–916.)7

6 Section 8547.12, subdivision (e) provides in relevant part:
“In any civil action or administrative proceeding, once it has been
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that an activity
protected by this article was a contributing factor in the alleged
retaliation against a former, current, or prospective employee,
the burden of proof shall be on the supervisor, manager, or
appointing power to demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that the alleged action would have occurred for
legitimate, independent reasons even if the employee had not
engaged in protected disclosures or refused an illegal order.”
7 As our high court explained in Lawson, this distinguishes
whistleblower actions from traditional employment
discrimination cases where our courts generally apply the three-
part McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework for trying

19
3. Golshani Produced Sufficient Evidence to
Demonstrate He Made a Protected Disclosure
The CWPA defines a “ ‘Protected disclosure’ ” as “a good
faith communication, including a communication based on, or
when carrying out, job duties, that discloses or demonstrates
an intention to disclose information that may evidence either of
the following circumstances: [¶] (A) An improper governmental
activity. [¶] (B) A condition that may significantly threaten the
health or safety of employees or the public if the disclosure or
intention to disclose was made for the purpose of remedying
that condition.” (§ 8547.2, subd. (e)(1).) In the context of a
whistleblower statute like the CWPA, the term “ ‘disclosure’ ”

claims of intentional discrimination based on circumstantial
evidence. (Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 707–710; see
McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792.)
Under that framework, “the employee must establish a
prima facie case of unlawful discrimination or retaliation”;
then “the employer bears the burden of articulating a legitimate
reason for taking the challenged adverse employment action”;
and, finally, “the burden shifts back to the employee to
demonstrate that the employer’s proffered legitimate reason
is a pretext for discrimination or retaliation.” (Lawson, at p. 708;
McDonnell Douglas, at pp. 802–804.) In contrast, for claims
brought under whistleblower statutes like section 8547.12, “a
plaintiff does not need to show that the employer’s nonretaliatory
reason was pretextual” because the statutory text requires
only a showing that the employee’s protected activity was a
“contributing factor.” (Lawson, at pp. 715–716 [determining
applicable framework for assessing plaintiff’s burden to
prove whistleblower claim under Labor Code section 1102.6];
see Scheer, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 915–916 [applying
Lawson to CWPA claim].)

20
encompasses a communication that “calls attention to” one of
the enumerated circumstances of public concern, even if the
“recipient of such information has prior knowledge” of it. (People
ex rel. Garcia-Brower v. Kolla’s, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 719, 726
(Kolla’s) [interpreting the term “disclosure” in Labor Code
whistleblower statute]; see Scheer, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 915–916 [recognizing our Supreme Court’s interpretation of
Labor Code is relevant and generally applicable to construction
of identical terms in CWPA].)
In his operative complaint, Golshani alleged he made three
protected disclosures, two of which he advanced in opposition to
summary judgment: (1) “informing his supervisors that he was
conducting a self-audit to ensure that the College was up to date
in policies and procedures relating to modern safety hazard[s]
after a chemical reaction resulted in a fire in the College’s lab”;
and (2) “making requests to his supervisor(s) for funding,
support, and personnel to address safety issues in the College.”8

8 Because we conclude the trial court correctly disregarded
the additional disclosures that Golshani asserted for the first
time in his opposition, we do not address those disclosures here.
(See Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th
486, 493 [“[T]he burden of a defendant moving for summary
judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff’s theories
of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party
need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not
included in the pleadings.”]; Melican v. Regents of University of
California (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 182 [“We do not require
[defendant] to negate elements of causes of action plaintiffs
never pleaded.”].)
Nor do we address Golshani’s alleged disclosure “informing
his supervisors about safety issues identified by the CSU safety
audit that [were] either addressed by the College’s technician or

21
In its motion for summary judgment, the Board argued
neither of these alleged disclosures met the statutory definition
of a “protected disclosure” because (a) Golshani’s “reason for
doing a ‘self-audit’ was not to sound the alarm on any particular
dangerous condition but simply to find out what, if any, changes
or updates to his policies might be recommended”; and (b) his
requests for funding were made “in the context of routine,
internal administrative functions and not for purposes of
‘blowing the whistle’ on any workplace hazard.” The trial court
agreed with the Board on these points, concluding Golshani
had not made a protected disclosure because (a) in announcing
the self-audit, Golshani “was not disclosing or demonstrating
any condition that could threaten health or safety” but, instead,
“merely declaring his intention to look into the safety practices
of his department”; and (b) in requesting funding, Golshani
“was not disclosing anything” but, instead, “simply asking for

[for] which purchase order[s] need[ed] to be submitted to contract
services.” The Board challenged this allegation in its summary
judgment motion, presenting evidence to show that it did not
constitute a protected disclosure because the alleged statements
were not made for the purpose of remedying “any threatening
safety condition,” but merely to report that “safety issues were
being addressed.” This was sufficient to satisfy the Board’s
moving burden. Because Golshani did not confront this evidence
in his opposition, let alone present his own evidence to create a
triable issue of fact, he effectively forfeited the issue for appeal.
(See California Restaurant Management Systems v. City of
San Diego (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1581, 1593, fn. 7 [“When
an argument is not asserted below in opposition to a motion
for summary judgment, it is deemed waived and will not be
considered for the first time on appeal to reverse an order
granting summary judgment.”].)

22
resources to address safety concerns, which is an administrative
concern.” There are a number of problems with this reasoning.
First, the Board’s arguments and the court’s conclusions
overlook crucial context established by the summary judgment
evidence. Viewed in the light most favorable to Golshani, the
evidence showed that from the beginning of Jersky’s tenure
in 2016, Golshani was “always outspoken about safety issues”
with the Provost, and he repeatedly called attention to the need
for funds to hire a full-time safety officer who could address
these ongoing safety concerns.9 Even after reallocating some
of Kavianian’s, and later Hom’s, teaching responsibilities to a
part-time safety officer assignment, Golshani continued to report
to Jersky that there were unresolved safety hazards and to stress
the need to hire someone full-time who could finally address
these issues. Then, in February 2018, the College experienced

9 Although the Board itself advanced as an undisputed
fact that Golshani “ ‘was always outspoken about safety issues’
to Dr. Jersky,” in its motion for summary judgment and on
appeal, it also relied on evidence purporting to show Golshani
“consistently sought to assure and re-assure his superiors that
there were not any significant safety or health conditions in
the College under his watch.” While possible inconsistencies in
Golshani’s prior testimony may prove relevant to a trier of fact
charged with assessing his credibility, on summary judgment,
we—like the trial court—are compelled to view the evidence
in the light most favorable to Golshani and to resolve all doubts
and credibility determinations in his favor. (Yanowitz, supra,
36 Cal.4th at p. 1037; see also Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare
(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 473 [“ ‘A summary judgment
should not be based on tacit admissions or fragmentary and
equivocal concessions, which are contradicted by other credible
evidence.’ ”].)

23
a major safety incident when a chemical explosion set fire to
one of the labs. As Golshani aptly puts it, he “did not simply
conjure a need to do a safety audit out of thin air.” Rather, he
had persistently raised safety concerns in making his requests
for additional resources to address what—we may reasonably
infer—he had disclosed were significant threats to “the health
or safety of employees or the public” in his meetings with the
Provost. (§ 8547.2, subd. (e)(1)(B).)
Second, as Golshani also correctly observes, the statutory
definition of “protected disclosure” encompasses “a good faith
communication” that either “discloses or demonstrates an
intention to disclose information” about a condition that may
significantly threaten “health or safety.” (§ 8547.2, subd.
(e)(1)(B), italics added.)10 After the fire, Golshani emailed Jersky,
Apel, and the President of CSULB to report that he had started
an audit of the College’s “safety procedures, procurement
processes, and faculty and students’ level of compliance with
[safety] guidelines,” with the intention of implementing

10 The Board claims Golshani “never” made the argument
in his summary judgment opposition that his alleged disclosures
included a communication demonstrating “an intention to
disclose health and safety information (as opposed to an actual
disclosure of information).” This is incorrect. Our review of
the record confirms Golshani opposed summary judgment on
this very point, emphasizing in his brief to the trial court that
section 8547.12 “specifically protects CSU employees from
retaliation for good faith communication disclosing or even for
a demonstrated intent to disclose evidence of a condition
that could significantly threaten the health or safety of employees
or the public,” and arguing, “[t]his is exactly what Plaintiff did
repeatedly.”

24
“every recommendation that the various investigating teams
will present to us.” A reasonable inference that we must draw
from this evidence is that Golshani called attention to this
safety audit because (a) there were unaddressed safety hazards,
as he had reported in meetings with Jersky and as the
chemical explosion seemingly confirmed; and (b) he intended
to disclose information about those hazards in implementing the
recommendations he anticipated the investigation would produce.
Notably, this appears to be exactly how CSULB’s President
understood the disclosure. Thus, in her reply to Golshani,
she thanked the Dean for the information and agreed that an
investigation was likely to uncover “something important that
will increase safety from this point on.”11 Viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to Golshani, we are compelled to draw
the same inference—that in disclosing he had begun an audit
of the College’s compliance with safety procedures, Golshani
communicated his “intention to disclose information” about
a condition that could significantly threaten “health or safety”
going forward. (§ 8547.2, subd. (e)(1)(B).)
Third, the trial court’s application of an exception for
purported “administrative concern[s]” is inconsistent with the
CWPA’s statutory text and its legislative purpose. As discussed,

11 It also is notable that, while Jersky’s stated misgivings
about Golshani’s investigation effectively put an end to it, the
investigation conducted by EHS without Golshani’s involvement
nevertheless reached a conclusion largely in line with the
principal safety issue that Golshani had raised—namely, that
faculty’s failure to follow existing protocols when handling
hazardous materials posed an ongoing threat to health and
safety at the College.

25
the Act protects two general categories of disclosures: (1) those
that evidence an “improper governmental activity”; and (2) those
that evidence a “condition that may significantly threaten the
health or safety of employees or the public.” (§ 8547.2, subd.
(e)(1).) When the latter category is implicated, the statutory text
imposes only three requirements for protection: (1) the disclosure
must be a “good faith communication”; (2) it must “disclose[ ]
or demonstrate[ ] an intention to disclose information” about
a “condition that may significantly threaten the health or safety
of employees or the public”; and (3) the disclosure or intention
to disclose must have been “made for the purpose of remedying
that condition.” (§ 8547.2, subd. (e)(1)(B).) So long as these
requirements are met, the statutory text is indifferent to whether
the disclosure was made in an administrative context like—
as the trial court put it—“asking for resources to address safety
concerns.” If the disclosure was made in good faith as part of
a request for funds to remedy an unsafe condition, the CWPA
protects a state employee from retaliation for making the
disclosure and funding request.
Indeed, the statutory definition of “protected disclosure”
expressly embraces communications made “based on, or when
carrying out, job duties.” (§ 8547.2, subd. (e)(1).) This is a
plainly sensible provision, as it would severely undermine the
Act’s purpose of encouraging state employees to report threats
to public health if those employees whose very job it is to remedy
unsafe conditions could be denied whistleblower protection on
the ground that they were just doing their job.

26
At the Board’s urging, the trial court relied on two cases
—Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist. (2005) 134
Cal.App.4th 1378 (Patten) and Levi v. Regents of University of
California (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 892 (Levi)—for this supposed
“administrative concern” exception. Both cases are materially
different because neither involved a protected disclosure under
the “health or safety” prong of the CWPA. (§ 8547.2, subd.
(e)(1)(B).)
In Patten, a junior high school principal brought
a whistleblower claim under Labor Code section 1102.5,
which prohibits retaliation against an employee for disclosing
information to a government or law enforcement agency
“ ‘where the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the
information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or
violation or noncompliance with a state or federal regulation.’ ”
(Patten, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1381, quoting former
Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (b).)12 Among other things, she
based her claim on her repeated requests for “additional staff
to keep the campus safe,” after a student was assaulted on the
large campus. (Patten, at p. 1382.) The Patten court concluded
her communications “about needing more staff for safety
purposes [did] not amount to whistleblowing as a matter
of law” because they “were made in an exclusively internal
administrative context” and did “not show any belief on [the
principal’s] part that she was disclosing a violation of state or
federal law in any sort of whistleblowing context, as required

12 As the Patten court noted, Labor Code section 1102.5 was
subsequently amended but, even in its present form, “remains
substantively the same.” (Patten, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1381.)

27
for a [Labor Code] section 1102.5(b) whistleblowing action.” (Id.
at p. 1385, italics added.) Golshani’s claim is obviously different
because, unlike the Labor Code statute at issue in Patten, the
CWPA protects disclosures “made for the purpose of remedying”
conditions that threaten “health or safety,” even if the state
employee is simply carrying out his or her “job duties.” (§ 8547.2,
subd. (e)(1)(B).)
In Levi, a resident program director for the department of
ophthalmology at the University of California, San Diego brought
a claim for retaliation under the CWPA, alleging, among other
things, she was retaliated against for reporting the department
chair “created a stressful work environment by yelling,
undermining employees’ confidence through statements that
they were performing poorly, and saying hurtful things.” (Levi,
supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 894–895, 903–904.) As in Patten
—but unlike here—she argued the reported conduct violated
university policies equivalent to state statutes and thus her
complaints were protected under the “improper governmental
activities” prong of the CWPA. (Levi, at pp. 903–904.) Relying
on Patten, the Levi court rejected the claim, holding “[c]omplaints
made ‘in the context of internal administrative or personnel
actions, rather than in the context of legal violations’ do not
constitute protected whistleblowing.” (Levi, at p. 904, citing
Patten, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1385.) Again, Golshani’s
claim is materially different, because his requests for funding
concerned conditions that could threaten health or safety—
not purported legal violations—and the evidence, when viewed
in the light most favorable to him, was sufficient to show
he made the requests “for the purpose of remedying” those
conditions. (§ 8547.2, subd. (e)(1)(B).)

28
Manavian v. Department of Justice (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th
1127 (Manavian) is distinguishable for similar reasons. As
in Patten and Levi, the plaintiff in Manavian asserted claims
under Labor Code section 1102.5 and the improper governmental
activity prong of the CWPA. (Manavian, at p. 1141.) The
reviewing court held one of the alleged disclosures was not
protected under either statute because it “did not disclose any
violation of state or federal law or regulation” but communicated
“merely a policy dispute.” (Id. at pp. 1142–1143.) The Board
suggests Manavian stands for the proposition that disclosures
made in connection with “internal policy discussions and
administrative processes” do not constitute protected activity.
This overstates the Manavian court’s holding.
In Manavian, it was not the context of the communications
that made them unprotected; rather, it was the fact that
the communications did not meet the statutory definition of
a protected disclosure under the Labor Code or CWPA because
they “did not disclose any violation of state or federal law or
regulation.” (Manavian, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1142–
1143.) Contrary to the Board’s argument, Manavian
does not suggest that an employee who makes a “good faith”
communication “for the purpose of remedying” a “condition
that may significantly threaten . . . health or safety” (§ 8547.2,
subd. (e)(1)(B)) must be denied protection simply because
the communication reflects what can be characterized as a
policy difference with the manager who subsequently engages in
retaliation. If an employee believes in good faith that a manager
has embraced a policy that threatens the health or safety of
CSU employees or the public, the employee must be free to call
attention to that policy “without fear of retribution.” (§ 8547.1.)

29
Notwithstanding these distinctions, the Board argues
we should nevertheless heed the Patten and Levi courts’
warnings against “creat[ing] a legion of undeserving protected
‘whistleblowers’ arising from the routine workings and
communications of the job site.” (Patten, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1385; Levi, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 904.) Indeed,
the Board says our Legislature “appears to have recognized
the mischief highlighted” in these cases and thus “added an
explicit limitation in section 8547.12 of the CWPA” to prevent it.
We agree this “limitation” is relevant, but not in a way that
supports the Board’s position.
Section 8547.12, subdivision (d) declares that, in
authorizing a claim for retaliation, the statute “is not intended
to prevent a manager or supervisor from taking . . . personnel
action, or from taking or failing to take a personnel action
with respect to any university employee . . . if the manager or
supervisor reasonably believes any action or inaction is justified
on the basis of evidence separate and apart from the fact that
the person has made a protected disclosure.” (Italics added.)
Contrary to the Board’s underlying premise, subdivision (d)
appears to recognize there will be many circumstances—
possibly including some arising from the routine workings and
communications of a job site—where a CSU employee may make
a “protected disclosure” under the CWPA. However, a protected
disclosure alone does not create liability, nor should it prevent
a manager from taking a discretionary personnel action, so long
as that action is “justified on the basis of evidence separate and
apart” from the protected disclosure and not in retaliation for it.
(§ 8547.12, subd. (d).) Subdivision (d) thus is consistent with
both the broad definition of “protected disclosure” set forth in

30
section 8547.2, subdivision (e)(1) and a manager’s right to prove,
as an affirmative defense, that an “alleged [retaliatory] action
would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons
even if the employee had not engaged in protected disclosures.”
(§ 8547.12, subd. (e).) The subdivision does not evidence an
implicit legislative intent to graft an “administrative context”
exception on to the unambiguous statutory text. (See Miklosy,
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 888 [“If the statutory language is
unambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said,
and the plain meaning of the statute controls.”]; see also Kolla’s,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 734 [rejecting contention that high court’s
construction of “ ‘disclose’ ” in Labor Code whistleblower statute
“threatens ‘to convert everyday workplace disputes into
whistleblower cases’ ”; explaining, “protections of [Labor Code]
section 1102.5(b) apply only where the disclosing employee
‘has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses
a [legal] violation’ ” and, moreover, “an employer accused of
retaliation in violation of section 1102.5(b) can rebut the charge
by ‘demonstrat[ing] by clear and convincing evidence that the
alleged [retaliatory] action would have occurred for legitimate,
independent reasons even if the employee had not engaged
in [protected] activities’ ”].)
Finally, there is the investigation that an independent
law firm conducted after Golshani filed his administrative
complaint with the University. Based on much the same
evidence as Golshani produced in opposition to summary
judgment—including statements he gave about his “ ‘many’
requests for funding to upgrade the College’s safety programs
and facilities”—the independent investigator found that Golshani
“made a Protected Disclosure” that “potentially involved safety

31
conditions and remedying such conditions at the [College of
Engineering] that could threaten the health and safety of
employees, students and/or the public.” The Board contends
this finding is irrelevant because it “simply” concerned “whether
there was a predicate to conduct the investigation at all under
the University’s [Executive Order] 1116 policy, and did not
involve an analysis of the legal requirements for what is a
protected disclosure under the CWPA.” (Footnote omitted.)
That is not what the evidence shows.
As explained in a report by the CSU Chancellor’s Office to
Jersky about the investigation’s determinations, the investigator
made all “relevant findings of fact”—including the finding that
Golshani “made a Protected Disclosure as defined by [Executive
Order] 1116”—“[u]sing the preponderance of the evidence
standard.” Critically, the Chancellor’s Office report discloses
that Executive Order 1116 defines “Protected Disclosure”
exactly as the term is defined in section 8547.2, subdivision (e)(1).
The report states, “ ‘Protected Disclosure’ is a good faith
communication, including a communication based on, or
when carrying out, job duties that discloses or demonstrates
an intention to disclose information that may evidence (1) an
Improper Government Activity, or (2) any condition that may
significantly threaten the health or safety of Employees or
the public made for the purpose of remedying that condition.”
(Boldface omitted.) Like the independent investigator, we
conclude Golshani produced sufficient evidence for a jury
reasonably to find he made a protected disclosure under
the CWPA.

32
4. Golshani Produced Sufficient Evidence to
Demonstrate His Protected Disclosures Contributed
to the Alleged Retaliation
To establish a prima facie case under the CWPA, an
employee must demonstrate causation—specifically, that his or
her protected disclosure was a “contributing factor” in an alleged
act of retaliation. (§ 8547.12, subd. (e).) To carry this burden,
the employee need not prove that the protected disclosure was
the only reason for an adverse employment action, nor that the
employer’s stated reason was merely a pretext for prohibited
retaliation. Even if the evidence shows “the employer had a
genuine, nonretaliatory reason for its adverse action, the plaintiff
still carries the burden assigned by statute if it is shown that
the employer also had at least one retaliatory reason that was
a contributing factor in the action.” (Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th
at p. 716 [interpreting evidentiary burdens under Labor Code
section 1102.6]; Scheer, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 915–916
[holding Supreme Court’s construction of evidentiary burdens
under Labor Code applies to identical statutory language in
CWPA].) “ ‘ “A ‘contributing factor’ includes ‘any factor, which
alone or in connection with other factors, tends to affect in any
way the outcome of the decision.’ ” ’ ” (Lawson, at p. 714, quoting
Rookaird v. BNSF Ry. Co. (9th Cir. 2018) 908 F.3d 451, 461.)
The trial court concluded there were no triable issues
regarding causation because “[n]one” of the reasons Jersky gave
for Golshani’s non-retention—safety concerns in the College,
the recommendation of Yu for tenure, and Golshani’s failure to
respect academic hierarchy—“were related to [Golshani’s] alleged
protected disclosures.” The court also noted that Golshani

33
“admitted that he believed” Jersky “blamed him for the College’s
safety problems,” and that Jersky “did not cite [Golshani’s]
self-audit idea as one of the reasons for why he was not retaining
[Golshani] as Dean.”
The problem with the court’s analysis is it focuses only
on Jersky’s stated reasons for the adverse employment decision
but fails to consider whether there was sufficient evidence to
prove Golshani’s protected disclosures were also a contributing
factor in the decision. As we have discussed, it is not enough
for an employer to demonstrate it had genuine, nonretaliatory
reasons for an adverse employment action. Rather, to obtain
summary judgment of a CWPA claim, the employer must
negate the causation element of the employee’s prima facie case
by showing the plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to prove a
protected disclosure was a contributing factor. The employer
may do this by showing either that no such evidence exists or
that the plaintiff’s evidence is irrelevant or otherwise insufficient.
The critical point is that the burden does not rest with the
employee to show the employer’s stated nonretaliatory reasons
were pretextual; it rests with the employer to show the plaintiff
cannot marshal sufficient evidence to prove the protected
disclosure affected the outcome of an adverse employment
decision. (Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 714–716.)
The Board attempts to fill this analytic gap by focusing on
Jersky’s first stated reason for not retaining Golshani as Dean—
his purported “poor oversight of safety at the College.” The Board
emphasizes that it presented evidence showing EHS and Jersky
“had concerns about the College’s safety culture and Golshani’s
leadership” as early as 2016 or 2017, which were necessarily
unrelated to his idea to perform a self-audit in 2018. Further,

34
the Board says Golshani’s disclosures about auditing the
College’s safety procedures or needing funds to address ongoing
safety hazards “cannot and did not contribute” to any adverse
employment action because “all of those ‘disclosures’ are
examples of Golshani purportedly taking some steps toward
safety improvement” and therefore these disclosures could not
have contributed to the decision not to retain him for failing to
address safety adequately. These arguments do not withstand
scrutiny under our prescribed standard of review.
When all doubts and credibility determinations are
resolved in his favor, Golshani argues the evidence is sufficient
to support a reasonable inference that Jersky retaliated against
him by shutting him out of the investigation and decision-making
processes after the chemical fire, thereby insulating Jersky
from scrutiny for his own failures to address safety issues that
Golshani had raised, while also “lay[ing] the groundwork for
the pretextual excuses Jersky used to remove Golshani from
his position as Dean.” Golshani maintains his evidence—when
viewed in the light most favorable to him as the nonmoving party
—was sufficient to prove “Jersky had a motive to take actions
that discredited Golshani in order to protect Jersky’s own
interests,” as the blame for a major safety incident otherwise
might have fallen on Jersky for refusing to provide resources
that Golshani had consistently requested in connection with
his ongoing “safety complaints and demands.” Because this
motive stemmed from his protected disclosures, Golshani
argues it satisfies the causation element of his prima facie case
for retaliation under the CWPA. On the record presented,
we are compelled to agree.

35
While there is evidence that EHS and Jersky were
concerned about the College’s safety culture back in 2016 or 2017,
other evidence—including evidence the Board relied on in moving
for summary judgment—showed Golshani was “always outspoken
about safety issues” since the beginning of Jersky’s tenure at
the University (and even before then). Moreover, during the
2016 and 2017 periods, the evidence shows Golshani received
performance evaluation ratings of “exceeds expectations” from
Jersky, which at least casts doubt on the Board’s claim that the
Provost and EHS were concerned about the Dean’s leadership
during those years. (See, e.g., Scheer, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 909, 919 [where plaintiff raised “ ‘concerns related to patient
safety,’ ” evidence that he “received excellent evaluations” over
relevant period “put in issue” employer’s claim that he was
“terminated for ‘poor performance and conduct’ ”].)
The evidence also shows Golshani had made repeated
requests for funds to hire a full-time safety officer and to address
other safety hazards in the College during this period, including
asbestos removal and the installation of fume hoods, non-skid
flooring, and biosafety cabinets in certain labs. However,
these requests were largely denied, even after an EHS audit in
2016 confirmed the need to appoint a qualified, full-time safety
officer, as conditions in the labs had “reached a potential hazard
threshold.” Then, the chemical fire occurred in 2018. In the
fire’s aftermath, Golshani initiated an audit of the College’s
safety protocols with the intention of identifying and correcting
deficiencies that the audit uncovered. Even though it
indisputably was Golshani’s responsibility to conduct the
preliminary investigation under the IIPP, Jersky discouraged

36
him from completing the audit, ultimately securing the Dean’s
agreement to end it.
After Golshani terminated his audit, EHS conducted
its own investigation of the fire. However, while EHS consulted
frequently with Jersky, Golshani was entirely excluded from
the process and received no information about the investigation’s
progress or findings. Despite this, Golshani continued to impress
upon Jersky the need to hire two full-time safety officers to
address lingering gaps in the College’s oversight mechanisms.
But even after funding was allocated to fill one position, Jersky
shut Golshani out of the hiring process and appointed a faculty
member from outside the College to head the search committee.
Although the new safety officer confirmed that the College
—still under Golshani’s leadership—managed to remedy
all safety issues identified in a 2019 audit conducted by the
CSU Chancellor’s Office, he quit the job within a year, citing
disagreements with leadership that were firmly disputed by
Associate Dean Rahai. The safety officer’s departure prompted
another investigation by EHS in coordination with Jersky,
of which Golshani was again kept in the dark. Within a few
months, Jersky informed Golshani of the decision not to retain
him as Dean.
According to Golshani, this evidence demonstrates
“Jersky undertook a pattern of adverse actions” after the fire
to undermine Golshani’s leadership on safety issues and thereby
insulate himself and EHS from scrutiny because Golshani
had been “pushing Jersky to provide resources to fix urgent
safety concerns that Jersky was unable or unwilling to provide.”
Although Golshani made largely the same contention in his
administrative complaint to the University and in his deposition

37
testimony—characterizing himself as a “scapegoat” for Jersky’s
and EHS’s failures—the Board appears to have never directly
confronted this claim. While there are other plausible
explanations for Jersky’s actions, we cannot say that a
reasonable jury, presented with the evidence detailed above
and resolving material conflicts in Golshani’s favor, would be
compelled to find that his efforts to investigate and secure
funding to address ongoing safety hazards had nothing to do
with Jersky’s decisions to disempower Golshani after the fire,
especially given Jersky’s apparent role in denying the funding
requests. Because there are triable issues of material fact,
the court erred in concluding Golshani could not establish
the causation element of his CWPA claim.
5. The Evidence Raises Disputed Issues of Material Fact
Regarding the Board’s Affirmative Defense
Under the CWPA, once an employee demonstrates a
prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer
or supervisor to prove, as an affirmative defense, “by clear and
convincing evidence that the alleged action would have occurred
for legitimate, independent reasons even if the employee had
not engaged in protected disclosures.” (§ 8547.12, subd. (e);
see Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 712 [analyzing identical
“ ‘same-decision’ ” “affirmative defense” under Labor Code
whistleblower statute].)
“The burden on a defendant moving for summary judgment
based upon the assertion of an affirmative defense is heavier
than the burden to show one or more elements of the plaintiff’s
cause of action cannot be established.” (Anderson v. Metalclad
Insulation Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 289 (Anderson).)
“Instead of merely submitting evidence to negate a single element

38
of the plaintiff’s cause of action, . . . ‘the defendant has the initial
burden to show that undisputed facts support each element of
the affirmative defense.’ ” (Ibid., italics omitted, italics added.)
“The defendant must demonstrate that under no hypothesis is
there a material factual issue requiring trial. [Citation.] If the
defendant does not meet this burden, the motion must be denied.”
(Id. at pp. 289–290; see also Fazio v. Fairbanks Ranch Country
Club (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1057 [“ ‘A defendant moving
for summary judgment based upon an affirmative defense . . .
bears an overall burden of persuasion that there is a complete
defense to the plaintiff’s action’ . . . [and] must persuade the court
there is no triable issue of fact as to that defense.”].)
In this case, the same evidence that supports the
causation element of Golshani’s prima facie case also necessarily
precludes summary judgment based on the Board’s assertion
of its affirmative defense. Because this evidence supports a
reasonable inference that Golshani’s protected disclosures may
have contributed to Jersky’s and the University’s adverse actions
against him, it also necessarily disputes the Board’s attempt
to prove that the same decisions would have been made even
if Golshani had not engaged in the protected activity. (See
Anderson, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 292 [to prevail on
summary judgment based on an affirmative defense, the
defendant must offer “uncontradicted evidence” supporting
every element of the defense].)
The Board cites Vatalaro for the proposition that, even
under the heightened clear and convincing burden of proof, an
employer may establish the same-decision affirmative defense
on summary judgment. (See Vatalaro, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at
p. 386, citing Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011–

39
1012 [discussing appellate review of findings made under the
clear-and-convincing-evidence standard].) We agree with this
proposition as far as it goes, but Vatalaro is materially different
from our case because there apparently was no evidence
offered in Vatalaro to demonstrate a protected disclosure was
a contributing factor. Rather, because the parties had incorrectly
litigated the summary judgment motion under the three-part
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, instead of
the framework articulated by our Supreme Court in Lawson,
the plaintiff had directed her opposition to showing only that
“the County’s stated grounds for [its adverse action] ‘lack[ed]
credence and competent evidence’ and were merely a ‘pretext’
for retaliation.”13 (Vatalaro, at p. 383.) While the reviewing
court had “asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing
to account for Lawson,” it appears the plaintiff again exclusively
focused on whether “the County’s evidence was insufficient” to
prove its same-decision affirmative defense—and not whether
she had (or could have) offered evidence to show protected

13 The Vatalaro court explained: The plaintiff’s “argument
on this point follows from her (and the County’s and the trial
court’s) initial misunderstanding of the governing framework
for [Labor Code] section 1102.5 claims. Again, all proceeded on
the understanding that an employer could defeat an employee’s
retaliation claim under section 1102.5 if (1) it showed it had a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action and (2) the employee failed to show its proffered
reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. . . . [T]heir
understanding was flawed. . . . [A]s the Lawson court explained,
the employee need not ‘show that the employer’s nonretaliatory
reason was pretextual.’ ” (Vatalaro, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at
p. 383.)

40
activity was a contributing factor in the decision.14 (Vatalaro,
at pp. 383–384.) Ultimately, the Vatalaro court determined
“the County’s undisputed evidence would require a reasonable
fact finder to find it ‘highly probable’ ” that the County’s adverse
employment decision “would have occurred for legitimate,
independent reasons” even if the plaintiff had not engaged
in protected conduct.15 (Id. at p. 386, italics added.)
Unlike the defendant in Vatalaro, the Board moved
for summary judgment on the ground that Golshani could not

14 It is not apparent whether the Vatalaro court requested
or would have allowed the plaintiff to submit supplemental
evidence on the contributory factor issue, given she had—due
to the grounds asserted in the County’s motion—directed her
summary judgment opposition entirely at showing the County’s
stated reasons were pretextual. This court faced a similar
predicament in Scheer. There, we determined the proper course
was to reverse the summary adjudication, as the defendants
brought it under the incorrect framework, while observing that
the defendants were “not precluded on remand from moving for
summary adjudication . . . in accordance with the Labor Code
section 1102.6 framework” articulated by our Supreme Court
in Lawson. (Scheer, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 915.)
15 The Board’s other cases are inapplicable because both
considered claims under the FEHA retaliation statute (§ 12940)
applying the McDonnell Douglas framework. (See Morgan v.
Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52,
62, 68, 77 [applying “three-part test developed in McDonnell
Douglas” to FEHA retaliation claim, holding the plaintiff failed
to produce “substantial evidence of pretext required to avoid
summary judgment”]; Nejadian v. County of Los Angeles (2019)
40 Cal.App.5th 703, 722, 725–727 [considering retaliation claim
under FEHA; holding the plaintiff presented “no evidence” to
establish pretext].)

41
prove causation. And, unlike the plaintiff in Vatalaro, Golshani
opposed the motion by producing evidence to show his protected
disclosures were a contributing factor in the adverse employment
decisions that followed. As this evidence was sufficient to
support a reasonable inference that protected activity may have
caused the adverse action, it also was necessarily sufficient to
dispute the Board’s affirmative defense that the adverse action
would still have been taken, even if Golshani had not engaged
in protected activity.
6. The Trial Court Must Decide on Remand Whether
Golshani Should Be Granted Leave to Amend
After receiving the trial court’s tentative ruling granting
the Board’s summary judgment motion, Golshani moved
to amend his complaint to add allegations regarding other
protected disclosures that he claimed would “conform the
pleadings to the evidence” he offered in opposition to summary
judgment. The trial court denied the motion, concluding
Golshani’s failure to request leave to amend before receiving
the court’s tentative ruling constituted “unreasonable delay”
and “prejudice” to the Board, as allowing the amendment
would require the Board “to file another motion for summary
judgment.”
We conclude the trial court reasonably exercised its
discretion based on the circumstances presented. (See, e.g.,
Record v. Reason (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 472, 486.) However,
those circumstances have now changed. In light of our reversal
of the summary judgment, should Golshani renew his motion
to amend, the trial court must determine whether the same
or other factors still warrant departure from our state’s liberal
policy on allowing amendments. To the extent the trial court

42
also concluded amendment was unwarranted because the new
allegations did not constitute a protected disclosure, the court
may need to reexamine that ruling based on the views expressed
in this opinion. We make no judgment on these issues and leave
the matter to the trial court’s sound discretion on remand.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. Plaintiff Forouzan Golshani
is entitled to costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

We concur:

ADAMS, J.

HANASONO, J.

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