CourtListener 10832002•C4 Distribution Co. v. Spark Enterprises CA4/3
C4 Distribution Co. v. Spark Enterprises CA4/3
CourtListener 10832002Calctapp2 avr. 2026
Texte intégral
Filed 4/2/26 C4 Distribution Co. v. Spark Enterprises CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
C4 DISTRIBUTION CO. LLC,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G065228
v. (Super. Ct. Case No. 30-2023-
01328541)
SPARK ENTERPRISES, LLC et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
James Hansen, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Affirmed.
Callahan & Blaine, Edward Susolik, Michael J. Sachs, and Brett
E. Bitzer for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Venable, Adam M. Weg, and Rodney S. Lasher, for Defendants
and Respondents.
* * *
C4 Distribution Co. LLC (C4) appeals from an order of the
superior court denying its motion to amend its judgment against respondents
Spark Enterprises, LLC (Spark) and RD Lynwood South, a California
corporation, (RD) to add three related parties as judgment debtors under the
alter ego doctrine. We conclude C4 failed to show the related parties were
alter egos of respondents. Accordingly, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
UNDERLYING PROCEEDINGS
Spark was formed on January 25, 2017, and RD was incorporated
on February 16, 2017, for the sole purpose of operating a cannabis business in
the City of Lynwood (City). Ryan Oganesian and Darrin Oganesian
(collectively, Oganesian) are the only managers of Spark, and at all times,
OG Ventures has been the sole member of Spark. The Oganesians are the
owners and managers of OG Ventures. OG Ventures is also the sole
shareholder of RD. Ryan is the president of RD, and Darrin is the secretary of
RD. RD has no other managers or employees.
On January 2, 2018, RD entered into a Development Agreement
with the City, which allowed respondents to legally operate a cannabis
business in the City. On March 15, 2019, respondents and C4 entered into a
management agreement, wherein C4 would manage respondents’ cannabis
business in exchange for a “license fee.”
On November 19, 2020, respondents initiated arbitration against
C4 for alleged breaches of the management agreement. In response, C4
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asserted counterclaims against respondents. On May 24, 2023, the arbitrator
found in favor of C4 on one of its counterclaims, and awarded $317,335 in
damages and $346,477 in attorney fees and costs. On November 2, 2023, the
trial court confirmed the arbitration award and entered judgment against
respondents.
II.
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT
On November 13, 2024, C4 filed a motion to amend judgment,
seeking to add the Oganesians and OG Ventures as alter ego judgment
debtors. In its memorandum in support of the motion, C4 argued it met its
burden to show: (1) the alleged alter ego entities had control of the
underlying litigation; (2) there is a unity of interest and ownership among the
parties; and (3) that an inequitable result would follow if the motion was
denied. As to the first factor, C4 argued the Oganesians and OG Ventures
“were in charge of [respondents],” and Ryan Oganesian appeared on behalf of
respondents during the arbitration.
As to the second factor, C4 argued the Oganesians “purposefully
and strategically undercapitalized [respondents] in order to make [them]
judgment proof.” Specifically, OG Ventures never made “capital
contributions” to respondents, but instead the Oganesians and OG Ventures
“‘loaned’” respondents in excess of $800,000 from 2017 through 2022. C4 also
claimed that respondents failed to follow corporate formalities. Specifically,
“Spark has no operating agreement or corporate minutes.” (Italics and
boldface omitted.) “RD has no corporate minutes.” “RD has an unsigned
Shareholder’s Agreement,” and no stock certificate reflecting its ownership by
OG Ventures, LLC. Respondents also failed to timely file tax returns for
years 2017 through 2019, and instead, they filed their tax returns for those
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years after May 2021. C4 also argued the Oganesians or OG Venture
personally having been paying respondents’ debts since respondents have no
assets. Finally, the shared ownership and shared business location supported
application of the alter ego doctrine.
As to the third factor, C4 argued it would be inequitable to deny
the motion because if the motion is not granted, “C4 will never be able to
collect the Judgment.”
III.
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT
Respondents opposed the motion, arguing C4 failed to show the
alter ego doctrine should be applied in this case. As to the first factor for
application of the alter ego doctrine (control and representation), respondents
argued the Oganesians and OG Ventures were not virtually represented in
the underlying litigation because no claims were made against them and
Ryan Oganesian only appeared in his capacity as an officer for respondents,
not in his individual capacity. As to the second factor (unity of interest and
ownership), respondents argued that they were adequately capitalized and
the loans are, as a matter of law, the equivalent of additional capitalization.
Respondents also argued they maintained corporate formalities such as filing
and maintaining incorporation and organization documents. They contended
they were not required to keep minutes because they never held any
proceedings, and that the unsigned Shareholder’s Agreement was prepared in
the event RD became successful and outsider investors became additional
shareholders, which did not occur. As to the third and final factor
(inequitable result), respondents argued the failure to satisfy a judgment is
insufficient, standing alone, to show an inequitable result. Additionally,
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respondents argued C4 failed to show bad faith, such as evidence the
respondents’ assets were diverted to avoid paying creditors.
In a supporting declaration, Ryan Oganesian stated: “When
Respondents were formed, my brother and I, through OG Ventures, provided
initial start-up capital to Respondents of at least $253,175.31, the amount of
which was recorded in Respondents’ accounting statement and attached to
C4’s Compendium of Exhibits, Exhibit 30. OG Ventures also contributed
$10,000 in initial start-up capital to Respondents. In addition to these
amounts, we infused cash into Respondents, through OG Ventures, at
formation (labelled as loans) totaling $363,642. See C4’s Compendium of
Exhibits[,] Exhibit 30. After formation, we infused additional cash, through
OG Ventures, into Respondents as necessary to meet their obligations during
operations, which began in 2019.” He further stated: “Although some cash
infusions after formation were labelled as loans, the loans were not secured
or documented, and there has been no repayment of those loans. The only
entities and individuals that infused cash into Respondents were the owners,
through OG Ventures. . . . Moreover, OG Ventures, myself, and my brother
never extracted any funds from [respondents], either before or after the
judgment.”
IV.
REPLY TO OPPOSITION
In response, C4 argued it established all three factors. As to the
first factor, the Oganesians and OG Ventures are in complete control and
were virtually represented in the underlying litigation because OG Ventures
paid all of respondents’ legal fees and the Oganesians are the only managers.
As to the second factor, C4 disputed Ryan Oganesian’s claim that OG
Ventures made capital contributions, arguing respondents’ bank accounts do
5
not reflect any capital contributions and their tax returns and financial
statement do not reflect “capital contributions from OG Ventures, LLC in
excess of a million dollars.” Additionally, it is undisputed that respondents
failed to timely file tax returns for years 2017 through 2019, and that the
Oganesians and OG Ventures are currently paying all of respondent’s debts
and obligations, including rent. As to the third factor, C4 argued that
respondents’ formation showed they were established to be judgment proof
and to be operated as “mere shell[s].”
V.
RULING ON MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT
On February 18, 2025, the trial court denied C4’s motion to
amend the judgment. It concluded C4 “failed to demonstrate unity of interest
and ownership and an inequitable result.” As to unity of interest and
ownership, the court found “only two factors (identical ownership and
possible use of the same offices) could support application of the alter ego
doctrine. There is no evidence here of commingling of funds and assets,
treatment by an individual of the assets of the corporation as his own, or the
use of the entity as a mere shell. The evidence is also insufficient to show
undercapitalization and lack of corporate formalities.” Specifically, as to
undercapitalization, the court noted C4 failed to refute Ryan Oganesian’s
declaration that OG Ventures provided as least $253,175 in capital
contribution as evidenced by Exhibit 30 and it failed to show the loans should
not count as capital contributions. As to inequity, the court determined C4
failed to present evidence to show the Oganesians purposefully and
intentionally grossly undercapitalized respondents in order to make them, at
all times, judgment proof.
C4 timely appealed.
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DISCUSSION
I.
AMENDING JUDGMENT TO ADD ALTER EGO
“The authority of a court to amend a judgment to add a nonparty
alter ego as a judgment debtor has long been recognized. [Citation.] ‘The
ability under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 187 to amend a judgment to
add a defendant, thereby imposing liability on the new defendant without
trial, requires both (1) that the new party be the alter ego of the old party and
(2) that the new party had controlled the litigation, thereby having had the
opportunity to litigate, in order to satisfy due process concerns.’” (Toho-Towa
Co., Ltd. v. Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1096,
1106.)
“Alter ego is essentially a theory of vicarious liability under
which the owners of a corporation may be held liable for harm for which the
corporation is responsible where, because of the corporation’s utilization of
the corporate form, the party harmed will not be adequately compensated for
its damages.” (Doney v. TRW, Inc. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 245, 249.) Stated
differently, the two general requirements for an alter ego finding are: “‘(1)
that there be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist and (2)
that, if the acts are treated as those of the corporation alone, an inequitable
result will follow.’” (Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290,
300 (Mesler).)
“The factors which may show the ‘unity of interest’ issue vary
according to each case and are fact specific. [Citation.] Among the facts which
can be considered are financial issues (e.g., was the corporation adequately
capitalized?); corporate formality questions (e.g., was stock issued, are
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minutes kept and officers and directors elected, are corporate records
segregated?); ownership issues (e.g., what is the stock ownership picture?);
commingling issues (e.g., are corporate assets commingled, does the parent
company merely use the corporate shell of the subsidiary to obtain goods and
services for the parent company?); etc.” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co.
(1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1285, fn. 13, citing Associated Vendors, Inc. v.
Oakland Meat Co. (1962) 210 Cal. App. 2d 825.)
As to the requirement for an inequitable result, “[t]he essence of
the alter ego doctrine is that justice be done. ‘What the formula comes down
to, once shorn of verbiage about control, instrumentality, agency, and
corporate entity, is that liability is imposed to reach an equitable result.’
[Citation.] Thus the corporate form will be disregarded only in narrowly
defined circumstances and only when the ends of justice so require.” (Mesler,
supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 301; see Las Palmas Associates v. Las Palmas Center
Associates (1992) 235 Cal.App.3d 1220, 1249 (Las Palmas) [“Because society
recognizes the benefits of allowing persons and organizations to limit their
business risks through incorporation, sound public policy dictates that
imposition of alter ego liability be approached with caution”].) “The alter ego
doctrine does not guard every unsatisfied creditor of a corporation but instead
affords protection where some conduct amounting to bad faith makes it
inequitable for the corporate owner to hide behind the corporate form.
Difficulty in enforcing a judgment or collecting a debt does not satisfy this
standard.” (Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th
523, 539 (Sonora Diamond).)
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II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Generally, “[t]he decision to grant an amendment lies in the
sound discretion of the trial court.” (Relentless Air Racing, LLC v. Airborne
Turbine Ltd. Partnership (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 811, 815.) “Whether the
evidence has established that the corporate veil should be ignored is
primarily a question of fact which should not be disturbed when supported by
substantial evidence.” (Las Palmas. supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1248.)
However, in this case the trial court denied the motion to amend
based on C4’s “fail[ure] to demonstrate unity of interest and ownership and
an inequitable result.” “When the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly
concluded that the party with the burden of proof failed to carry that burden
and that party appeals, it is somewhat misleading to characterize the failure-
of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment. This is
because such a characterization is conceptually one that allows an attack on
(1) the evidence supporting the party who had no burden of proof, and (2) the
trier of fact's unassailable conclusion that the party with the burden did not
prove one or more elements of the case. [Citations.] Thus, where the issue on
appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court
becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a
matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the
appellant's evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of
such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination
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that it was insufficient to support a finding.’” (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz
1
(2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 279.)
III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT
C4 argues it is “undisputed” there is a unity of interest between
the Oganesians/OG Ventures and RD/Spark because: (1) “[i]t is undisputed
RD and Spark were never capitalized”; (2) the Oganesians and OG Ventures
paid RD’s debts in June 2020 and respondents’ current rents, and it can be
1
Citing People v. Manzilla (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 891, C4 argues
the standard of review in this case is de novo because the trial court made its
ruling denying the motion based on written declarations and oral arguments.
We disagree. Manzilla did not involve a motion to amend a judgment or the
alter ego doctrine. (See id. at p. 903 [applying independent standard of review
to a motion under Penal Code section 1473.7].) Moreover, as the California
Supreme Court has stated, “when reviewing a ruling under the substantial
evidence standard, ‘an appellate court should defer to the factual
determinations made by the trial court,’ regardless of ‘whether the trial
court’s ruling[s are based] on oral testimony or declarations.’” (People v. Vivar
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 528, fn. 13.)
The standard of review is one of several reasons why C4’s
reliance on Triyar Hospitality Management, LLC v. WSI (II)—HWP, LLC
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 636 (Triyar) is misplaced. First, Triyar expressly held
that “the standard of review of an order amending the judgment adding alter
ego parties is abuse of discretion.” (Id. at p.640.) Second, in that case, the
appellate court affirmed an order granting an order amending the judgment,
whereas in this case, we are reviewing an order denying a motion to amend
the judgment. (See id. at p. 638.) Third, the appellate court found substantial
“overwhelming evidence” supported the alter ego finding. (See id. at pp. 641–
642.) As discussed below, we conclude otherwise. Thus, Triyar is legally and
factually distinguishable.
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inferred they paid Spark’s rent in 2017 because Spark had no assets; (3)
respondents failed to follow corporate formalities by not timely filing tax
returns and having no loan documents, and RD has no stock certificate
reflecting its ownership by OG Ventures; and (4) respondents are owned by
members of the same family and Spark has the same business location as OG
Ventures.
C4, however, does not address the trial court’s finding crediting
Ryan Oganesian’s declaration that Exhibit 30 reflects a capital contribution
of $253,175 to respondents. Moreover, in the case of closely held companies
such as respondents, “there is no substantial difference between a capital
contribution and an interest-free loan.” (Sonora Diamond, supra, 83
Cal.App.4th at p. 548, fn. omitted.) In sum, there is no uncontradicted
2
evidence that would compel a finding of undercapitalization.
As for the remaining evidence, they do not compel a finding of
unity of interest. The trial court found shared ownership and possible shared
business location, but, as the court properly concluded, those facts are
insufficient by themselves to compel a finding of unity of interest. (See Leek v.
Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 415 [“An allegation that a person owns
all of the corporate stock and makes all of the management decisions is
insufficient to cause the court to disregard the corporate entity”].) The failure
to timely file tax returns does not compel a finding that there was a disregard
of corporate form. Rather, it could reflect lack of professionalism or
negligence by the managers. The same reason would apply to the failure to
maintain a stock certificate or loan documents. Finally, that the Oganesians
2
Even if reviewed for substantial evidence, Ryan Oganesian’s
testimony and Exhibit 30, which shows “Start-up Costs” of $253,173, would
support a factual finding that respondents were not undercapitalized.
11
and OG Ventures paid respondents’ debts in 2020 and later do not compel a
finding there was a unity of interest. (See Sonora Diamond, supra, 83
Cal.App.4th at p. 547 [noting that it is normal for an owner of an unprofitable
company to provide ongoing financial support because “[i]f such an owner
wishes to remain in business in the anticipation of ultimately turning a
profit, one option is to use its own assets to make up for the business's
inability to generate sufficient revenue to cover all its costs”].) In sum, C4
has not shown the evidence would compel a finding in its favor on the second
factor of the alter ego test as a matter of law.
As to the third factor of the alter ego test, C4 has not shown an
inequitable result would follow in the absence of an alter ego finding. The
inability to collect on the judgment is insufficient. “The alter ego doctrine
does not guard every unsatisfied creditor of a corporation but instead affords
protection where some conduct amounting to bad faith makes it inequitable
for the corporate owner to hide behind the corporate form. Difficulty in
enforcing a judgment or collecting a debt does not satisfy this standard.”
(Sonora Diamond, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 539.) Evidence that the
Oganesians purposefully and intentionally grossly undercapitalized
respondents in order to make them, at all times, judgment proof would show
inequity, but as discussed above, the evidence does not compel a finding of
undercapitalization as a matter of law. In sum, the trial court did not err in
denying C4’s motion to amend the judgment.
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover costs on appeal.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
SANCHEZ, J.
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