CourtListener 10846383•In re O.M. CA2/7
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Filed 4/21/26 In re O.M. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re O.M., a Person Coming Under B345321
the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP00965A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
M.M. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Nancy Ramirez, Judge. Affirmed.
Linda Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant M.M.
Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Z.R.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
In this dependency appeal, father M.M. (Father) and
mother Z.R. (Mother) each appeal from the juvenile court’s
termination of their parental rights as to their son O.M. (born
March 2023) under Welfare and Institutions Code section
366.26.1 The parents’ sole argument on appeal is that the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)
(ICWA) and related California law by failing to inquire of a
maternal aunt, a maternal uncle, and a paternal aunt whether
O.M. might be an Indian child. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Petition, Proceedings, ICWA Inquiry, and Termination of
Parental Rights
In March 2023, the Department filed a section 300 petition
on behalf of newborn O.M., after he tested positive for fentanyl
1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise specified.
2
and methadone at birth. The petition alleged substance abuse by
the parents, including methamphetamine use by Mother during
her pregnancy, and failure to protect by Father. (§ 300,
subd. (b)(1).)
O.M. had been removed shortly after birth pursuant to a
protective custody order and was detained from his parents with
monitored visits after the petition was filed. Both parents denied
Indian ancestry in court, and each filed an ICWA-020 form
denying any known Indian ancestry. The juvenile court found no
reason to know or believe O.M. was an Indian child. Both
parents denied Indian ancestry throughout the subsequent
proceedings.
On April 11, 2023 and May 22, 2024, paternal grandmother
Robyn M. denied Indian ancestry. On April 11, 2023, May 22,
2024, and December 19, 2024, maternal grandmother Mary R.
denied Indian ancestry.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing on May 1, 2023,
the juvenile court sustained the petition, declared O.M. a
dependent of the court, and removed him from both parents with
reunification services. Father’s counsel asked that “paternal
aunt, Jennifer [J.]” be assessed as a visitation monitor, and the
court ordered the Department to assess Jennifer J. as a potential
visitation monitor.2 The record does not otherwise contain a
reference to a paternal relative named Jennifer, and Father
subsequently reported he has five siblings, none of whom is
named Jennifer.
2 The court’s minute order states that “paternal aunt,
Jennifer P.” is to be assessed as a monitor for Father’s visits.
3
Mother reported she had three siblings—Sydney R.,
Zachary R., and Josh R.—and had previously provided the
Department with contact information for Sydney and Zachary
(but not Josh) in March 2023. Mother and Josh were adopted;
Sydney and Zachary were the birth children of Mary R. and
Mark R. Mother told the Department “she was adopted at birth
and was raised by her adoptive parents” and “she does not know
her biological family.”
Mother also stated she had a “wonderful relationship” with
Sydney and Josh, and that all of her siblings loved O.M.,
especially Sydney. In June 2023, the Department twice
communicated by telephone with maternal aunt Sydney, who
lived with maternal grandmother Mary R.3 The record does not
reflect Sydney was asked about O.M.’s Indian ancestry. The
Department made two unsuccessful attempts to contact Josh by
telephone in April 2023 and June 2023.
In November 2023, the juvenile court released O.M. to
Mother with the conditions that she submit negative drug tests
and not live with Father.
In April 2024, the Department filed a section 387
supplemental petition alleging Mother failed to comply with her
reunification plan due to continued substance abuse, including
smoking fentanyl with Father, and failure to follow court orders
to drug test and participate in treatment programs. O.M. was
detained from Mother, with monitored visits, and not released to
Father. The juvenile court found no reason to know or believe
O.M. was an Indian child.
3 Sydney R.’s name is sometimes spelled “Sidney” in the
record. We follow the spelling used in Mother’s briefs.
4
On May 22, 2024 and December 19, 2024, maternal
grandfather Mark and maternal uncle Zachary denied Indian
ancestry.
In June 2024, the juvenile court sustained the
supplemental petition, removed O.M. from Mother, and ordered
monitored visits and reunification services. The juvenile court
again found ICWA inapplicable.
In September 2024, at the review hearing, the juvenile
court found progress by both parents was unsubstantial,
terminated reunification services for both parents, and set a
section 366.26 hearing.
On January 17, 2025, paternal grandfather Kevin M. and
his wife, paternal step-grandmother Jill M., denied Indian
ancestry.
On March 24, 2025, the juvenile court held the
section 366.26 hearing. Mother objected to termination of her
parental rights and argued the beneficial parental relationship
exception to adoption was applicable. The court found O.M.
adoptable, determined the beneficial parental relationship
exception to adoption was inapplicable, terminated both parents’
parental rights, and placed O.M. for adoption. The juvenile court
determined ICWA was inapplicable.
Father and Mother each timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. ICWA and the Duties of Inquiry and Notice
“ICWA establishes minimum standards for state courts to
follow before removing Indian children from their families and
placing them in foster care or adoptive homes and does not
5
prohibit states from establishing higher standards.” (In re
Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1129 (In re Dezi C.); see 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1902, 1921; see also In re T.R. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 206,
218.) “[W]hen ICWA applies, ‘the Indian child’s tribe shall have a
right to intervene at any point’ in a proceeding involving the
removal of an Indian child from their family.” (In re Dezi C., at
p. 1129; see 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c).)4 “To ensure tribes have the
opportunity to exercise their rights in dependency proceedings,
an investigation of a family member’s belief a child may have
Indian ancestry must be undertaken and notice provided, where
appropriate, to the relevant tribes.” (In re T.R., at p. 218; see
§ 224.2, subd. (a).)
An inadequate ICWA inquiry in a dependency case does not
involve “a conventional scenario in which the harm from error
directly and solely affects the appealing party.” (In re Dezi C.
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1138.) Rather, “an appealing parent ‘is in
effect acting as a surrogate for the tribe in raising compliance
issues.’ ” (Ibid.) “ICWA and Cal-ICWA ‘ “recognize[ ] that the
tribe has an interest in the child which is distinct from but on a
parity with the interest of the parents” ’ and other relatives.”
(Ibid.) “That interest is compromised and cannot be protected if
4 For purposes of ICWA, an “Indian child” is an unmarried
individual under age 18 who is either a member of a federally
recognized Indian tribe or is eligible for membership in a
federally recognized tribe and is the biological child of a member
of a federally recognized tribe. (See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4)
[definition of “ ‘Indian child’ ”] & (8) [definition of “ ‘Indian
tribe’ ”]; see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (a) [adopting
federal definitions].)
6
the social service agency and the juvenile court fail to perform
their inquiry duties.” (Ibid.)
The duty to inquire “ ‘begins with initial contact (§ 224.2,
subd. (a)) and obligates the juvenile court and child protective
agencies to ask all relevant involved individuals whether the
child may be an Indian child.’ ” (In re Rylei S. (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 309, 316; see § 224.2, subds. (a)-(c).) The juvenile
court is required to “ask each party to the proceeding and all
other interested persons present whether the child is, or may be,
an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) The Department’s duty of
“[i]nquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking the child,
parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family
members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party
reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be,
an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2); see In re T.R., supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at pp. 218-219.)
ICWA and Cal-ICWA define “ ‘extended family member,’ ” if
not separately defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s
tribe, as “a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who
is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister,
brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second
cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); see § 224.1,
subd. (c).) “[A]lthough a child welfare agency need not interview
extended family members whom it cannot locate after a good
faith effort, it must seek to elicit information from extended
family members who are ‘ “reasonably available to help the
agency with its investigation” ’ into whether a child has potential
Indian ancestry.” (In re Claudia R. (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 76, 81
(Claudia R.); see In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140.)
7
The duty of further inquiry is triggered if the juvenile court
or the Department “has reason to believe that an Indian child is
involved in a proceeding, but does not have sufficient information
to determine that there is reason to know that the child is an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e); see In re T.R., supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at p. 219.) That further inquiry requires
interviewing, “as soon as practicable,” extended family members;
contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs; and contacting “the tribe
or tribes and any other person that may reasonably be expected
to have information regarding the child’s membership,
citizenship status, or eligibility.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e), (e)(2)(C); see
In re T.R., at p. 219.)
If the further inquiry “results in a reason to know the child
is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of
section 224.3 apply.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041,
1052; accord, In re T.R., supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 219; see
25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); § 224.3, subd. (a).) “ ‘The duty to develop
information concerning whether a child is an Indian child rests
with the court and the Department, not the parents or members
of the parents’ families.’ ” (In re Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th
at p. 317; accord, In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1131-
1132.)
“[E]rror resulting in an inadequate initial Cal-ICWA
inquiry requires conditional reversal with directions for the child
welfare agency to comply with the inquiry requirement of
section 224.2, document its inquiry in compliance with
rule 5.481(a)(5), and when necessary, comply with the notice
provision of section 224.3. When a Cal-ICWA inquiry is
inadequate, it is impossible to ascertain whether the agency’s
error is prejudicial. [Citations.] ‘[U]ntil an agency conducts a
8
proper initial inquiry and makes that information known, it is
impossible to know what the inquiry might reveal.’ ” (In re
Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1136; accord, In re T.R. supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at p. 220; see In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1087, 1094 (In re Kenneth D.) [“a judgment must be conditionally
reversed when error results in an inadequate ICWA inquiry”].)
But, “[i]f, upon review, a juvenile court’s findings that an
inquiry was adequate and proper and ICWA does not apply are
found to be supported by sufficient evidence and record
documentation as required by California law (rule 5.481(a)(5)),
there is no error and conditional reversal would not be warranted
even if the agency did not inquire of everyone who has an interest
in the child.” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)
“The juvenile court’s factual finding that ICWA does not
apply is ‘subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence.’
(§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).).” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1134; see Claudia R., supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 85 [“ ‘We
generally review the juvenile court’s factual finding that ICWA
does not apply for substantial evidence’ ”].) “[T]he juvenile
court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry is adequate,
proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary
function’ [citation] subject to a deferential standard of review.”
(In re Dezi. C., at p. 1141; see § 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
“ ‘On a well-developed record, the court has relatively broad
discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper,
adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.
However, the less developed the record, the more limited that
discretion necessarily becomes.’ ” (In re Kenneth D., supra,
16 Cal.5th at pp. 1101-1102.)
9
B. The Department Complied with Its Duty of Inquiry Under
Section 224.2, Subdivision (b)
As detailed above, the Department’s reports confirm its
social workers or investigators contacted and inquired about
O.M.’s Indian ancestry by asking both parents, both maternal
grandparents (who adopted Mother), both paternal grandparents,
and a maternal uncle, all of whom denied Indian ancestry. The
paternal step-grandmother also denied any knowledge of Indian
ancestry in the paternal family.
Although the Department’s ICWA inquiry covered the
available branches of O.M.’s family tree, the parents contend we
should conditionally reverse and remand for further ICWA
inquiry because three of their siblings were not asked about
O.M.’s Indian ancestry: (1) paternal aunt Jennifer, whom the
juvenile court ordered the Department in May 2023 to assess as a
monitor for Father’s visits with O.M., at Father’s request; (2)
maternal uncle Josh, with whom Mother stated she had a
“wonderful relationship”; and (3) maternal aunt Sydney, who
lived with maternal grandmother Mary and was contacted by the
Department by phone in June 2023.
Section 224.2, subdivision (b), however, does not mandate
that every living extended family member be interviewed. (In re
Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140 [reversal is not required in
“all cases in which every possible extended family member has
not been asked about the child’s Indian ancestry”].) What is
required is that the Department interview known and
“reasonably available” extended family members and make
reasonable efforts to identify and thereafter to interview any
other extended family members, as well as other individuals who
have an interest in the child regarding the child’s possible Indian
10
ancestry. (See Claudia R., supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 88 [duty
of inquiry not satisfied where Department failed to inquire of
maternal grandfather, maternal aunt, and maternal uncle whose
contact information was known to mother and who were in
contact with her].)
Here, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
finding that the Department discharged its duties under ICWA.5
As to paternal aunt Jennifer, the only reference to her in
the record is at the jurisdiction and disposition hearing when
Father’s counsel requested, and the court ordered, that Jennifer
be assessed as a potential monitor. The parents’ supplemental
briefs identify no other reference to Jennifer in the record. And,
as stated, none of Father’s five siblings is named Jennifer. The
record also does not reflect that any contact information was ever
provided for a “Jennifer.” On the day his counsel asked the court
to assess Jennifer as a monitor, Father submitted a “Relative
Information Sheet” to the juvenile court that included contact
information only for the paternal grandmother. There is no
substantial evidence that Father has a paternal sibling named
Jennifer who was reasonably available for an ICWA inquiry.
As to maternal uncle Josh, Mother argues that “on June 9,
2023, the Department unsuccessfully attempted to contact
maternal uncle, Josh R., - but did not try to contact him again.”
The Department’s telephone logs, however, reflect that the
Department made two efforts to contact Josh, once in April 2023
5 We invited the parties to submit supplemental briefing
regarding whether Father has a paternal relative named
Jennifer, and whether Jennifer, Sydney, or Josh were reasonably
available such that the Department had a duty to contact them to
conduct an ICWA inquiry.
11
and again in June 2023. The Department even made efforts to
obtain Josh’s name and contact information when Mother did not
provide either to the Department when she gave contact
information for Mary, Zach, and Sydney. Under the
circumstances presented, the court could reasonably conclude
that Josh was not “reasonably available.” (See In re C.L. (2025)
116 Cal.App.5th 53, 69 (In re C.L.) [sufficient evidence supported
juvenile court’s determination that Department’s inquiry was
adequate despite failure to inquire of maternal uncle where the
record did not “clearly demonstrate that the maternal uncle was
‘reasonably available to help the agency with its investigation’ ”];
In re Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1101 [“ ‘On a well-
developed record, the court has relatively broad discretion to
determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate,
and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.’ ”].)
As to maternal aunt Sydney, the Department
communicated with Sydney twice in June 2023, but the record
does not reflect it inquired regarding O.M.’s Indian ancestry. The
Department subsequently made efforts to contact Sydney in May
2024 for its updated June 2024 report to the court, but the
Department was told by Zachary and Mary that Sydney was
unavailable because she was out of the country for the next
month. Mary also stated that although Sydney had been living
with her in Florida, she was moving out in August 2024. And,
although Mother had stated she was close with Sydney, Mary
reported that Mother had recently “blocked” Sydney on her
telephone. Under these circumstances, it is not clear Sydney was
reasonably available. But even assuming she was, the juvenile
court could reasonably conclude it had sufficient, reliable
information before it from Mother, both maternal grandparents,
12
and another of Mother’s siblings indicating the maternal family
had no Indian ancestry, and there was no indication Sydney
would have any additional information.6 (See In re C.L., supra,
116 Cal.App.5th at p. 70 [substantial evidence supported court’s
determination Department’s ICWA investigation was adequate
because “[t]he court could reasonably consider the responses of
mother, the maternal grandmother, and the maternal great
uncle, as well as the absence of any indication the maternal uncle
would have more information than his own mother (the maternal
grandmother) as to whether the children are or may be Indian
children”]; In re Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1101.)
DISPOSITION
The orders terminating parental rights are affirmed.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
I concur:
STONE, J.
6 The dissent thoughtfully and correctly notes the
Department could have done more to reach maternal siblings
Josh and Sydney. But in light of the well-developed record before
the juvenile court, substantial evidence supports its
determination ICWA did not apply here. (In re Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1134; In re Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1101.)
13
FEUER, J., Dissenting
I agree with the majority’s thorough analysis of the
obligations of the juvenile court and the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (Department) under
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et
seq.) and the California Indian Child Welfare Act (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 224 et seq.).1 Specifically, as the majority explains, a
child welfare agency must seek to elicit information from
extended family members who are reasonably available to assist
the agency with its investigation into a child’s Indian ancestry,
but it “‘need not interview extended family members whom it
cannot locate after a good faith effort.’” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8,
quoting In re Claudia R. (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 76, 81
(Claudia R.); see In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1140 (Dezi
C.).) However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the
Department “discharged its duties under ICWA” (maj. opn., ante,
at p. 11) by making sufficient, good faith efforts to contact
Mother’s siblings Sydney and Josh. Sydney and Josh were
reasonably available (especially close family member Sydney), yet
no effort was made during the 18-month period in which O.M.
was removed from Mother to contact either of them to inquire
about the family’s Indian ancestry.2 Substantial evidence
therefore does not support the juvenile court’s determination that
the inquiry was adequate and that ICWA did not apply.
1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 O.M. was returned to Mother on November 8, 2023 and
remained with her until he was again removed on April 30, 2024.
The Department was generally diligent with respect to its
inquiry, interviewing the parents, the four grandparents,
maternal uncle Zachary, and the paternal step-grandmother, all
of whom denied Indian ancestry. For the final status report
before the March 24, 2025 hearing under section 366.26, the
social worker provided a helpful chart for the juvenile court that
outlined the individuals who were contacted, the dates and
method of contact (including telephone numbers), and
information provided by the contacts. Notably, however, Sydney
and Josh are not included in the chart, even to identify them as
extended family members who had not been contacted.
In March 2023 Mother told the social worker she had three
siblings and provided the social worker with Sydney’s telephone
number (and later with Josh’s telephone number). At the time,
Sydney was living with maternal grandmother Mary R. and the
maternal grandfather in Florida. The social worker interviewed
Mary as to the family’s Indian ancestry on April 11, 2023,
May 22, 2024, and December 19, 2024 (and the maternal
grandfather on the May and December dates), but not Sydney or
Josh. The only contact with Sydney reflected in the record is that
the social worker contacted her twice in June 2023, once as a
“consult” with a collateral contact as part of the initial
investigation, and a second time regarding available services for
O.M. The social worker attempted to call Josh two times (in
April and June 2023), also to consult as a collateral contact, but
the only other information in the record about this call is that the
social worker “attempted” to reach him. The record does not
show that the social worker left a message or a number where
she could be contacted.
2
It appears from this record that the social worker’s failure
to inquire of Mother’s two siblings may have been an oversight,
especially given that the social worker interviewed non-extended
family members, including the step-grandmother, Mother’s
roommate, and the roommate’s best friend. It is true that
“section 224.2 ‘does not require the agency to “find” unknown
relatives and others who have an interest in the child, merely to
make reasonable inquiries.’” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1140; see Claudia R., supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 87 [“in cases
where [the Department] makes a good faith effort to locate an
extended family member but is not successful, section 224.2 does
not require the Department to take additional steps to locate the
family member if there are other reasonably available family
members who can provide sufficient information on the children’s
potential Indian ancestry”].) But Sydney and Josh were far from
unknown.
Nor did the Department make a good faith inquiry. With
respect to Sydney, the majority relies on the Department’s two
conversations with Sydney in June 2023 for its underlying
investigation and that in May 2024 the Department learned
Sydney was out of the country for a month (into June), Sydney
was moving out of the family home in August 2024, and Mother
had recently “blocked” Sydney from calling her on her telephone.
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.) However, the May 22, 2024
conversation with the maternal grandparents and Zachary was
not about ICWA; rather, the dependency investigator interviewed
the family about their concern that they had lost contact with
Mother in the prior week and that Mother had potentially
relapsed. In that conversation Mary stated Sydney had been
living with the family and talked to Mother every day but Sydney
3
had not heard from Mother for a week. Zachary confirmed “their
whole family has been worried and trying to contact [M]other,”
noting Mother spoke most frequently with Sydney. Mary and
Zachary told the dependency investigator that she might not be
able to reach Sydney for the next month because Sydney was out
of the country and would “be unavailable for the next month.”
Neither the dependency investigator nor the social worker
attempted to contact Sydney following Sydney’s return in late
June or during the nine months leading up to the section 366.26
hearing. It is not clear why, as the majority concludes, the fact
Mother blocked Sydney from calling her, or that Sydney planned
to move out of the family home, would have prevented the social
worker from contacting Sydney by phone (at the number on
which they previously spoke) or from contacting Sydney through
the maternal grandparents or Zachary.
The Department likewise never attempted to contact Josh
after the April and June 2023 attempts to reach him during the
initial investigation (almost two years before the section 366.26
hearing). The record does not reflect that the social worker left a
message for Josh, nor did the social worker ask Mother (who had
a “wonderful” relationship with Josh and the siblings) to confirm
his contact information or help the social worker to contact him.
The fact the social worker did not include Josh in her ICWA
status reports throughout the case underscores that no effort was
made to contact him for this purpose.
Notwithstanding the Department’s lack of good faith efforts
to contact Sydney or Josh (acknowledging “the Department could
have done more”), the majority concludes the juvenile court
satisfied its obligations under ICWA because the court could have
reasonably concluded that it had sufficient information from the
4
grandparents and Zachary, and that Sydney (and presumably
Josh) would not have provided additional information. (Maj.
opn., ante, at pp. 13-14 & fn. 6.) It is true that the Department
was able to interview all four grandparents, who would be in the
best position to recount the family’s Indian ancestry. But that
does not mean the Department could ignore its obligation to
contact reasonably available extended family members who
might have information relevant to O.M.’s ancestry. On this
record, substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s
finding the Department made a sufficient, good faith effort to
contact Sydney and Josh during the 18 months in which O.M.
was removed from Mother. (See Claudia R., supra,
115 Cal.App.5th at p. 85 [“‘We review the juvenile court’s factual
finding that ICWA does not apply for substantial evidence.’”]; In
re C.R. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 793, 800 [same].)3
3 In re C.L. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 53, 70, relied on by the
majority (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 13-14), is distinguishable. In
that case the Court of Appeal concluded substantial evidence
supported the juvenile court’s determination that the
Department’s inquiry was adequate and ICWA did not apply,
notwithstanding the agency’s failure to inquire of the maternal
uncle whether the children may be Indian children. (Id. at p. 69.)
Unlike this case, the social worker made multiple attempts to
contact the maternal uncle, who was visiting the family from
Texas and had gotten in a physical altercation with the father
that led to detention of the children. The social worker called the
uncle on his cell phone (but he did not answer); she could not
leave a message because his voicemail was not set up; she sent a
text message to the uncle (with no response); the social worker
learned the uncle was in an inpatient rehabilitation program and
attempted unsuccessfully to locate the program; and she learned
5
Moreover, a determination that the juvenile court complied
with its ICWA obligations because the court had sufficient
reliable information and would not have learned anything new
from Sydney (or Josh) is, in my view, another way of saying the
error in failing to conduct an adequate ICWA was harmless. As
the majority acknowledges, the Supreme Court in Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at page 1136 clarified that “error resulting in an
inadequate initial Cal-ICWA inquiry requires conditional
reversal with directions for the child welfare agency to comply
with the inquiry [and notice provisions].” Further, “‘until an
agency conducts a proper initial inquiry and makes that
information known, it is impossible to know what the inquiry
might reveal.’” (Ibid.)
I recognize the importance of providing O.M. the
permanence and stability that every child needs. Had the
Department made some effort to contact Sydney and Josh prior to
the section 366.26 hearing a year ago, O.M. could be on his way
to adoption (unless the new information revealed he may have
Indian ancestry). And it may be that the failure to do so was an
oversight. Nonetheless, in light of the essential right of Indian
tribes to determine whether a child is an Indian child and to
intervene in removal proceedings when ICWA applies, I would
conditionally reverse and require the Department to remedy that
oversight now.
the uncle was not allowed to receive calls on his cell phone while
in the program. (Id. at pp. 59-60, 69.) In addition, it was
undisputed that the social workers had contacted all other
reasonably available extended family members. (Id. at pp. 69-
70.)
6
I therefore respectfully dissent.
FEUER, J.
7
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