In re N.G. CA5

CourtListener 10846321Calctapp21 avr. 2026

Texte intégral

Filed 4/21/26 In re N.G. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re N.G. et al., Persons Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN F090668
SERVICES,
(Super. Ct. Nos. JD144789-01,
Plaintiff and Respondent, JD144790-01, JD144791-01)

v.
OPINION
J.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Christie
Canales Norris, Judge.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Kendra L. Graham, Interim County Counsel, and Elizabeth M. Giesick, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Appellant Javier G. (father) is the father of Alvin R., Natalie G., and Nathan G.
(collectively “the children”), who are the subjects of this dependency case. Father
challenges the juvenile court’s order issued at a Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.261 hearing that resulted in his parental rights being terminated. Father
contends the juvenile court erred when it declined to apply the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception. Father also argues that the juvenile court erred in denying his
section 388 petition requesting placement of the children.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2023, the children were taken into protective custody by law
enforcement after mother’s arrest for violating a domestic violence restraining order.
Sacramento County Child Protective Services (Sacramento CPS) filed an original petition
alleging the children were described by section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The allegations
involved mother’s history of engaging in domestic violence in the presence of the
children and untreated anger management problem.
A social worker conducted interviews with Natalie and Alvin on March 21, 2023.
Natalie, at six years of age, stated mother was fighting with a roommate before she was
taken to jail. She indicated father was living in Bakersfield. Natalie had observed
mother and father physically fight in the past. She described a situation where father
pulled mother’s hair and mother punched father in the stomach.
Alvin, at 11 years of age, recorded the fight between his mother and the roommate
on his cell phone. The children and mother used to live in Bakersfield with father.
Father was the stepfather of Alvin, but Alvin considered him as his father. Alvin
witnessed mother and father fight approximately four times per week when they lived

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

2.
together. Mother often left Alvin at home with his siblings at night, and he was unaware
of where mother went.
At a continued detention hearing held on March 30, 2023, the children were
detained from mother’s custody and released to father with court supervision. A
combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing was set for April 27, 2023.
On June 6, 2023, the allegations of the petition were found true, and the
disposition hearing was continued to June 22, 2023. Sacramento CPS requested the case
be transferred to Kern County based upon father’s current residence. The transfer out
motion was granted on June 22, 2023, and the Kern County Juvenile Court (juvenile
court) accepted the case on July 19, 2023. A disposition hearing was set for August 16,
2023.
On July 20, 2023, the children were taken into protective custody after mother and
father were involved in a domestic violence incident while the children were present.
The Kern County Department of Social Services (department) filed both supplemental
section 387 and subsequent section 342 petitions. The petitions alleged father kicked
mother’s leg and abdomen, pushed her with both hands, struck her with a closed fist to
the chest, and attempted to strangle her. The petitions further alleged mother threw
porcelain items at father, which struck Natalie’s ankle. Father then threw a broken piece
of porcelain at mother. Mother attempted to kick father in the head while she was on the
ground.
At the detention hearing on the petitions, held on July 24, 2023, the children were
ordered detained from both parents. A jurisdiction and disposition hearing for the
petitions was set for August 7, 2023. The juvenile court found the allegations in each of
the petitions true at a contested jurisdiction hearing. Father was served with a temporary
restraining order in open court. The disposition hearing was continued to September 28,
2023.

3.
The report for the disposition hearing on the supplemental and subsequent
petitions, dated September 21, 2023, recommended the children be removed from the
custody of mother and father, and family reunification services were to be provided to
both parents. Father was participating in 26-week programs for domestic violence and
parenting.
At the disposition hearing, the children were removed from the custody of both
parents, and family reunification services were ordered for mother and father. Father was
ordered to participate in counseling for child neglect/parenting, domestic violence
counseling, and random drug testing. A positive drug test would require father to enroll
in substance abuse counseling. Supervised visits were to occur between father and the
children twice per week for two hours. A six-month review hearing was set for March
28, 2024.
Family Reunification Period
The report prepared for the six-month review hearing, dated March 18, 2024,
recommended that reunification services be continued for mother and father. Father
attended 17 of 18 potential visits with the children. In October 2024, the department
denied father’s request to attend visits with mother due to the domestic violence
concerns. In January 2024, the social worker informed mother and father that they were
still unable to have joint visitation because they were observed arguing before a visit.
Father was described as attentive to all the children during his visits.
Father completed his parenting classes in January 2024 and domestic violence
classes in February 2024. Two of father’s random drug test results were positive for
alcohol, and he did not show for three of the 11 total tests. The department’s assessment
indicated father needed to find appropriate housing and demonstrate behavioral changes
in relation to his relationship with mother. Mother was dropped from her anger
management and domestic violence class, and she was not eligible for reinstatement due

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to her aggressive and disrespectful behavior. However, father continued to maintain his
relationship with mother.
In a supplemental report, filed March 28, 2024, the department changed its
recommendation to terminate family reunification services for Nathan and Natalie due to
their ages. At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court ordered continued family
reunification services for both parents as to all the children. Father was ordered to submit
to weekly random drug tests due to the court’s concerns with father’s recent positive drug
test result for alcohol. The issue was identified as a “huge factor” for the 12-month
review hearing set on May 16, 2024.
The report prepared for the 12-month review hearing recommended that family
reunification services be terminated for mother and father and a section 366.26 hearing be
set. Natalie and Nathan were placed together in a resource family home, and Alvin was
placed in a separate home. The children’s care providers were unwilling to provide plans
of adoption or guardianship. The social worker was attempting to look for placements
that could offer more permanency.
On April 2, 2024, Natalie’s care provider explained that father showed her several
missed phone calls from mother. He claimed he did not know why mother called his
phone. On April 15, 2024, the care provider informed the social worker that Natalie
reported speaking with mother during her latest visit with father. Natalie admitted that
each of the children spoke to mother on the phone while father told them to whisper.
Natalie’s face appeared scared when questioned about the incident by the social worker,
and she stated, “I don’t want my parents to get in trouble.” Natalie shared that her father
loved mother, but the judge did not want them living together.
Alvin denied that he spoke with mother during father’s visit, and he indicated that
his parents were working together to get the children out of foster care. Father
acknowledged that he allowed the children to speak with mother during the visit. He

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denied having a relationship with mother, and he stated that he would tell mother to leave
the home if the children were returned to his care.
Father admitted to drinking on his birthday, but he insisted that he was not an
alcoholic. The results of father’s weekly drug and alcohol tests were negative for all
substances. The social worker’s assessment determined the children could not be
returned home because father did not understand his responsibility in protecting the
children from mother and their domestic violence relationship.
The juvenile court adopted the department’s recommendation at the 12-month
review hearing held on May 16, 2024, and it terminated reunification services for mother
and father. In making its decision, the juvenile court stated:

“I do believe that the father is being untruthful regarding his relationship
with mother. [¶] …[¶] … I do not believe he’s being forthcoming. The
encouragement of the children not to be truthful regarding that phone call in
the visit, that is the theme throughout the case. [¶] I agree with
[department’s counsel], that because of this continued relationship, he fails
on the second and third prong to find a substantial probability the children
will be returned…”

The children were found to not be proper subjects for adoption or guardianship,
and a permanent plan of placement with a fit and willing relative was ordered. A review
hearing pursuant to section 366.3 was set for November 13, 2024.
Combined Sections 366.26 and 388 Hearing
The department’s reports for the section 366.3 review hearing recommended that a
section 366.26 hearing be set for each of the children. Alvin’s care providers were
committed to a plan of legal guardianship. The care providers of Natalie and Nathan
expressed a desire to provide a plan of adoption. At a continued section 366.3 review
hearing, the juvenile court set a section 366.26 hearing for May 13, 2025.
The section 366.26 report, dated May 1, 2025, recommended that the juvenile
court order a plan of legal guardianship for Alvin and terminate the parental rights of

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mother and father and a plan of adoption be ordered for Nathan and Natalie. Alvin had
been placed in the home of his prospective legal guardians since July 2023. Natalie and
Nathan had been living with their prospective adoptive parents since May 2024.
The social worker explained the differences between adoption, legal guardianship,
and long-term foster care to each of the children. Thirteen-year-old Alvin stated he was
open to legal guardianship because he wanted an opportunity for father to reunify with
him. Eight-year-old Natalie reported she was open to adoption because she liked to live
with her current care providers. She explained that she would “beg for visits” if she was
unable to see her mother and father again. Four-year-old Nathan was open to adoption
because he wanted to live with the care providers “forever.”
The care providers for Natalie and Nathan were committed to providing a
permanent plan of adoption. Natalie and Nathan formed a parental relationship with their
care providers, and they depended on the care providers for their daily physical and
emotional needs. Father attended 147 of 156 visits throughout the proceedings. The
social worker’s adoption assessment acknowledged that there was an established
relationship between father and the children. The children looked forward to their visits
with father, but there were no major signs of distress or difficulty during or after visits.
The department believed the benefits and permanency of adoption would outweigh any
detriment caused by termination of parental rights.
On May 8, 2025, father filed a section 388 petition requesting the children be
returned to his custody with family maintenance services. The petition alleged father
completed his case plan and avoided contact with mother for several months. Father
attached several documents to demonstrate his completion of programs, attendance of
AA/NA meetings, and negative drug tests. The children’s best interest was alleged to be
served because father was able to keep the children safe and “provide love and care
forever.”

7.
The juvenile court set the section 388 petition for a hearing on the same date as the
upcoming section 366.26 hearing. Both hearings were continued to allow the department
to respond to father’s petition. The department was provided with discretion to allow
unsupervised visits between father and the children.
The department filed a supplemental report, dated June 12, 2025, which
recommended the petition be denied. The adoption social worker interviewed Nathan
and Natalie on May 15, 2025. Natalie was willing to have two-to-four-hour visits with
father, but she did not want to spend the night at his home. She did not want to return to
her father’s care because she was afraid that her parents would get back together and
fight again. Natalie expressed her wishes to stay with her current care providers forever.
Nathan told the adoption social worker that he did not want to participate in an
unsupervised visit with father. He responded “oh no” when asked if he wanted to return
to father’s home. Nathan was afraid his parents would fight, and he wanted his care
providers to become his mom and dad.
On June 8, 2025, the adoption social worker asked Alvin about the possibility of
returning to father’s home. Alvin stated, “I know if I go back home, I would be with my
family, but at the same time I want to stay where I am right now.” He acknowledged his
previous desire to return to his parents, but he explained that he felt more comfortable in
his current placement.
During a supervised visit with father on August 11, 2025, Nathan told the
visitation monitor that he was ready to leave before the visit was over. The children and
father began walking to the parking lot with approximately 10 minutes remaining in their
visit. In August 2025, Nathan indicated that he did not want to live with mother and
father. He identified his current care providers as his “mom” and “dad.” Natalie
reaffirmed her desire to be adopted by the care providers. She responded that she would
like to continue visits with mother and father when she was asked about the possibility of

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returning to her parents. Natalie felt protected in the care providers’ home, and she was
provided with all that she needed.
On August 29, 2025, the juvenile court held a contested hearing on father’s section
388 petition and the section 366.26 hearing. Father was present and testified in support
of his section 388 petition. He believed the children should be returned to his care
because he completed his parenting class, domestic violence program, and substance
abuse treatment. Father testified regarding his relationship with each of the children. His
sobriety from drugs and alcohol provided him with a clearer mind. The last reported
contact between father and mother was over one year earlier.
In closing argument, father’s counsel argued that father demonstrated a change in
circumstance such that it was in the children’s best interest to be returned to his custody.
Counsel for the children and department requested that father’s petition should be denied
due to a lack of changed circumstances. After hearing argument from all counsel, the
juvenile court proceeded to its ruling on the section 388 petition. The juvenile court
acknowledged that father had demonstrated a change in circumstances since his
reunification services were terminated. However, the court concluded there was no
evidence that placing the children in father’s care would be in their best interest. In
relation to the children’s best interest, the juvenile court gave great weight to the
statements the children made to the adoption social worker.
Father’s section 388 petition was denied, and the juvenile court proceeded to the
section 366.26 hearing. Father’s counsel requested the juvenile court incorporate father’s
testimony from the section 388 hearing into evidence, and she argued that the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception to adoption applied.
The juvenile court found Nathan and Natalie were likely to be adopted. It
acknowledged father had demonstrated the first element of the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception with regular visitation and contact. However, the court concluded
father did not meet his burden of proving the final two elements of the exception.

9.
The juvenile court proceeded to follow the department’s recommendation, and it
terminated the parental rights of mother and father and selected a permanent plan of
adoption for Natalie and Nathan. The juvenile court found there was not clear and
convincing evidence that Alvin would be adopted. Alvin was ordered to remain placed in
foster care with a permanent plan of placement with a fit and willing relative. Father
filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Denial of Section 388 Petition
Father contends the juvenile court erred when it failed to grant his section 388
petition requesting custody of the children. He argues that the court abused its discretion
by applying a “simple best interest test.”
A. Legal Principles
A petition to modify a juvenile court order under section 388 must allege facts
showing new evidence or changed circumstances exist and changing the order will serve
the child’s best interests. (§ 388, subd. (a); In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217,
1235.) The petitioner has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.570(h)(1)(D).) In assessing the petition, the juvenile court may
consider the entire history of the case. (In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181,
189.)
Section 388 serves as an “ ‘escape mechanism’ when parents complete a
reformation in the short, final period after the termination of reunification services but
before the actual termination of parental rights.” (In re Kimberly F. (1997)
56 Cal.App.4th 519, 528.) (Kimberly F.) “After the termination of reunification services,
the parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer
paramount. Rather, at this point ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency
and stability’ ….” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.)

10.
“The change in circumstances must relate to the purpose of the order and be such
that the modification of the prior order is appropriate. [Citations.] In other words, the
problem that initially brought the child within the dependency system must be removed
or ameliorated. [Citation.] The change in circumstances or new evidence must be of
such significant nature that it requires a setting aside or modification of the challenged
order. [Citation.]” (In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 612.) “A petition which
alleges merely changing circumstances and would mean delaying the selection of a
permanent home for a child to see if a parent, who has repeatedly failed to reunify with
the child, might be able to reunify at some future point, does not promote stability for the
child or the child’s best interests.” (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47.)
When determining whether a modification under section 388 would be in the best
interests of the child, courts have considered several factors including but not limited to:
“(1) the seriousness of the problem which led to the dependency, and the reason for any
continuation of that problem; (2) the strength of relative bonds between the dependent
children to both parent and caretakers; and (3) the degree to which the problem may be
easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been.” (Kimberly
F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 532.)
B. Standard of Review
We review the denial of a section 388 petition after an evidentiary hearing for
abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318.) “ ‘The appropriate
test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.’ ”
(Id. at pp. 318–319.) “ ‘The denial of a section 388 motion rarely merits reversal as an
abuse of discretion.’ ” (In re Daniel C. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1445.) Where
there is conflicting evidence, we reverse only if the evidence compels a finding for the
appellant as a matter of law. (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527–1529.)

11.
C. Analysis
In the present case, the juvenile court determined that father did not prove the
children’s best interests were served by granting his request. Father provided evidence
that he completed his case plan, ceased communication with mother, and maintained his
relationship with the children through regular visitation. These facts were understood
and acknowledged by the court. However, it is irrelevant that there may be evidence
which would support a conclusion contrary to that of the juvenile court. (In re K.B.
(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1292.) The court denied father’s section 388 petition
because it did not find that placing the children with father was in their best interests,
given the children’s need for permanency. Thus, the court properly focused on the
children’s permanency and stability when it considered father’s request to delay the
children’s proposed permanent plans.
Citing to Kimberly F., father argues that the juvenile court’s denial of his section
388 petition was based upon the application of a “simple best interest test.” !(AOB at p.
28, 31)! In Kimberly F., the court of appeal rejected a trial court’s use of a simple best
interest test — of comparing the household and upbringing offered by the natural parent
or parents with that of the caretakers — in analyzing a section 388 petition. (Kimberly
F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at pp. 526–530.) The appellate court recommended a list of
factors, not meant to be exhaustive, which should be considered. (Id. at pp. 531–532.)
They are as follows: “(1) the seriousness of the problem which led to the dependency,
and the reason for any continuation of that problem; (2) the strength of relative bonds
between the dependent children to both parent and caretakers; and (3) the degree to which
the problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually
has been.” (Ibid.)
Father’s contention, however, is not supported by the evidence as there is no such
comparison of households on this record. In making its decision, the juvenile court
emphasized its reliance on the children’s statements that they were afraid of returning to

12.
father’s care because of the possibility that they would be exposed to more fighting
between their parents. Father’s history of engaging in domestic violence with mother
after the children were already removed from mother’s care at the outset of the
dependency provided an adequate reason for the court to question father’s promise to
remain separated from mother. The children clearly expressed their desire to remain in
their current placement, and this desire was appropriately considered by the court. The
evidence showed that the children were in stable placements with care providers who
were committed to providing a permanent home.
At this stage in the proceedings, father’s best interest is “simply no longer the
focus.” (See, e.g., In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527 [“after reunification efforts
have terminated, the court’s focus shifts from family reunification toward promoting the
child’s needs for permanency and stability”].) Father’s argument that his bond with the
children and completion of his case plan required a return of the children to his custody
ignores the legally required shift in focus once his prior efforts failed. According to In re
Debra M. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1032, “[t]he reality is that childhood is brief; it does not
wait while a parent rehabilitates himself or herself. The nurturing required must be given
by someone, at the time the child needs it, not when the parent is ready to give it. [¶]
The Legislature has expressed increasing concern with the perceived and accurate reality
that time is of the essence in offering permanent planning for dependent children.” (Id. at
p. 1038, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Eli F. (1989) 212
Cal.App.3d 228, 234.)
Father’s section 388 petition contemplated further delay in permanency for
children that had remained in out of home care for over two years. His argument that the
Kimberly F. factors warranted the relief he sought is little more than an invitation for this
court to reweigh the evidence. However, it is the exclusive province of the juvenile court
to evaluate credibility and determine what weight to give testimony. (In re Laura F.
(1983) 33 Cal.3d 826, 833.) Furthermore, the juvenile court properly focused on whether

13.
the relief father sought would advance the children’s interest in permanence and stability
and found otherwise. We conclude therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying father’s request. (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318.)
II. Beneficial Parent-Child Relationship Exception
Father’s next contention is that the juvenile court erred when it did not apply the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption. Father asserts that the juvenile
court “failed to consider the primary attachment of Nathan and Natalie to Father since
birth.”
A. Legal Principles
At a section 366.26 hearing, when the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing
evidence the child is adoptable, it is generally required to terminate parental rights and
order the child be placed for adoption unless a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1).) One of the statutory exceptions is the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception, which applies when “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining
that termination would be detrimental to the child” where “[t]he parents have maintained
regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing
the relationship.” (Id., subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
A parent claiming an exception to adoption has the burden of proof to establish by
a preponderance of evidence that the exception applies. (In re Melvin A. (2000) 82
Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252.) Thus, the parent must prove three elements in order to prevail
under the beneficial relationship exception: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a
relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614, 631 (Caden C.).)
The first element of the beneficial relationship determination asks the
“straightforward” question of whether the parent visited consistently, considering the
extent permitted by court orders. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The focus is

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on the best interest of the child as opposed to punishing or rewarding parents for good
behavior in maintaining contact. (Ibid.)
The second element of the exception asks whether the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The parent-child
relationship “may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the
portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect
of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Ibid.,
quoting In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) The juvenile court’s focus
should again be on the child, and it “must remain mindful that rarely do ‘[p]arent-child
relationships’ conform to an entirely consistent pattern.” (Caden C., at p. 632.)
When considering the third element, courts must determine “how the child would
be affected by losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the
child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 633.) Potential negative effects from severance of the relationship might
include “emotional instability and preoccupation leading to acting out, difficulties in
school, insomnia, anxiety, or depression.” (Ibid.) An adoptive home might provide a
new source of stability that alleviates emotional instability and preoccupation leading to
those problems, making the loss “not, at least on balance, detrimental.” (Ibid.) Under
this element, the court is again guided by the child’s best interest, but in a “specific way:
it decides whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the security and the
sense of belonging a new family would confer.’ ” (Ibid.)
In Caden C., the court held “that because the parent continued to struggle with
substance abuse and mental health issues and because of the risks of foster care and
benefits of the potential adoptive home, no reasonable court could find the child’s
relationship with his parent outweighed the benefits of adoption.” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 625–626.) Rejecting that conclusion, our Supreme Court found “[t]he
Court of Appeal did not explain how the parent’s struggles related to the specific

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elements of the statutory exception: the importance of the child’s relationship with the
parent or the detriment of losing that relationship.” (Id. at p. 626.) A parent’s struggles
with issues that led to dependency were determined to be relevant only to the extent they
inform whether the child would “benefit from continuing the relationship and be harmed,
on balance, by losing it.” (Id. at p. 638.)
B. Standard of Review
Appellate courts review a juvenile court’s ruling on the application of the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception using a “hybrid” standard. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.) The substantial evidence standard applies to the first two
elements of regular visitation and existence of a beneficial relationship. (Id. at pp. 639–
640.) The juvenile court’s decision as to the third element—whether termination of
parental rights would be detrimental to the child—is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
(Id. at p. 640.) “Review for abuse of discretion is subtly different, focused not primarily
on the evidence but the application of a legal standard. A court abuses its discretion only
when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)
The standard of review of a court’s determination that a parent did not meet his or
her burden to prove an exception to termination of parental rights is “whether the
evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.” (In re I.W.
(2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved on other grounds by Conservatorship of
O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) Specifically, the question is “whether the
appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was
insufficient to support a finding.’ ” (In re I.W., supra, at p. 1528.)
C. Analysis
In the present case, the juvenile court determined that father did not meet his
burden of proof as to the application of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception.

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The parties acknowledge the juvenile court’s finding that father visited regularly.
However, the juvenile court did not find that there was sufficient evidence that
maintaining Nathan and Natalie’s relationship with father outweighed the benefits of
adoption to establish the exception.
In support of his contention that the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the
exception, father cites to evidence that he had positive and affectionate interactions with
the children during visits. While father consistently visited the children, satisfying the
first prong of the exception, he failed to identify any evidence that would compel a
finding that termination of their parental rights would cause the children great harm. The
evidence before the court established that the children appeared to enjoy the supervised
visits that occurred with father for the two years following their removal. However,
evidence that the children had pleasant visits with their father is not enough to preserve
parental rights. (See In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827 [“The parent must
do more than demonstrate ‘frequent and loving contact[,]’ [citation] an emotional bond
with the child, or that parent and child find their visits pleasant”].)
We do not find that, in making its determination, the juvenile court abused its
discretion by failing to consider father’s attachment to the children since birth. Viewed
in its context, the juvenile court considered Natalie and Nathan’s need for stability based
upon their expressions of safety in the home of their prospective adoptive parents. On
balance, it concluded that ongoing interactions while father continued making positive
changes to his life was not as beneficial as their greater need for stability. Furthermore,
the court’s ruling on the exception did not consider father’s inability to provide a home in
comparison to the suitability of their current placement, and there is no indication that the
court relied on father’s present inability to fill a “parental role” to bar the parent-child
relationship exception.
The evidence in the record weighed in favor of the preferred permanency option of
adoption. Given the fact that Nathan and Natalie were still relatively young, showed no

17.
distress when separating from father, and were bonded to their care providers, we find the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. Under these circumstances, the juvenile
court’s ruling is entitled to a presumption of correctness, and remand is unwarranted.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) Therefore, the juvenile court did not err in
declining to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, and its orders
terminating father’s parental rights were proper.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.

DE SANTOS, J.
WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, Acting P. J.

MEEHAN, J.

18.

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