CourtListener 10842890•Weiser v. Bronstein CA2/5
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Filed 4/14/26 Weiser v. Bronstein CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
RACHEL WEISER and ISRAEL B338418
BRONSTEIN, as trustees, etc.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiffs and Respondents, Super. Ct. No.
19STPB08650)
v.
IDA FINKELSTEIN
BRONSTEIN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gus T. May, Judge. Affirmed.
Steiner & Libo, Leonard Steiner, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Lagerlof, Christopher M. Lenz, Nicholas G. Everett, and
Matthew J. Pero for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Ida Finkelstein Bronstein appeals from the trial
court’s order granting plaintiffs’1 Probate Code section 850
petition, in part, and confirming trust ownership of a residence in
Los Angeles (the property). She also appeals from the court’s
subsequent order denying her motion to set aside the order after
hearing or, in the alternative, for a new trial. We affirm.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
A. The Trust
On June 4, 1999, plaintiffs’ parents, Sam and Molly
Bronstein,3 established the trust as settlors and co-trustees and
transferred the property, which was their residence, into the
trust as an asset. Molly died on October 31, 2002. Thereafter,
Sam married Ida.
1 Plaintiffs are Rachel Weiser and Israel Bronstein, children
of decedents Sam and Molly Bronstein, and co-trustees and
beneficiaries of the Sam and Molly Bronstein Trust dated June 4,
1999 (the trust).
2 In this appeal from a judgment following a bench trial, we
“‘view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
judgment, drawing every reasonable inference and resolving
every conflict to . . . support the judgment.’” (Adhav v. Midway
Rent A Car, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 954, 969.)
3 Because Sam, Molly, Israel, and Ida Bronstein share the
same last name, we will refer to them by their first names.
2
B. The Quitclaim Deed
On May 28, 2004, Sam executed a quitclaim deed
transferring his interest in the property to himself and Ida as
“joint tenants.” On May 13, 2009, Sam recorded the deed.
C. The Life Estate
On January 5, 2012, Sam executed a “Second Amended
Bronstein Revocable Trust,” which recited that Molly was
“deceased as of October 31, 2002” and Sam remained as sole
trustee of the trust.4 The document amended the trust to grant
Ida, identified as Sam’s present wife, a life estate in the property
as well as other assets unrelated to the property.
D. The Settlement Agreement
Sam died on January 22, 2013. In March 2013, the parties
executed a settlement agreement,5 which identified Ida as Sam’s
widow and plaintiffs as co-trustees of the trust. According to the
document recitals, “disputes ha[d] arisen among and between Ida
[and plaintiffs] relating to the assets in which Sam had an
ownership interest during his life . . . [and] [¶] . . . the Parties
wish[ed] to settle, once and forever, all their disputes.” The
4 The document references the “First Amended Bronstein
Revocable Trust” dated December 5, 2005, but it is not part of the
record on appeal.
5 Ida was represented by attorney Leslie Klein and plaintiffs
were represented by attorney Shalom Kev Katz.
3
agreement provided that the property “shall be available for Ida
to live in, rent free, for so long as” she maintained it as her
primary residence, remained unmarried, and did not “rent out
the [h]ome to anyone or take in a tenant.” Property taxes,
insurance premiums, and major repairs would be paid by the
plaintiffs “in their capacities as [c]o-[t]rustees of the [t]rust,
which owns [the property].” In paragraph D of the agreement,
“[t]he [p]arties agree[d] to execute such other and further
instruments, documents and instructions as may be necessary or
convenient to carry out the terms, conditions and purposes of
[the a]greement.”
E. Plaintiffs’ Requests for a Quitclaim Deed
On April 3, 2013, about a week after plaintiffs executed the
settlement agreement, they—through attorney Katz—made the
first of several email requests through Ida’s counsel, attorney
Klein, that Ida sign a corrective quitclaim deed disclaiming any
interest in title to the property.6 Attorney Klein ignored the
emails. On June 3, 2013, attorney Katz sent an email to attorney
Klein informing him that he learned from another source that
“Ida doesn’t want to sign the deed.” On June 4, 2013, attorney
Katz sent an email to attorney Klein with the subject line: “Any
idea when Ida will sign the deed?” and no other text. On June 26,
2013, attorney Katz sent an email to attorney Klein stating, “We
have been very patient with your client. [¶] Time has passed
without any response. [¶] So, [plaintiffs] are strongly
6 At trial, the parties stipulated to the authenticity of emails
exchanged by attorney Katz, on behalf of plaintiffs, and attorney
Klein.
4
considering filing a [quiet] title action against her. . . . [¶] . . .
[W]hy won’t she sign the deed? Is it because she thinks that later
on she can leave (while alive) and then sue [plaintiffs]? What
other reason would she have. [¶] The sole purpose of the deed is
to avoid a law suit [sic] at a later time.”
Five years later, on July 19, 2018, attorney Katz sent an
email to attorney Klein, stating, “[L]et me know if [Ida] will
finally sign a deed.” On August 14, 2018, attorney Klein
informed attorney Katz, “I called Ida. She is not signing the
document.” Attorney Katz asked, “I was curious, did you explain
that the reason we need the deed signed is to remove a ‘cloud on
title’?” Attorney Klein replied, “No.” Attorney Katz wrote,
“Could you have please? If she won’t sign it then [plaintiffs] may
get a different lawyer to pursue a quiet title action . . . .” The
following day, attorney Klein responded, “She says when she dies
[plaintiffs] will get the house.” To which, attorney Katz replied,
“But we need her to sign the deed to make sure it does, don’t we?”
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Probate Code Section 850 Petition
On September 12, 2019, plaintiffs filed a petition under
Probate Code section 850, subdivision (a), to request an order and
judgment establishing the trust’s ownership of the property on
the basis that “the trustee . . . holds title to, real . . . property, and
the property, or some interest, is claimed to belong to another.”
(Prob. Code, § 850, subd. (a)(3)(A).) Plaintiffs requested an order
(1) declaring the property is an asset of the trust and (2) directing
[Ida] to “prepare, execute and deliver to [plaintiffs] any and all
5
documents necessary to provide [plaintiffs] with clear title to the
[p]roperty . . . .” The petition included a verification, under
penalty of perjury, stating that plaintiffs were “the acting [c]o-
[t]rustees of the [trust] . . . .” The petition attached the trust
instrument as an exhibit. The trust expressly listed the property
as trust property.
On January 13, 2020, Ida filed an objection asserting that
she owned the property by operation of the 2004 quitclaim deed.
On May 11, 2023, Ida amended her objection to add a statute of
limitations defense.
B. Joint Trial Statement
Prior to trial, the parties filed a joint trial statement. They
listed the following to be the issues contested at trial:
(1) whether plaintiffs met their burden to show that the
settlement agreement confirmed the trust held a 100% fee simple
interest in the property; (2) whether plaintiffs’ claims are barred
by the applicable statute of limitations; (3) whether the parties in
fact entered into the settlement agreement; (4) whether the
settlement agreement was entered into as a result of a mistake of
fact; and (5) whether there was consideration to Ida for entering
into the settlement agreement.
On the statute of limitations defense,7 Ida argued that the
cause of action accrued in 2013 when plaintiffs made several
demands that she transfer her interest in the property to the
trust via quitclaim deed and threatened her with a quiet title
7 The trial court had previously denied plaintiffs’ motion for
summary adjudication of the limitations defense finding there
was a triable issue of fact as to when the cause of action accrued.
6
action when she failed to comply. Petitioners countered that the
cause of action did not accrue until Ida “stated explicitly that she
claimed an existing interest in the real property” which “occurred
either in 2018, at the earliest, when [Ida] first asserted that she
still claimed an interest, or in 2019, at the latest, when [she]
objected to the instant petition, thereby pressing her claim and
repudiating the settlement agreement in its entirety.”
C. Trial
The bench trial commenced on November 30, 2023. The
trial court heard testimony from attorney Katz, who testified that
he represented plaintiffs during their 2013 dispute with Ida, and
that he had negotiated the terms of the settlement agreement
with attorney Klein, whom he understood represented Ida.
Ida testified that she signed the settlement agreement on
March 20, 2013, at a bank, and that attorney Klein, attorney
Katz, and another person were present. Ida added that she did
not recall whether she had any communication with attorney
Klein before signing the agreement. Ida believed that attorney
Klein represented plaintiffs.
Attorney Klein testified that someone in his office drafted
the settlement agreement. He also admitted to communicating
with attorney Katz and forwarding emails from attorney Katz to
Ida. Attorney Klein testified that even though he had not been
retained as an attorney by Ida, he drafted the settlement
agreement on her behalf. He confirmed that he never
represented plaintiffs. He admitted that he signed the
settlement agreement on a signature line that identified him as
“Attorney for Ida Bronstein.”
7
After the close of evidence, the trial court issued its oral
statement of decision. (Code Civ. Proc., § 632, subd. (b).) The
court stated, as relevant here:
“[Ida] argues that the 2004 quitclaim deed validly
transferred title of that real property to settlor Sam . . . and Ida
. . . as joint tenants.
“The court finds that [Ida] waived her right to assert this
objection when she signed the settlement agreement in 2013.
That settlement agreement confirmed that 100 percent of the
interest in this real property was transferred to the trust.
“[Ida] argues that the settlement agreement is ambiguous
as to whether it resolved the title dispute. The court is not
persuaded.
“As [plaintiffs] point out, in 2004, title to the real property
was held by the trust. Although settlor, Sam . . . , purported to
transfer the real property through the 2004 deed, which was later
recorded in 2009, Sam . . . did not own the real property in 2004;
rather, the trust did. Thus, this deed was a wild card deed.”8
The trial court then found that the settlement agreement
was not ambiguous and “confirmed that the house was and is
owned by the trust.” The court also expressly found that: (1) the
settlement agreement was not void for lack of consideration;
(2) Ida was estopped from asserting that the agreement was void
for a mistake of fact; and (3) Ida was represented by attorney
Klein during the negotiations resulting in the settlement
agreement.
8 A “wild” deed is one that is “recorded outside the chain of
title.” (Far West Savings & Loan Assn. v. McLaughlin (1988) 201
Cal.App.3d 67, 73.)
8
Finally, the trial court ruled on the statute of limitations
defense: “The court finds that the settlement agreement resolved
the dispute regarding title such that signing the requested deed
was a mere administrative task. [¶] The triggering event for the
statute of limitations was [Ida’s] January 13, 2020, objection to
the [Probate Code section] 850 petition, which argued that the
settlement agreement should be given no effect when analyzing
the . . . petition because the trust did not own the real property.
For that, see [Salazar v. Thomas (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 467
(Salazar)].”
The trial court concluded: “[B]ecause [plaintiffs] have met
their burden and [Ida] has not met the burden in response, the
court grants the [Probate Code section] 850 petition insofar as it
seeks confirmation that title to the real property . . . is owned by
the trust. [¶] The court denies without prejudice as moot the
requests for relief that Ida . . . prepare, execute, and deliver to
[plaintiffs] any and all documents necessary to provide [plaintiffs]
with clear title to the property.”
D. The Motion to Set Aside the Order After Hearing
On February 2, 2024, Ida moved to set aside the order after
hearing or, in the alternative, for a new trial on the grounds that
(1) there was insufficient evidence to support the decision
because, among other things, there was “no testimonial or
documentary evidence . . . to establish that [plaintiffs] were in
fact trustees or successor trustees of the [t]rust”; and (2) the trial
court erred by concluding that the 2004 quitclaim deed was an
invalid “wild card deed” that caused it to erroneously reject Ida’s
defenses based on flawed reasoning that she never had an
9
interest in the property aside from the life estate granted by the
trust.
On February 13, 2024, plaintiffs opposed the motion. They
argued that they had demonstrated they were the trustees of the
trust and that Ida had never challenged the validity of the trust
or their status as trustees. They conceded that the 2004
quitclaim deed was not wild but maintained that the trial court’s
reference to the “wild card deed” was dicta and irrelevant to its
ruling.
On March 20, 2024, the trial court denied the motion to set
aside the order after hearing. The court recognized the error it
made regarding the 2004 quitclaim deed and that it was not in
fact a “wild card deed”; but it explained “that fact does not impact
the court’s ultimate decision that there was a dispute about the
2004 quitclaim deed and the settlement agreement was reached
in response to that dispute and to resolve that dispute. [¶] So
yes, there is an error, but it’s not an error that made a difference
in the ultimate order.” In rejecting Ida’s contention that
plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate they were trustees of the
trust, the court noted that their status “didn’t appear to be an
issue at all, particularly given the settlement agreement—which
is the large basis for granting the [Probate Code section] 850
[petition]—was signed by them as trustees.”
Ida timely appealed from both the order entered on
December 11, 2023, and the minute order entered on March 20,
2024, which denied her motion to set aside the order after
hearing.
10
IV. DISCUSSION
Ida contends that the judgment is not supported by
substantial evidence that the plaintiffs were trustees of the trust
or that the property was an asset of the trust. She also contends
that the petition should have been dismissed as barred by the
statute of limitations. Finally, she asserts that the trial court’s
purported “secret undisclosed ruling” (capitalization and boldface
omitted) that the 2004 quitclaim deed was a “wild card deed”
prevented her from having a fair trial.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
According to Ida, the evidence was insufficient to support
the judgment because plaintiffs offered no evidence at trial that
they were the trustees of the trust with standing to prosecute the
action. Further, she argues, the evidence failed to establish that
the trust existed or held title to the property. We disagree.
1. Standard of Review
“In general, in reviewing a judgment based upon a
statement of decision following a bench trial, ‘any conflict in the
evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts will
be resolved in support of the determination of the trial court
decision. [Citations.]’ (In re Marriage of Hoffmeister (1987) 191
Cal.App.3d 351, 358.)” (Estate of Young (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th
62, 75–76 (Young).) We look at the entire record on appeal for
evidence. (Id. at p. 76.) We are bound by the trial court’s
credibility determinations, may not reweigh evidence, and
11
liberally construe findings of fact to support the judgment. (Ibid.)
Substantial evidence may consist of inferences, so long as they
are a “‘“product of logic and reason”’ and “‘rest on the evidence.”’”
(Ibid., quoting Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22
Cal.App.4th 1627, 1633.)
2. Legal Principles
Code of Civil Procedure section 367 requires that “[e]very
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest, except as otherwise provided by statute.” “When a cause
of action is prosecuted on behalf of an express trust, the trustee is
the real party in interest.” (Wolf v. Mitchell (1999) 76
Cal.App.4th 1030, 1036; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 369, subd. (a).)
3. Analysis
At trial, the parties stipulated to the authenticity and
admissibility of the settlement agreement and the trial court
admitted it as trial exhibit 4 without objection. The court also
admitted the second amended trust as trial exhibit 36 without
objection. The court relied on the agreement—which identified
the trust, Ida as widow and beneficiary, and plaintiffs as Sam’s
children9 and co-trustees—as evidence that the trust existed and
plaintiffs were co-trustees. (See Evid. Code, § 622 [“The facts
recited in a written instrument are conclusively presumed to be
true as between the parties thereto, or their successors in interest
9 Petitioners’ status as children also makes them interested
persons with standing to file a petition under Probate Code
section 850. (Prob. Code, §§ 48, subd. (a)(1), 850, subd. (a)(3).)
12
. . .”].) The court further relied on the language in the agreement
referencing “the [t]rust, which owns [the property]” as conclusive
evidence that “100 percent of the interest in this real property
was transferred to the trust.” The court’s findings, which were
based on reasonable inferences from authenticated documents,
the admissibility of which was not challenged at trial, is
supported by substantial evidence.10 We find no error.
B. Statute of Limitations
Ida next contends that the trial court erred when it found
the petition was not time-barred by the statute of limitations.
According to Ida, the four-year statute of limitations applicable to
breach of contract actions (Code of Civ. Proc., § 337, subd. (a))
applied to the petition, and that statute began to run in 201311
10 We note that the trust instrument was attached as an
exhibit to the petition and the parties never disputed plaintiffs
were the trustees or that the property was an asset of the trust.
Against this record, Ida’s decision to wait until a motion for new
trial to challenge the failure to introduce an uncontested trust
document as evidence at trial appears to be an “attempt at a
‘gotcha!’” that should not be rewarded on appeal. (IIG Wireless,
Inc. v. Yi (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 630, 645.) In any event, for the
reasons discussed above, there was substantial evidence to
demonstrate that plaintiffs were trustees and that the property
was a trust asset.
11 Ida contends that “at the very least the [s]ettlement
[a]greement was breached by Ida on August 14, 2013,” when Ida
“unequivocal[ly] refus[ed]” to sign the quitclaim deed. Attorney
Klein sent attorney Katz an email stating that Ida “is not signing
the document” on August 14, 2018.
13
when Ida failed to execute the corrective quitclaim despite
plaintiffs’ repeated requests.
1. Standard of Review
The determination of which statute of limitations governs a
cause of action is a question of law that we review de novo.
(Wang v. Nesse (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 428, 438.) And, the
application of the governing statute to undisputed facts is also a
purely legal question. (See Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44
Cal.3d 1103, 1112.) If the trial court resolved conflicts in the
evidence, whether by express or implied findings, the substantial
evidence standard applies. (Shenefield v. Kovtun (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 925, 933–934.)
2. Legal Principles and Analysis
“Generally speaking, the claim underlying a [Probate Code]
section 850 petition in probate is subject to the same statute of
limitations that would apply had an ordinary civil suit been
brought.” (Estate of Yool (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 867, 874, fn. 5;
accord, Young, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 76.) To determine
the relevant statute of limitations to apply, we must first
“identify the nature of the cause of action, i.e., the ‘gravamen’ of
the cause of action.” (Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th
1, 22–23 (Hensler); see also PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v.
Hulven Internat., Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 156, 172.) It is the
“‘nature of the right sued upon and not the form of action nor the
relief demanded [that] determines the applicability of the statute
of limitations under our code.’” (Hensler, supra, 8 Cal.4th at
14
p. 23.) We also consider the purpose of the petition. (Young,
supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 77.)
Here, the petition sought “an order determining that real
property is owned in its entirety by a trust,” specifically, an order
declaring that “all right, title, and interest in and to [the
property] is an asset of [the trust], to be held, administered and
distributed by [plaintiffs], as [t]rustees, under the terms of said
[t]rust.” Accordingly, the gravamen of the cause of action
asserted in the petition was quiet title.
“[T]here is no statute of limitations governing quiet title
actions as such, [so] it is ordinarily necessary to refer to the
underlying theory of relief to determine which statute applies.”
(Muktarian v. Barmby (1965) 63 Cal.2d 558, 560 (Muktarian).)
The statute of limitations, however, is tolled while the plaintiff
who seeks to quiet title is in “possession of the property.” (Ibid.)
The court in Muktarian explained the rationale for the tolling
rule: “In many instances one in possession would not know of
dormant adverse claims of persons not in possession. [Citation.]
Moreover, even if, as here, the party in possession knows of such
a potential claimant, there is no reason to put him to the expense
and inconvenience of litigation until such a claim is pressed
against him. [Citation.] Of course, the party in possession runs
the risk that the doctrine of laches will bar his action to quiet
title if his delay in bringing action has prejudiced the claimant.
[Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 560–561.) Even where a plaintiff
voluntarily shares possession of the property with a tenant, the
statute of limitations is tolled if the tenant “never assert[s] an
adverse claim that disturbed plaintiff’s possession or threatened
his claim to superior title.” (Reuter v. Macal (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 571, 580.)
15
Here, pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement,
Ida agreed that the trust held an ownership interest in the
property while she held a tenancy interest. Moreover, after she
signed the settlement agreement, Ida did not assert an adverse
claim that disturbed the trust’s possession of the property or
threatened its claim to superior title. Although she refused to
execute the quiet title deed on August 15, 2018, she
simultaneously confirmed that “when she dies [plaintiffs] will get
the house.”
On this record, the trial court’s finding that the statute of
limitations was tolled until Ida objected to the petition is
supported by substantial evidence. (See Salazar, supra, 236
Cal.App.4th at p. 478, quoting Secret Valley Land Co. v. Perry
(1921) 187 Cal. 420, 426–427 [the statute of limitations in a quiet
title action does not begin to run “‘until the hostile claim is
asserted in some manner to jeopardize the superior title. So long
as the adverse claim lies dormant and inactive the owner of the
superior title may not be incommoded by it and has the privilege
of allowing it to stand indefinitely’”].)
C. Error in Describing Quitclaim Deed as a “Wild Card Deed”
Finally, we consider Ida’s contention that the trial court’s
purported “undisclosed ruling” that the 2004 quitclaim deed was
a “wild card deed” prevented her from having a fair trial.
As we explain above, the trial court, in its oral statement of
decision, described the 2004 quitclaim deed as a “wild card deed.”
It also acknowledged its error on March 20, 2024, and expressly
found that the quitclaim deed was not a “wild card deed.” It
noted, however, that Ida was not prejudiced by the error because
16
the court’s earlier description of the deed did not affect the
judgment. Because we agree that Ida was not prejudiced by the
court’s conceded error, we reject Ida’s contention on appeal. (See
F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099, 1108 [California
Constitution “‘prohibits a reviewing court from setting aside a
judgment due to trial court error unless it finds the error
prejudicial’”].)
V. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiffs are awarded costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
KUMAR, J.*
* Retired judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
17
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