In re C.G. CA2/6

CourtListener 10840456Calctapp9 avr. 2026

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Filed 4/9/26 In re C.G. CA2/6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re C.G., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B347663
Under the Juvenile Court (Super. Ct. No. 17JV00424)
Law. (Santa Barbara County)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

C.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

C.G. appeals from the juvenile court’s order transferring
him to criminal court. (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 707). He contends
the juvenile court abused its discretion when it found all five

1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
criteria under section 707 weighed in favor of transfer. We
affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In June 2022, Joseph Ray Lujan was murdered. He had 18
gunshot wounds, six of which were to his head. A.V. was shot
twice in the abdomen. According to the police report, three
individuals, including C.G., went to Lujan’s home armed with
firearms to commit a robbery of Lujan, who was involved in
illegal marijuana sales. When A.V. suspected a robbery was
occurring, she ran outside and was shot. She witnessed the
individuals shoot Lujan multiple times. C.G. was 17 years and
nine months old at the time of the incident.
In October 2023, the Santa Barbara County District
Attorney’s Office filed a section 602 petition alleging C.G.
committed the murder of Lujan (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and
assault with a firearm against A.V. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd.
(a)(2)). As to both counts, it was further alleged C.G. personally
used a firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd.
(b)).
In April 2025, the prosecution moved to transfer C.G. to an
adult court of criminal jurisdiction. (§ 707, subd. (a)(1).)
Prosecution evidence
At the contested section 707 transfer hearing, Lompoc
Police Officer Gabriel Molina testified he pieced together C.G.’s
whereabouts on the day of the murder from police reports,
surveillance videos, cell phone records, and C.G.’s gang history.
Video footage from the day of the murder showed C.G. with four
“F Street” gang members. C.G. was “flashing gang signs” with
his hands, and he had a “GLOCK-style” firearm with an extended
magazine that appeared loaded. C.G. was at the home of an

2
F Street gang member about two blocks away from Lujan’s house.
A compilation of videos showed the route C.G. and two of his
associates took from the gang member’s home to Lujan’s home. A
video showed one person contacting Lujan at his gate and leaving
the gated area with Lujan. A.V. then leaves the home and drops
to the ground. A video showed C.G. walking through the
alleyway next to Lujan’s home. He was “flashing” gang signs and
lifting his shirt to display the firearm in his waistband.
Officer Molina testified that the F Street gang is a Sureño
street gang in Lompoc and that C.G. was a registered gang
member. He testified that gang members must “put in work”
meaning they must commit crimes and that gangs thrive by
instilling fear into the community. Subsequent to the June 2022
murder, C.G. was arrested twice as an adult for possession of a
firearm and for an incident involving a hit-and-run collision
where a third party observed C.G. point a firearm.
Probation officer Tiffany Phillips testified regarding C.G.’s
behavior while housed at the Juvenile Justice Center (JJC).
Phillips testified that there were several incident reports
involving C.G., including one in which he assaulted a staff
member, incidents where he was violent with other youths, and
an incident where he vandalized his cell. C.G. requested
rehousing in county jail. Phillips provided the reasons for why
his request should be granted: (1) in C.G.’s prior experiences in
county jail, he had no behavior writeups or injuries and he felt
more comfortable in county jail versus JJC, (2) the programming
provided at JJC could be offered in county jail, (3) county jail has
more ability to assess and separate the population by age and
gang affiliation, and (4) the JJC youth and staff were at risk of
danger if C.G. remained because he expressed he was going to

3
assault staff if he was not rehoused in county jail. In January
2024, C.G.’s request was granted.
Thereafter, there were two instances in county jail where
C.G. and another person assaulted another inmate. In the
incident reports, C.G. was classified as “Maximum” which meant
that he was a “repeated violent offender and/or an active gang
member.”
Psychologist Dr. Amy Watt testified as the prosecution’s
expert. Dr. Watt prepared a report in 2024 based on C.G.’s
records, and another report in 2025 which included a
psychological evaluation after a clinical interview with C.G. and
several psychological tests. In both reports, Dr. Watt opined that
C.G. should be transferred to adult criminal court. Dr. Watt
found that all five criteria weighed in favor of transfer.
As to the criminal sophistication criteria, Dr. Watt
considered C.G.’s long history of arrests and gang involvement
dating back to when he was 13 years old. Almost all his arrests
were related to gang members and gang activity. Dr. Watt
observed that in the instant offense, there was “a lot of planning
involved.” Based on the hypothetical in which C.G. and his
associates walked to Lujan’s home with a firearm and lured
Lujan out of his home to rob him, Dr. Watt opined those acts
demonstrated criminal sophistication.
As to whether C.G. could be rehabilitated within the
juvenile jurisdictional time limits, Dr. Watt opined that there
was “very limited rehabilitation potential” for C.G. She noted
that since October 2023 when he was placed in custody, C.G. had
multiple incidents and altercations in JJC and adult jail and that
most of these altercations were gang related. Dr. Watt
acknowledged his participation in programs, but he had no

4
insight into future plans and had no community support. If he
were released, she believed he would go back to his gang because
they were the “only people that he experiences acceptance and
recognition because of his horrific family history and feeling
abandoned and rejected by his family throughout his life.”
Additionally, Dr. Watt observed that C.G. engaged in “deceitful
and manipulative” behavior to achieve his purpose. Dr. Watt
observed that C.G. would appear confused during his interview to
achieve his purpose, but there was a “stark difference” from all
other descriptions of him in the record. C.G. also exhibited no
regret or remorse, which reflected his lack of intent to change.
Dr. Watt reviewed defense expert Dr. Carolyn Murphy’s
report. Dr. Watt indicated C.G. may have an antisocial
personality disorder. She explained the treatment for antisocial
personality disorders is intensive mental health treatment and
that “it takes longer for treatment to be effective.” She opined, “I
cannot say if mental health treatment would be effective with
[C.G.] because he has routinely refused mental health treatment
or counseling.” During testing including psychological,
personality, cognitive, and emotional functioning testing, C.G.
appeared confused, but Dr. Watt observed he presented
differently and there was no confusion in other instances such as
when he spoke to his girlfriend over the phone. Similarly, C.G.’s
I.Q. measured low, but this result was inconsistent with Dr.
Watt’s personal observations and there was no evidence to
support a diagnosis of intellectual disability. Dr. Watt believed
his test results were due to poor effort or lack of cooperation.
As to C.G.’s previous delinquent history, Dr. Watt
discussed his history of arrests starting when he was arrested for
vehicle theft at 13 years old and escalating to gang violence and

5
firearm offenses. He was often arrested with gang members and
gang activities.
As to prior attempts to rehabilitate, Dr. Watt noted that
previous attempts were unsuccessful as he continued to commit
offenses and was arrested right before the instant offense. Dr.
Watt further noted that after he finished juvenile probation, he
was arrested as an adult more than once. Based on her review of
incident reports from JJC and county jail, C.G. was the aggressor
in a majority of incidents.
As to the circumstances and gravity of the offense, C.G was
17 years and nine months old at the time of the offense. Dr. Watt
observed that C.G.’s behavioral patterns have been ongoing since
he was 13 years old. Dr. Watt did not believe C.G. could be
rehabilitated in the juvenile system within the jurisdictional time
limits.
Probation officer Victoria Kral wrote the transfer reports
recommending that C.G. be transferred to adult criminal court.
As to criminal sophistication, Kral considered C.G.’s intellectual
capacity and noted that he took many programs in jail and has
the capacity to finish school. Kral testified C.G. had social
adaptive behavior issues involving following rules, problem
solving, and respecting the law. She was not aware of any
intellectual or developmental disabilities. Regarding C.G.’s
physical and mental health, Kral noted that C.G.’s mother used
drugs while pregnant, but there was no diagnosis regarding how
it currently affected him. Kral also noted C.G. had a “poly-
substance disorder.” With respect to impetuosity or failure to
appreciate the risks and consequences of criminal behavior, Kral
noted C.G. was an F Street gang member and that he had
repeatedly been exposed to violence. With respect to his family

6
environment and upbringing, Kral further noted that C.G.’s
parents neglected him. He alleged he was physically and
emotionally abused by his stepmother and grandmother. Based
on a hypothetical reflecting the alleged facts of this offense, Kral
opined that C.G. was “transferable.”
Kral believed C.G. could not be rehabilitated before the
expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. She also believed
his previous delinquent behavior also supported transfer. C.G.
was referred to probation when he was 13 years old for unlawful
sexual intercourse and thereafter for petty theft. He was then
declared a ward in 2017 for evading a police officer in a vehicle,
twice in 2018 for unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle and
resisting arrest, and in 2019 for carrying a loaded firearm in
public—all offenses involving other F Street gang members. C.G.
also had two adjudicated probation violations, including an
instance where he absconded from camp. After the instant
offense, he was convicted twice as an adult for firearm offenses.
From the last interview, C.G. was not getting any mental health
services in jail. Kral believed this factor supported transfer
because C.G. continued to commit crimes with firearms and other
gang members despite receiving programming, completing a
camp commitment, and living in another state.
Regarding previous attempts to rehabilitate C.G., Kral
listed services C.G. had received through juvenile and adult
probation and camp commitment. Kral believed prior efforts by
the juvenile court to rehabilitate “have been exhausted.”
As to the circumstances and gravity of the offense, Kral
noted the level of harm that was caused; Lujan lost his life, and
A.V. could have lost hers. Kral testified regarding instances in
custody where C.G. engaged in fights with other gang members,

7
threatened staff members with violence, and continued to engage
in acts showing his allegiance to his gang.
Kral testified that C.G. did not do well in juvenile hall, and
towards the end, he was doing everything he could to get
transferred to jail including assaulting other youth and staff.
Kral testified that C.G. continued to associate with the F Street
gang while at JJC through 2024 and that he continued to be
violent in custody. Probation recommended transfer to adult
court as there was insufficient time to rehabilitate C.G. in the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction.
Defense evidence
Martín Flores testified as a defense gang expert. He
interviewed C.G. and discussed his family background. C.G. said
his mother was no longer in his life because of her own mental
health and drug issues and that all of her children were removed
from her custody. C.G.’s father was in and out of custody and
had drug issues, but nevertheless gained custody over C.G.
There were reports of potential physical abuse by his father.
C.G.’s stepmother treated him like an “abandoned stepchild” and
differently from her own children. C.G. lived in extreme poverty
without family or support, and such circumstances heightened
his risk of joining a gang. Flores opined that C.G. would have a
better chance of putting gang life behind him if he remained in
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and took advantage of services.
Flores believed that C.G. was taking steps to change because he
began taking advantage of resources and programs. C.G. also
told probation and Flores that he was no longer an F Street gang
member. Flores believed C.G. was amenable to rehabilitation in

8
the juvenile court jurisdiction and that there was sufficient time
(more than four years) for him to rehabilitate.
Psychologist Dr. Murphy testified as a defense expert.
Murphy interviewed and evaluated C.G. for transfer. Dr.
Murphy reviewed C.G.’s family history and noted that his mother
used drugs while pregnant, but he did not test positive for drugs
at birth. C.G. was placed in foster care at birth and was removed
from her custody. His stepmother was the dominant parental
figure in his life. He perceived his stepmother preferred her own
children to him, and there was a lot of anger and resentment
from the way she treated him. C.G. began using alcohol and
cannabis at an early age. Dr. Murphy opined that such use
affected his development.
From her evaluation, Dr. Murphy diagnosed C.G. with
conduct disorder and was also concerned about his cannabis use.
She explained that conduct disorder is when an individual has
behavior disturbance in at least three areas of functioning; the
general categories are truancy, assaults, property destruction,
fire-setting, and theft.
As to the section 707 criteria, Dr. Murphy testified that
when it came to degree of criminal sophistication, she agreed
with Dr. Watt that C.G. was not intellectually delayed. In
considering C.G.’s intellectual capacity, Dr. Murphy mentioned
that C.G. reported a probable concussion incident, probable drug
exposure in utero, and some impulsivity and immature decision-
making, but he was not disabled. When considering the impact of
his family, she opined that both biological family and gang family
were “critical in his development of a lot of attitudes and beliefs
that are conduct disorder. They’re not pro-social.” Dr. Murphy
testified that C.G. experienced “adverse childhood events”

9
including parental criminality, household substance use, parents
with mental health issues, and divorce. He also experienced
“[a]dverse community events,” including poverty and growing up
in a “criminogenic” neighborhood where violence and stealing are
normalized. Dr. Murphy had mental health concerns regarding
C.G. including conduct disorder, anger management, and
emotional dysregulation. She also opined that due to trauma, his
age, and cannabis use, C.G. was impulsive, had poor decision-
making, and lacked appreciation for risks and consequences.
Regarding C.G.’s prior delinquent history, Dr. Murphy
opined that one could expect to have some continued behavioral
problems and difficulty pulling away from a gang when a person
is still young and in an environment with other people of similar
backgrounds. Acting out should be considered in the context of a
person’s level of trauma and dysfunction. With respect to C.G.’s
noncompliance with treatment, Dr. Murphy noted that his
parents contributed by refusing to take him to necessary
assessment when he was a minor.
Dr. Murphy opined that psychologists cannot weigh in on
the circumstances and gravity of the offense because there was no
psychological test or process to do so. She opined that C.G.’s
behavior was attributed to his background, which included his
exposure to drugs at birth, his relationship with his parents, the
modeling of drug use and criminality and being homeless, and his
relationship to his gang affects his behavior. She opined that
C.G. was amenable to rehabilitation.
Transfer order
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court granted
the motion and ordered C.G. transferred to adult criminal court.
It found all five criteria under section 707 weighed in favor of

10
transfer. Based on the five criteria and totality of the evidence,
the court found the People met their burden to show by clear and
convincing evidence that C.G. was not amenable to rehabilitation
while under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
C.G. contends the juvenile court erred in evaluating three
of the criteria under section 707—the degree of criminal
sophistication, previous delinquent history, and the gravity and
circumstances of the offense. We conclude there was no error.
Section 707, subdivision (a)(3) provides that in order to
“find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal
jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence
that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
In making its decision, the court shall consider the
following five criteria: (A) “The degree of criminal sophistication
exhibited by the minor”; (B) “Whether the minor can be
rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction”; (C) “The minor’s previous delinquent history”; (D)
“Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate
the minor”; and (E) “The circumstances and gravity of the offense
alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor.”
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)–(E).)
“If the court orders a transfer of jurisdiction, the court shall
recite the basis for its decision in an order entered upon the
minutes, which shall include the reasons supporting the court’s
finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).)
The minor’s amenability to rehabilitation under the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction is “the ultimate question for the court

11
to decide.” (In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416.) In
deciding that question, the juvenile court shall analyze the five
criteria set forth in section 707, subdivision (a)(3) “focused
through the lens of amenability to rehabilitation.” (In re S.S.
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1288 (S.S.), superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in In re J.M. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 745,
751–753; E.P., at p. 416.)
We review the juvenile court’s order transferring a case to
an adult court of criminal jurisdiction for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 680.)
The juvenile court’s findings as to the five fitness criteria under
section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(A) through (E) are factual findings
that we review for substantial evidence. (Jones, at p. 681.) The
substantial evidence standard is deferential, and we review the
record most favorably to the judgment to determine whether
there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact
could have made the requisite finding under the governing
standard of proof. (In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152,
165; In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 298.) We give due
deference to how the trier of fact evaluated the credibility of
witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drew reasonable
inferences from the evidence. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9
Cal.5th 989, 1011–1012.)
On appeal, C.G. contests the criminal sophistication, prior
delinquent history, and the circumstances and gravity of the
alleged offense criteria. He does not contest the juvenile court’s
findings as to criteria pertaining to whether the minor can be
rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction and the previous attempts to rehabilitate C.G. We

12
therefore address only the three criteria directly challenged on
appeal.
1. Criminal sophistication
When evaluating the degree of criminal sophistication
exhibited by a minor, the juvenile court “shall give weight to any
relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s age,
maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and
emotional health at the time of the alleged offense; the minor’s
impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and consequences of
criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure
on the minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s family and
community environment; the existence of childhood trauma; the
minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care system;
and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking,
sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the minor’s criminal
sophistication.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that the degree of criminal sophistication weighed in favor of
transfer. C.G. was three months shy of being 18 years old at the
time of the offense. He was not intellectually disabled. Probation
officer Kral testified that C.G. took many programs in jail and
had the capacity to finish school. Furthermore, as the court
observed, C.G. showed the capacity to “support himself in relative
normalcy by securing a job while out of state in 2022 and
establishing and maintaining a household for a brief period of
time.” The circumstances of the crime also reflect a level of
intellectual and mental capacity to engage in a deliberate and
planned criminal activity. (See In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
205, 214 [planning ahead to commit a crime is indicative of
criminal sophistication].) As Dr. Watt observed, there was “a lot

13
of planning involved” in the offense. He and two gang associates
planned an armed robbery of Lujan, lured him out of the house,
and shot him and A.V. multiple times. C.G. also had a history of
criminal activities and gang involvement, which began when he
was 13 years old and almost all his previous arrests were gang
related. C.G. “flashed” gang signs before and during the
commission of the offense, indicating that, like his previous
offenses, the offense was gang related. As the trial court
observed, such facts reflect that his actions were not “the result of
impetuosity” but rather demonstrate “criminal sophistication in
planning a robbery, with the unfortunate but foreseeable result”
of murder and violence.
C.G. contends the juvenile court failed to consider the effect
of his family and community environment on this criterion and
erred in finding that he did not suffer from “any notable mental
health or . . . emotional issues.” But the record does not reflect
the juvenile court ignored such evidence. Here, the court cited to
the factors it was required to consider under section 707,
subdivision (a)(3)(A), including the minor’s “physical, mental, and
emotional health at the time of the alleged offense,” “the effect of
the minor’s family and community environment,” and “the
existence of childhood trauma.” We presume the juvenile court
followed the applicable law, and such presumption will only be
overcome by an affirmative showing of error in the record.
(People v. Nakano (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 623, 635.) C.G. makes
no such affirmative showing of error. The record neither shows
the juvenile court failed to evaluate any relevant factors, nor does
it show the court ignored the abundant evidence regarding C.G.’s
family and community environment, childhood trauma, or mental
and emotional health. Rather, the juvenile court expressly stated

14
it considered all written and oral arguments, the testimony of all
witnesses including defense witnesses, and all exhibits received
into evidence.
The court’s review necessarily included evidence of C.G.’s
childhood trauma, the effect of his family and community
environment, and his mental and emotional health. (In re J.S.,
supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 214.) The court also expressly
acknowledged C.G.’s childhood trauma, which it found
“significant” but did not “attribute much weight to this factor”
when weighed against other factors unfavorable to C.G. This
finding is further supported by the testimony of Dr. Watt, who
psychologically evaluated C.G. and acknowledged his childhood
trauma, but nonetheless found the degree of criminal
sophistication criteria weighed in favor of transfer.
We also conclude the court did not err in finding that C.G.
did not currently or at the time of the offense suffer “any notable
mental health or . . . emotional issues.” We do not read this
statement as the juvenile court’s failure to properly evaluate his
mental health; rather we interpret it to mean that in considering
the evidence of C.G.’s mental health or emotional issues, the
court found it did not negate the degree of criminal sophistication
C.G. had exhibited. We give deference to how the juvenile court
weighed the evidence. (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th
at pp. 1011–1012.)
C.G. further contends that the juvenile court made “no
mention” of family and community environment in its ruling, and
its failure to do so means it ignored such factors. We disagree
because the court discussed C.G.’s gang relations and family
trauma. But in any event, we do not equate the court’s omission
of specific mention of a factor with its failure to evaluate it.

15
Section 707, subdivision (a)(3) requires the court to “recite the
basis for its decision, . . . which shall include the reasons
supporting the court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
The juvenile court adequately did so here.
2. Previous delinquent history
When evaluating the minor’s previous delinquent history,
“the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor,
including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minor’s
previous delinquent history and the effect of the minor’s family
and community environment and childhood trauma on the
minor’s previous delinquent behavior.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(ii).)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that C.G.’s previous delinquent history weighed in favor of
transfer. C.G.’s had a lengthy delinquent history, which began
when he was 13 years old. The probation supplemental transfer
report provides a summary of his offenses as a minor including
unlawful driving or taking a vehicle, evading an officer, resisting
arrest, and carrying a loaded firearm. He violated probation
multiple times, including absconding from camp. After
committing the instant offense, he was convicted as an adult of
two firearm offenses. He also was convicted of two counts of
resisting an executive officer, which involved the assault of two
JJC officers.
As the trial court observed, C.G.’s unlawful activity “has
been relatively unabated since he was 13 years old despite the
programming he received while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.” Moreover, the incident reports from JJC and
county jail and Kral’s testimony reflect that C.G. continued to act
violently, including assaulting other youths, inmates, and staff

16
with C.G. being the aggressor in many instances. (D.C. v.
Superior Court (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 441, 453 [conduct occurring
after the alleged offense was relevant to evaluating the minor’s
delinquent history].)
C.G. does not contest his previous delinquent history, but
he contends the juvenile court once again ignored evidence
regarding the effect of his family and community environment
and childhood trauma. We disagree. The juvenile court
acknowledged he “suffered childhood trauma” but found “there is
no evidence to indicate that this unlawful behavior is mitigated
by this factor.” As we discussed in relation to the criminal
sophistication criterion, the court was aware of C.G.’s family and
community environment and childhood trauma. Such evidence
was presented at the transfer hearing and set forth in detail in
the transfer report. We presume the court properly weighed all
relevant factors both favorable and unfavorable to C.G. when
evaluating his previous delinquent history. (See In re Julian R.
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 499.)
C.G. also contends the juvenile court’s statement that there
was “no evidence to indicate that this unlawful behavior is
mitigated” by his childhood trauma indicates the court
overlooked or ignored evidence of his childhood trauma. We do
not read that statement as the court ignoring evidence. The
court was entitled to and was in the best position to determine
whether the evidence of C.G.’s childhood trauma mitigated or
negated his unlawful behavior. It found that it did not, and we
defer to the court’s weighing of evidence. (Conservatorship of
O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1011–1012.)

17
3. Circumstances and gravity of the alleged offense
When evaluating the circumstances and gravity of the
alleged offenses, the juvenile court “shall give weight to any
relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the actual behavior
of the person, the mental state of the person, the person’s degree
of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by
the person, and the person’s mental and emotional development.”
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(ii).)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that the circumstances and gravity of the instant offense weighed
in favor of transfer. The harm here was “the most serious and
grave harm possible.” Lujan lost his life. He had 18 gunshot
wounds, six of which were to his head. A.V. had two gunshot
wounds to the abdomen and was critically injured. The robbery
was planned and deliberate, and C.G. and his associates were all
armed. C.G. was “flashing” gang signs before and during the
commission of the offense, reflecting allegiance to his gang. His
allegiance to his gang was a consistent theme, as reflected with
his prior offenses and with his continued behaviors in JJC and
county jail. Dr. Watt testified he showed no remorse or regret for
his actions.
C.G. contends the juvenile court ignored evidence that his
mental and emotional development played a significant role in
the commission of the offense. We again disagree. The juvenile
court here noted that there was some evidence of sexual abuse,
but “no evidence was presented that this abuse, nor the youth’s
mental and emotional development was a significant factor in the
commission of this crime.” The court’s finding is proper. The
court considered all of the evidence of C.G.’s mental and
emotional health and development including evidence regarding

18
his polysubstance disorder, conduct disorder, and potential
antisocial personality disorder. But, in weighing such evidence,
the court found it was not a significant role in the commission of
the offense and did not negate the gravity of the offense.
Because substantial evidence supports all three of the
contested criteria and C.G. does not otherwise show error, the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering C.G. to be
transferred to adult criminal court jurisdiction.2
DISPOSITION
The transfer order pursuant to section 707 is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

CODY, J.

2 Because we address the merits of C.G.’s contentions, we
need not determine whether C.G.’s claims were forfeited.

19
Gustavo E. Lavayen, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Kristen Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David A. Voet, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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