People v. Goodner CA1/1

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Filed 4/20/26 P. v. Goodner CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171924
v.
STEVEN GOODNER, (San Francisco City and County
Super. Ct. No. CRI-23015442)
Defendant and Appellant.

A jury convicted defendant Steven Goodner of two counts of felony
vandalism and two counts of misdemeanor malicious mischief but acquitted
him of two counts of burglary after he twice caused damage to the same
victim’s car. He was sentenced to time served and placed on probation.
On appeal, Goodner challenges only his vandalism convictions under
Penal Code section 594, subdivision (b)(1), which required proof that “the
amount of defacement, damage, or destruction” was at least $400 (damage-
value element). The parties agree that the trial court erred under state law
by admitting the victim’s hearsay testimony about the costs to repair her
vehicle. But Goodner contends, while the Attorney General denies, that the
error was prejudicial and that retrial of the damage-value element is barred
because there was no substantial evidence to support it. We agree that the
admission of the hearsay testimony was prejudicial under state law, but we
reject Goodner’s substantial-evidence claim.1 Thus, we reverse the vandalism
convictions and remand for the People to elect whether to retry them as
felonies or accept their reduction to misdemeanors. (See People v. Jackson
(2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 371, 373.)
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
A. The 2022 Incident
C.E., her husband, and their two young children lived near the
Broadway tunnel in San Francisco. On the morning of October 13, 2022, C.E.
and the children left the house so she could drive them to school. C.E.’s car, a
Toyota Corolla, was parked on the street near the house. As she approached
her car, which she left locked the night before, she saw a man she later
identified as Goodner in the driver’s seat. He was “rummaging through” the
Toyota’s interior. C.E. told Goodner to get out of her car, at which point he
did so and began “slowly walking” away on the sidewalk.2
After Goodner left, C.E. observed that the Toyota’s interior was “very
dishevel[]ed.” There was “a very large poop” in the space between the driver’s
seat and the doorjamb, and the driver’s seat was reclined back and “wet with
liquid.” The cup holders had liquid in them, the steering wheel and center

1 As a result, we need not address Goodner’s claim that the evidence’s

admission also violated his rights under the federal confrontation clause,
which would set a lower bar for finding prejudice. (See People v. Navarro
(2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 310.)
2 C.E. took photographs of Goodner as he walked away from her. She
also photographed him about two months later, when she happened to
encounter him in downtown San Francisco. We do not discuss the evidence of
Goodner’s identity in detail, as it is uncontested for purposes of this appeal
that he was the person who damaged the interior of the Toyota during both
charged incidents.

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console had “burn marks” on them, and “the seat belt receptacle for the
driver’s [seat] was completely melted to where [it] didn’t work.” The car was
full of trash and other items that did not belong to C.E.’s family, including an
insulated lunch bag and shoes. Photographs of the Toyota’s interior that C.E.
took later that morning, after she cleaned out the excrement, were admitted
into evidence.
C.E. testified that there was no damage to the Toyota’s interior before
the 2022 incident. She took her car to a repair shop, where she did not ask to
“fix anything that was not caused by [Goodner] in [her] vehicle.” She testified
that she paid a $100 deductible to her insurance company and, over a
hearsay objection, that “[t]he amount of the final bill” to repair the Toyota
“was roughly $2,100.” No repair bill was introduced into evidence. On cross-
examination, after refreshing her recollection with a copy of the repair
estimate that also was not introduced into evidence, C.E. agreed the repairs
included damage to the Toyota’s front door that was “likely” caused in an
attempt to enter the car.
B. The 2023 Incident
Several months later, on the morning of September 23, 2023, C.E.’s
nine-year-old daughter was at home watching cartoons when she “heard a car
door slam.” She looked outside and saw a man “getting out of the driver’s
seat” of C.E.’s Toyota. The car’s door had been opened into her father’s car, a
Mazda CX-5, which was parked next to the Toyota. The daughter, who
testified at trial, could not identify the man she saw in the Toyota, although
she remembered details about his hair and clothing consistent with other
evidence about Goodner’s appearance during the incident.
The daughter found C.E. and told her that someone was in the Toyota.
C.E. went to the front door to look outside but did not see anyone. She and

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her husband got in the Mazda and began driving around to look for the
suspect. C.E. soon spotted Goodner, whom she recognized from their
previous contact, walking down the sidewalk. She then called 911. Goodner
was ultimately arrested the following day, after being reported for
trespassing at another residence in the same area.
C.E. testified that the Toyota, which she left locked the night before,
“was full of trash. There were beer cans, energy drink cans, cigarette
packets, powder.” Similar to the car’s condition after the 2022 incident, the
driver’s seat was reclined, the cup holders were full of liquid, and there was
excrement between the driver’s seat and door. There were also burn marks
on the interior of the driver’s door and the steering wheel.
A police officer who responded to C.E.’s 911 call that morning
determined that the Toyota’s “doorjamb [was] bent in, which more than likely
helped pry the door open” and thus created the point of entry. There was a
metal rod that C.E. did not recognize on the car’s floorboard, but the officer
determined that the rod was not used to pry open the car’s door because it did
not fit the doorjamb. A “pretty mangled” lighter was also inside the car, and
the wrong key was in the car’s ignition. The police took photographs of the
Toyota’s condition that were admitted into evidence.
C.E. took the Toyota, which she testified was not damaged beforehand,
to a repair shop. She testified that she again paid a $100 deductible and,
over another hearsay objection, that “[t]he final bill was around $8,[2]00,”
meaning her insurance company paid $8,100.3 Again, the bill was not
introduced into evidence.

3 C.E. also testified about the cost to repair the purported damage to

the Mazda, but we do not discuss this testimony in detail because the jury
was unable to return a verdict on the vandalism count associated with that
vehicle.

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C. Procedural History
Goodner was charged with three felony counts of vandalism causing
$400 or more of damage, two felony counts of second degree burglary of a
vehicle, and two misdemeanor counts of malicious mischief to a vehicle. It
was also alleged as an aggravating circumstance that the felonies involved an
attempted or actual taking or damage of great monetary value.4
For the 2022 incident, the jury convicted Goodner of vandalism and
malicious mischief as charged and acquitted him of burglary. It found not
true the great-value aggravating circumstance as to the vandalism. For the
2023 incident, the jury also convicted Goodner of vandalism and malicious
mischief of the Toyota as charged, acquitted him of burglary of that vehicle,
and found not true the great-value aggravating circumstance as to the
vandalism. The jury was unable to return a verdict for the vandalism of the
Mazda, and the trial court declared a mistrial on that count.
After the verdicts, Goodner moved to reduce the two vandalism
convictions to misdemeanors on the basis that the prosecution failed to
establish the Toyota sustained at least $400 of damage on each occasion. He
argued that C.E.’s testimony about the cost of repairing the vehicle was
inadmissible because it was based on the repair bills, which were hearsay
under established case law. He pointed out that even though Evidence Code5
section 813, the provision on which the trial court relied, permits an owner to

4 The charges were brought under Penal Code sections 594,

subdivision (b)(1) (vandalism), and 459 (burglary), and Vehicle Code
section 10853. The aggravating circumstance was alleged under California
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(9).
5 All further statutory references are to the Evidence Code unless

otherwise noted.

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opine about the value of property, it does not authorize admission of an
opinion about repair costs based on bills that were not themselves admitted.
At the September 2024 sentencing hearing, the trial court denied
Goodner’s motion to reduce the vandalism convictions to misdemeanors.
Although the court agreed with the defense that it had erred by overruling
the hearsay objections to C.E.’s testimony, it concluded that the error was
harmless because “substantial [other] evidence, if not ample evidence,”
supported the jury’s determination that there was at least $400 of damage to
the Toyota during each incident. This other evidence included C.E.’s
testimony describing the damage and photographs of the car’s interior.
The trial court then suspended imposition of the sentence for the
vandalism convictions and placed Goodner on two years of probation. He was
sentenced to 180 days total in jail for the malicious-mischief convictions, a
term that was deemed served.6
II.
DISCUSSION
A. The Admission of C.E.’s Hearsay Testimony Was Prejudicial.
The Attorney General concedes that C.E.’s testimony about the amount
of the repair bills was erroneously admitted, as the trial court found at the
sentencing hearing. But the parties disagree about whether the evidence’s
admission was harmless. We conclude that the error was prejudicial under
state law and the felony vandalism convictions therefore cannot stand.
Hearsay is “a statement that was made other than by a witness while
testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter

6 Goodner was later ordered to pay over $13,000 in direct restitution to

C.E. We dismissed his appeal from the restitution order under People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 after his appellate counsel filed a no-issues
brief. (People v. Goodner (Jan. 13, 2026, A173940) [nonpub. opn.].)

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stated.” (§ 1200, subd. (a).) Hearsay evidence is inadmissible except as
provided by law. (§ 1200, subd. (b).) Under section 813, the provision on
which the trial court relied to admit C.E.’s testimony about the Toyota’s
repair costs, the owner of property may give an opinion about the property’s
value. (§ 813, subd. (a)(2).) The parties agree that the challenged testimony
was inadmissible under either this provision or any exception to the hearsay
rule and that state-law errors are reviewed for harmlessness under People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th
1293, 1308.) Under Watson, reversal is required if there is “a reasonable
probability [Goodner] would have achieved a more favorable result absent the
out-of-court statement[s].” (People v. Lozano (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 366,
381–382.)
We conclude that the evidentiary error was prejudicial under this
standard. The only testimony about the costs to repair the Toyota that was
based on C.E.’s personal knowledge, as opposed to her review of the repair
bills, was her testimony that she paid $100 as an insurance deductible on
both occasions. The other primary evidence from which the jury might have
inferred that the total damage each time was at least $400 was the testimony
about and photographs of the Toyota’s condition. But since Goodner was
acquitted of both burglary charges, suggesting the jury was unconvinced he
broke into the Toyota, the damage to the car’s exterior was not necessarily
attributable to him. As for the car’s interior, we cannot say that the cleaning
and repair costs were obviously at least $400 on both occasions. In the
absence of concrete evidence about the cost of repairs, it is reasonably

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probable that at least one juror would have remained unconvinced beyond a
reasonable doubt of the damage-value element of felony vandalism.
The parties disagree about whether other aspects of the record also
suggest that the evidentiary error was prejudicial. For example, after the
jury originally returned their verdicts, polling of the jurors resulted in one of
them expressing that the guilty verdicts on both Toyota felony vandalism
counts were not that juror’s true verdicts. The jury then deliberated further
and returned guilty verdicts on those counts. We need not decide whether
this suggests the hearsay evidence tipped the balance in a “close[]” case, as
Goodner argues, or is insignificant because it fails to suggest that any juror
“harbored doubt as to the value of the damage” in particular, as the Attorney
General argues. Reversal is required since (1) the admissible evidence of the
damage to the Toyota did not clearly establish that it cost at least $400 to fix
each time and (2) there is nothing else in the record foreclosing the
reasonable probability that at least one juror would have a reasonable doubt
about the damage-value element.
B. Substantial Evidence Supported the Damage-value Element of
Both Felony Vandalism Counts.
Goodner also claims that the felony vandalism convictions cannot stand
because, excluding C.E.’s erroneously admitted testimony, there was no
substantial evidence that the damage to the Toyota was at least $400 each
time. We are not persuaded.
As we already held that the vandalism convictions must be reduced to
misdemeanors because of the error in admitting C.E.’s hearsay testimony, the
only further relief Goodner could obtain from prevailing on his substantial-
evidence claim is a bar to retrying him on the damage-value element. (See
People v. Eroshevich (2014) 60 Cal.4th 583, 591.) To resolve this claim, we
consider whether the record contains “ ‘substantial evidence to support the

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verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such
that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced
from the evidence. [Citation.] “Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject
to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the
exclusive province of the . . . jury to determine the credibility of a witness and
the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.” ’ ”
(People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87.)
We agree with the Attorney General that Goodner misapprehends the
nature of substantial-evidence review in arguing that we cannot consider the
inadmissible evidence about the repair bills. As our Supreme Court has
made clear, “ ‘[e]vidence erroneously admitted is properly considered in
weighing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, notwithstanding
its erroneous admission.’ [Citation.] The reason for this is that ‘a reversal
based solely on evidentiary insufficiency has fundamentally different
implications, for double jeopardy purposes, than a reversal based on such
ordinary “trial errors” as the “incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence.”
[Citation.] While the former is in effect a finding “that the government has
failed to prove its case” against the defendant, the latter “implies nothing
with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant,” but is simply “a
determination that [the defendant] has been convicted through a judicial
process which is defective in some fundamental respect.” ’ ” (People v. Jasso
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 684.)
Thus, contrary to Goodner’s position, we can consider C.E.’s
inadmissible testimony about the repair costs in resolving the instant claim.

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Since C.E. testified that it cost about $2,100 to repair damage that occurred
during the 2022 incident and about $8,200 to repair damage that occurred
during the 2023 incident, there was substantial evidence that both instances
of vandalism resulted in at least $400 of damage.
To the extent Goodner suggests there was insufficient evidence of the
damage-value element even accepting C.E.’s hearsay testimony, we are
unpersuaded. He cites C.E.’s agreement with his trial counsel on cross-
examination that even though the damage to the Toyota in 2023 was to the
“front left door” and interior, the repair shop also fixed “the front bumper, the
front lamps and fender[,] and the rear door.” This testimony may imply that
some of the damage to the Toyota preexisted the 2023 incident, but C.E. also
testified unambiguously on direct that there was no damage to the car before
that incident and she did not ask for any repairs unrelated to that incident.
The jury was not required to resolve any contradiction in favor of determining
that the total repair cost included damage that did not result from the
2023 incident. As Goodner does not explain why the evidence of the 2022
repair cost was insufficient, we conclude that C.E.’s hearsay testimony
furnished substantial evidence of the damage-value element of both felony
vandalism counts.
III.
DISPOSITION
The two convictions for vandalism under Penal Code section 594,
subdivision (b)(1), are reversed, the sentence is vacated, and the matter is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand,
the People may elect to (1) accept a reduction of these two convictions to
misdemeanors under Penal Code section 594, subdivision (b)(2), in which case
the trial court is to resentence Goodner accordingly, or (2) retry him for felony

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violations of Penal Code section 594, subdivision (b)(1). In all other respects,
the convictions are affirmed.

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_________________________
Humes, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Banke, J.

_________________________
Smiley, J.

People v. Goodner A171924

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