CourtListener 10838238•In re D.E. CA3
Texte intégral
Filed 4/6/26 In re D.E. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----
In re D.E., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law.
THE PEOPLE, C102839
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. JJC-JV-DE-
2017-0001829)
v.
D.E.,
Defendant and Appellant.
On August 26, 2022, minor D.E. was shot in the buttock by Kenneth H. The
following morning, minor, along with his uncle and two friends, approached Kenneth’s
son, Sauci Haywood, about the shooting. An altercation ensued during which minor shot
Sauci in the back.
On the prosecutor’s petition, the juvenile court held a transfer hearing. After
evaluating the transfer criteria under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 (statutory
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section references that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise
stated), the court found by clear and convincing evidence that minor was not amenable to
rehabilitation under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and ordered minor to be
transferred to criminal court.
Minor appeals from this decision and raises two challenges. First, he contends
that the juvenile court’s amenability finding was not supported by substantial evidence.
Second, minor claims that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the opinions
and transfer report of retained psychologist Dr. Alison Vargas. We affirm the juvenile
court’s order.
FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Sauci’s Murder
Minor lived with his grandmother until she passed away when minor was 12 years
old. His living situation afterwards is difficult to track, but it appears he lived with his
mother for a period of time, an aunt and uncle, and an abusive woman name Lawanda;
minor also moved around through several homes of either acquaintances and/or family
members, and he experienced bouts of voluntary homelessness. When he was 17,
minor’s uncle, Bryon S., became his guardian. Minor’s mother abused drugs and had a
criminal history; she came into his life intermittently. There is no information about
minor’s father.
Bryon and minor “claimed” the 6200 Block of Porterfield Court in Stockton,
though Bryon denied being in a gang. On the evening of August 26, 2022, Bryon and
minor were walking together in Porterfield Court when minor was shot in the buttock by
Kenneth. Bryon shot at Kenneth in return.
The next day, minor and Bryon returned to Porterfield Court with friends Dee B.
and David J. Minor, David, and Dee saw Sauci, Kenneth’s son, drive into the court. The
group confronted Sauci about his father shooting minor. Minor, David, Bryon and Dee
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surrounded Sauci; David punched Sauci and the two began to fight. During the fight,
minor shot Sauci in the back with a gun that he either brought to the confrontation
himself or that Bryon handed to him during the altercation.
Sauci died from his injuries.
The day after the murder, minor texted his friend Cameron J. about the shootings.
Cameron asked minor if he knew who shot him, to which minor responded, “[Y]eah. I
already did what I had to do.”
Bryon and minor left for Las Vegas after the murder.
Minor carried guns and bought and sold guns and ammunition in 2022 and 2023.
He was eventually arrested and charged with carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle
(Pen. Code, § 25400, subd. (a)(1)) in March 2023. Minor admitted to the charge and was
placed on an ankle monitor. Photographs on social media showed minor holding and
pointing a firearm towards his ankle monitor and standing near large bags of marijuana.
Minor was eventually arrested in Nevada for Sauci’s murder and placed into
juvenile hall on January 19, 2024.
Legal Proceedings
On January 2, 2024, a petition under section 602 was filed alleging minor
murdered Sauci and intentionally and personally discharged a firearm and proximately
caused great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d).) On the
prosecutor’s petition, the juvenile court held a transfer hearing under section 707.
At the hearing, incident reports from juvenile hall were admitted and revealed that
minor suffered approximately 30 “disobedience[s]” between January and August 2024.
The disobedient behavior included failing to follow rules; talking back to, manipulating,
intimidating, and threatening staff; “sexually acting out”; arguing with, harming, and
threatening other juveniles; disrupting class and programs; and fighting.
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Dr. Vargas, a licensed clinical psychologist, testified at the transfer hearing. She
was retained by the prosecutor to write a report regarding minor’s transfer from juvenile
to criminal court. The juvenile court recognized Dr. Vargas as an expert in psychology.
Dr. Vargas reviewed records related to the murder charge, minor’s educational and
mental health treatment records, and his disciplinary history in juvenile hall. She also
researched recidivism in teenage offenders. She noted that minor has no intellectual
disabilities or special education.
With this information, Dr. Vargas analyzed the criterion under section 707. Based
on the circumstances of the murder; minor’s ongoing criminal history including drugs,
violence, and illegal gun possession; as well as minor’s failure to benefit from the
disciplinary consequences and available treatment in juvenile hall, Dr. Vargas opined that
minor would not rehabilitate before he aged out of the juvenile court system in 2030 at
age 25.
Minor called several witnesses to speak on his behalf. One of minor’s juvenile
hall teachers testified that he had “no problems” with minor in class and that he
completed all his schoolwork. Minor’s older sister also testified and described her
childhood with minor including their time living with their grandmother, minor’s various
homes throughout the years, and the abuse from Lawanda. She did not remember minor
as a “bad kid” or “getting in trouble.”
In independently evaluating each of the five criteria under section 707 regarding
transfer, the juvenile court considered testimony, including expert testimony from
Dr. Vargas, and evidence regarding minor’s childhood, schooling, mental health, criminal
history, and discipline in juvenile hall. The court found that three criteria weighed in
favor of transfer, including criminal sophistication, ability to rehabilitate while in the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction, and gravity of the offense. The juvenile court found two
criteria weighed against transfer, including previous delinquent history and previous
attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate.
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In considering these criteria collectively, the juvenile court found by clear and
convincing evidence that minor was “not amenable to the care, treatment, and training
programs available through the juvenile court system under the statutory criteria.” Minor
was ordered to be transferred to the jurisdiction of the criminal court.
DISCUSSION
I
Substantial Evidence Supports Transfer to Criminal Court
Minor contends that the evidence presented at the hearing was insufficient to
establish criminal sophistication, inability to rehabilitate before expiration of the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction, and the gravity of the offense under section 707. Minor requests
reversal of the transfer order with instructions on remand to enter a new order denying
the request for transfer. Alternatively, minor asks for remand for a new amenability
hearing.
Legal Standards
Section 707 provides the only method for the prosecution to try a juvenile offender
in criminal court. To transfer a minor under this section, the prosecution must show “by
clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).) The statute sets out
five criteria that juvenile courts must consider in making this determination. These are
(1) “[t]he degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor” (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3)(A)(i)); (2) “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(i)); (3) “[t]he minor’s previous
delinquent history” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)); (4) the “[s]uccess of previous attempts by
the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)(i)); and (5) “[t]he
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circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed
by the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(i)).
The juvenile court does not consider these criteria in isolation. Instead, the statute
“requires the juvenile court to consider all five [criteria] together in determining whether
the minor is amenable to rehabilitation.” (In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 417.)
Nor does the statute dictate the importance of one criterion over another: “[T]he court has
the discretion to conclude that one or more of the five [criteria] predominate so as to
determine the result, even though some or all of the other [criteria] might point to a
different result.” (Ibid.)
Additionally, each of the five criteria include a list of factors the juvenile court
must consider when evaluating amenability and the court is statutorily required to afford
weight to the listed factors. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3) (A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii).)
Standard of Review
We review for substantial evidence the juvenile court’s factual findings under
section 707, subdivision (a) (In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 165), mindful
“of [the] high probability demanded by this standard of proof.” (Conservatorship of O.B.
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005, fn. omitted.) But “the question before a court reviewing a
finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence is not whether the
appellate court itself regards the evidence as clear and convincing; it is whether a
reasonable trier of fact could have regarded the evidence as satisfying this standard of
proof.” (Id. at p. 1009.) We “do[ ] not reweigh the evidence itself.” (Id. at p. 1008.)
Rather, we must “view the record in the light most favorable to the judgment below,”
“indulge reasonable inferences that the trier of fact might have drawn from the evidence,”
“accept the fact finder’s resolution of conflicting evidence,” and we “may not insert [our]
own views regarding the credibility of witnesses.” (Ibid.)
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In this context, the criteria used to determine fitness are based on the premise that
the minor did, in fact, commit the offense. (People v. Superior Court (Rodrigo O.)
(1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1303-1304 [minor’s evidence that he was elsewhere at the
time of the crimes was not relevant to the determination of his fitness for treatment under
the juvenile court law].)
Criminal Sophistication
Pursuant to section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(A)(i), the juvenile court is to consider
the minor’s criminal sophistication. “When evaluating [this] criterion . . . , the juvenile
court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s
age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time
of the alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and
consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the
minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s family and community environment; the
existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care
system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or
sexual battery on the minor’s criminal sophistication.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).) The
court found this factor weighed in favor of transfer based on the manner in which the
shooting occurred as well as minor’s decisions to flee and continue committing crimes
after the murder.
Substantial evidence supports the court’s findings on this criterion. Minor and his
uncle and friends approached Sauci the morning after Sauci’s father shot minor in the
buttock. The group surrounded Sauci and confronted him about the shooting. David
lured Sauci into a physical fight. During the altercation, minor shot Sauci in the back
with a gun he either pulled out himself or was given by Bryon. Minor proudly texted his
friend afterwards that he “did what [he] had to do” in response to being shot by Kenneth.
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Shortly after the murder, minor fled to Las Vegas. After the murder, but before he
was arrested, minor admitted to carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle. He was placed
on an ankle monitor and then mocked the justice system by posting photographs on social
media where he posed with marijuana and pointed a gun at his ankle monitor. Minor was
also known to sell firearms and ammunition between the time of the murder and his
arrest.
A reasonable trier of fact could have regarded these facts as clear and convincing
evidence of criminal sophistication.
Rehabilitation
The juvenile court must also consider “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated
prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(i).) In
evaluating this criterion, “the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor,
including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow and mature.” (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3)(B)(ii).) The court also found that this factor weighed in favor of transfer based on
minor’s exhibited defiance and “total disregard for . . . authority” while in juvenile hall as
well as his refusal to change.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding on this criteria. Minor was
19 years old at the time of the hearing and had six years from that point to rehabilitate
before turning 25 and falling out of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. (§ 607, subd. (c).)
Although minor had access to programs, school, and therapy in juvenile hall, he did not
take any meaningful advantage of these opportunities. Instead, minor spent his time
failing to follow rules; talking back to, manipulating, intimidating, and threatening staff;
“sexually acting out”; arguing with, harming, and threatening other juveniles; disrupting
class and programs; and fighting. As the juvenile court noted from Dr. Vargas’s
testimony, there was “no demonstrative change in [minor’s behavior] and no lessening of
disciplinary reports” despite consequences for his actions. Although minor had an
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abundance of opportunities, and no intellectual deficiencies, he repeatedly chose not to
improve his behavior.
The juvenile court could thus reasonably infer from minor’s continued poor
behavior in juvenile hall that effective rehabilitation required more time than juvenile
jurisdictional limits permitted.
Circumstances and Gravity of the Offense
The juvenile court also considers “[t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense
alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(i).)
In weighing these criteria, “the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor,
including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the
person, the person’s degree of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused
by the person, and the person’s mental and emotional development.” (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3)(E)(ii).) The court also found this criterion weighed in favor of transfer, noting that
murder is “as serious as it can get,” especially given that minor shot Sauci from behind
while he was fighting David.
Substantial evidence also supports this finding. Minor and his friends and uncle
approached and surrounded Sauci, outnumbering him four to one. While Sauci was
fighting David, minor shot Sauci in the back. Minor’s actions, taken in revenge for being
shot by Kenneth the night before, reflect deeply troubling and serious circumstances of
the offense.
II
Testimony of Dr. Vargas
Minor claims that the juvenile court abused its discretion and violated his
constitutional right to due process and a fair hearing by permitting Dr. Vargas to testify
and by admitting and considering her transfer report. According to minor, Dr. Vargas’s
testimony and report were “categorically” inadmissible because they were founded upon
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actions taken by Dr. Vargas that violated the American Psychological Association’s Ethics
Code (APA Ethics Code). Specifically, minor contends that Dr. Vargas violated the APA
Ethics Code by giving her opinions without meeting with minor first (APA Ethics Code,
§ 9.01(b)); failing to seek minor’s consent before giving her opinions and writing her
report (APA Ethics Code, § 3.10(c)); and failing to take reasonable steps to avoid
harming minor (APA Ethics Code, § 3.04(a)).
Counsel raised and lost the same argument in In re: S.F. (In re S.F. (March 20,
2025, C099783) [nonpub. opn.] (S.F.).) As we explained, “[W]e are not tasked with
reviewing a violation of professional ethics. Our job is to determine the legal issue of
whether Dr. Urquiza’s testimony is admissible. And nowhere in the Evidence Code, or
any other applicable legal authority provided by minor, requires a psychologist to obtain
consent from the subject of expert testimony before delivering an opinion in court, nor
that this opinion cannot be that a minor is not amenable to rehabilitation. We therefore
conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by permitting Dr. Urquiza to
testify on the matters that he did.” (Ibid.)
Counsel’s failure to acknowledge this court’s prior decision on the same issue, or
to make any effort to customize his argument to persuade us to come to a different result,
is inappropriate – at least. The reasoning in S.F. is sound, and counsel does not change
our minds by simply repeating the same argument.
Consequently, we reach the same conclusion on minor’s challenge to the
admission of Dr. Vargas’s testimony and report as we did in S.F. Minor’s repeated
challenges to expert evidence based upon the APA Ethics Code does not bear on this
appeal and minor has, once again, failed to point to applicable legal authority to
demonstrate that the juvenile court erred in admitting Dr. Vargas’s testimony and report.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order transferring minor to a court of criminal jurisdiction is
affirmed.
____________________________
HULL, J.
We concur:
____________________________
EARL, P. J.
____________________________
MESIWALA, J.
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