Lakeview Loan Servicing v. Hernandez CA2/7

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Filed 4/13/26 Lakeview Loan Servicing v. Hernandez CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

LAKEVIEW LOAN SERVICING, B345703
LLC,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 19NWCV00885)

v.

NATALIE HERNANDEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Brian F. Gasdia, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Natalie Hernandez, in pro. per., for Defendant and
Appellant.
McCarthy & Holthus and Melissa Robbins Coutts, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION

Natalie Hernandez, proceeding in propria persona, appeals
the trial court’s order denying her motion for relief from default
or default judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473,
subdivision (b), which she appealed before entry of final
judgment.1 Because Hernandez did not appeal from an
appealable judgment or order, we lack jurisdiction and dismiss
the appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

A. Default Proceedings
In November 2019, Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC
(Lakeview) filed a foreclosure action in superior court against
Hernandez and other defendants regarding real property located

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2 Without the benefit of a complete record on appeal, we
recite the facts and procedural history as available. To aid in our
review, we take judicial notice of the trial court’s minute orders
and the register of actions on our own motion. (See Evid. Code,
§§ 452, subd. (d), 459; Frisk v. Superior Court (2011)
200 Cal.App.4th 402, 407, fn. 2 [taking judicial notice of superior
court file on the court’s own motion to “fully determine the
procedural history”]; County of Orange v. Superior Court (2007)
155 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1256, fn. 1 [“The trial court’s orders . . .
are records of a court of this state, of which we may properly take
judicial notice.”].)

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in Pico Rivera.3 At Lakeview’s request, default was entered as to
Hernandez in February 2020.
In October 2023, Hernandez filed a “motion to set aside the
judgment and any default, and to quash any writ of
possession/execution.” A copy of this motion is not included in
the appellate record, but it appears Hernandez requested relief
under sections “473(b), 473.5, 173(d), and/or [] 128(a)(8).”
In January 2024, Lakeview requested entry of default
judgment against Hernandez. On February 2, 2024, the trial
court entered default judgment against Hernandez and the other
defendants.
Lakeview opposed Hernandez’s motion to set aside default
or default judgment in March 2024. This opposition does not
appear in the appellate record.
On April 16, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on
Hernandez’s pending motion to set aside the default or default
judgment. In a minute order, the court ruled: “Here, default was
entered on February 21, 2020, and default judgment was entered
on February 2, 2024. However, on October 9, 2023, [Hernandez]
filed the instant motion to set aside the default entered on
February 21, 2020. Because [Hernandez’s] motion was pending
when default judgment was entered on February 2, 2024, it
appears default judgment was entered improperly. The policy of
hearing cases on their merits is well-established. [Citation.]
Given the liberality associated with Motions to Set Aside
Defaults, the Court is inclined to grant relief.” The trial court

3 Other defendants named in the foreclosure action—
Jayreiner Mangahis Hernandez; Gilberto Herrera; Foundation
Finance Company, LLC; and State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company—are not parties to this appeal.

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continued the hearing on Hernandez’s motion and ordered her to
file an answer to the complaint.
On April 26, 2024, the trial court denied Hernandez’s
motion as to the default entered on February 21, 2020, but it
granted the motion as to the default judgment entered on
February 2, 2024. The court ruled that the February 2, 2024
default judgment was “improperly entered” because Hernandez’s
motion was pending. But it concluded that Hernandez did not
demonstrate entitlement to further relief under sections 473 or
473.5 because she did not file a proposed answer or other
pleading responding to Lakeview’s complaint. The court noted
Lakeview was “not foreclosed from requesting entry of default
judgment a second time.”
On May 24, 2024, Hernandez filed an affidavit asserting,
“No signed contract between [her] and Lakeview Loan
Servicing, LLC exists. Thus this is a fraudulent claim.”
In August 2024, Lakeview again requested entry of default
judgment. The record does not include this document.
Hernandez filed a second affidavit in August 2024 stating
she “move[d] to have the plaintiffs cease all harassment and
collections of any debt, remove all liens on the property,” and
“have the case dismissed immediately.”

B. Hernandez’s Second Motion Under Section 473, Subdivision
(b)
In October 2024, Hernandez filed a second motion under
section 473, subdivision (b), to set aside or vacate the default.
Hernandez argued she was not personally served with the
summons and complaint, that she “did not receive any notice
from the court regarding this action until after the default had

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been entered,” and “the judgment is void as the court lacks
jurisdiction.” Hernandez further argued that the loan held by
Lakeview was fraudulent because: the original promissory note
and the contract were signed with a different entity; “there was
no notice, approval, or authorized change of title/note sent to
[Hernandez] when the loan was transferred and assigned to any
other company”; and there were “discrepancies in the
documentation, including the absence of any proper chain of title
demonstrating a valid transfer of the note.”
Hernandez also filed an affidavit stating she was “not
properly served with the summons and complaint” because
“during the relevant period, I was not consistently residing at
[the subject property]. There were multiple times I was outside
of the country at various locations and times.” Hernandez
attested she “first became aware of this case” when someone
called her looking for Jayreiner Hernandez, another defendant to
the foreclosure action. “I immediately went to the court and was
informed that I was already in default. Since that time, I have
been acting in good faith and doing my best to rectify and resolve
this matter.” The record does not indicate whether Hernandez
attached a proposed answer or other responsive pleading to
Lakeview’s complaint.
The trial court held a hearing on Hernandez’s motion to set
aside the default on March 17, 2025, and it denied the motion.
There is no reporter’s transcript or settled statement of this
proceeding.
Hernandez timely appealed the denial of her motion on
April 8, 2025.

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C. Subsequent Entry of Default Judgment
After Hernandez filed her notice of appeal, the trial court
held a default prove up hearing on July 18, 2025. The court
entered a default judgment of foreclosure and order of sale in
favor of Lakeview against Hernandez. The judgment awarded
$632,790.05 to Lakeview for unpaid principal balance, interest,
property taxes, and other property-related expenses. Hernandez
did not appeal the default judgment.

DISCUSSION

Lakeview argues that Hernandez did not appeal from an
appealable order or judgment. We examine whether we have
jurisdiction to hear Hernandez’s appeal. (See Jennings v.
Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126 [appellate court must
independently confirm jurisdiction over appeal].) “ ‘[A]ppellate
jurisdiction’ is simply the power of a reviewing court to correct
error in a trial court proceeding.” (Leone v. Medical Board (2000)
22 Cal.4th 660, 666.)
“A reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only
when there is (1) an appealable order or (2) an appealable
judgment.” (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 688, 696; accord, Efron v. Kalmanovitz (1960)
185 Cal.App.2d 149, 152.) Statutes define which orders and
judgments are appealable. (Kirk v. Ratner (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th
1052, 1060; accord, Garau v. Torrance Unified School Dist. (2006)
137 Cal.App.4th 192, 198; see, e.g., § 904.1 [listing appealable
orders and judgments in civil cases].) If a party appeals from a
nonappealable order, the reviewing court has no jurisdiction and
is required to dismiss the appeal. (See Efron, at p. 152.)

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The denial of a section 473 motion to vacate a default
judgment is appealable as an order made after final judgment.
(Shapell SoCal Rental Properties, LLC v. Chico’s FAS, Inc. (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 198, 207, fn. 2; Shapiro v. Clark (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1137; Stevenson v. Turner (1979)
94 Cal.App.3d 315, 317; see § 904.1, subd. (a)(2) [providing for
appeals from “an order made after a judgment”].) By contrast, an
“order denying [a] motion to vacate default—made before entry of
the default judgment—is not independently appealable.”
(Jade K. v. Viguri (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1459, 1465 (Jade K.);
accord, Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981;
Shapiro, at p. 1137; Veliscescu v. Pauna (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d
1521, 1522 (Veliscescu) [“Established California decisional law
provides that no appeal lies from an order granting [or denying] a
motion to vacate a default upon which no default judgment has
been entered.”]; Winter v. Rice (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 679, 682
(Winter).)
We liberally construe a notice of appeal in favor of hearing
an appeal on the merits if it is reasonably clear what the
appellant is trying to appeal. (See K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified
School Dist. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 875, 882; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.100(a)(2).)4 Therefore, if “judgment was entered at the
time of filing of a notice of appeal from [an] order” denying a
motion to vacate a default, “the notice may be construed to refer
to the judgment thereby permitting review of the order.” (Winter,
supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 682; see Jade K., supra,
210 Cal.App.3d at p. 1466; rule 8.104(d) [a notice of appeal is

4 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of
Court.

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valid if “filed after judgment is rendered but before it is entered”
or filed “after the superior court has announced its intended
ruling, but before it has rendered judgment”].)
When the trial court denied Hernandez’s section 473
motion for relief from default on March 17, 2025, there was no
default judgment—that is, no judgment had been entered. When
Hernandez appealed from the court’s denial of her motion by
filing a notice of appeal on April 8, 2025, there was also no
default judgment or judgment entered at that time. Although the
court had previously entered a default judgment against
Hernandez on February 2, 2024, the court vacated this judgment
almost a year before (on April 26, 2024) Hernandez filed her
notice of appeal. The court did not enter the default judgment in
this case against Hernandez until July 18, 2025, more than three
months after she filed her notice of appeal.
In this light, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because
the denial of Hernandez’s motion to vacate default was not
independently appealable, and she filed her notice of appeal
before the court entered the default judgment. (See Veliscescu,
supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1522-1523 [dismissing appeal from
an order granting a motion to vacate default before entry of
default judgment].) We are unable to construe Hernandez’s
notice of appeal as referring to any appealable final order or
judgment because her notice of appeal does not meet the two
exceptions in Rule 8.104. That is, the notice of appeal was not
filed “after judgment [was] rendered but before it [was] entered,”
nor was it filed “after the superior court [had] announced its
intended ruling, but before it [had] rendered judgment.”
(Rule 8.104(d)(1), (2); see First American Title Co. v. Mirzaian
(2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 960 [a notice of appeal from the

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denial of a section 473 motion, filed four months before entry of a
default judgment, “does not meet the criteria for treatment as a
premature notice of appeal from the judgment” because it “was
filed even before the default prove up occurred”].)
Because Hernandez appealed from a nonappealable order,
and we cannot construe her notice of appeal as referring to an
appealable final order or judgment, we lack jurisdiction and must
dismiss her appeal. (See Winter, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 682-683 [dismissing “defendant’s purported appeal from the
order denying his motion to set aside entry of his default,” where
there was no judgment entered at the time defendant appealed
the denial, and “defendant’s notice of appeal cannot be construed
to refer to a nonexistent judgment”].)
Hernandez argues the denial of her motion to vacate
default “is independently appealable under Code of Civil
Procedure section 904.1(a)(2).” But as stated, section 904.1,
subdivision (a)(2), applies only to orders denying relief from
default or default judgment “made after a judgment.” (§ 904.1,
subd. (a)(2).) Here, there was no judgment at the time
Hernandez filed her notice of appeal from the denial order.
Hernandez further contends that once she “filed her Notice
of Appeal, the trial court was immediately divested of jurisdiction
over matters ‘embraced in’ or ‘affected by’ the order being
appealed. (Code Civ. Proc., §[ ]916.) Thus, the prove-up
[hearing] and judgment entered during the automatic stay are
void and cannot retroactively affect the validity or timing of [her]
appeal.” Section 916 provides that “the perfecting of an appeal
stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order
appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected
thereby . . . .” (§ 916, subd. (a).) However, an appeal from a

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nonappealable order “d[oes] not divest the trial court of
jurisdiction to proceed with [a] trial on the merits pending such
appeal.” (Mortgage Guarantee Co. v. Lee (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d
367, 373; accord, Central Sav. Bank v. Lake (1927) 201 Cal. 438,
442 [appeal from nonappealable order did not have “the effect of
depriving the trial court of the power to proceed further in the
cause pending the purported appeal”].)

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed. The motion to augment attached
to the reply brief is denied. The parties are to bear their own
costs on appeal.

MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:

FEUER, J. GIZA, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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