CourtListener 10842160•People v. Redix CA2/7
Texte intégral
Filed 4/13/26 P. v. Redix CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B342664
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA044579)
v.
ANTHONY REDIX,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Dorothy L. Shubin, Judge. Affirmed.
Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________
In 2008, at the age of 31, Anthony Redix pleaded no contest
to robbery, forcible rape, and other sex crimes that he committed
when he was 17 years old. The trial court sentenced him to a
determinate sentence of 40 years in prison. In 2024, Redix filed a
petition under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)
(section 1170(d)(1)),1 which allows juvenile offenders to petition
for recall and resentencing after 15 years of incarceration if they
were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).
The court denied Redix’s petition, finding he was ineligible for
relief because he was not sentenced to LWOP and a determinate
sentence of 40 years is not the functional equivalent of LWOP.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1994 Redix and three other men entered a home in
Pasadena armed with handguns.2 The men assaulted and bound
a man and herded his daughter and her nanny into a bedroom.
The men then sexually assaulted the man’s wife, ransacked the
home, and stole the family car. Redix was 17 at the time (born
May 31, 1977).
Almost 10 years later, an informant identified Redix as one
of the perpetrators. (See People v. Redix (Apr. 20, 2010, B210341)
2010 WL 1544819, at *1 [nonpub. opn.].) The police obtained a
DNA sample from a paper coffee cup that Redix had thrown away
and determined it matched samples from the crime scene. (Ibid.)
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Unless otherwise stated, we draw the facts from the
probation report.
2
In July 2008 Redix pleaded no contest to two counts of
home invasion robbery while acting in concert (§§ 211,
213(a)(1)(A); counts 1 & 2), three counts of forcible rape while
acting in concert (§ 264.1; counts 4, 7 & 8), two counts of forcible
sodomy while acting in concert (§ 286, subd. (d); counts 5 & 10),
forcible oral copulation while acting in concert (§ 288a, subd. (d);
count 6), anal and genital penetration with a foreign object
(§ 289, subd. (a); count 9), and two counts of assault with a
firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 11 & 12). Redix also admitted
as to count 1 that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a)), and as to counts 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 that he used a firearm
in the commission of a sexual offense (§ 12022.3, subd. (a)).3
On August 15, 2008, when Redix was 31 years old, the trial
court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 40 years in prison,
comprised of: the upper term of nine years plus 10 years
consecutive for the gun enhancement for count 1 (robbery); a
consecutive term of two years plus one year for the gun
enhancement for count 2 (robbery); a consecutive term of two
years four months, plus one year for the gun enhancement each
for counts 4 (forcible rape in concert) and 5 (sodomy by force in
concert); a consecutive term of two years four months each for
counts 6 (oral copulation by force in concert), 7 (forcible rape in
concert), 8 (same), and 10 (sodomy by force in concert); and a
consecutive term of two years for count 9 (penetration by foreign
object). The court awarded 940 days of presentence custody
credit—818 days of confinement credit and 122 days of conduct
credit.
3 At sentencing, the People moved to strike the admission of
the enhancement as to counts 6 and 7.
3
Redix appealed his sentence, and we affirmed. (People v.
Redix, supra, B210341.)
On March 6, 2024, Redix filed a motion to recall his
sentence under section 1170(d)(1). He asserted that based on
equal protection principles, People v. Heard (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard) had extended the statutory right to
relief under section 1170(d)(1) to juvenile offenders sentenced to
the functional equivalent of LWOP, and he further contended his
40-year determinate sentence was the functional equivalent of
LWOP.
The court denied the motion. The court stated, “[T]his is
not a life sentence. I haven’t seen any . . . cases with determinate
sentences, saying they are the functional equivalent of
LWOP. . . . So the sentence in this case is distinct[] from those
indeterminate sentences, and therefore is not the functional
equivalent of LWOP.”
Redix timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Section 1170(d)(1) provides, “When a defendant who was
under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense
for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life
without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated for at least
15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a
petition for recall and resentencing.” (§ 1170(d)(1)(A).) On its
face, section 1170(d)(1) “applies to juvenile offenders sentenced to
life without the possibility of parole; it does not apply to any
other group of defendants.” (People v. Munoz (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 499, 507, review granted June 25, 2025, S290828
(Munoz); see People v. Superior Court (Valdez) (2025)
4
108 Cal.App.5th 791, 800 (Valdez) [“[b]y its terms,” section
1170(d)(1) limits relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP].)
Even though Redix was sentenced to a 40-year determinate term,
not LWOP, he contends that based on the guarantees of equal
protection, he has the right to petition for the same relief under
section 1170(d)(1) as a juvenile offender sentenced to LWOP.
In evaluating an equal protection challenge to a statute
that distinguishes between different groups of individuals, unless
a suspect classification or a fundamental right is involved, courts
apply the deferential “rational basis” standard, under which “we
presume that a given statutory classification is valid ‘until the
challenger shows that no rational basis for the unequal treatment
is reasonably conceivable.’ ” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th
834, 852.) “ ‘If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts
may not second-guess its “ ‘wisdom, fairness, or logic.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Redix contends his sentence of 40 years is the functional
equivalent of LWOP and thus he is entitled under equal
protection guarantees to the opportunity to petition for
resentencing under section 1170(d)(1). He chiefly relies on
Heard, in which the court held that “there is no rational basis for
making juvenile offenders sentenced to explicit terms of life
without parole eligible for resentencing under section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1), while denying the same opportunity to juvenile
offenders sentenced to terms that amount to the functional
equivalent of life without parole.” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th
at p. 631.) The court held that “denying juvenile offenders, who
were sentenced to the functional equivalent of [LWOP], the
opportunity to petition for resentencing [under section 1170(d)(1)]
violates the guarantee of equal protection.” (Heard, at p. 612; see
also People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 454 (Sorto)
5
[agreeing with Heard and concluding there is no rational basis to
treat differently “explicit LWOP offenders and functionally
equivalent LWOP offenders” and thus § 1170(d)(1) “violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection by denying relief to
juvenile offenders sentenced to functionally equivalent LWOP
terms”].)
In Munoz, a majority of this court rejected the argument
that, under the reasoning of Heard and Sorto, a 50-years-to-life
sentence for a 16-year-old juvenile homicide offender is the
functional equivalent of LWOP for purposes of eligibility for relief
under section 1170(d)(1). (See Munoz, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 507-508, review granted.) We held that such a sentence is
“quantitatively different” from the sentences in Heard and Sorto
that had minimum parole eligibility dates much greater than 50
years. (Munoz, at p. 508.) In Heard, the juvenile offender was
serving a sentence of 23 years plus 80 years to life (Heard, supra,
83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629), and in Sorto, the juvenile was
sentenced to 10 years, plus 130 years to life (Sorto, supra,
104 Cal.App.5th at p. 440). The offenders in Heard and Sorto
were certain to die in prison, while the juvenile sentenced in
Munoz would become eligible for parole at age 66; we concluded
that juvenile offender had a “ ‘ “realistic opportunity to obtain
release” from prison during his . . . expected lifetime.’ ” (Munoz,
at p. 508.) Thus, we concluded a juvenile homicide offender
sentenced to 50 years to life is not entitled under equal protection
principles to seek relief under section 1170(d)(1). (Munoz, at
p. 508; accord, People v. Thompson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1058,
review granted September 24, 2025, S292540 [§ 1170(d)(1) does
not violate equal protection by excluding a juvenile homicide
offender sentenced to 50 years to life]; but see People v. Cabrera
6
(2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 650, 653 [concluding 50-years-to-life
sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP for purposes of
relief under § 1170(d)(1)]; Munoz, at p. 513 (dis. opn. of Feuer, J.).
Although there is disagreement among the Courts of
Appeal regarding whether a juvenile sentenced to 50 years to life
should be eligible to file a petition under section 1170(d)(1), no
California court has concluded that a juvenile sentenced to 40
years in prison is eligible for such relief.4 In People v. Baldwin
(2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 978, review denied November 25, 2025,
the Court of Appeal held a juvenile non-homicide offender
sentenced to 44 years to life sentence is not eligible for relief
under section 1170(d)(1). (Baldwin, at p. 985.) The court
distinguished Heard and Sorto and held those decisions did not
“confront[] how functional equivalence should be assessed when a
defendant’s term-of-years sentence could potentially offer a
parole opportunity inside the juvenile’s natural life.” (Baldwin,
at p. 994.) The court also concluded “[t]he Legislature could
rationally determine that ‘providing the relatively small number
of juvenile offenders otherwise certain to die in prison an
opportunity to obtain a lesser sentence was the most pressing
priority.’ [Citation.] While this excludes juveniles with lengthy
term-of-years sentences that do not guarantee their death in
prison, the Legislature is ‘entitled to proceed incrementally, so
long as it proceeds rationally, in “walking [the] tightrope” of the
political process.’ ” (Id. at p. 1005.) Thus, the court determined
the juvenile offender had “failed to demonstrate. . . that section
4 Nor has Redix cited any cases that apply the logic of Heard
and Sorto to a determinate sentence of any length and conclude
the guarantees of equal protection require affording a defendant
the right to petition for relief under section 1170(d)(1).
7
1170(d)’s limitation on eligibility to those sentenced to LWOP has
no rational basis, and is therefore unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to juvenile nonhomicide
offenders sentenced to 44 years to life.” (Id. at p. 985.)
We conclude an individual sentenced to a determinate term
of 40 years for a crime committed as a juvenile is not serving the
functional equivalent of LWOP, even assuming he or she is not
paroled earlier under section 3051 or section 3055.5 (Munoz,
supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 508.) Had Redix not managed to
avoid being identified and apprehended for 10 years, he would
have been eligible for parole by around age 57. A juvenile
offender eligible for parole at age 57 is not the functional
equivalent of a juvenile sentenced to LWOP, and the Legislature
could rationally treat the two differently.
Redix now attempts to use to his advantage the fact that he
was able to escape justice for those 10 years, arguing that
assuming he serves his full 40-year sentence, he will be 71 years
5 Redix was first eligible for parole in 2023, his 15th year of
incarceration, under section 3051, which requires parole hearings
for most youth offenders incarcerated for crimes they committed
before the age of 25. (§ 3051, subd. (b)(1).) Redix is also eligible
for consideration for elderly parole under section 3055 when he
turns 50, in 2027. (§ 3055, subd. (a).) The People maintain Redix
has already had several parole hearings. Because we conclude
Redix’s sentence is not the functional equivalent of LWOP, we
need not examine whether his immediate or imminent parole
eligibility under either section 3051 or section 3055 renders him
ineligible for relief under section 1170(d)(1).
8
old before he completes his prison term,6 increasing the chance
that he will die in prison rather than have “time to establish life
outside of prison.” However, someone in Redix’s circumstances is
not the functional equivalent of a juvenile offender who is serving
an LWOP sentence, and we conclude the Legislature rationally
could distinguish between juveniles who will never experience life
as an adult outside of prison from those who were able to live free
outside of prison for a decade as an adult before being
apprehended. The lengthy period of time that elapsed before
Redix was brought to justice does not convert his 40-year
determinate sentence into the functional equivalent of LWOP.
In sum, the guarantees of equal protection do not afford
Redix the right to petition for section 1170(d)(1) relief.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Redix’s section 1170(d)(1) petition is
affirmed.
STONE, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J. FEUER, J.
6 In fact, given his 940 days of presentence credit, but not
estimating post-sentence conduct credit or factoring in other
opportunities for parole, Redix will be released no later than age
68.
9
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