CourtListener 10846853•People v. Vogel CA1/2
Texte intégral
Filed 4/22/26 P. v. Vogel CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A174291
v.
CHANNING JAY VOGEL, (Del Norte County
Super. Ct. No. CF249189)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Channing Vogel appeals from a judgment of conviction after
he pleaded no contest to taking a vehicle without consent and was sentenced
to two years in county jail. Vogel’s court-appointed counsel has asked this
court to independently examine the record in accordance with People v.
Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) to determine if there are any arguable
issues that require briefing. Counsel advised Vogel of his right to file a
supplemental brief, and he did not do so. We have independently reviewed
the record in accordance with our Wende obligations and find no meritorious
issues. We thus affirm.
BACKGROUND1
On May 19, 2024, Wilhelm Knodel noticed that two large limbs had
been cut off a tree between his shed and the front of his property. A blue
1 The factual background is drawn from the testimony at the preliminary
hearing and the probation report.
1
truck and trailer were “backed to [the] shed” and hooked up to one of Knodel’s
Honda all-terrain vehicles. Knodel called the police and reported a “theft in
progress” and “that there was someone on his property in his shed.”
When Sergeant Dylan Balch of the Del Norte County Sheriff’s Office
arrived in response to the call, he found Vogel inside the shed holding a piece
of wood. Vogel told Sergeant Balch that he was “stacking wood,” and that he
worked on the property “sawing, mowing, and weed whacking.” He further
explained to Sergeant Balch that “he had observed Knodel’s yard out of hand
and came over to help,” and that “he had also been at the property the prior
day and was beginning to worry about Knodel because he had not been well.”
Knodel told Sergeant Balch that Vogel had previously done yard
maintenance for him six or seven times over a period of three or four years,
but that the most recent such occasion was over a year before the incident.
Knodel had not spoken to or seen Vogel in nine months and did not give him
permission to be on the property that day. He also indicated that Vogel had
“already stolen items from his shed,” including a BowFlex, table saw, hand
tools, bicycles, and a second Honda all-terrain vehicle worth some $2000.
Sergeant Balch then placed Vogel under arrest and read him his
Miranda2 rights. Vogel admitted that he did not have Knodel’s permission to
be on the property, and that he had taken the missing all-terrain vehicle to
his own property about half a mile away without Knodel’s permission. Vogel
claimed that he took the vehicle when he “noted a garage door open,” and
“ ‘was going to hold onto it until I got hold of [Knodel], because the garage
was open, man. Someone was in there. I hate to see his shit come up missing
like that.’ ”
2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
2
On June 20, the Del Norte County District Attorney filed a complaint,
and on December 11, the operative information, charging Vogel with two
counts of second degree burglary (Pen. Code3, § 459) (counts 1 and 2) and
driving or taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a))
(count 3). With respect to count 2, the information included the special
allegation that Vogel had previously been convicted of receiving stolen
property (§ 496d, subd. (a)) pursuant to section 666.5, subdivision (a). And
the information further alleged, as a circumstance in aggravation under
section 1170, subdivision (b) and California Rules of Court, rule 4.421, that
Vogel’s prior convictions as an adult were numerous.
In August, the matter was twice continued so that Vogel could hire
private counsel, and on September 17, Vogel indicated that he wished to
represent himself. The trial court set a further hearing for October 7 to set a
date for the preliminary hearing, giving Vogel “a chance to look at all of the
documents and talk to the district attorney” in the meantime.
On October 7, the matter was continued again after Vogel indicated
that he had not had a chance to talk to the district attorney and was
“currently getting some legal advice.” And on October 30, the preliminary
hearing was set for November 13.
The preliminary hearing began on November 13, with Vogel continuing
to represent himself. The prosecution’s first witness was Knodel, and after
his direct examination concluded, Vogel indicated that he had “questions, but
I don’t know how to ask them” and that he wished “to hire an attorney.”
After obtaining Vogel’s waiver of his rights to a speedy preliminary hearing
and to have that hearing conducted in one session (see § 861), the trial court
3 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3
continued the hearing until November 26, “to make sure Mr. Vogel does have
an attorney. If he doesn’t we will appoint the public defender.”
On November 26, the trial court appointed the public defender who had
previously represented Vogel to represent him again. On December 11 the
preliminary hearing resumed, and concluded that same day when the trial
court held Vogel to answer on the charges.
On May 9, 2025, Vogel—now represented by a different public
defender—entered into a plea agreement whereby he pleaded no contest to
count 3 in exchange for three years4 formal probation and dismissal of counts
1 and 2, as well as the pending charges in seven other cases.5 Vogel also
entered a waiver pursuant to People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247 (Cruz),
expressly agreeing that if he failed to appear at sentencing, a warrant would
issue for his arrest, he waived his right to withdraw his plea, and he could be
sentenced up to the three-year statutory maximum. (See id. at p. 1254, fn. 5.)
The plea agreement also required Vogel to “participate in [the pre-sentence
investigation] process with probation” and “[a]dhere to [the] terms of pretrial
supervision.” Sentencing was set for June 2.
On June 2, Vogel failed to appear. The trial court issued a bench
warrant and expressed its intent to reject the plea agreement and proceed to
trial upon Vogel’s arrest.
On June 13, defense counsel filed a request that the matter be placed
on calendar on June 18 “for recalling of warrants and setting.” On June 18,
Vogel again failed to appear, and defense counsel indicated that he “did not
4 The probation report would later note that section 1203.1, subdivision
(a) provides for a maximum two-year term of probation.
5 Several of these charges were for violation of a written promise to
appear (§ 853.7).
4
know where [Vogel]” was, and “the last communication I had with Mr. Vogel,
he indicated that he was not likely to be coming to court today.”
On July 11, Vogel was arrested, and on July 14, appeared in custody.
The trial court set a hearing on violation of the Cruz waiver and sentencing
for July 21.
At the hearing on July 21, the trial court found Vogel had violated the
Cruz waiver. After Vogel reiterated that he wished to plead guilty to count 3,
the trial court found that he was not suitable for mandatory supervision and
sentenced him to two years in county jail. The court then granted the
prosecution’s motion to dismiss the other two counts, as well as the
misdemeanor cases.
Vogel filed a notice of appeal and attached a request for a certificate of
probable cause, which the trial court granted.
DISCUSSION
As noted, Vogel’s appellate counsel has filed a brief under Wende,
supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, identifying no potentially arguable issues.
However, Vogel’s request for a certificate of probable cause appears to
assert that his preliminary hearing was not held within 60 days of his plea or
arraignment, as required by section 859b.6 Vogel concedes that on July 26,
2024, he executed a written waiver of his right to have a preliminary
examination within 10 days of his arraignment, but contends that “[a]t no
time after this did I give any further time waivers” and “[a]t no time did I
6 “The magistrate shall dismiss the complaint if the preliminary
examination is set or continued more than 60 days from the date of the
arraignment, plea, or reinstatement of criminal proceedings . . . unless the
defendant personally waives his or her right to a preliminary examination
within the 60 days.” (§ 859b.)
5
waive the 60 calendar day time for preliminary hearing.” These contentions
are not accurate. On September 17, 2024, after Vogel indicated that he
wished to represent himself at his preliminary hearing, the trial court
confirmed that Vogel would “give up your right . . . to a preliminary hearing
within 60 days beyond that date,” to which Vogel replied, “Yes, your Honor.”
And, as noted, on November 13, in continuing the preliminary hearing after
Vogel indicated he wished to hire an attorney, the trial court expressly asked:
“[D]o you waive and give up your time for the speedy preliminary hearing?”
Vogel again responded, “Yes, Your Honor.”
Vogel also contends that he felt “compelled” to accept a plea agreement
“based on extreme coercion and under the threat of immediate, long term
incarceration. I was given the impression that I had no other real choice.”
Vogel provides no facts or explanation to support this assertion, nor has our
independent review of the record located any.7
Finally, Vogel complains that he was represented by “three separate
attorneys,” the last of whom was “overloaded with cases,” and that he
“provided [his] appointed attorneys with motions to file, which none of them
would file, that I believe would have resulted in the proper dismissal of my
cases.” But Vogel’s request for a certificate of probable cause does not set
forth sufficient facts from which we could find that for any challenged act or
omission, there simply could be no satisfactory explanation for defense
counsel’s conduct. (See People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266–
7 Vogel was out of custody on May 9 when he entered his plea. And we
note that, given the Cruz waiver and the parties’ plea agreement for formal
probation, Vogel could in all likelihood have avoided incarceration altogether
(“long term” or otherwise) by simply appearing at his sentencing hearing on
June 2. He declined to do so.
6
267.) Thus, any claim of ineffective assistance of defense counsel “is more
appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (Ibid.)
In any event, we have independently reviewed the record for any
arguable issues. In entering his plea, Vogel was represented by counsel; he
discussed his plea with his attorney; he acknowledged and waived his rights;
he personally entered the plea; and the parties stipulated that the transcript
of the preliminary hearing provided a factual basis for it.
Further, given Vogel’s violation of his Cruz waiver, the sentence was
consistent with the plea agreement and authorized by law.
Having examined the entire record, we find no arguable error that
would result in a disposition more favorable to Vogel.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
7
RICHMAN, J.
We concur.
STEWART, P. J.
DESAUTELS, J.
(A174291N)
8
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