CourtListener 10831525•In re V.V. CA4/3
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Filed 4/1/26 In re V.V. CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re V.V., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL
SERVICES AGENCY,
G065839
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 24DP1278)
v.
OPINION
S.R.,
Defendant and Appellant;
C.V.,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Adrianne E. Marshack, Judge. Affirmed.
Jesse McGowan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant S.R.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Debbie Torrez and Aurelio Torre,
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent Orange County Social
Services Agency.
Jill Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Respondent C.V.
No appearance for the Minor.
* * *
Following a jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile
court found the child, V.V., came within its jurisdiction under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300,1 removed the child from S.R. (Mother), and
placed the child with C.V. (Father), who lives in Arizona. At a subsequent
hearing—for the six-month review and for Mother’s and Father’s requests to
change an order—Mother’s attorney requested a continuance. The court
denied the request for continuance, heard further arguments, and ultimately
terminated its jurisdiction over the child and issued exit orders. Among other
things, the court ordered physical custody to Father and joint legal custody to
Mother and Father, and it granted Mother certain visitation in Arizona. On
appeal, Mother argues the custody orders must be reversed because the court
abused its discretion in denying the request for continuance. We conclude the
1
All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the requested continuance, and
even if it erred, the error was harmless. Thus, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) reported the
family came to its attention in October 2024 after V.V., who was then six
years old, disclosed to his maternal grandmother that Mother had beat him
up and he was observed to have bruises. The maternal grandmother
contacted the police, who transported V.V. to the emergency room. At the
time, Father did not reside with V.V.; he resided in Arizona with his wife and
other children. After V.V. was taken into protective custody, he was placed
with a maternal aunt.
In October 2024, SSA filed a petition asserting V.V. came within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivisions (a),
(b)(1), (g), and (i). Among other things, the petition alleged Mother physically
abused V.V. and, on or around October 13, 2024, Mother struck the child
“repeatedly on his body with an open hand,” “grabbed the child by the neck
and strangled the child, causing the child not to be able to breathe and to
possibly lose consciousness,” and “bit the child.” The petition further alleged
“the child had extensive bruising to his face and body” on October 14, 2024,
and Mother had beaten the child on prior occasions but this was the worst
incident. The petition also alleged Father resides in Arizona and has not been
involved in V.V.’s life. It further alleged that, other than approximately two
months when V.V. stayed with Father, Father’s level of involvement in V.V.’s
life is unknown. The petition alleged Father “was aware and/or had reason to
know that the child . . . was at substantial risk of being physically and/or
emotionally harmed by [Mother], and he failed to protect the child.”
3
On November 1, 2024, the office of the public defender was
appointed to represent Mother. Mother subsequently retained new counsel,
and on November 21, 2024, attorney Matt Koohanim appeared on her behalf.
Thereafter, the record reflects Koohanim consistently appeared on behalf of
Mother in the juvenile court until the hearing on August 4, 2025, which is
discussed further below.
The jurisdiction and disposition hearing occurred over several
days in December 2024 and early 2025. Father and a social worker testified;
Mother did not. The juvenile court admitted into evidence SSA’s reports. The
court found the allegations of the petition, as amended by interlineation,2 to
be true by a preponderance of the evidence to bring the child within its
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (i). The court also
declared V.V. to be a dependent of the court under section 360, subdivision
(d). Additionally, the court found section 361, subdivision (c)(1), applied and
removed V.V. from Mother’s custody. It found vesting custody with Father
would be in the child’s best interest. The court ordered V.V. to be placed with
Father. It also ordered Father to bring the child from Arizona to California to
visit Mother once a month. The court scheduled a six-month review hearing
for August 4, 2025.
In June 2025, Mother and Father each sought to change the
court’s order. Father sought to have the case closed or, alternatively, to
change Mother’s visits to phone or video.3 Mother requested Father be
2
The juvenile court struck the allegations under section 300,
subdivision (g).
3
Father also filed an ex parte application asking that he not be
required to travel with V.V. to California for the visit in June.
4
ordered to bring V.V. to California for additional visitation and for her visits
4
to be liberalized to unmonitored with a step up plan for overnight visitation.
At a July 10, 2025 hearing regarding Mother’s and Father’s requests, the
juvenile court found a prima facie showing had been made and scheduled an
evidentiary hearing for August 4, 2025, which was when the six-month
review hearing was scheduled.
On August 1, 2025, Koohanim filed a request to appear remotely.
Mother states Judge McCartney “issued a written order directing [M]other’s
5
counsel to appear in person.”
In its status review report for the August 4, 2025 hearing, SSA
recommended terminating the dependency with exit orders. Among other
additional information and updates, SSA noted V.V. has continued to reside
with Father and was observed to have a good relationship with Father, the
stepmother, and his half-siblings. SSA said Father “has demonstrated the
ability to meet the child’s needs on a consistent basis, and to keep him safe
from further harm.” SSA reported Mother had participated in all of the case
plan services and had been consistent with her visits. SSA also stated,
although Mother “has actively participated in the case plan services,
[Mother’s] service providers have reported ‘minimal engagement and gained
insight’ as to the [SSA’s] involvement. Although [Mother] reported having
learned new parenting skills and reported understanding that
4
Mother also filed a supporting declaration and exhibits.
5
Father agrees Koohanim’s request was denied. Both Mother and
Father cite to a page of the clerk’s transcript that appears to be an order
requiring counsel to appear in person, but it does not appear to be signed. In
any event, whether the juvenile court entered an order denying Koohanim’s
request to appear remotely does not change the outcome of this appeal.
5
physical/corporal punishment is not appropriate, [Mother] will sometimes
still have ‘outbursts’ with the [social workers] and has reported, ‘I don’t even
6
know why this is all happening. Everyone always takes [Father’s] side.’” SSA
also reported on Mother’s drug test results, which included repeatedly testing
positive for THC.
On August 4, 2025, attorneys for SSA, Father, and the child
appeared at the hearing. Father was present via zoom, but Mother was not
7
present. An attorney named Gary Harrison, appearing remotely, stated he
8
was “specially appearing for Mr. Koohanim, attorney for [Mother].” Harrison
requested a continuance, stating he had food poisoning and was “just in my
car at the urgent care right now.”9 Harrison further stated, “[t]hat way we
can also have a full hearing on the 388 motion,” and if there was no
continuance, he “would ask to be heard as to the family law order.”10
6
SSA provided additional details from the services in which
Mother had participated. Among other things, SSA noted Mother’s therapist
had reported, in May 2025, Mother “‘has a very short fuse and she’s not
taking therapy very seriously,’” and although Mother is participating, “‘she is
not gaining insight.’”
7
Father’s counsel noted she had seen Mother in the hallway prior
to lunch. The court, however, noted Mother was not currently present, and
before the hearing began, SSA’s counsel checked the hallway to see if Mother
was there.
8
Mother notes “the record shows that Mr. Harrison was in the
same law firm as Mr. Koohanim.”
9
Father opposed the request to continue. SSA noted it submitted
to the court as to whether there was good cause to continue.
10
Koohanim also had signed, on August 4, 2025, a declaration in
support of a motion to disqualify Judge McCartney pursuant to Code of Civil
6
Harrison did not elaborate on what he would want to present at a “full
hearing” that he could not present if appearing remotely; nor did he assert
what, if any, witnesses he wanted to call. Harrison also did not provide any
explanation regarding when he first became sick or why Koohanim, Mother’s
counsel of record, was not appearing. When the juvenile court asked if
Mother was opposed to closing the case, Harrison responded, “[h]er concern is
more with the custody arrangements” and “[s]he wants 50/50 custody.” The
court denied the motion to continue. The court noted it “sympathize[d] with
you having food poisoning, but there are multiple people in your office,
though, that could handle this case.” The court further stated that, although
they were apparently alerted earlier in the morning that counsel had food
poisoning, counsel was only now going to the doctor and “[m]aybe this is
something that should have been handled more quickly.”
The juvenile court admitted into evidence SSA’s status review
report. Regarding Mother’s request for “50/50” custody, the court found it
would not be in the child’s best interest at this time. The court noted it was
very concerned about Mother’s lack of insight, which was noted in the report.
The court also heard further arguments from the attorneys. Harrison again
argued for “50/50” custody and, failing that, joint legal custody. Harrison
further argued: “As far as visitation, we would be requesting at least
overnights. Mother would have to go to Arizona over the weekend. Mother’s
visits have been going well. She’s been making some progress on her case
plan, and she has a strong bond with the child.”
Procedure section 170.6. At the August 4, 2025 hearing, Harrison asked to be
heard on the Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 motion if the juvenile
court denied the motion to continue, but Judge Marshack noted she was a
different judge.
7
The court ultimately ordered the child dependency proceedings
terminated and awarded physical custody to Father and joint legal custody to
Mother and Father. It also granted Mother visitation of eight hours a day on
a Saturday and Sunday once a month to occur in Arizona, with the specific
weekend to be arranged between the parties, and three telephone calls per
week.
DISCUSSION
“When terminating jurisdiction over a dependent child, section
362.4 authorizes the juvenile court to issue ‘an order determining the custody
of, or visitation with, the child.’” (In re Reyna R. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 486,
492.) “In making a custody or visitation order under section 362.4 (commonly
referred to as an ‘exit order’), the court’s ‘“focus and primary consideration
must always be the best interests of the child.”’” (Ibid.) On appeal, Mother
does not assert the juvenile court erred in terminating jurisdiction; nor does
she argue the court abused its discretion in setting the exit orders if it
correctly denied the continuance.11 Instead, Mother argues the juvenile court
abused its discretion in denying the request for continuance made at the
August 4, 2025 hearing, contending she would have achieved a better result
had the court granted the continuance.12 We conclude the juvenile court did
11
The juvenile court referred to proceeding under section 364 for
terminating its jurisdiction. Neither Mother nor Father has argued the
juvenile court applied an incorrect statutory provision to terminate its
jurisdiction and issue exit orders.
12
On appeal, SSA states, “[a]s SSA did not oppose the
continuance request now at issue, Mother’s claims of prejudice primarily
involve details as to the time and manner of visits . . . , and the case is no
longer under dependency jurisdiction, SSA will not oppose Mother’s current
appeal.”
8
not abuse its discretion in denying the request for continuance, and even if it
should have granted a continuance, the error was harmless.
“Continuances are discouraged in dependency cases.” (In re
Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 604.) Under section 352, subdivision
(a), “[u]pon request of counsel for the parent, . . . the court may continue any
hearing under this chapter beyond the time limit within which the hearing is
otherwise required to be held, provided that a continuance shall not be
granted that is contrary to the interest of the minor. In considering the
minor’s interests, the court shall give substantial weight to a minor’s need for
prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children
with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary
placements.” (Id., subd. (a)(1).) Additionally, “[c]ontinuances shall be granted
only upon a showing of good cause and only for that period of time shown to
be necessary by the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion for the
continuance.” (Id., subd. (a)(2).) “We review the denial of a continuance for
abuse of discretion.” (In re Giovanni F., at p. 605.)
Here, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the continuance.13 Other than asserting he had food poisoning and
was in his car at an urgent care facility, Harrison provided no further details
regarding his illness, such as when he first became ill, why he did not seek a
continuance earlier, or the severity of his illness. Harrison also noted a
continuance would allow “a full hearing on the 388 motion,” but again,
provided no further explanation of what he wanted to present to the court
13
In her opening brief on appeal, Mother asserts no party
objected in the juvenile court to the requested continuance. In her reply brief,
Mother concedes that assertion is incorrect; Father’s counsel opposed a
continuance.
9
that he could not then present. Notably, Mother did not attend the hearing,
and Harrison did not provide any explanation for Mother’s absence or argue
he needed a continuance to present her testimony (or the testimony of any
other witness). Moreover, Harrison provided no explanation for why
Koohanim—who had consistently appeared at prior hearings for Mother, had
asked to appear remotely at the hearing (which, according to Mother and
Father, had been denied), and had filed a declaration in this case pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 the same day as the hearing—was not
14
present for the hearing. On these facts, we cannot find the court abused its
discretion by denying the request for a continuance.
Mother argues this case is analogous to In re D.Y. (2018) 26
Cal.App.5th 1044 (D.Y.), and “a continuance was necessary to protect
[M]other’s right to a fair hearing.” In D.Y., the court placed the child under
the legal guardianship of his grandmother when he was an infant, and it
retained jurisdiction over the child for the next 16 years while conducting a
review hearing every six months. (Id. at p. 1047.) At one of the hearings, the
juvenile court terminated jurisdiction, despite a request by the child’s counsel
for a continuance. (Id. at pp. 1047–1048.) The appellate court concluded the
juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the continuance request. (Id.
at pp. 1056–1057.) The appellate court noted there was good cause for a
14
Mother faults the juvenile court for noting another attorney in
Harrison’s office could have handled the case. According to Mother, she
“needed an attorney who knew her case and could handle the evidentiary
hearing,” and “[a]ssigning the case at the last second to an attorney
unfamiliar with the facts would be inconsistent with the right to counsel at
the detention hearing and ‘at all subsequent proceedings before the juvenile
court.’” Mother’s argument rings hollow, given that Harrison was specially
appearing for the first time at the hearing and he offered no explanation why
Koohanim was not present.
10
continuance because “the status report before the court was missing
important information the social worker had indicated would be
forthcoming.” (Id. at p. 1056.) The appellate court further explained, “[t]he
second and more compelling reason the court abused its discretion by denying
the request for a continuance is the lack of notice to D.Y. and grandmother
that dependency jurisdiction might be terminated at the hearing.” (Ibid.) The
appellate court stated, “[i]n the context of this long-running case, in which
maintenance of the status quo had been the norm for 16 years and remained
the recommendation of DCFS, it was an abuse of discretion for the juvenile
court to abruptly terminate jurisdiction without alerting all of the interested
parties to that possibility.” (Id. at p. 1057.)
D.Y. is not analogous to this case, and Mother has not shown that
there was a violation of her right to a fair evidentiary hearing. Unlike D.Y.,
there is no dispute that Mother had notice of the hearing and that the
juvenile court might terminate jurisdiction and issue exit orders. Indeed,
SSA’s report in advance of the hearing recommended the court terminate
jurisdiction with exit orders. Moreover, as discussed, Harrison appeared and
argued remotely at the hearing. Although Mother asserts she had a right to
present evidence at the hearing and claims her counsel “indicated an interest
in presenting additional evidence,” Harrison did not assert there was any
specific witness testimony or other evidence that he wanted to present but
was unable to do so. Mother apparently was in the courthouse earlier in the
day but did not attend the hearing. Mother offered no explanation for her
absence from the hearing in the juvenile court.15
15
Although Mother’s opening brief stated “the reason she missed
the afternoon calendar is unknown,” her reply brief asserts “the more
reasonable conclusion is that [M]other finally left the courthouse after
11
Mother also relies on In re Dolly A. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 195
(Dolly A.), but that case also is inapposite. In Dolly A., criminal charges were
brought against the father for lewd and lascivious conduct with his daughter,
and child welfare proceedings also were instituted. (Id. at p. 198.) The father
requested a continuance pending completion of his criminal trial, but the
juvenile court denied the continuance, found the petition as amended to be
true at the jurisdiction hearing, and placed the child in the mother’s custody
at the disposition hearing. (Ibid.) The appellate court noted the child was
living with her mother at the time the father’s request for continuance was
denied, the juvenile court had “pointed to nothing which made a delay
contrary to [the child’s] interest,” and “[a]bsent a finding of contrary interest,
the court’s decision to grant or deny the continuance was discretionary.” (Id.
at pp. 199–200.) The appellate court explained, “[i]n this instance, where
denial of a continuance forced defendant to elect between giving up his right
not to be deposed as a criminal defendant and his right to testify on his own
behalf in the proceeding to deprive him of custody of his daughter, we find it
was an abuse of discretion to deny the continuance. The risk of possible
injury to [the child’s] interests was relatively slight, whereas the
infringement upon defendant’s rights was a clear and serious danger.” (Id. at
p. 201.)16
learning that her retained counsel would not be coming, and would instead be
asking for a continuance based on his illness.” Harrison, however, did not
provide this explanation to the juvenile court, and again, he did not state at
the hearing that he wanted Mother to testify.
16
Section 352, subdivision (a)(2) now provides, “neither a pending
criminal prosecution nor family law matter shall be considered in and of itself
as good cause” for a continuance. (Ibid.)
12
Here, Harrison’s reason for seeking a continuance bears no
similarity to the reason given in Dolly A. Mother has not argued the juvenile
court’s denial of a continuance threatened the constitutional rights of a
criminal defendant. Instead, Harrison asked for a continuance during the
hearing because he stated he was ill and was in his car at an urgent care
17
facility.
Mother asserts “[t]he denial of the continuance request was also
counter to the juvenile court’s previous order directing [M]other’s counsel to
appear in person.” According to Mother, “[t]his order was intended to ensure
that [M]other could confer with counsel, assist in planning a trial strategy,
and testify if she chose to,” but “none of these intended benefits could accrue”
given her counsel’s food poisoning. Given Mother’s failure to appear at the
hearing, this argument is unconvincing. Moreover, Koohanim, not Harrison,
filed the request to appear remotely for the hearing. In any event, while there
may be benefits in some situations to having both counsel and the client in
person at a hearing, Mother does not advance developed argument with
applicable case authority that both of them needed to attend in person for
17
Mother asserts Dolly A. is similar because V.V. “had already
settled into a stable placement with another parent, so the countervailing
interests in section 352—requiring the juvenile court to give substantial
weight to the child’s need for stability and to avoid prolonged temporary
placements—did not apply.” Section 352, subdivision (a)(1), provides “that a
continuance shall not be granted that is contrary to the interest of the
minor.” (Ibid.) But even if a continuance is not contrary to the interest of the
minor, that does not obviate the need for a showing of good cause or prohibit
the juvenile court from exercising its discretion. Dolly A. does not hold
otherwise. (See Dolly A., supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at p. 200 [“Absent a finding of
contrary interest, the court’s decision to grant or deny the continuance was
discretionary”].)
13
Mother to receive a fair hearing. Again, Mother did not attend the hearing,
nor did Harrison assert he wanted Mother to testify.
Additionally, even if the juvenile court abused its discretion by
not granting a continuance, we would conclude the error was harmless.
Mother agrees harmless error review applies here, but she contends the
purported error in denying the continuance was prejudicial because “[w]ith
an evidentiary hearing at which [M]other’s counsel could appear in person,
present evidence, and cross-examine witnesses, it is reasonably probable that
[M]other would have secured more favorable final exit orders.” (See In re
Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 59–60 [noting “[t]he California Constitution
prohibits a court from setting aside a judgment unless the error has resulted
in a ‘miscarriage of justice’” and reversal is permitted “only if the reviewing
court finds it reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable
to the appealing party but for the error”].) Although Harrison argued for
“50/50” custody at the hearing, Mother acknowledges on appeal that “[t]he
juvenile court was correct in stating that [M]other’s request for ‘50/50’
custody was unrealistic given that [F]ather lived in a different state.”
Instead, Mother argues “less ambitious goals were achievable.” Specifically,
Mother argues she “could have secured an order directing [F]ather to
continue transporting [V.V.] to California once a month to see her,” “could
have secured an order allowing her overnight visitation,” and “could have
secured an order granting her extended visitation during holidays or school
breaks.” (Boldface omitted)
Mother’s arguments are unpersuasive. Given the circumstances
here, we conclude it was not reasonably probable Mother would have
obtained more favorable exit orders had a continuance been granted. At the
hearing, the juvenile court explained it was very concerned about Mother’s
14
lack of insight, as articulated in the report, and “most significantly, her
therapist says that she’s not gaining insight, and is kind of going through the
motions in therapy.” The juvenile court also noted the logistical challenges
posed by the fact the parents lived in different states and found it was better
for Mother’s visitation to be in Arizona so V.V. could participate in
extracurricular activities that may occur on the weekends. The court also
explained it did not believe that overnight visits with Mother were in the
child’s best interests at the time. Mother speculates about what arguments
and evidence might have been presented at a continued hearing, but
Harrison was able to present arguments at the hearing on her behalf.
Moreover, Harrison did not state at the hearing that there was any specific
witness testimony or other evidence that he wished to present but could not.
Mother’s speculation about what might have been presented at a later
hearing does not establish a reasonable probability of more favorable exit
18
orders under the circumstances here.
18
For example, in support of her argument that she could have
obtained overnight visitation, Mother asserts she “could have testified about
her marijuana use and assured the juvenile court that she did not become
intoxicated.” Notably, Mother does not state she actually would have testified
to that information. In any event, even if Mother would have appeared at a
continued hearing and testified about the theoretical information she asserts
in her appellate brief, there is no reasonable probability more favorable exit
orders for Mother would have been obtained under the circumstances here.
15
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
GOODING, J.
WE CONCUR:
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
DELANEY, J.
16
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