People v. Miller CA2/4

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Filed 4/16/26 P. v. Miller CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B343698

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA039139
v.

JOHN DREW MILLER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Alison S. Matsumoto, Judge. Remanded for
resentencing.
Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan M. Krauss and Stefanie
Yee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In this postconviction appeal from a Penal Code section
1172.75 resentencing order, the parties agree that remand for a
full resentencing hearing is warranted.1 We agree with the
parties.

BACKGROUND
In 2002, after a jury trial, the trial court sentenced
appellant John Drew Miller to 48 years to life in state prison
under the Three Strikes law. This sentence included a one-year
prior prison term enhancement imposed under section 667.5,
subdivision (b), an upper term sentence on a burglary conviction
(§ 459), and an upper term firearm enhancement imposed under
section 120225, subdivision (a).
Decades later, following the passage of Senate Bill No. 483
(Stats. 2021, ch. 728) (SB 483), the trial court held a resentencing
hearing for Miller under section 1172.75.2 At that hearing, the

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 “Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b)
required trial courts to impose a one-year sentence enhancement
for each true finding on an allegation that a defendant served a
separate prior prison term and had not remained free of custody
for at least five years.” (People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th
664, 681, citing former § 667.5, subd. (b).) “Effective January 1,
2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) [ ] (Stats. 2019,
ch. 590) amended section 667.5 by limiting the prior prison term
enhancement to only prior terms for sexually violent offenses.”
(People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 380 (Burgess).)
“Enhancements based on prior prison terms served for other
offenses became legally invalid.” (Ibid.) The Legislature later
enacted SB 483, effective January 1, 2022, to make the changes
implemented by Senate Bill No. 136 retroactive by adding former

2
court struck the prior prison term enhancement and, in total,
reduced Miller’s sentence from 48 years to life to 36 years to life
in state prison. The court reimposed the upper term sentences on
Miller’s burglary conviction and firearm allegation. Miller timely
appealed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Miller argues that his case should be remanded
for resentencing because the trial court erroneously concluded it
did not have the authority to consider his motion under People v.
Superior Court (Romero) 1996 13 Cal.4th 497 at his section
1172.75 resentencing hearing. The Attorney General contends
the record is ambiguous regarding whether the trial court
erroneously concluded it could not consider Miller’s Romero
motion, but agrees that remand is warranted to ensure the trial
court properly considers the motion. We agree with Miller’s
reading of the record. It appears the trial court declined to
consider Miller’s Romero motion because it concluded that doing
so would amount to an unconstitutional amendment to the Three
Strikes Reform Act of 2012.
We disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that
considering Miller’s Romero motion would violate the Three
Strikes Reform Act. “A trial court has the authority to strike

section 1171.1 (now section 1172.75) to the Penal Code. (Burgess,
supra, at p. 380, citing Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.) Section 1172.75,
subdivision (c) requires the trial court, upon being properly
notified that a defendant is serving a sentence that includes a
legally invalid prior prison term enhancement (see § 1172.75,
subd. (b)), to recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.

3
prior strikes under section 1385(a) and Romero at a section
1172.75 hearing.” (People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340,
345 (Rogers).) “Because a trial court’s power under section
1385(a) to dismiss or strike a strike prior is independent of either
the Three Strikes law or the subsequent [Three Strikes] Reform
Act, any exercise of that power at a resentencing proceeding
under section 1172.75 does not offend either.” (Rogers, at p. 362.)
On remand, the trial court is directed to hold a resentencing
hearing under section 1172.75 and consider Miller’s Romero
motion.
The parties disagree over whether the trial court’s
reimposition of the upper term sentence based on aggravating
factors not found true beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by
Miller violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Courts of Appeal
are split on this issue, and it is currently pending in the
California Supreme Court in People v. Eaton (Mar. 14, 2025,
C096853) [nonpub. opn.], review granted May 14, 2025, S289903
(Eaton).3
Consistent with our division’s prior unpublished decisions,
we conclude the plain language of section 1172.75, subdivision
(d)(4) expressly permitted the trial court to reimpose the upper
term in the manner it did. Subdivision (d)(4) states: “Unless the
court originally imposed the upper term, the court may not

3 The issue on review in Eaton is: “May a trial court reimpose
a previously imposed upper term sentence under Penal Code
section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) where the facts underlying one
or more aggravating circumstances were neither stipulated to by
the defendant nor found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial
by the jury or by the judge in a court trial (cf. Pen. Code, § 1170,
subd. (b)(2); id., § 1172.75, subd. (d)(2))?”

4
impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless there are
circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term
of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those facts have
been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3), italics added.) The trial
court complied with this clear statutory language and thus did
not err in reimposing upper term sentences. (See People v.
Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455, 458 (Brannon-
Thompson) [Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) “does not require
aggravating factors to be found true beyond a reasonable doubt if
the upper term was previously imposed”]; accord People v. Mathis
(2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359, 371–374; but see People v. Gonzalez
(2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 329–330 [concluding that following
Brannon-Thompson’s reading of the statute would violate the
Sixth Amendment].)
On remand, the trial court has jurisdiction to consider
Miller’s Romero motion and every aspect of Miller’s sentence.
This means the court may consider its full range of sentencing
options, including whether it would serve the interest of justice to
reimpose the upper terms or to instead impose different terms on
the burglary count and the firearm allegation. (See People v.
Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893; People v. Coddington (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 562, 568.)
DISPOSITION

The case is remanded for a resentencing hearing. At that
hearing, the trial court is directed to consider its full range of
lawful sentencing options, including whether to grant or deny
Miller’s Romero motion. We express no opinion on whether the

5
trial court should grant Miller’s Romero motion or otherwise
further reduce his sentence.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

COGLIATI, J.*

* Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

6

Filed 4/16/26 P. v. Miller CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B343698

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA039139
v.

JOHN DREW MILLER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Alison S. Matsumoto, Judge. Remanded for
resentencing.
Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan M. Krauss and Stefanie
Yee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In this postconviction appeal from a Penal Code section
1172.75 resentencing order, the parties agree that remand for a
full resentencing hearing is warranted.1 We agree with the
parties.

BACKGROUND
In 2002, after a jury trial, the trial court sentenced
appellant John Drew Miller to 48 years to life in state prison
under the Three Strikes law. This sentence included a one-year
prior prison term enhancement imposed under section 667.5,
subdivision (b), an upper term sentence on a burglary conviction
(§ 459), and an upper term firearm enhancement imposed under
section 120225, subdivision (a).
Decades later, following the passage of Senate Bill No. 483
(Stats. 2021, ch. 728) (SB 483), the trial court held a resentencing
hearing for Miller under section 1172.75.2 At that hearing, the

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 “Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b)
required trial courts to impose a one-year sentence enhancement
for each true finding on an allegation that a defendant served a
separate prior prison term and had not remained free of custody
for at least five years.” (People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th
664, 681, citing former § 667.5, subd. (b).) “Effective January 1,
2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) [ ] (Stats. 2019,
ch. 590) amended section 667.5 by limiting the prior prison term
enhancement to only prior terms for sexually violent offenses.”
(People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 380 (Burgess).)
“Enhancements based on prior prison terms served for other
offenses became legally invalid.” (Ibid.) The Legislature later
enacted SB 483, effective January 1, 2022, to make the changes
implemented by Senate Bill No. 136 retroactive by adding former

2
court struck the prior prison term enhancement and, in total,
reduced Miller’s sentence from 48 years to life to 36 years to life
in state prison. The court reimposed the upper term sentences on
Miller’s burglary conviction and firearm allegation. Miller timely
appealed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Miller argues that his case should be remanded
for resentencing because the trial court erroneously concluded it
did not have the authority to consider his motion under People v.
Superior Court (Romero) 1996 13 Cal.4th 497 at his section
1172.75 resentencing hearing. The Attorney General contends
the record is ambiguous regarding whether the trial court
erroneously concluded it could not consider Miller’s Romero
motion, but agrees that remand is warranted to ensure the trial
court properly considers the motion. We agree with Miller’s
reading of the record. It appears the trial court declined to
consider Miller’s Romero motion because it concluded that doing
so would amount to an unconstitutional amendment to the Three
Strikes Reform Act of 2012.
We disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that
considering Miller’s Romero motion would violate the Three
Strikes Reform Act. “A trial court has the authority to strike

section 1171.1 (now section 1172.75) to the Penal Code. (Burgess,
supra, at p. 380, citing Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.) Section 1172.75,
subdivision (c) requires the trial court, upon being properly
notified that a defendant is serving a sentence that includes a
legally invalid prior prison term enhancement (see § 1172.75,
subd. (b)), to recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.

3
prior strikes under section 1385(a) and Romero at a section
1172.75 hearing.” (People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340,
345 (Rogers).) “Because a trial court’s power under section
1385(a) to dismiss or strike a strike prior is independent of either
the Three Strikes law or the subsequent [Three Strikes] Reform
Act, any exercise of that power at a resentencing proceeding
under section 1172.75 does not offend either.” (Rogers, at p. 362.)
On remand, the trial court is directed to hold a resentencing
hearing under section 1172.75 and consider Miller’s Romero
motion.
The parties disagree over whether the trial court’s
reimposition of the upper term sentence based on aggravating
factors not found true beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by
Miller violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Courts of Appeal
are split on this issue, and it is currently pending in the
California Supreme Court in People v. Eaton (Mar. 14, 2025,
C096853) [nonpub. opn.], review granted May 14, 2025, S289903
(Eaton).3
Consistent with our division’s prior unpublished decisions,
we conclude the plain language of section 1172.75, subdivision
(d)(4) expressly permitted the trial court to reimpose the upper
term in the manner it did. Subdivision (d)(4) states: “Unless the
court originally imposed the upper term, the court may not

3 The issue on review in Eaton is: “May a trial court reimpose
a previously imposed upper term sentence under Penal Code
section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) where the facts underlying one
or more aggravating circumstances were neither stipulated to by
the defendant nor found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial
by the jury or by the judge in a court trial (cf. Pen. Code, § 1170,
subd. (b)(2); id., § 1172.75, subd. (d)(2))?”

4
impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless there are
circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term
of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those facts have
been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3), italics added.) The trial
court complied with this clear statutory language and thus did
not err in reimposing upper term sentences. (See People v.
Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455, 458 (Brannon-
Thompson) [Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) “does not require
aggravating factors to be found true beyond a reasonable doubt if
the upper term was previously imposed”]; accord People v. Mathis
(2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359, 371–374; but see People v. Gonzalez
(2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 329–330 [concluding that following
Brannon-Thompson’s reading of the statute would violate the
Sixth Amendment].)
On remand, the trial court has jurisdiction to consider
Miller’s Romero motion and every aspect of Miller’s sentence.
This means the court may consider its full range of sentencing
options, including whether it would serve the interest of justice to
reimpose the upper terms or to instead impose different terms on
the burglary count and the firearm allegation. (See People v.
Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893; People v. Coddington (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 562, 568.)
DISPOSITION

The case is remanded for a resentencing hearing. At that
hearing, the trial court is directed to consider its full range of
lawful sentencing options, including whether to grant or deny
Miller’s Romero motion. We express no opinion on whether the

5
trial court should grant Miller’s Romero motion or otherwise
further reduce his sentence.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

COGLIATI, J.*

* Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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